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AUSTRALIA-CANADA SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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CLOSER AUSTRALIA-CANADA DEFENCE COOPERATION?

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ABOUT THE PROJECT

Begun in late 2012, this two-year project will explore and promote the ways that Canada and Australia can enhance their security cooperation and contribute to more stable regional security environments and governance mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.

The region has become an increasingly important area for the Canadian government's international economic priorities. Regional security and stability are prerequisites to achieving these priorities, and given Australia's tremendous success engaging with Asia-Pacific countries from trade and investment through to security, there is no better partner for Canada's own broader engagement in the region.

CIGI and ASPI will explore the possibilities for Canadian and Australian cooperation in promoting strengthened security and regional governance in the Asia-Pacific. It will cover areas such as strategic policy, cooperation in foreign policy and defence initiatives, and closer military-to-military ties. The project will be led by Australian and Canadian co-chairs, advised by a binational council of prominent individuals and officials. The project's research will contribute to discussions at the February 2014 Australia-Canada Economic Leadership Forum in Melbourne. The resulting report will be presented later in 2014 to both Australian and Canadian governments.

As an additional element, CIGI is working closely with two Korean partners — the Seoul Forum for International Affairs and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies — which will host one of the two regional workshops that form part of the project. It is expected that this workshop will also give important insights into the possibilities of Korean engagement with Canada and Australia in ongoing cooperation in the security domain.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John Blaxland is a historian and senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, who writes about Asia-Pacific military, intelligence and security affairs. John is a former defence attaché to Thailand and Burma and chief staff officer for Joint Intelligence (J2) at Headquarters Joint Operations Command. He has a Ph.D. in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. His publications include *Strategic Cousins* (2006), *Revisiting Counterinsurgency* (2006), *Information Era Manoeuvre* (2002), *Signals* (1999) and *Organising an Army* (1989). His forthcoming book is entitled *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the prospect and utility of closer defence cooperation for both Canada and Australia. It reflects on commonalities and like-mindedness, particularly as they concern regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Forward-looking measures are presented for Canadian and Australian defence policy makers to capitalize on each other's strengths and similarities. A visionary understanding of the two countries' shared heritage and common interests is called for, but Canada has to demonstrate how serious it is about engagement in the region. Cooperation could enhance both countries' ability to engage in the region, their mutual defence capabilities and their engagement with the great powers. With this in mind, closer bilateral engagement should be considered in three areas: bolstering regional engagement, cost-saving measures and enhancing engagement with great powers.

WHY CLOSER COLLABORATION?

Australia and Canada have an enduring interest in making a positive ongoing contribution to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.[1] They're equidistant from the strategic hotspots of Northeast Asia (Figure 1). They're close, even intimate, treaty allies of the United States and supporters of the rules-based global order known as the Pax Americana established in the aftermath of World War II, most visibly through institutions such as the United Nations and backed by US military power. They also have similarly sized and structured armed forces, employing uncannily comparable equipment and repeatedly contemplating many of the same operational deployments and equipment acquisition decisions, ranging from fighter aircraft to armoured vehicles, weapons and communications systems, warships and submarines.[2] For a long time, both countries' armed forces have tended to follow trends initiated from Britain or the United States. But increasingly, with Britain and the United States taking a more constrained role in security affairs, Canadian and Australian officials are finding themselves the more vocal of the traditional English-speaking security partners. Finding themselves agreeing on a number of issues has caught some by surprise. Yet they have long had much in common, and the shared understanding and altered circumstances are pointing to a renewed interest in collaboration and cross-pollination to enhance regional security and stability.

Like Australia, Canada has a significant and distinctive legacy of involvement in the security affairs of the Indo-Pacific, although for many years that legacy has been obscured by Canada's focus on trans-Atlantic security ties through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both have an enduring obligation, through the United Nations, to the defence of South Korea.

