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Good morning, everyone.


We have as a witness this morning, from the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Mr. Paul Heinbecker, who's the director of International Relations and Communications Program. Mr. Heinbecker was also a former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations and Ambassador to Germany, and director of Laurier Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy.

Bienvenue, monsieur Heinbecker. The floor is yours. You have the time that you wish.

Please, go ahead.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Director, International Relations and Communications Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation): Thank you very much.
I have a very soft voice, so I'm hoping this is going to carry all the way, even with the microphone, because I can't reach the microphone. Maybe I'll move this chair.

The Chair: That's fine, I guess, we'll--

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Fix it up? Okay.

I have a lot of sympathy for foreign policy review writers because I'm one of them. Not this review! I wrote the 1984 foreign policy review, and that experience jaundiced me a little bit about the idea of policy reviews.

Still, there are several things in this document that strike me as very welcome. First of all, I think it's conceptually strong. It recognizes that we're dealing with a very different world than we were when I wrote the 1984 foreign policy review, for example. Indeed, the 1995 review is out of date. The problem with reviews is that they get out of date very quickly.

The statement recognizes that the central reality of our time is that insecurity undermines prosperity and underdevelopment generates instability. There is a reciprocal relationship between development and security. I would add human rights, which is, also, the argument in the Secretary-General's reform proposal for the United Nations. The paper also recognizes that perhaps the three greatest challenges Canada is facing are countering global terrorism, stabilizing and rebuilding failed and fragile states, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the links between those. One is tempted to say that we are overreacting to the idea of terrorism, despite the fact that we've seen the horrific events we've seen, because on any given day more people are dying in Africa of diseases than are being killed by terrorists. But at the same time, it's the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, were that ever to happen, which could very much change our whole attitude towards globalization and everything else.

I agree with the paper when it talks about the days of the middle power idea being over. I've never been a believer in the idea of middle power. I think it's a limiting idea. I don't think Canada has ever been a middle power. I don't think the concept actually makes very much sense. We have one of the largest economies in the world. I notice that in the time it takes to go from reading one of the documents or two of the documents, we go from being the eighth largest economy in the world to being the twelfth largest economy in the world, but that is a sign that things are moving pretty fast.

(0910)

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Give a few more minutes (inaudible).

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Give a few more minutes and we'll be down further.
The important point is that the document makes a strong case for policy coherence. In fact, the overview, plus the four documents attached to it--I think it's four--is, in itself, a statement of the importance of coherence. We're not a big enough country to have the luxury of having a foreign policy made in the Defence Department, one made in Foreign Affairs, another in the PMO or PCO or Finance Department, and so on. Foreign policy is what the Canadian government does. Foreign policy belongs to the Canadian government. It doesn't belong to any of the departments.

Having said that, I think the document wisely sets out that, while every department has an international role--virtually every department--it asks the Foreign Affairs Debarment “to provide leadership across government on international matters, both within and outside Canada”, and it asks Foreign Affairs “to lead in the formulation of Canada's overall international policy and in the interdepartmental development of whole of government strategies”. I think that's a very important affirmation of the central role of Foreign Affairs to play if we are to have a coherent international voice and presence.

I also welcome the fact that the statement confirms the thrust of the recent budget, that an effective foreign policy costs money--for diplomacy, for official development assistance and for defence, and the military, among other things. I'm not sure what's going to happen politically in the next while, not even the next hours, but there are important--

**Mr. Ted Menzies (Macleod, CPC):** That's not funny, Beth, is it?

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** --spending proposals in the budget that are actually crucial to the effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy. Declaratory foreign policy not backed up by effective instruments of influence and power, risk being just empty rhetoric.

It reminds me of a story that was told about a British diplomat who had returned to London from a stint at the State Department in Washington, and he was asked what the difference is between being an American diplomat and a British diplomat. He said, in the State Department when something bad happens in the world, they ask, “What should we do about it?” In the U.K., when something bad happens in the world, we ask, “What should the Americans do about it?”.

**Some hon. members:** Oh, oh.

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** Too often in Ottawa we've asked, “What should we say about it?” We really do need to have the effective instruments. We need a military that's capable and big enough to give the government options, not so small that it gives the government excuses.

There are two things in particular I draw your attention to: the stabilization and reconstruction task force idea is going to be very helpful in dealing in a more timely way with international crises, and the global peace and security fund the budget promised will help our capacity to assist in dealing with failing and fragile states.
I'll come back to ODA later.

Canada-U.S. relations--I think the statement gets the priority right on Canada-U.S. relations. Canada-U.S. relations are job one for this country and that does not make it a zero-sum game for everything else. I'd say the statement is important for something that it doesn't say. While there's a lot of talk of regulatory harmonization, and one would want to look at that, there's no suggestion of any kind of a grand bargain, of a big bang, of exchanging security for access, of going along to get along, nor any talk about a customs union, explicitly.

The statement sensibly contemplates both partnership with the U.S. and independence. We have every reason to make sure that we don't become a back door through the border into American security for terrorists and others--every interest in that--and at the same time, we should not forget that there's more to Canada-U.S. relations than border issues, terrorism issues, as important as they are, softwood lumber, cattle exports and so on. We and the U.S. are sharing a shrinking globe, and we have every interest in having a “made in Canada” foreign policy. It's not anti-American to recognize that support for the United States around the world is at a low ebb. For Canada, differing with Washington for the sake of being different is unproductive, and gratuitous insults are unworthy of us. Recognizing that American foreign policy is not, in important respects, coincident with Canadian interests, let alone values, however, is just being realistic.

By the way, I strongly agree with the Prime Minister when he argues that now is the time to strengthen international law and to consolidate international law, when the U.S. is the sole superpower. That situation is not going to last long. The rise of China is already perfectly evident. Other countries are coming behind them. We're going into a very different world than we have now, and now is not the time to be throwing out the rules of the road. We are going to want those emerging countries to respect those rules of the road.

