Pratap Mehta is president and chief executive of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.

The G8 Summit was followed very keenly. But this was less on account of the importance of the G8 itself. Rather it was because of a whole series of other events associated with the Summit (the G8+G5, The Major Economies Forum) and because of a keen interest in the positions of particular countries, especially the United States and China. There is by and large consensus that G8 itself is an anachronism that has outlived its usefulness. Some commentators put it even more strongly. The unwillingness of a number of European nations to give up their seats at the global high table has itself become an obstacle to global governance reform. The Indian Prime Minister's strong letter to the G8 called for the reform of the United Nations Security Council, and for global governance to adjust to new power shifts in world politics.  The Indian Prime Minister got high marks for reiterating this stand; and several G8 members were presented as being obstacles to change in global governance.

On other substantive issues, there was a sense that India protected its interests quite well. The commitment of all countries to fight protectionism and conclude the Doha round has been loudly applauded, though there is some uncertainty of what compromises this might entail on India's part.  But there is a sense that India does not want to be seen to play spoiler on trade issues, and so progress may be possible after all.

There is a perception that on climate change issues, both the G8 and the associated meeting did not make any major breakthroughs.  The fact that there are still significant differences between Americans and Europeans on emissions targets lends credence to the view of developing countries that the developed world is still not serious about discharging its responsibilities in cutting emissions.  There is a sense that most of the key issues - baselines to be used for emission cuts, funding, technology transfer regimes -still remain deadlocked. Against this backdrop, developing countries are right to dig in their heels and not agree to any binding targets. The two thoughts in the final communiqué that have drawn most attention  on climate change issues are the request to G20 finance ministers to come up with concrete suggestions on financing before the next G20 summit, and the possibilities of global cooperation on energy.  But there is no confidence yet that the Summits have produced a credible road map on climate change.

Interestingly, opinion was somewhat divided on India's clubbing itself with China on this issue. This is so for two reasons: First, China's per capita emissions are considerably higher than India's. There is a line of argument that is not in India's interests for Indian and China to be clubbed together, either by the developed world or through a form of self identification. Second, domestically there is beginning to be some recognition that India does need to think about the nature of its own development path, and following China may not be desirable. While there is overwhelming support that India not take on binding targets, the Summit at least occasioned some discussion on whether India's international position should crowd out domestic discussion of India's development path.

President Obama's views on nuclear proliferation, the NPT review and the status of the CTBT were matters of considerable interest to India. But on these matters, there is by and large a wait-and- watch attitude in India.

As always there was a great deal of interest in China's position. President Hu Jintao's early departure dominated news reporting of the Summit.  This was for two reasons. First, the intrinsic importance of the story as an indicator of how serious the unrest in Xinjiang might be . But there is also a Summitry dimension to it. Do Summits, by their very existence, also act as an informal peer pressure group on domestic happenings? Certainly there was considerable press speculation on this. But the very fact that this issue is being discussed raises an interesting question about the relationship between Summits and domestic matters in particular countries.  In a slightly more farcical vein, it has to be said that Prime Minister Berlusconi made more news than the G8 Summit, adding to the general perception that the G8 was relatively inconsequential.

But there was also considerable interest in China's strong signals about moving away from the dollar as the default reserve currency.  There was some relief that countries seem to have committed themselves to not engaging in competitive devaluation. But China's position on "alternative" reserve currencies has aroused considerable interest. The signalling war between the US and China on American economic policy and its implications for both currency values, and the value of Chinese assets, is a matter of great global interest. To conclude: the G8 did not itself arouse much interest; the G-8+5+1 and Major Economies Form were seen as meetings of greater importance. There was a sense that no country seems to be in a position to exercise leadership to break significant deadlocks on issues like climate change. If there seems to have been progress on issue like trade, it is not because of leadership. It is simply because the interests of countries on that particular issue may be converging at the moment. Whether Summits bring this convergence, or the convergence is a precondition for a Summit to work remains an open question.

*This article is unedited.