With Northeast Asian trade booming, Canada's economic centre of gravity has been shifting westward toward the "Far East." With a pipeline from Alberta to Canada's west coast being considered, trade with Asia is expected to jump, generating a natural lobby for even greater engagement. Together with mounting security concerns, and with its closest security and trade partner, the United States, undertaking a "pivot" or "rebalancing" toward Asia, there is legitimate renewed Canadian interest in security engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which has often been seen more as Australia's than Canada's domain when it comes to defence and security.[3]

From Australia's perspective, concern remains that the Canadian government has shown little real interest in "pivoting" to the Pacific in this way. Such a move would take considerable political capital to effect, and the current Canadian government under Stephen Harper has tended to direct much of its "strategic" thought inwards, focussing on ensuring short- to medium-term political gain.

Yet Canada's renewed focus, if it proves to be a genuine and sustained one, is of intrinsic interest to Australia, and carries significant policy implications. A visionary understanding of the two countries' shared heritage and common interests is called for. Both countries also see security ties with the US as enduring and recognize the need to think creatively in a period of constraint about options for strengthening alliance ties with the US and bilateral ties with a range of Asian powers, notably including China. At the same time, both Canada and Australia are middle powers with limited industrial capacity and ability to launch and sustain major capital works, such as ship or submarine building. Latent efficiencies and savings are ripe for harvest through collaboration. Both countries also have a parochial view of their place in the world and of each other's relevance to and role in Indo-Pacific security affairs.

A SHARED LEGACY

As Australia and Canada contemplate the implications, it is worth reflecting on their shared experiences in the Indo-Pacific. Both fought in the Boer War, World War I, World War II and the Korean War.

1 For the significance of this term, see Rory Medcalf (2012), *Pivoting the Map: Australia's Indo-Pacific System*, Centre of Gravity series, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, November.

2 This is argued in Blaxland (2006).

3 See the proceedings of the "Canada in the Pacific Century" conference, September 2012, available at www.ceocouncil.ca/pacific/conference and www.nsi-ins.ca/newsroom/a-pivot-to-asia-canadas-real-globalization/.

Figure 1: The Pacific Rim

Source: Blaxland, 2006.

Combatants from both countries are commemorated for their sacrifice at Commonwealth war graves in Myanmar, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere.[4] Canadians lost a whole brigade in the defence of Hong Kong in December 1941, while Australians lost a division of two brigades in the defence of Singapore in February 1942. The losses occurred with little forethought about improving their prospects through allied collaboration. Thereafter, Canadian forces engaged in an amphibious operation, storming ashore at Kiska Island in the Aleutians (northeast of Japan), and contemplated sending one or two combat divisions to fight in the Pacific alongside the Australians.[5]

As the war progressed, both were left with little voice in the direction of grand strategy (Blaxland, 2006: 83). In the end, the Canadians sent a special wireless battalion, which operated out of Darwin. But it was a secret organization, so few knew about this Canadian contribution to Australia, even though the bonds established then in the realm of special intelligence endure to this day.[6]

Afterwards, Canada contributed a brigade-sized land force plus naval and air elements during the Korean War, fighting alongside Australians and together inflicting a setback on the enemy at the Battle of Kapyong in 1951.

During the Vietnam War, Canada was the principal Western country sending monitors to Vietnam to work with the International Commission for Supervision and Control, largely as a favour to the US — and in a manner that faintly echoed Australia's contribution alongside the Americans. Later, Canadians and Australians bumped into each other on UN peacekeeping missions around the globe. In 1999, Canada sent an infantry company with air and sea logistic support to participate in the International

4 Thirty-three Australians are buried alongside Canadians, Britons, Indians and Dutch at Hong Kong's Sai Wan Commonwealth War Cemetery; the names of 181 Canadian airmen are inscribed in the Singapore Memorial.

5 The idea was floated by Major General V. W. Odlum, Canada's High Commissioner to Australia, in Canberra in January 1942.