When Washington takes its notion of American exceptionalism to the extent of undermining the whole idea of collective security, when it manifests contempt for international law, the same law that was created and promoted by Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy, Johnson, Bush--George H. W. Bush--among others, it's time for Canadian governments to chart their own course internationally, and privately and respectfully, to speak truth to power in Washington.

The statement makes a point that multilateralism is essential to our collective security and our prosperity, not as a counter-balance to the U.S., but because in an age of globalization, of economic integration, of asymmetric warfare, of climate change, ozone holes, and globe-trotting viruses, no country can secure its citizens on its own.
A world without the UN--and here I'm talking about its security vocation--and without international law would take us back to the beginning of the 20th century. That period saw two of the bloodiest wars in world history, indeed, the two bloodiest wars in world history. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, what would World War III look like? It was to avoid World War III that the UN was created in the first place. The indispensability of the UN does not excuse its shortcomings and failures which are all too obvious. Facilitating UN reform is a Canadian priority. In seeking to reform the UN, we should, as the statement asserts, remember that collective security depends on both power and principle. We should work with the United States where we can, and we should work around the United States where we must, against a day when they will come back to the organization in the way they have, for example, in the law of the sea treaty.

I welcome the emphasis on gender in this statement, and gender equality as a cross-cutting theme, particularly the importance of empowering women to participate fully in the political and economic activities of their community.

I like when the report uses the words “setting our own course”, “pulling our own weight”, and so on. I like the word “leadership” less. There are several cases in the report where we're talking about leadership, when what we are doing in reality is rebuilding our standing after a decade of retreat; a retreat forced on us by our own financial situation, but nonetheless a retreat.

I don't know what to make of the determination to focus foreign aid. I'm not an aid expert. It seems to be common sense, but I'd like to know more what it actually means in practice.

On Darfur, the statement makes much significance of the crisis and speaks of a leadership role. Again, leadership. There appears to be no disposition to go beyond providing logistics to others, nor to put Canadian boots on the ground. Meanwhile, the statement emphasizes the importance of the responsibility to protect, a Canadian initiative that is vitally relevant to Darfur.

The statement also skirts the issue of the Pearson target of 0.7% of GDP for official development assistance, to which we've subscribed for 30-odd years. In fact, beyond one single reference in the foreign affairs booklet to the report of the millennium project, the basis on which the Secretary General wrote a good part of his reform document for the UN, the Sachs report is not mentioned at all.

Establishing a timetable leading to 0.7% is part of the Secretary General's first recommendation for UN reform. There are numerous poor countries, including those identified by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, whose governance and other attributes are such that they could put to effective use considerably more ODA. In fact, several of the countries on that list appear to also be on CIDA's new focus list.
Either we accept 0.7% and establish a time-bound schedule, or we do not accept and state why we think it's inappropriate. There are reasons why a lot of people in this town think it's inappropriate. Then we can debate the issue.

But if we think a time-bound target is unwise and unachievable, we need to square that view with the fact that Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have already achieved it through good times and bad, and that the British, the French, and now the Germans have committed themselves to do that by 2015, and that even the Japanese have begun to talk about it.

Canada has never been richer and our finances have never been sounder. According to the statement itself:

> Prudent fiscal policy has produced a series of surpluses and enabled us to reduce our debt. This foundation underpins our freedom to make the choices that define us as a country.

Nothing in the statement, by the way, including in the separate commerce book, demonstrates to me why we need a separate department of trade. That is especially true for trade policy, which is quintessentially the relationship between governments.

A few words on foreign affairs, and then I'll stop there.

The statement effectively gives Foreign Affairs a leadership role in the development of Canadian foreign policies as I've said earlier, and I hope that implies an end to the sort of ready depreciation one hears of the Foreign Affairs department and of the foreign service, that's it's almost become routine in Ottawa.

I'm going to declare not a conflict of interest, but I'm going to declare maybe a “confluence” of interest.

I was a foreign service officer for 38 years. I have two daughters in the department, one a foreign service officer and one on contract. The foreign service officer has four degrees - one from the University of Toronto, one from Queen's and two from McGill. She had three years of prior international work experience before joining the service. She's fluently bilingual and can manage well in a third language. She has lived about a third of her life abroad. When I joined the foreign service, with the exception of one university degree, I had none of those qualifications.

Between 5,000 and 8,000 people write the foreign service exam each year, and about 1% are offered jobs. I'm not sure whether this puts them among the “best and the brightest” as some say. I don't know where such statistics are being kept, but there's no doubt in my mind that the young officers with whom I worked in New York for example,
before I retired in 2003 were more qualified, better educated, more broadly experienced and more capable than I was at the same age.

If the statement can assert that the Canadian Forces are recognized globally as one of the finest militaries in the world, which is true, it should not shrink from claiming that Canada's foreign service is also recognized as being among the best in the world. And that's also true.

I have a younger daughter who's well qualified and comes with substantial relevant work experience. She's the contractor. She's not sure she wants to join the Foreign Affairs department. It's a major investment in developing the skills and the expertise and acquiring the experience inherent in a profession.

The statement states explicitly now that senior appointments will be open to other departments. I am not arguing that there should be no lateral entry to the Foreign Affairs department; the place is not a monastery, it's not a trade union, it's a place where excellence is valued. But those that enter need to accept the same terms and conditions as everybody else does and not come in and cream off an assignment and go away to some other job back in Ottawa when it's over.

Recruitment from the outside should be needs based and it should not be so extensive that it destroys the profession itself because once gone, it will be very difficult to recreate. So why write a foreign service exam and subject yourself and your family to the hardships involved if jumping the cue becomes acceptable behaviour.

As for the issue of heads of post, there need to be safeguards in place including strict competencies to guard against bureaucratic patronage.

I'm not sure that there's any board of deputy ministers who I think have the international experience necessary, certainly many of them do not, to make sound judgments about such assignments.

