Centre for International Governance Innovation

Digital Policy Hub

Digital Policy Hub – Working Paper

Global Tech Rivalry Changes Cooperation Opportunities for Middle Powers

Kristen Csenkey

Fall 2024 cohort

About the Hub

The Digital Policy Hub at CIGI is a collaborative space for emerging scholars and innovative thinkers from the social, natural and applied sciences. It provides opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students and post-doctoral and visiting fellows to share and develop research on the rapid evolution and governance of transformative technologies. The Hub is founded on transdisciplinary approaches that seek to increase understanding of the socio-economic and technological impacts of digitalization and improve the quality and relevance of related research. Core research areas include data, economy and society; artificial intelligence; outer space; digitalization, security and democracy; and the environment and natural resources.

The Digital Policy Hub working papers are the product of research related to the Hub's identified themes prepared by participants during their fellowship.

About CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is an independent, non-partisan think tank whose peer-reviewed research and trusted analysis influence policy makers to innovate. Our global network of multidisciplinary researchers and strategic partnerships provide policy solutions for the digital era with one goal: to improve people's lives everywhere. Headquartered in Waterloo, Canada, CIGI has received support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario and founder Jim Balsillie.

Partners

Thank you to Mitacs for its partnership and support of Digital Policy Hub fellows through the Accelerate program. We would also like to acknowledge the many universities, governments and private sector partners for their involvement allowing CIGI to offer this holistic research environment.

67 Erb Street West
Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2
www.cigionline.org

Key Points

- This working paper analyzes Canada's approach to quantum technologies through narrative practices.
- Canada promotes a "ties over tensions" narrative, framing quantum technologies as an opportunity for middle-power cooperation grounded in shared prosperity rather than competition.
- Relying on a qualitative analysis focused on publicly available documents (for example, statements and announcements), this study reveals that Canada aligns economic and national security goals through collaborative narratives with implications for future economic and defence partnerships.
- The study highlights how middle powers such as Canada use technology narratives to assert strategic agency, possibly moving away from binary great-power competition models. This working paper recommends operationalizing this approach through newly formed mechanisms, such as the proposed Group of Seven (G7) Joint Working Group on Quantum Technologies, to strengthen value-driven governance.

Introduction

Technology competition has become an important focus in policy at the national and international levels. Often in reference to disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI),[1] sixth-generation wireless technology[2] and quantum,[3] conversations about competition are increasingly framed as part of a global technology conflict. Generally, there are two ways to understand the impact of this framing: as an economic issue or as a national security issue.[4] A tension exists between these global technology competition discussions in the context of changing geopolitics. Mainly, there is increasingly a bridge between the narratives that blends both economic and security issues — effectively amalgamating private sector with public sector competition into a singular concept. This blending of narratives has implications for states because it effectively determines who should take the lead in defining the uses, developmental trajectory and outcomes of technologies, foreign policy decisions and domestic partnerships. There are many competing narratives and therefore it is relevant to ask: How are global technology competition narratives changing or challenging opportunities for cooperation?

To address this research question, this paper draws on the concept of narrative practices. Relying on the recent work of Ingvild Bode, Cecilia Ducci and Pak K. Lee (2025), this method recognizes that narratives are constructed and practised by

1 For example, see Drexel (2025).

2 For example, see Neuberger (2025).

3 For example, see Moscioni (2025); Shivakumar, Wessner and Schumacher (2025); Glaser and Howell (2024).

4 For example, see Geng (2024).

state actors and decision makers, representing a way of making sense of the world and achieving objectives. By emphasizing how quantum technologies fit into the broader landscape of global technology competition, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of what these narratives mean when viewed through different lenses, including economic and national security. This understanding is important because it has significant implications for international cooperation.

This paper is set up as follows. The first section presents and contextualizes the details of technology competition with an emphasis on the role of middle-power states. The second section outlines the methodology and the conceptual underpinning of narratives in international security. The results are presented in the third section, and the fourth section discusses how these narratives specifically apply to quantum technology governance and cooperation. The final section offers a recommendation based on the findings, focusing on creating inclusive, value-guided technology cooperation and partnerships implemented through the G7 Joint Working Group on Quantum Technologies proposed in the leaders' statement at the Kananaskis G7 Summit (G7 2025). This recommendation emphasizes the challenging position that states such as Canada may now face as they grapple with stimulating economic growth, defining new defence objectives and moving beyond this duality of goals toward democratic technology governance.