6 See Jean Bou (2012), *MacArthur's Secret Bureau: The Story of the Central Bureau, General MacArthur's Signals Intelligence Organisation*, Loftus: Australian Military History Publications.

Force East Timor (INTERFET). Canada and Australia contributed forces to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but short of a fresh UN mandate, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien balked at participating in Iraq in 2003 — despite, like Australia, having embedded officers alongside their US counterparts. Interestingly, this was a move that then opposition leader Simon Crean proposed in Australia as well.

Since then, Canada has undertaken major combat operations in the Afghan province of Kandahar, adjacent to the Australians in Oruzgan, leading the fight against the Taliban and suffering greater casualties. As a NATO member, Canada quietly but forcefully advocated on Australia's behalf for greater access and influence on policy and strategy deliberations within the organization. Additionally, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships have worked alongside in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for over two decades.

All these events happened on short notice, with little time to coordinate Canadian and Australian policy or plans, but they demonstrate the congruence in the two countries' strategic outlooks for more than a century. Few appreciate how much Canada has done for Australia or how significant and enduring are the understated ties between these two former British colonies.

Canada has demonstrated that it genuinely cares about security in the Indo-Pacific region. If it now appears ready to bolster its credentials as a serious actor there, it should consider closer engagement, particularly with Australia and the United States, but also with other Asian powers, including China.

Canada's and Australia's fixations on ties with the superpower and an apparent disregard for their enduring common security interests have sometimes obscured the utility of comparing and contrasting or sharing notes and experiences with each other, or exploring opportunities for mutually beneficial collaboration. And yet there's an enduring commonality between these two uncannily like-minded middle powers, steeped in shared histories, institutions, cultures, traditions and interests.

DEEPER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

In Australia, few have seen Canada as a serious player in the region in recent years, so few have spent much effort on expanding collaboration beyond well-established multilateral intelligence links and such working-level arrangements as the collaborative standardization program between the armies of America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA), as well as New Zealand.

In the light of Canada's renewed interest and extensive historical commitments and ties to the Indo-Pacific, Australian skepticism needs to be overcome. A fresh look at Canada's significance to shared security objectives is required, as both nations seek to enhance regional security and stability to facilitate their own expanding trade ties and an enduring leadership role for the US, particularly in security affairs.

As Canada reconsiders its engagement in the region, Canadian and Australian officials should be encouraged to read about what it is they have in common and why enduring significance continues in the ties between these strategic cousins. Officers on both sides need to lift their vision to have a clearer understanding of the utility of collaboration and the missed opportunities of the past. Reflecting on experiences with INTERFET, for example, might provide some useful pointers for future engagement. INTERFET involved the rapid deployment of troops, working alongside other coalition partners, including many Southeast Asian countries, employing amphibious capabilities, a coalition IT network, intelligence sharing and undertaking agreed tasks.

PROPOSED MEASURES

The following measures should be explored by Canadian and Australian defence policy makers to best capitalize on each other's strengths, commonalities and shared interests. In particular, cooperation can produce benefits in the three key domains: enhancing their ability to engage in the region, accruing financial savings and efficiencies, and enhancing engagement with the great powers.

BOLSTERING REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Defence Attaché Presence

For Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, among others, appearances sometimes matter more than substance; form precedes function. To burnish its credentials and open doors in the region, Canada needs to bolster security ties by increasing its representational defence presence. Canada has a conspicuous shortage of defence attachés across Southeast Asia. Increasing the number of attachés would help Canada gain greater access to local officials and provide a better understanding of local circumstances. With greater access and understanding, more opportunities for bilateral collaboration could be explored.

At the moment, that's difficult to do. Each Canadian attaché covers a handful of countries and spreads their time thinly between their areas of responsibility. This leaves them poorly placed for proactive engagement beyond offering places in English language courses. Similarly, reciprocal attaché offices in Ottawa and Canberra need to be staffed at the colonel (or equivalent) level and resourced to maximize the benefits from enhanced bilateral ties and working-level arrangements in the two capitals.