Thank you very much.

(0925)

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Heinbecker.

We'll start with the question and answer, and we'll start with Mr. Day, please. It's five minutes, Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Ambassador. It's too bad the necessary limitations of our committee don't really allow us to get into some indepth discussion which could properly draw on your wealth of experience, and we appreciate your service to our country and to the United Nations.
I'll be as succinct as possible on some pretty big issues and ask you just to comment.

Yesterday, we had a presentation here from Human Rights Watch. They in their view, Canada could be taking a far more aggressive and pro-active position related to the situation in Darfur by actually moving ahead, building some kind of a multilateral coalition that could assist the African union with more than just money, but an actual presence. First, if you could comment on what are the practicalities? How would a country like Canada do that related to the United Nations or some other grouping? Secondly, in the International Policy statement even though China clearly is recognized geopolitically in terms of its importance, there's not a word about human rights violations, and that seems to be a characteristic of the report in terms of strong statements either related to China or Cuba or other areas. And thirdly, the U.S./European--the Atlantic alliance vis-à-vis U.S. especially is under stress. There's no question about that. Canadian action tends to go between gesture of politics and direct siding consistently with the EU, and taking the EU's position or the position of some in the EU of simply being a counterweight always to the United Nations instead of seeing ourselves as what I think to be a bridge between Europe and the United States, we could play an effective role there.

You comment.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: You would have to ask the Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff whether we actually have the forces currently at our disposal that we could lead in Darfur. There is a real life experiment we can draw on and that was what we did in eastern Zaire in 1996 where everyone else was standing by hoping that something would happen, but no one was doing anything. Canada stepped forward and said we will lead the mission into eastern Zaire, and we found a lot of ready supporters for that.

There were a number of lessons learned. The first lesson we learned is if you can't put enough troops on the ground yourself to be the backbone of the force, not just the command structure, but the actual backbone of the force, people with boots and bayonets, you can't really succeed. The first question would have to be, do we have the actual capability now? It seems to me we must be getting close to that because it's been some time since we've been in some of the other theatres. The second thing we learned in doing that was when the Prime Minister called the President we were offered a battalion. When I called my counterpart we were offered a couple of doctors. It's a lot tougher to lead that sort of thing than it looks.

On the other hand, on the issue of Darfur, I've listened while people talked about sovereignty, I've listened while people talked about the complexity of the situation, I've listened while people talked about the various economic interests at play, I've heard people talking that this is just one more plot from the west to push Muslim countries around, I've heard all of that stuff. Meanwhile, in all of that complexity we've gone from 50,000 dead, to 60,000 dead, to 70,000 dead, and now people are talking that the numbers are approaching 200,000. I don't know if anybody knows that. Now is really the time for
someone at the UN who has the capability to step forward, to say we will participate, and try to bring other people into it. I think that's the way it can be done, but in the absence of that being done, the African Union is just not capable of saving the situation. When we say, never again, well it's happening right now.

On China and human rights, I'm not sure how to answer that. It's certainly a major issue. On the other hand, China is moving so fast, developing so quickly, and changing so quickly, that I think there's reason to be optimistic in all of that. Its integration into the world is moving at an enormous pace. There are plenty of things, of course, to object to.

On the Atlantic Alliance, to me it has become a kind of an insurance policy. I don't know who the enemy is anymore. One of the things I find when I read through the defence report and the other report, is talk about threats, but we're very vague about who the enemy is, who is actually threatening us. I suppose they're worrying about a residual threat where the Russians might start to behave like the Soviet Union somewhere down the road, and maybe they had in mind way down the road, a kind of Chinese threat, but there's a lot of talk of that and I'm not convinced.

I think the Atlantic Alliance is not a regional organization in the normal sense of the word. A regional organization operates in its region. You don't see the OAS trying to do something in Afghanistan. I'm not quite sure what the future of this organization is.

But I think the military has an absolutely vital role to play in Canada in coastal surveillance and air surveillance on the terrorism issue, aid to the civil power if that need be, but it is a pretty big sledgehammer to be going after creatures that are pretty small and maneuverable.

(0930)

So I think that on the terrorism issue, intelligence, information sharing, police activity are likely to be more availing in most cases. Bringing that back to the Atlantic Alliance, I think the Alliance is there, to my mind, as a kind of insurance policy. Down the road, we may need it. We shouldn't be getting rid of it, but it doesn't strike me as being an instrument that we can use terribly well. It has had some success in Afghanistan, admittedly, but no sign of it in Darfur.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

Now we'll pass to Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.

[Français]

Mme Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Oui.
Merci beaucoup, monsieur Heinbecker. C'est passionnant de vous entendre.

Merci de nous redonner confiance dans une politique étrangère qui n'est pas que des mots, des souhaits ou une volonté de visibilité, mais une volonté d'actions concrètes qui envisage les moyens nécessaires d'en faire de sérieuses.

Je vais poser trois questions, ou plutôt examiner trois problèmes.

Vous parlez d'abord de cette volonté de lutter contre le terrorisme. J'apprécie ce que vous avez dit, mais ne trouvez-vous pas qu'il y a une contradiction entre cette volonté très affirmée et le fait que, dans ce rapport, nulle part, comme vous l'avez souligné, on n'accepte que 0,7 p. 100 d'aide internationale doive être l'objet d'un délai fixé, d'une borne.

Or il me semble que les rapports sont nombreux entre le terrorisme et le terreau qui l'engraisse. De plus, il me semble que la politique étrangère du Canada à cet égard souffre d'une contradiction importante en faisant reposer la lutte au terrorisme seulement sur la défense: la protection des frontières et le reste.

Je voudrais ajouter à cette question une demande: ne trouvez-vous pas que le thème du dialogue des civilisations devrait aussi être abordé, au lieu de la lutte entre les civilisations? Au Comité des affaires étrangères, on a mené une étude sur les rapports entre le Canada et des pays du monde musulman, et on a commencé à en apprendre beaucoup. Il me semble que dans ce rapport on devrait faire référence à ce thème important.