Stuck in the Middle? Quantum Technologies and Middle-Power States

Quantum technologies are currently in the global spotlight, with the United Nations declaring 2025 the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology. With similarities to the framing of AI, quantum is increasingly caught in a narrative of global technology rivalry between China and the United States, a situation that Brian Moscioni (2025) refers to as a "neck-and-neck race for technological supremacy." He suggests that this pursuit of supremacy is motivated by the "fear of inevitable suppression or even possible destruction of the other" between great powers (ibid.). Consequently, middle-power states may be caught in the middle of intensifying rivalries and power projection through technological superiority. Yet, as Tim Sweijs and Michael Mazarr (2023) argue, middle-power states increasingly play an important role in world politics. This is not because they are navigating their place adjacent to great powers and their rivalries, but rather because they are strategic actors in their own right.

As quantum technologies become part of spheres of influence whereby power is projected by shaping objectives and aligning with desired outcomes (Csenkey 2025), middle-power states have the potential to influence geopolitical dynamics (Moyer et al. 2018). For instance, the announcements in June 2025 from Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney regarding defence commitments and priorities for the Canadian G7 presidency (Prime Minister of Canada 2025c, 2025b), followed by the release of the "Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies" (G7 2025), collectively highlight the importance of narratives and the role of specific technologies, such as quantum, in defining partnerships toward economic and national security objectives.

As Jonathan D. Moyer, Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows and Hugo Van Manen (2018) contend, middle powers are increasingly recognized for wielding influence and power in the international system. Leveraging narratives can help these state actors project their interests and areas of concern as part of deliberate strategic decisions. Thus, it is of interest to practitioners and scholars of international security to explore how non-great-power states navigate a system that benefits great powers with vast resources and capacity, and to understand how global technology competition narratives are disregarded or leveraged by middle powers to fulfill economic and national security objectives. It is also important to narrow the focus to quantum technologies, as this is increasingly becoming a domain of geopolitical competition where states with domestic expertise could exert influence through issue-specific objectives with other middle powers.

On the Importance of Narratives

Narratives are important because they can shape perceptions of reality, including events, actors and relationships within society (White 1980; Shiller 2019; Bode, Ducci and Lee 2025). Notably, narrative practices can shape international governance issues by influencing action and be used to exert political power (ibid.). Narratives are performed and practised and can change over time (ibid.), and their practice — through a process of building, managing and maintaining performances and stories — can be applied to understanding foreign policy (Faizullaev and Cornut 2017). For instance, James B. Steinberg (2020) traces how the bilateral relationship between China and the United States was transformed through narratives of geopolitical competition during the presidency of Barack Obama. Daniel McCarthy (2015) argues that technology war narratives are linked to strengthening and sustaining US hegemony in the world. As such, narratives of competition can have an impact on how economic and national security issues are addressed within national and foreign policy.

Power and narratives do not exist independently, and this meaning-making can have tangible political effects (Homolar and Löfflmann 2021; Homolar and Casado 2025). For example, Alexandra Homolar and Georg Löfflmann (2021) argue that the use of a narrative (stories in narrative form) of humiliation, and victimhood from the threat of China (Homolar and Casado 2025), are frequently used by US President Donald J. Trump in his approach to foreign and trade policy, bilateral relations and election politics. The use of narratives, specifically those during the 2024 presidential elections and into President Trump's second term, have emphasized an ongoing race between China and the United States as a "geopolitical rival and technological competitor" (The White House 2025c), blaming past foreign policy decisions for the current context of American technological innovation toward a new vision of political strength and power through science and technology policy (The White House 2025b).

Increasingly, domestic political narratives in Canada and the United States that blend economic and national security objectives into science and technology policy — including foreign, trade and defence — are having tangible impacts around the world

through tariffs[5] and new military partnerships.[6] The identification of these narratives, an examination of their projected realities, and their practices can help clarify what global technology competition means for middle-power states and their collaborations, in spite of the great-power race and rivalry being touted as the only frame of practice in the international system.

