As we approach the Los Cabos summit, it is easy to be downbeat about the state of the global economy. The G20 goals of a full recovery from the Great Recession and putting the global economy on a sustainable growth path, as outlined in the Cannes Action Plan for Growth and Jobs, are not only far from realization, but they have also suffered serious setbacks due to failures of policy and governance.

In considering the evolving role of the G20, it is worth reflecting upon the factors that shaped the group’s original mandate. As the first decade of the new century progressed, it became increasingly clear that the international balance of power had shifted, but the institutional framework, which sought to manage the global economy, had not adapted to reflect this new reality. The financial crisis of 2008 forced the leading economic powers (notably the US, where the crisis originated) to confront the need to integrate the emerging economies more effectively into international economic decision making.

In 2008-2009, when confronted by the gravest global economic crisis in 80 years, G20 governments and their central banks responded promptly and appropriately by providing ample liquidity to financial markets, avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal policies and resisting protectionist trade measures that would invite retaliation.

It may be a new year, but Europe faces the same malaise that plagued it in 2011. And, with the application of the same policy prescriptions, the prognosis, sadly, is unchanged.

As the world’s political and business leaders head home from the World Economic Forum in Davos, it is right asking which of the world’s toughest challenges were identified, let alone solved, on the “Magic Mountain.” Timely, then, that today the UN launches the report of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability.

The Greek tragedy of sovereign debt, the overlay of a potential for regional recession, social turmoil, perceptions of structural corruption, and political theatrics and brinkmanship is all too familiar. This is reminiscent of Argentina in 2002, which remains the largest sovereign debt default in economic history. This comparison should give the Greeks some hope — after all, Argentine 10-year government bonds today are comparable to other emerging market economies and investors flocked back to Argentina. What did Argentina do and what can Greece learn from its experience?

At 10 years’ remove from the sturm und drang in American policy circles over China’s accession to the WTO, the entire episode rests more quietly. So much has happened in China, in the world economy and in US-China economic and political relations since 2001. The burning questions that surrounded discussions in the run-up to China’s accession to the WTO seem, to many observers, muted and diminished. The multi-year “phase-in” process accompanying some of China’s most far-reaching adjustments has expired.

The Cannes G20 Summit was almost blown off course by the sovereign debt crisis, which euro zone members tried, but failed, to stem in the days preceding the summit. In spite of the economic storm, the G20 managed, on a number of important files, to reaffirm and clarify directions taken and commitments made at earlier summits. Arguably, however, the summit also represents a step back from some other aspects of the G20 economic cooperation agenda, which, while more daring and difficult, could have fostered a more dynamic response to the unfolding crisis.

The heady days of the London and Pittsburgh summits of 2009 are gone. The spectre of the advanced world entering a “lost decade” is a real prospect. Governments are withdrawing stimulus as quickly as it was introduced. Mismanagement of the euro zone has largely eroded confidence to deal with the crisis that threatens to tear apart the single currency area. We are no nearer to a resolution of the euro crisis.