'TIMOR Leste is currently calm and relatively stable compared to the 2006-2007 crisis period, but is still widely seen as fragile,' states a recent report by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), a Canadian think-tank. But the balance scales will soon be tested.

The country's new-found aura of calm was shown with village council elections, which passed without incident in October last year. Its fragility will be challenged in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary polls due in 2012, where considerably more power is at stake. And the security services may well prove pivotal.

A year after Timor Leste's formal independence in May 2002, the country seemed to have largely shrugged off its turbulent past. The internal security situation had cooled considerably since the violent unrest of 1999, though tensions had not fully dissipated. But this facade of nascent stability soon crumbled.

The crisis that unfolded from 2006 revealed deep divisions within the armed forces, commonly known as the F-FDTL, along with bitter institutional rivalry between them and the police (or PNTL). This volatile mix was further seasoned by politicisation of the National Intelligence Service.

The result was widespread rioting, violent confrontations between members of the F-FDTL and PNTL, and the unauthorised arming of civilian gangs by some government ministers.

The F-FDTL emerged from these events in a shambles. Desertions and dismissals saw its strength of about 1,400 depleted by more than half and an ambitious force development plan covering the period 2005 to 2020 was threatened.

Timor Leste's Force 2020 plan is centred on redressing locally perceived flaws in the original military structure, which is seen as having been imposed by the United Nations. It envisages a doubling of armed forces strength to 3,000, a substantially stronger naval element and the establishing of an air component.

This vision has been criticised as potentially untenable due to sustainability and cost issues. But the force development plan - and a rebuilding of the F-FDTL - has nevertheless seen some progress.

The renewal of armed forces ranks was launched in May last year with the induction of 579 new recruits, and this June saw delivery of two Type 62-class patrol boats bought from China to replace two old and expensive-to-operate Albatroz-class patrol boats donated by Portugal. Then, last month, construction started on a new integrated Defence Ministry/F-FDTL headquarters whose US$9 million (S$12 million) cost is being borne by Beijing.

Progress in crafting a national security architecture is also evident. A first National Security Policy is nearing finalisation and in March, Parliament approved a key package of legislation - the National Security Law, National Defence Law and National Internal Security Law. Three years ago, a law governing the country's intelligence system was enacted.

However, the fears have yet to be fully eased. 'There are concerns over legislation involving the police-army relationship and over implementation, as legislation has often been passed and then bypassed,' an international observer commented. 'The impunity in the country, particularly in the security sector, is an example.'

Illustrating this last point, a UN probe into the 2006 crisis recommended, to no avail, the investigation and potential criminal prosecution of several senior figures - the then interior minister, the then defence minister and the top five F-FDTL commanders. Security personnel implicated in shootings have meanwhile received presidential pardon.

The CIGI report expresses worry over the potential for renewed rivalry between the F-FDTL and PNTL and over police militarisation - the latter particularly centred on newly formed Special Police Units accused of abuses, illegal detentions and political targeting. This and the profusion of arms among regular police personnel detract from the community approach to policing, and encourage military involvement in internal security.

'The UN's police training programme has basically been ineffective,' the international observer said. 'But the F-FDTL should be as far removed from internal security as possible.'

The CIGI report is cautionary more than pessimistic, reflecting what seems a wider perception.

'During the 2006 crisis and the 2007 national elections, certain political actors manipulated contentious issues - including the dismissal of F-FDTL soldiers, east-west regional divisions and F-FDTL/PNTL tensions - for political gain that often fuelled violence. Many of these underlying issues have not yet been fully addressed,' it states.

'The lack of accountability, particularly for the 2006 crisis, means that in effect there is now less deterrence against political violence from the justice system than previously - particularly in the security services. The east-west divide remains dormant but recent disputes over police promotions have demonstrated that the issue can easily resurface... Against this backdrop, concerns remain over the political neutrality and professionalism of individuals or sections of the PNTL and F-FDTL in the event of heightened political tensions during the electoral process.'

Let that be a warning, then.