Deuxième question: vous avez dit avoir vu, dans le rapport, que le premier ministre Martin disait que c'était le temps de consolider le droit international. Je vais le relire parce que je n'ai pas vu cela. Mais je donne mon accord total à vos affirmations.

Troisièmement: vous posez clairement une question très importante. Vous avez dit: ou bien le Canada accepte l'objectif de 0,7 p. 100 et se fixe un objectif, ou il s'y objecte. C'est ce que vous avez dit. Or le Canada est capable, compte tenu de ses surplus, d'atteindre cet objectif à l'intérieur des deux délais prévus. La réforme de l'ONU prévoit 0,5 en 2010.

Quelle est votre proposition?

(0935)

Le président: Monsieur Heinbecker.

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker:
I think that one of the things we're seeing in New York at the UN, in the statement by the Secretary General on reforming the UN, on the advocacy of reform by the high-level panel, and indeed in the Sachs report, is that you have to take a comprehensive approach to terrorism.

I think the Secretary General said that without security you won't have development, without development you won't have security, and without a respect for human rights you won't have either.

Let me also say that this report has been out since Tuesday. I'm not sure that I've absorbed every detail in it because it's 120 pages, or something like that, and it's dense.

What I would say is certainly, you're correct that the emphasis on fighting terrorism has to be comprehensive. It isn't just a question of, when you have people actually crossing your borders, that's police and intelligence. When you have a ship off your shore that may have unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, carrying something terrible on-board, that's a military issue.

There's a whole world out there where if we can get governments established that respect the views of their people, that are subject to change peacefully, that kind of a world.... By the way, that's been growing. We're now at over 100 countries in the UN. I think some people say there are 130 which are either democratic, or partly democratic, or largely democratic... that kind of a world is much safer.

So putting your emphasis, as the CIDA statement does, on governance, and improving the functions of governance, the capacity of states to function--something that we used to call “peace, order, and good government” in Canada--that, I think, is certainly part of preventing terrorism.

There are always going to be some people who will be terrorists. Making terrorism illegal doesn't mean it stops terrorism anymore than making murder illegal stops murder. There are always going to be some people. Still, the more that you can create societies which can look after their own problems, the less you're going to have to worry, I think, about terrorism.

On the dialogue of civilizations issue, there has been discussion in the UN on the dialogue of civilizations. I think we certainly need greater understanding. I don't think that I would want to see--and this is going to be controversial--religious leaders leading it. I'm not sure that actually makes it better or turns the temperature down.

On law and the Prime Minister, I do know where I read it, it was in a statement he made on Monday over in the Museum of Civilization. So I presume it was in here somewhere too, but I haven't had time to cross-reference it.

The third point was on 0.7%.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes. Either we accept and put the aid, or we (inaudible). What is your position?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I think we should do 0.7%. I think it sends a....

I think fundamentally it's something that Canada can afford. I don't think it's something we can't afford. In taking together what we've just been saying about the importance of development abroad to our security and our prosperity, you could even portray it as an interest. I do think it's a value. I think it's a question of helping other people who are less fortunate than we are. I think that's something Canadians support.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Mr. McTeague, please.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Ambassador, Mr. Heinbecker, thank you for being here today.

You've raised a number of very interesting points both with the depth of your knowledge of years of service, as well as basically giving us a broad brush of your experience, certainly since you wrote the 1984-1985 paper.

I point out when I was looking at some of the material going back to that time about the different tracks of approach taken: one by the Prime Minister, then Mr. Mulroney, of engaging with the United States as sort of the reality based politics policy of the time; and Mr. Clark, then looking at the rest of the world in doing his foreign policy save and except with the United States. Many of those trends I see are still very much present today, although now more towards the security base.

You had suggested a couple of things here and I know the question of debt relief is very important. I'll take off from where Madam Lalonde has just finished as far as Canada's contribution and .07. Do you have any comments as to the mix of initiatives that the Government of Canada has taken? Of course, that does mean commitment of resources, and things like, for instance, debt relief, or support for other organizations. Taken as a whole it would mean that Canada's contribution per capita may be greater than the countries that you've cited. That would be the first one.

The second one, of course, is recognizing what Mr. Day has just said. I'm well aware, and I think this committee is well aware, of the decline of Atlantisism, certainly since the European Union and the inability, or rather the redundancy, of going down that road as Canada tries to sort of define itself as a bridge between Europe and the United States. I think many Europeans are simply saying, you're Americans in return, we'll do that ourselves, thank you.
More to the issue today of how you see this document, there was discussion here a little earlier about the tragedy of Darfur and Canada's perhaps lack of commitment to situations around the world from a humanitarian point of view. We've just come through the Axworthy period in which, of course, the doctrine and advancement of human security was paramount.

It seems that we have, for anybody out looking, save and except for the many who look at foreign policy and live and breathe this, there's a confluence of a lot of issues occurring at the same time and human security is now somehow morphed into a question of general security. Do you see this document as being reality based, or do you see it as something that's more notional? If I'm to take what Lester B. Pearson had said, if you want to know where I stand on foreign policy, come back in a year from now and I'll tell you what foreign policy is.

The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: There's an interesting study I can commend to you--and if you haven't already read it, maybe you have--done by Foreign Policy magazine in the U.S. I think it's being done by the Centre for Global Development. It tries to measure the things that you're talking about on assisting other countries. Things like lowering your tariffs and your development assistance, forgiveness of debt, and so on. My recollection is that even on that we're not leading the pack by any means.

So I think that there is a certain assumption that we're doing more than we actually are doing. Certainly that would be the view, when people look at us, that's the impression they have. I was talking to a foreign ambassador Monday, and he said, “I don’t understand that a country as rich as you has such difficulty with these kinds of things”. He left it at that.