Narrative Practices and Document Analysis

Narratives are typically situated and purposeful — they depict actors and events in ways that simplify complex issues, blame or silence certain people, and entertain or enrage a target audience (van Hulst et al. 2025). They are performed by a diverse set of state and non-state actors, including policy makers, academics, analysists, lobbyists and politicians, and can change over time (Faizullaev and Cornut 2017; Bode, Ducci and Lee 2025). These practices are observed in policy and strategies, statements and speeches, among other documents. For instance, Bode, Ducci and Lee (2025) identify and observe the narrative practices of the "tech war" between China and the United States performed by US actors (specifically, academics, analysts and policy makers). They link the tech war narrative practised over time in publicly available documents to a change in China-US policy, from one of political cooperation and economic interdependence to one that is adversarial, competition-focused and emphasizing insecurity, rivalry and war. The results of their analysis suggest that this dominant competition narrative and its practice by policy makers redefined and narrowed the available policy choices and silenced alternative options. Importantly, the authors demonstrate that the current great-power competition framing is incrementally created by narrative practices and perpetuated by US foreign policy audiences because it, among other reasons, appeals to their competitive ways of sense-making (ibid.).

Drawing on the work of Bode, Ducci and Lee (ibid.), this study focuses on identifying and defining the types of narrative practices portrayed in documents, statements, speeches and so on, to make sense of how defence partnerships and economic cooperation may be portrayed by Canada. Specifically, this paper focuses on identifying how the narratives of technology war/race/competition/rivalry are related to quantum technologies, building on the work by this author (Csenkey 2025), and the entanglement of these technologies into geopolitical competition narratives.[7] This analysis has broader implications for how, and with whom, new partnerships are formed by middle-power states.

This study analyzes publicly available government statements from a Canadian context since the beginning of the second-term US presidency (January 2025 to July 2025) and focuses on key words related to the global technology competition framing.[8] Attention to the Canadian context through qualitative document analysis is relevant for three reasons. First, as Canada grapples with its changing bilateral relationship with the

5 For example, The White House (2025a); www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/international-trade-finance-policy/canadas-response-us-tariffs.html.

6 See Brewster (2025).

7 See, for example, Howell (2024) and Moir (2019).

8 Keywords include "quantum" as related to technology. The identification of narrative practices was informed by the following keywords and concepts: "interdependence," "cooperation," "engagement" and "collaboration," versus "competition," "war," "rivalry," "adversary," "threat" and "great power."

United States in the wake of shifting trade and defence terms since the re-election of Trump, the narratives Canada chooses may provide insight into how a middle power and close partner navigates a changing dynamic with a great-power ally. Second, the narrative of a technology rivalry portrayed and performed by US actors may influence Canada's choices in responding to the United States' demands, tariffs, and both existing and emerging defence partnerships and projects. Third, the 2025 federal election was, arguably, a response to discontent with how Justin Trudeau's Liberal government handled the perceived economic threats posed by the United States following Trump's re-election (Kassam and Cecco 2025). The Mark Carney–led Liberal Party campaigned on a platform focused on protecting Canada from these perceived threats while addressing broader economic concerns.[9] While navigating this response domestically, Canada also serves as a valuable case study of how a middle power can pursue its own strategic goals amid its great-power neighbour's manoeuvres at both bilateral and international levels.

Narratives of Quantum Technology Competition

A total of 11 publicly available documents were identified as meeting this study's temporal and contextual parameters with specific mention of quantum relating to technology. These documents and the associated identified concepts are listed in Table 1 and include the government's key pronouncements on the topic of quantum technologies. Generally, the Carney government has been consistent in its approach to publicly available statements on quantum over the five months examined in this study. This consistency is interpreted here as reflecting Canada's position, suggesting a deliberate strategic decision rather than merely a preliminary approach.[10]

Many documents, including "Prime Minister Carney announces Canada's G7 priorities ahead of the Leaders' Summit," "Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces" and "Joint statement: Enduring Partnership, Ambitious Agenda," reference the challenges of navigating through geopolitical uncertainty, upheaval, tensions and a divided world. Most documents emphasize the concepts of partnership, collaboration and cooperation, with the exception of "Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces," in which alliances are highlighted in the context of building capacity and capability. Generally, this document is focused on enhancing domestic security, defence and sovereignty.

Apart from the G7-related documents[11] and the domestic defence announcement, many of the documents focus on partnerships and collaborations with like-minded allies, especially with other middle powers, including France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Europe more broadly.

