Short-selling Bans and Institutional Investors' Herding Behaviour: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis
The authors examine bans on selected financial stocks in six countries during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, which provided a setting to analyze the impact of short-sale restrictions. In particular, the authors focussed on short-sale constraints’ effect on institutional investors’ trading behaviour and the possibility of generating herding behaviour. They conclude that the empirical evidence shows that short-selling restrictions exhibit either no influence on herding formation or induce adverse herding.
This paper, based on a series of reports and discussions on the post-2015 development agenda that took place over the past two-and-a-half years, reviews the history of the MDGs, describes the current context, lists the premises and starting points and provides a brief summary of the evolution of the project’s view. The paper concludes with some observations on each of the 10 recommended goals.
In the space of a decade, how and why has migration shifted from being an issue that was of marginal interest on the international development agenda to one that is increasingly at its centre?
During the recent global financial crisis, regulators, politicians and high-profile media coverage blamed short sellers for amplifying stock market downturns. Regulatory authorities in a number of countries imposed short-sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines.
While the concerted policy actions of the G20 countries in the autumn of 2008 prevented another Great Depression, for most advanced economies, the subsequent recovery has been disappointing. At the same time, the crisis and its extraordinary policy responses have left a number of legacies that pose significant adjustment challenges to the international community.
The failure of many observers to recognize the varied scale of the G20’s efforts — from macroeconomic rebalancing to ratification of the main anticorruption treaty — has made it harder for the G20 to gain credit for the valuable role it can play.
The current global financial and economic crisis resulted from the failure of major economies and global institutions to recognize and address, in a meaningful way, emerging fault lines in global financial markets and global institutions. The crisis brought to light long-standing weaknesses in the global system for economic and financial cooperation, providing opportunities for reform.
This paper argues that credibility and trust in any new international regulatory framework must first begin at home with a determination for fiscal and monetary policies to work in harmony. This includes cooperation, if not coordination, of regulatory and supervisory functions to ensure that macroprudential policies effectively complement domestic monetary policy and provide an additional tool to implement a sound macroeconomic framework that will soften the blow from the next financial crisis.
Sound economic policies, which are in short supply in most key nations of the world, are fundamental to national security and international leadership. Even if the United States — still the dominant world power — is able to fix its myriad economic problems, it will no longer be able to exert the influence it once could. The United States must work alongside others — and accept that others will sometimes work together without it — to deal with a wide range of persistent and emerging global problems and issues.
This paper explains why the resolution to the climate change problem is deadlocked and presents a putative global package of “Global Super Fund” expenditure ideas that will win widespread support from all major countries.