ASEAN Engagement

For Australia, its participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) has matched its participation in ASEAN-related forums, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), particularly in various working groups. Australian support for enhanced Canadian engagement in such forums should be predicated on a commitment from Canada to have a long-term plan to engage with the region and to act collaboratively with Australia. As an important precursor, Canada must work assiduously to gain access to these working groups to demonstrate its goodwill and genuine commitment to regional engagement.

Collaborative projects with countries like Indonesia and Thailand would likely reap considerable benefits for Canada. Canada has compatibilities with the Indonesian armed forces inventory, with their Leopard 2 tanks for instance, which may present opportunities for shared training or related collaboration. Similarly, Thailand operates a comparable inventory to items in Canada's arsenal that could provide opportunities for engagement and exchanges. Other countries in ASEAN may present similar engagement opportunities as well.

Such engagement would also make it much easier for Australia to partner with Canada in related regional security activities. With a demonstrably increased commitment to the region, including through an increased military diplomatic presence, the ASEAN member states that control the ADMM Plus arrangements would likely be willing to see Canada's membership ambition fulfilled.

Engagement with PACOM

Australia has chosen to work closely with the US Pacific Command (PACOM), collaborating on a range of activities and exercises, and being invited to assume prominent senior appointments with integrated staff; Canada has also been invited to participate. But there is scope for an even greater focus on the PACOM domain for Ottawa policy makers, paralleling its equivalent arrangements in NATO. Some will see this as overambitious, but if Canada is serious about participating in the Pacific region, such engagement must be considered seriously.

Tandem Thrust, a bilateral US-Australian military training exercise, may lend itself to Canadian participation as well, as has been the case in other exercises. Canada's inclusion would be a worthy reciprocal act for Canada's advocacy on behalf of Australia in NATO forums. Certainly, the Australian-led multilateral KAKADU naval exercise would be a useful activity for the RCN to join, as would Exercise Pitch Black for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).

Participation in the FPDA

Australia is a major participant in the FPDA with Singapore, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and New Zealand. Canada could conceivably seek observer status in such activities and coordinate the timing of participation in other regional activities (such as Exercise Cobra Gold, described below) to be closely aligned, enabling sequential participation.

Participation in Regional Multilateral Exercises

One useful way to boost regional profile is to participate in regional multilateral exercises. Exercise Cobra Gold is a bilateral exercise arranged between the United States and Thailand. It has become more of a multilateral activity in recent years, with observers from Myanmar and China included. The exercise also has the active participation of air, land and sea components from Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea. Australia should be seeking to play a more prominent role in this exercise in order to burnish its regional multilateral ties and to strengthen ties with Thailand and other ASEAN participants. Similarly, Canada should seek to engage in Cobra Gold.

Collaboration on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)-related components of the exercise would be worth targeting, as would the amphibious component, in order to exercise and demonstrate the functions of the RAN's landing helicopter docks (LHDs), which are due to become operational soon.

Collaboration with Amphibious Capability Development

As Australia brings its LHDs into service, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should invite neighbouring countries on board to participate collaboratively in exercises and related activities centred on HA/DR scenarios, such as Indonesians and other Southeast Asians.[7] Canada has limited capability in this domain, but as it considers its options for the future, it should be invited to participate and mix in with the other regional participants.

MUTUAL CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENTS AND EFFICIENCIES

Shared Education and Training Exchanges

There may be additional areas where efficiencies and savings can be made by sharing undergraduate officer education and training. Canadian officer cadets could be invited to study at the ADF Academy and Australian cadets could be similarly invited to study for a term at the Royal Military College of Canada. This has been tried before, and participants have benefitted considerably from

7 See Brendan Taylor (2013), "A New Flank: Fresh Perspectives for the Next Defence," Centre of Gravity White Paper series, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, April.

the experience. For mid- and late-career courses, such as staff college and defence college, exchanges remain in place, having proven to be beneficial. There's merit in a similar arrangement for career-entry level exchanges as well.