To be sure, these middle powers are a part of the G7, and with Canada as president and host of the 2025 G7 meeting, it is expected that it would identify and commit to

9 See https://liberal.ca/plan.

10 Future research may focus on expanding the temporal period of this study for further comparison and analysis.

11 Specifically, "Prime Minister Carney announces Canada's G7 priorities ahead of the Leaders' Summit," "Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies," "Chair's Summary" and "Prime Minister Carney concludes 2025 G7 Leaders' Summit."

priority areas with other member states. However, the lack of joint statements and commitments made with the United States (also a member of the G7) is important to consider in the analysis of narrative practices related to global technology competition. This pivot from Canada's partnership-building and collaboration-seeking alignment with the United States may signal a departure from the dominant narratives of geopolitical technology rivalry, competition, races and wars. This diversification of international partnerships may also signal a shift in how Canada seeks to realign with other allies

Table 1: Documents Analyzed in This Study Organized by Publication Date

Title	Source	Concepts
"Prime Minister Carney meets with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Sir Keir Starmer"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025a), released March 17	Partnership, security, responsibility, alliance
"Prime Minister Carney announces Canada's G7 priorities ahead of the Leaders' Summit"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025b), released June 7	Cooperation, coordination, protection, security, partnership, coalition
"Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025c), released June 9	Security, sovereignty, alliance, building capacity and capability, defence
"Joint Statement by Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Starmer"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025d), released June 15	Friendship, shared values and security, partnership, collaboration, connection, cooperation, stability, safety, support
"Prime Minister Carney meets with Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025e), released June 15	Collaboration, partnership
"Prime Minister Carney meets with President of France Emmanuel Macron"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025f), released June 16	Cooperation, shared priorities, partnership
"Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies"	G7 (2025), released June 17	Security, collaboration, partnership, participation, interoperability, risks
"Chair's Summary"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025g), released June 17	Safety, security, partnership, cooperation, threats, stability, defence, sovereignty, collaboration, protection, shared priorities
"Prime Minister Carney concludes 2025 G7 Leaders' Summit"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025h), released June 17	Cooperation, collaboration, partnership, opportunities, deepening of alliances
"Canada-Italy joint statement"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025i), released June 17	Cooperation, coordination, security
"Joint statement: Enduring Partnership, Ambitious Agenda"	Prime Minister of Canada (2025j), released June 23	Partnership, shared values and interests, defence, security, stability, sovereignty, peace, cooperation, collaboration, threats, prosperity, alignment, interoperability

Source: Author.

through more pragmatic collaborations aimed at reducing dependence on American military technology, innovation and supply chains.[12]

This diversification can be interpreted as applying broadly to Canada-US relations and foreign policy and specifically to middle-power partnership on quantum technology governance.

Ties Over Tensions: Aligning Economic and Security Objectives

Following Bode, Ducci and Lee (2025), the concepts interpreted in the documents are analyzed as master narratives. The master narratives interpreted from the concepts identified in the document analysis (as listed in Table 1) are generalized along the performance of ties over tensions. Put another way: Canada works to align economic and security objectives through cooperation rather than competition.

Canada presents quantum technologies as an opportunity for middle-power states to cooperate around the shared value of prosperity. It does so through a narrative practice that aligns economic and national security objectives into a unified goal. This approach is apparent in speeches, official statements and agreements, and has the potential to shape future national and foreign policy.

The narrative of global technology competition has changed the opportunities for cooperation for middle powers. In response, states such as Canada are crafting narratives — specifically about technologies such as quantum — that position them within spheres of influence where power is projected through the convergence of economic and security objectives. The "ties over tensions" narrative extends beyond quantum technologies but is exemplified by them. Quantum technologies, in this context, are portrayed not only as tools for collaboration but also as an opportunity to engage in a more favourable model of global competition — one that opens space for middle-power engagement rather than reinforces dominance by great powers.

This study has several limitations, including a short time frame, the absence of a temporal comparison to track changes in narrative practices over time, and the exclusive focus on quantum technologies and on Canada.[13] However, it offers an important takeaway: while focusing on Canada as a case for changing middle-power dynamics, this study finds that it is no longer a question of choosing between economic growth or security and aligning these objectives and policies with great powers. Instead, this narrative emphasizes how they can pursue both simultaneously, through cooperation under a broader master narrative of shared prosperity.

12 The author wishes to thank Jamie Duncan for raising this point.

13 Future research could explore these areas and build on the results presented in this working paper.

Recommendations

Rather than being trapped in a narrative of global technology rivalry that frames everything as a binary competition between great powers, Canada may be adapting to the shifting global order and choosing a path that aligns with its own strategic priorities. Instead of aligning with the goals of great powers by mirroring narratives of global technology competition, the political dynamics have changed, and some middle powers are making their strategic interests more prominently known in the international system through narrative practices, in an attempt to navigate the politics and power of quantum technology narratives to both serve their own objectives and collaborate with other middle powers.