Debt forgiveness is important. Letting poorer countries have access to our markets is important. Getting rid of, for example, textile limits is important. For a lot of countries, development assistance is important. The market is not going to take care of the problem; no matter how well they govern themselves, they are not going to be places where the private sector is pouring in with money.

Your second point on the Atlantic Alliance, I'm not sure I understood what the questioning was, or was it that the Europeans don't need a bridge. They haven't needed us as a bridge, I don't think, since about the fifties. While that comes up every once in a while, and it's an attractive idea because it is clearly the case that there is a gulf of understanding between Washington and many European capitals. I'm not sure that there's really a role for us in there.

That role was played, to some degree, by Mr. Mulroney in the nineties. I was his foreign policy advisor, in the late eighties and nineties. For example, it's not much known, but he had a significant impact on the willingness of other countries to support German unification. At the time when both Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand
were having serious doubts about the wisdom of German unification, Mr. Mulroney was able to persuade or if Mr. Bush needed a lot of persuading, I don't know, but he was able to persuade him that this is something which had to be done.

So at times we've been able to play that role. As a kind of general principle, I don't know. I think it has to be kind of issue-specific on that.

You mentioned that in those days we had a kind of foreign policy in which the Prime Minister looked at the U.S. and the foreign minister looked at the rest. To some extent, that was the case, although the Prime Minister was much interested in Indonesia and human rights in South Africa and Indonesia and East Timor.

Hon. Dan McTeague: And Central America.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: and so on. I think that the setup now, where you have the cabinet committee for the U.S. and a cabinet committee for the rest of the world, I don't really care how they're organized, so long as they work well.

When I was a secretary of the cabinet committee for foreign and defence policy in the late eighties and early nineties, it didn't work very well. No one was interested. No one showed up. It had no money to spend. It met as a kind of pro forma thing, once in a while. So the issue really is effectiveness rather than the structure. That depends on basically the amount of investment the Prime Minister is able to put in time into those committees. Mr. Mulroney didn't go to those committees at all, for example.

Human security and security, I think that's right. We've been saying for some time that human security and national security are the two sides of the same coin. They have different implications and we're seeing the implications in this report. If you're going to take human security seriously, you've got to have a military that can do something.

It's a little bit like the reverse of Madeleine Albright's question to Colin Powell when he was head of the Joint Chief, in the U.S., why do we need this military if we can't use it? The reality is, why do we have a human security policy if we can't do anything about it? You're not going to save people in Darfur with diplomatic notes or with aid programs. That's important. That has its place, but the immediate need is to stop people killing people, and for that you need a combat capable military.

The Chair: Thank you.

We will go to Ms. McDonough please.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Heinbecker, for being with us today. It's a bit of a daunting task for you to
reflect on every aspect of this document that took 16 months in the making. It's going to take a little more in the digesting than you've been given the opportunity to do.

I really welcome not only you sharing your expertise this morning, but I admire the fact that you were prepared to share some personal reflections about two daughters who are contemplating where foreign service is going. I have to say that one of the things I find extremely distressing is that when it suits and the government likes to talk about how much we are respected in the world for our professional foreign service, but in fact we do nothing today to ensure that it remains robust and continues to be supported as it should be, both at the level of their remuneration and also at the level of their advice being taken seriously.

I'd like to raise questions in three particular areas. It won't surprise you about the .7 percent. I'm sure you're aware that we have had over a period now of certainly the three years that I've had any association with this committee, just a series of outstanding experts, both domestic and international, who have come before us and pleaded eloquently and convincingly the case for Canada moving to the .7 percent personation target, with targets and timetables and in a timely way meeting our international obligations.

To say that it is disappointing that this document has not done that is probably the world's greatest understatement. I think humiliating would probably describe it more accurately.

One of the questions that I want to raise is in relation to your earlier comment, that we are trying to recover really from a decade of dwindling status. The words were used again and again that Canada's reputation really has been shrinking somewhat because of our failures to deliver on some of these things.

What do you see as the implications for us being a respected multilateralist participating in the international arena?

Secondly, the comments that you made about having, and I don't want to misrepresent your words, but having some skepticism about the concept of middle powers. If we are not prepared to associate, perhaps middle powers isn't the concept so much as progressive powers from other parts of the world in trying to push forward the human security agenda, the non-proliferation treaty obligations for example, moving from those who fail to deliver on .7 to be among those who have met their obligations and we're now at the back of the pack. We're in the lower half of donor nations, for example.

What do you see as the base from which Canada is to be a progressive, proactive, international citizen and global leader if we don't move on either of those fronts?

The third question I want to raise really is to ask for some clarification because I'm not sure I totally grasped your comments about this debate or controversy around the merging or separating of foreign affairs and international trade. I have to say that the
paper in its complete failure, for example, to address human rights and human security
just reinforced, I have to say, my concern about the separation, so that international trade
can be completely unfettered in ignoring human rights issues and just turning its back
without even having a Minister of Foreign Affairs able in any way to account for that.

I wonder if I could ask you to clarify your comments on that?

(0950)

The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If I understood the first question, it was the impact of not doing
0.7 percent on our reputation?

Ms. Alexa McDonough: And our ability to really be a respected actor.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Well, the statement begins with, what is it, what's the overall
line. “A role of pride and influence in the world”. Influence comes from doing things, and
if you are not present--it's one of the reasons why I also expressed a certain hesitation
about the issue of focus. I'm reminded of a paper I read that said “focus pocus”. If we're
talking about the eradication of poverty strictly in its own terms or if we're talking about
it as part of our foreign policy, you might end up with a different attitude to how you
spend the money. It's certainly not the current conventional wisdom and it's not the view
taken by this paper which I'd have to say is a mainstream view, that we really ought to be
focusing our money and not dispersing it. But on the other hand, if you want to have
influence in a lot of countries, it doesn't take very much money to be spending in those
countries to have some influence. So from a sheer foreign policy perspective, there's a
question in my mind about it all.