Exercise Long Look has provided excellent opportunities for the cross-pollination of ideas among the armies of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. A similar arrangement should be considered between Australia and Canada. With some creative thinking and ingenuity on both sides, cost-efficient ways to do this can be found despite budget constraints.

Major Acquisitions

There is also scope for closer collaboration on major acquisition projects, including the F-35 and future submarine projects. Australia, like Canada, has a significant requirement for a non-nuclear-powered submarine force that has the range to operate in and around the Indo-Pacific. Australia is on the cusp of developing and building submarines to replace the six aging Collins class submarines built in the 1980s and early 1990s. Canada is likewise reflecting on its future submarine options.

The two countries could participate in a collaborative project, as they have similar requirements and challenges in terms of economies of scale. There is scope for efficiencies and commonalities to be explored to ensure that the most appropriate platforms are acquired and in the best configurations and quantities. Neither country can honestly afford to go it alone. A collaborative project would likely generate unforeseen benefits.

In considering this approach, managing the expectations of both countries' supplier lobbies and political considerations will need to be taken into account. Overcoming local resistance will be tough, particularly because procurement in both countries touches on local defence industry shibboleths and requires visionary and long-term commitment. Perhaps a quid pro quo approach for such a collaborative project could be found, drawing on Canada's expertise in managing its Arctic.

Capability Development Relating to the Arctic and Antarctic

Canada has a wealth of experience in managing its Arctic territorial responsibilities. As Australia is giving more thought to its responsibilities around the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters, it should give close consideration to the RCN's Arctic/offshore patrol ships, which are being designed and built in Canada for operations in the Arctic. Australia could benefit considerably from close collaboration with Canada as it seeks to further develop its ability to operate in and around the Southern Ocean.

Indigenous Exchanges

Similarly, there are lessons to be learned from the Canadian Rangers and its Junior Rangers program. These indigenous units that operate in Canada's far north have strong parallels with Australia's counterpart regional force surveillance units, with many lessons to exchange and learn from.

Establishing an IT Network for Crisis Coalition Support

As Australia plays an increasingly prominent, if not leading, role to facilitate participation in multilateral regional activities, a secure coalition IT network is required. Such infrastructure was required for INTERFET and has been used by coalition partners in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. A similar configuration should be established by Australia. With its impressive IT industry, Canada could be a partner in enabling such a network to be established, using the amphibious LHDs as a test bed. HA/DR exercises and activities are a useful arena in which to use such a system.

Shared Networked and Virtual Training Opportunities

Both the ADF and the Canadian Armed Forces face significant budgetary constraints as the Afghanistan drawdown nears completion. To maintain honed forces and cutting-edge capabilities, maximum use will need to be made of simulation, networked IT facilities and online training resources. Australia and Canada should look toward developing shared online training programs where commonalities exist across the three services. Such shared arrangements can readily build on the high level of compatibility arising from common standards and protocols negotiated through forums such as the ABCA program.

Shared preparation of syllabus material should be considered in areas such as principal warfare officer training for RCN and RAN officers, RCAF and Royal Australian Air Force aircrew training, and regimental officers advanced courses for the Army.