The results of the document analysis suggest that, rather than perpetuating dominant narratives of geopolitical technology rivalry, competition, races and conflict, which often reinforce the merging of economic and national security objectives, Canada reframes these concepts within a master narrative of "ties over tensions." This narrative emphasizes that instead of competition set within the parameters of great-power rivalry, collaboration and partnership building with other middle-power states are necessary to achieve the shared goal of mutual prosperity.

The implications of this framing — and the blending of strategic objectives in this way — are that future defence partnerships and economic cooperation will need to recognize this shared common goal and agree on its meaning. As such, the recommendation is that **the definition of shared values and interests must be clearly articulated, and linked not only to economic and security objectives but also to democratic values** that can solidify the ties between like-minded states through, for instance, upholding accountability, as well as through the responsible use and deployment of quantum technologies.

It must also be recognized that **while great-power-driven narratives of geopolitical technology competition have created space for middle powers to respond and shape strategies that benefit their own interests, this approach should not become exclusionary to non-great and non-middle powers**. Such exclusion may result in partnerships that leave out states not fitting into these categories, thereby limiting the global governance of quantum technology through inclusive, value-guided cooperation. This recommendation can be operationalized through new and existing mechanisms for dialogue — such as the proposed G7 Joint Working Group on Quantum Technologies.

Middle powers, such as Canada, have the potential to influence the narrative about disruptive technologies such as quantum in ways that advance their own strategic interests. This may include diversifying partnerships and strengthening political leverage by choosing when and with whom to cooperate. At the same time, such influence should be guided by a values-based approach that ensures small and developing states are included in decision-making processes and have a voice as these technologies are implemented.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the feedback graciously provided by John Bruce, Dariush Ebrahimi, Rafael Morales-Guzman and Jamie Duncan. She would also like to thank Reanne Cayenne and Dianna H. English, the Digital Policy Hub team and the CIGI Publications team, especially Lynn Schellenberg and Carol Bonnett. This research was produced with support from CIGI and Mitacs Accelerate as part of the Digital Policy Hub

fellowship program. Any errors and omissions are those of the author, and the opinions expressed in this paper do not represent an official position of any affiliated individuals or institutions.

About the Author

Kristen Csenkey, Ph.D., formerly a Digital Policy Hub post-doctoral fellow, is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council post-doctoral fellow at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University. Her research broadly focuses on global cyber governance, technology interdependence and geopolitics. Follow her work at www.kristencsenkey.com.

Works Cited

Bode, Ingvild, Cecilia Ducci and Pak K. Lee. 2025. "Narrating and Practising the US–China 'Tech War.'" *Global Studies Quarterly* 5 (2): ksaf037. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf037.

Brewster, Murray. 2025. "Canada signs deal deepening European defence and security partnership. *CBC News*, June 23. www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-rearm-europe-deal-1.7567162.

Csenkey, Kristen. 2025. "Scrambling for Quantum Supremacy in the Global Commons." Digital Policy Hub Working Paper. www.cigionline.org/static/documents/DPH-Paper-Csenkey.pdf.

Drexel, Bill. 2025. *Promethean Rivalry: The World-Altering Stakes of Sino-American AI Competition*. Center for a New American Security, April 22. www.cnas.org/publications/reports/promethean-rivalry.

Faizullaev, Alisher and Jérémie Cornut. 2017. "Narrative practice in international politics and diplomacy: the case of the Crimean crisis." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20 (3): 578–604. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.6.

G7. 2025. "Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies." Leaders' Statement, June 17. https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/kananaskis-common-vision-for-the-future-of-quantum-technologies/.

Geng, Yinuo. 2024. "What Does It Really Mean to Talk about Tech Competition?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14. www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-it-really-mean-talk-about-tech-competition.

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Sam Howell. 2024. "Quantum Computing in US-China Competition," July 9, in *China Global Podcast*, produced by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, podcast, 28:40. www.gmfus.org/news/quantum-computing-us-china-competition.

Homolar, Alexandra and Georg Löfflmann. 2021. "Populism and the Affective Politics of Humiliation Narratives." *Global Studies Quarterly* 1 (1): ksab002. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab002.

Homolar, Alexandra and Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado. 2025. "Imaginaries of trauma and victimhood: The role of the 'China threat' in Trump's populism of the privileged." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 27 (1): 179–98. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481241259383.

Howell, Sam. 2024. *The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing*. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security. www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-quest-for-qubits.