But you do need money. Foreign policy takes money, and it takes as I've said a very
capable military. It takes very competent--CIDA with money to spend. If we don't give
them that money and if we're not perceived positively because 0.7% has become a kind
of symbolic test. That shows whether you're serious or not about it, whether you really
accept that this is an important issue. If we're not going to accept that, then I think we're
going to pay a cost in influence. I don't think there's any question about it.

Skepticism on middle powers and “progressive countries” , I'm very skeptical about
the idea of being a middle power. I always thought that was kind of an excuse. It was
about process--as you read in Jennifer Welsh's book, I think she's right. It was about
process, not results. I think we're big enough that we need to get past that.

I do agree with you that there's a role for progressive countries. It reminds me of a joke
I was told by an American diplomat, a crusty American diplomat who said that now that
Sweden has joined the EU, the job of world's mother-in-law is open, and are you
planning to run for it.
Ms. Alexa McDonough: A mother-in-law without a pay cheque apparently.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I've always been a little skeptical about that. I do believe the notion of being a kind of a good global citizen. It is manifestly in our interest to try to see progress on arms control, manifestly in our interest. If terrorism is the big issue and weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, what we are now told is the thing that we are to be most worried about. Doesn't it make sense to get rid of the nuclear weapons, and shouldn't that be an emphasis? I think to some degree, that is an emphasis in here, a good degree.

On the issue of the role between foreign affairs and trade, I really do believe that trade policy is part of foreign policy. It's integral to foreign policy. It's relations between governments. I don't think you strengthen your position by separating those things.

At the same time, these issues have to be integrated somewhere. They can be integrated in the Foreign Affairs department sort of half way up, three quarters of the way up, or they can be integrated at cabinet. But I don't think that it would be possible for modern government to say “Foreign Affairs will look after the humans right stuff and, Trade, you just look after selling guns”. I think that that stuff does have to get integrated and if it doesn't get integrated within the department, it's going to have to be integrated at cabinet. I don't see any way around it, and I don't think people would stand for a kind of tous azimut military sales policy.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Phinney.

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): Yes, thank you very much for being with us today.

You mentioned that you're pleased that this review confirms the thrust of the last budget, and you also mentioned that we need a military that's big enough. Do you think what we have in the last budget and what was suggested in the last budget, will that be big enough?

But further on near the end of your address to us, you said that the report doesn't mention putting boots on the ground, and if your answer is yes to the first part, what did you mean by this? It was just a very short statement, it wasn't explained. Could you explain why you mentioned that specifically?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: How much is enough? I don't know how much is enough on defence. This is a good start. I don't think there's any question about that. It might be better if some of it were more front-end loaded than back-end loaded, but there isn't much prospect, I don't think, that the money will not, one way or the other, be forthcoming. It
seems to give the Chief of the Defence Staff and the defence department the confidences and assurances they need.

You may actually need more money and more boots. I think 5,000 regular troops and 3,000 reserves is good. It wasn't very long ago that we had considerably more than that. When you add that to what we have now, we had an even larger capability, so that may well turn out to be...We'll see. If the world becomes more and more demanding, it needs more and more intervention. If you look around the world and ask yourself where you are going to need troops-

There are lights flashing. Is everybody fine?

😊 (1000)

The Chair: It's the opening of the House.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Somebody else is doing that, not us.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If you look around the world for where you may need forces, you look at the Congo, you look at northern Uganda, you look at southern Sudan. There are 10,000 who have just gone in there, and western Sudan. West Africa is always a candidate for more forces. One day there may be an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. That may take a substantial number of forces. We have Afghanistan. Something is happening in Nepal. Who knows what will go on between the Indians and the Pakistanis. There is an almost endless need of capable forces, and it's not up to Canada to provide them all, obviously, but if you want to be a responsible global citizen, you have to do your share, and we'll see whether the 8,000 new troops and the money to be spent on gear--and by the way, the defence department is talking about a much more modern force, more mobile, in some ways more lethal and more usable that what we've had, with a lot of emphasis on the ground forces, which are the people you need if you're going to be going to Darfur or places like that. That's what I was getting at. We are just providing logistics.

We're providing helicopters. We're providing communications and so on for the African force, but the evidence is that the situation is not being turned around in Darfur, and it may be that it won't be turned around until there is a militarily competent force. I don't mean any disrespect to the Africans, but they don't have the equipment and they often don't have the training. Until there's a force there that will make other people stand up and take notice and stop doing some of those things that they're doing...

Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Somebody said something about human rights that I didn't answer, that there's no reflection on human rights in this. I think there is actually. There is talk of the International Criminal Court, for one thing. There is talk of support for the new Human Rights Council on the multilateral side.
There may not be a section that says human rights.

There is talk about women's rights. It's one of those things where there's 120 pages and it's in there, and if you package it you get quite a bit, but they haven't said “economics, military, human rights”, which, by the way, was what we did in the 1984 review, which was close to dead on arrival.

Le président: Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

Now we'll go to Mr. Menzies, please.

Mr. Ted Menzies: Well thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. I find your remarks a breath of fresh air. It's quite interesting and informative for us.

I guess I would like to start off with a bit of a comment. We've watched since 1993 our ODA slashed by $9 billion and I'm assuming that it hasn't sat well with you. And as a comment, what we see in the development part of this policy statement, there's some glaring errors as far as I see. We've split the aid envelopes into a one-third, two-thirds and to me it looks like, and I would like some comments, your opinions on this, to me it looks like we've chosen the easy wins and we've left out those that are in the news, those that are serious, serious concerns to us and you've mentioned a few of them: Haiti, Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan and the Middle East.

We seem to have forgotten that we've got a peace process that is imminently necessary in the Middle East and we haven't addressed that. Those very important ones aren't even on the target list. They're left to the one-third envelope that probably is going to be some of the most difficult to resolve. That would be question number one.