ENHANCING ENGAGEMENT WITH GREAT POWERS

Participation Alongside US-led Initiatives

Working alongside the US has enduring importance for both Canada and Australia. Whatever collaborative work is undertaken between the two countries will probably always pale in comparison with the bilateral undertakings each has with the US. There are, however, several areas where both Canada and Australia could contribute alongside the US to collaborative measures aimed at enhancing regional security and stability in a way that could also help bolster Canada-Australia ties. These include the four measures for collaboration between the

US and Australia suggested by Thomas Mahnken (2013) in a recent blog piece:

- Participation in the integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network for the Western Pacific would aim to improve shared understanding to deter hostile action and, if need be, to facilitate collective action.
- Cooperation on undersea warfare could include ensuring that Canada and Australia acquire replacement submarines with high levels of interoperability with the US Navy and with each other.
- Increased cooperation and interoperability on precision munitions would allow for common stockpiles for mutual benefit (experience in the Korean War is instructive on this point).
- Common investment in high-payoff capabilities in collaboration with the US should be considered, and may produce effective and efficient research and development in an era of greater financial austerity.

Exercises with China

Australian policy makers have consistently claimed that nothing is gained from arguing there is a need to choose between China as principal economic partner and the United States as principal security partner. Painting security challenges in such unambiguous terms misses the real world's shades of grey that policy makers grapple with. Moreover, in a region where appearances often matter more than substance, making declaratory policies in such stark terms can have unintended negative consequences.

Instead, Australia has sought to downplay the differences, seeing multilateral collaboration as the best course. With this in mind, Australia has engaged with China in a variety of bilateral military exercises in recent years, and in April this year, then Prime Minister Julia Gillard called for trilateral exercises between China, Australia and the United States. The preferred areas for collaboration have tended to be in the realms of HA/DR, special operations, search and rescue, and basic naval activities, including passing exercises and naval gunnery. So far, Canada has been largely absent from such discussions, distracted by other domestic priorities. But as Canada reflects on its own demands for a rebalancing towards Asia, there may be scope for its participation in similar activities, drawing on Australia's experience. Canada could take part in multilateral exercises involving Australia and China, and possibly alongside other regional powers, including the United States. Creative thinking and a constructive approach are required; some are already thinking along this line (Manicom, 2013).

Defence-level Arrangements

With so many potential areas for collaboration, information sharing and exchanges, there may be scope for the establishment of a formal Canadian-Australian Defence Arrangement. To date, Canada and Australia have relied primarily on US-led multilateral arrangements to provide the venue for engagement. But with the United States distracted by its own financial concerns and protracted domestic political manoeuvrings, there appears to be considerable utility in Canada and Australia setting up their own bilateral arrangements. This could take the form of the bilateral ministerial meeting arrangements entered into with Britain (the Australia-United Kingdom Ministerial Consultations) and the US (the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations) or the strategic dialogue arrangements with China, or the "two-plus-two" meetings with foreign and defence ministers of South Korea.

Whatever Canada decides, with the global centre of gravity shifting to the Indo-Pacific, the imperative for Canadian engagement can only grow. Better to act now rather than to be dragged in later, unprepared.

CONCLUSION

If Canada is serious about engaging in Indo-Pacific security, it needs to participate more actively. A number of low-cost steps could be taken by Canada and Australia to bolster regional security and stability, in turn facilitating increased trade and prosperity.

Canada should boost its military and diplomatic presence through its defence attaché network and seek participation in a number of multilateral exercises and activities. It should also be more serious about developing and maintaining capabilities that could be employed in the region.

Australians should pay close attention to their Canadian counterparts, encouraging and even facilitating greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing what Canada has done for Australia elsewhere and reciprocating in the region.

With a demonstration of such resolve, considerable benefit may accrue from Australia and Canada working alongside to further shared interests in regional security and stability, maintaining the rules-based order associated with the *Pax Americana* while encouraging China's continued peaceful rise.

ACRONYMS

ABCA	America, Britain, Canada and Australia
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
HA/DR	humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
LHD	landing helicopter dock
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PACOM	US Pacific Command
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy

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ABOUT ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the Australian Government to provide fresh ideas on Australia's defence and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed decisions.

For more information, please visit www.aspi.org.au.

ABOUT CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI's interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI's current research programs focus on four themes: the global economy; global security; the environment and energy; and global development.

CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l'appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l'Ontario.

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CIGI MASTHEAD

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