Kassam, Ashifa and Leyland Cecco. 2025. "Justin Trudeau promised 'sunny ways' but could not fulfil his lofty ambitions." *The Guardian*, January 6. www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/06/justin-trudeau-promised-sunny-ways-but-could-not-fulfil-his-lofty-ambitions.

McCarthy, Daniel R. 2015. *Power, Information Technology, and International Relations Theory: The Power and Politics of US Foreign Policy and the Internet*. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moir, Nathaniel L. 2019. "AI and Quantum Supremacy Will Not Defeat Revolutionary Warfare." RealClearDefense, November 13. www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/11/13/ai_and_quantum_supremacy_will_not_defeat_revolutionary_warfare_114845.html.

Moscioni, Brian. 2025. "Another Technology Race: US-China Quantum Computing Landscape." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 13. www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/another-technology-race-us-china-quantum-computing-landscape.

Moyer, Jonathan D., Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows and Hugo van Manen. 2018. *Power and Influence in a Globalized World.* Washington, DC: Atlantic Council. www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Power_and_Influence_.pdf.

Neuberger, Anne. 2025. "China Is Still Winning the Battle for 5G — and 6G: America Must Do More to Compete With Huawei." *Foreign Affairs*, May 1. www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-still-winning-battle-5g-and-6g.

Prime Minister of Canada. 2025a. "Prime Minister Carney meets with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Sir Keir Starmer." March 17. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/03/17/prime-minister-carney-meets-prime-minister-united-kingdom-sir-keir-starmer.

— — —. 2025b. "Prime Minister Carney announces Canada's G7 priorities ahead of the Leaders' Summit." June 7. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/07/prime-minister-carney-announces-canadas-g7-priorities.

— — —. 2025c. "Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces." June 9. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/09/canadas-new-government-rebuilding-rearming-and-reinvesting-canadian.

— — —. 2025d. "Joint statement by Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Starmer." June 15. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/15/joint-statement-prime-minister-mark-carney-and-prime-minister-sir-keir-starmer.

— — —. 2025e. "Prime Minister Carney meets with Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz." June 15. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/06/15/prime-minister-carney-meets-chancellor-germany-friedrich-merz.

— — —. 2025f. "Prime Minister Carney meets with President of France Emmanuel Macron." June 16. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/06/16/prime-minister-carney-meets-president-france-emmanuel-macron.

— — —. 2025g. "Chair's Summary." June 17. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/17/g7-chairs-summary.

— — —. 2025h. "Prime Minister Carney concludes 2025 G7 Leaders' Summit." June 17. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/17/prime-minister-carney-concludes-2025-g7-summit.

——— . 2025i. “Canada-Italy joint statement.” June 17. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/17/canada-italy-joint-statem.

——— . 2025j. “Joint statement: Enduring Partnership, Ambitious Agenda.” June 23. www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/23/joint-statement-enduring-partnership.

Shiller, Robert J. 2019. *Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shivakumar, Sujai, Charles Wessner and Andreas Schumacher. 2025. “Quick Take: Quantum Technology Global Competition.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (blog), February 3. www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/quick-take-quantum-technology-global-competition.

Steinberg, James B. 2020. “What Went Wrong? U.S.-China Relations from Tiananmen to Trump.” *Texas National Security Review* 3 (1): 119–33. https://tnsr.org/2020/01/what-went-wrong-u-s-china-relations-from-tiananmen-to-trump/.

Sweijs, Tim and Michael J. Mazarr. 2023. “Mind the Middle Powers.” *War on the Rocks*, April 4. https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/mind-the-middle-powers/.

The White House. 2025a. “President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China.” Fact sheet, February 1. www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/.

——— . 2025b. “A Letter to Michael Kratsios, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.” Statement, March 26. www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/a-letter-to-michael-kratsios-director-of-the-white-house-office-of-science-and-technology-policy/.

——— . 2025c. “Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat.” Speech, April 14. www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/04/remarks-by-director-kratsios-at-the-endless-frontiers-retreat/.

van Hulst, Merlijn, Tamara Metze, Art Dewulf, Jasper de Vries, Severine van Bommel and Mark van Ostaijen. 2025. “Discourse, framing and narrative: three ways of doing critical, interpretive policy analysis.” *Critical Policy Studies* 19 (1): 74–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2024.2326936.

White, Hayden. 1980. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality.” *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1): 5–27. https://doi.org/10.1086/448086.