I just came from a briefing on the African issues, on the knee pad process, and it was highlighted that the African Union does not want UN troops or Canadian troops on the ground. And I sense that you have some concerns with that and they've said that they would accept Canada and the United Nations help training African Union troops. And if you could comment on that too.

Third point--

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Who was it that said that?

Mr. Ted Menzies: This was a briefing that I was at this morning, some CIDA people who were talking about, just reiterating the African Union's position that they've stated that they're not comfortable. In fact they were pretty strong on the fact that they don't want Canadian troops or UN troops in Sudan, thank you very much, in Darfur, but they would certainly like some help in training African Union people to intervene in that process. So, some comments on that if you would.
Overall, I look at Canada's position as being weakened not only in international affairs but also in international trade. I've talked to a number of different countries that are saying where is Canada at the WTO? Where is Canada in international affairs? Some comments on those if you would, please.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'm sorry, I was trying to find a comment I had written in a margin that was pretty much the same as your first point. I'm not prepared to second guess exactly what they're going to do with the money because I don't think it's very clear, but I did write down Iraq and Afghanistan. Those are our two major destinations of ODA now and I don't think they qualify from a good governance, human rights, or from a lot of other considerations.

I'm not sure how we're going to square those numbers that they are talking about. I'm not saying they can't do it, but it's not evident to me that this will work out. This again goes back to the issue of focus that I was talking about. You need to have flexibility to be spending money in places like Haiti, Sudan, Iraq, and maybe in the Palestinian authority, and they may not be meeting the test of good governance and all of that sort of thing. They may not meet your test of focus. These are things that are going to have to be worked out on a kind of case-by-case basis I presume.

I think that they want to establish a focus because without a focus there's a tendency to be blown all over the map. So they say, we're going to try to focus on these, but the very fact that they're talking about a one-third that's not going to be focussed, I think is recognition that it really is impossible just to pick 20 countries and say that's it, that's all we're doing, and the rest we don't care about. There's also the millennium development goals and there are things we could be doing there as well, which would not necessarily be fitting within the focus.

As for the African Union not wanting foreign troops, I also heard the Sudanese ambassador saying they didn't want foreign troops. I'm not going to put myself up as an expert on Sudan, I just note that we're now approaching 200,000 dead, and ask at what point do we stop listening to people talking about their druthers and start doing something about it.

Mr. Ted Menzies: If I could--

The Chair: Just very short, please.

Mr. Ted Menzies: My third question.

The Chair: You're over, but go ahead, Mr. Menzies.

Mr. Ted Menzies: Our position at the WTO, our position in international affairs overall, I feel and sense that other countries are, shall I say, losing respect for our what should be a dominant position. We used to be a peacekeeper, where are we at now?
Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It depends on how you measure it. When I left the UN, in terms of UN peacekeeping we ranked 35th or 36th. I often had the experience of passing back requests that were turned down in Ottawa for Canadian participation at one level or another and very often not for many people and mostly that was the case with respect to Africa.

At the same time, I want to make a counterpoint and that is, as Ambassador at the UN I never had the impression that we weren't being listened to. I never had the impression that someone said, “oh well, there go the Canadians, you know they would say that wouldn't they, too bad they don't actually live up to what they say.” We always got a respectful hearing.

If you take the issue of Iraq, which was where we tried, and failed, to find a compromise between the Americans and basically the rest of the UN, probably we were the only country that could have done that. If you talk about the idea of bridging, that was a bridging effort there between the United States and everybody else. People listened to us, people welcomed the idea that we made the proposal, and a lot of people hoped that the major powers would accept it, including some of the people who were in the coalition who were very keen on the major powers accepting the compromise, etc. We were encouraged, for example, by the British to keep pushing our proposals.

I don't think it's the case that we have sort of fallen off the table in any perceptual sense, but I do think it's the case that we've been living off past successes to some degree and that we need to start reinvesting in our foreign policy. I think in the budget and in this statement there's quite a bit of reinvestment there. Whether it's enough, time will tell.

The Chair:

Thank you.

Now we'll go to Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Thank you again, Mr. Heinbecker.

Again, you've raised a number of very interesting points. I'd like to get your opinion on a couple of them.

One of them, of course, is the proposal in the study of the L-20. Based on the success that we had in G-20 as far as the human security agenda is concerned, in stabilizing nations, particularly as it relates to foods or relates to energy security, and of course being able to address more effectively, given the weight of the nations that would be proposed as part of that group. If you could give some opinions and your comments on that. This is certainly a bold step in the right direction, as this side of the committee believes.
Your comments on the Canada corps in relation to the situation as it relates to your own family, opportunities to become involved, not necessarily through foreign affairs but through other related organizations, and the importance that will play in terms of channeling Canada’s many energies towards long-term relief. Also, if I could get some of your comments with respect to the redeployment of personnel from the FAC to, as it were, a variant of putting more boots on the ground, but putting more officials from the department over into our missions, given what this document has recognized as being highly concentrated and Ottawa-centric. If you could, just comment on those.

Finally, I'm sorry to throw this in. You touched on the word “customs union”. Immediately, alarm bells went off in my head. I'm thinking of Zollverein in 1866, and of course the creation of Germany. I understand there have been some politicians and previous politicians, certainly Mr. Manley, who've talked about this idea. I'm wondering if you could expand on that a little bit, sorry, in the time you're given.

The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker:

Yes. I'll go as quickly as I can.

The L-20, I think, is a great idea. I should declare an interest. Our research centre is doing a lot of work on that in providing, together with our colleagues at the University of Victoria, ideas. We've had a series of about eight or nine meetings around the world, meeting with think-tank people and to some degree government officials from other countries.

Why is it a good idea? I think it's a good idea because the G-8 has just become too narrow. If you want to talk about exchange rates, the Chinese are not there. If you want to talk about failing economies, the Argentinians, and the Turks, and so on--by the way, the Turks are not failing anymore, but the economy's in difficulty--they're not there. If you want to talk about the security issues, which we do talk about, the security-consuming countries are not there.

While the G-8 can do a lot of things itself, it can make decisions that it will do things, its decisions are not going to carry conviction for people who are not at the table. So the individual members of the G-8 can decide what they're going to do, but that doesn't mean that the Argentinians are going to listen to what the G-8 says on the economic meltdown that they had. I think that's very obvious. So that's one thing.

The second thing is that leaders can do things ministers can't do. Leaders have broad responsibilities. That's one of the lessons of the G-8. If you have a broad agenda, you can work agreements across several different issue areas at the same time. Trade ministers can't do that. Foreign ministers can't do that. Finance ministers can't do that. It's only the Prime Ministers who can do that.
A third thing that happens is there's a relationship that develops between the leaders, networks get established, back channels get built. Issues become easier to manage when they understand the political situations facing each other. It's all very well for the President of South Africa to want more of this or that from the President of the United States in the abstract, but when he's had an opportunity to sit there on a regular basis for a day-and-a-half or two days, he begins to understand what's possible and what makes sense asking for and what doesn't make sense asking for, what he needs to give and what he needs to get. So you get a much better informed discussion.

Another reason is that there is nobody really looking at governance in a global sense. There are a lot of problems at the IMF. There are lots of problems at the World Bank. There are problems at the UN. The UNDP does some things. The World Bank does some things. The regional banks do some things. The IMF is doing something else.

At the moment, that stuff is not really being brought together. It can't be brought together because in some forums, you have finance department people, in other forums you have development agency people, in other forums you have foreign affairs people. These things just remain at loggerheads. There needs to be people who look down at these institutions from above.

The fourth thing is that there are inter-institutional problems. Right now we're looking at, if you're going to have an L-20 meeting, what would it do? Well, what it would do, for example, is look at international public health. That's one thing which, when you're talking about viruses that can transit the world faster than their incubation periods. We know from the local level, the city level, to the provincial level, to the national level, to the international level that we're not well-organized to deal with these things.

We're also worrying about bioterrorism. The response to bioterrorism is pretty much the same response as it to viruses. So we can combine these things. There's no institution in which actually, these kinds of ideas are perfectly housed. The WHO to some degree, and maybe that would be an operational one. But that kind of issue, and the linkages between issues, reside between institutions, and there's no one now looking after it.

Finally, I'd say, it's not a competition with the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council does peace and security. It meets at the level of ambassadors. It's a standing committee that meets virtually daily.

(1015)

Heads of government would meet once a year probably. I don't see them as being in competition. In fact, I think one of the good things an L-20 could do if it were already in effect would be to push UN reform and try to get some consensus among rather divided countries on what has to happen, for example, on responsibility to protect or dealing with terrorism and so on. I think that's a very strong idea.
On Canada Corps, I think that the paper makes a lot of good points. I think that the fundamental issue is that foreign policy increasingly goes beyond what governments do. There's a role for Canadians, and lots of Canadians, abroad. In fact, there are already a lot of Canadians abroad. One of the things that's striking when you go to places--I visited Angola and there's a man there who is running a very small NGO that has made an enormous difference. He got the Order of Canada, by the way. He made an enormous difference to the local community.

While the government was putting flagstones down on the Corniche so they could have a nice walkway, he brought a pipeline of water to a neighbourhood of 250,000 people who didn't have any. There are a lot of things that can be done by individual Canadians or by groups of Canadians and the Canada Corps I think is a good way of organizing and supporting that kind of thing.

More FS’s abroad I think is probably a good idea. We made a number of mistakes, I think we made mistakes, when we were making cutbacks in the Nineties. We tended to cut back on the most junior positions and then we found ourselves with a lot of junior officers and no place abroad to put them. I think that has actually become a morale issue. We should have been cutting more of the senior positions, which cost more anyway, and so we could have kept more junior positions.

In any case, FS’s are really the eyes and ears of Canada. It's all very well to read the New York Times and to read the Globe and Mail, but you don't really get a sense of what's at stake for Canada and Canadians unless you have people who can report on what's going on.

I'm not one of those people who thinks that it has to only be foreign service officers. I think we can make good use--I would point to Marcus Pistor, who is sitting here and used to be at the Canadian embassy in Bonn as a political officer. I think it makes a lot of sense to have people like that who understand the local scene, understand the language intimately, who can provide the kind of understanding that maybe you don't readily get or you don't get right away if you're a foreigner.

Nevertheless, I think we need to get more people abroad. I think it's the right decision, although it does cost money.

😊 (1020)

[François]

Le président: Merci. Nous allons maintenant passer à Monsieur...

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Customs union--
The Chair: I'm sorry, go ahead.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If the red states and the blue states became two countries, I'd be interested in a customs union.

[Français]

Le président: Monsieur Paquette s'il vous plaît.

M. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Merci monsieur le président. Alors merci pour votre présentation et vos propos. Vous avez signalé dans votre présentation qu'il est important que la politique étrangère soit connectée avec la politique commerciale. De ce que j'ai pu comprendre, vous étiez en accord avec le fait qu'un seul ministère chapeaute les deux missions. Comme vous le savez, le gouvernement a essayé de diviser les deux ministères en Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada ce qui a été refusé par le Parlement. Cependant il ne semble pas que le gouvernement ait pris acte de ce fait. Dans la présentation des crédits, nous n'avons pas vu de modifications dans la façon dont le gouvernement gère à la fois le commerce et les affaires étrangères.

Est-ce que vous pensez — et j'aimerais que vous élaboriez un peu sur les liens entre les deux — que le comité devrait, dans le cadre de sa consultation et éventuellement son rapport sur l'énoncé de politiques étrangères, faire une recommandation à l'effet que le gouvernement revienne sur sa démarche de scinder les deux ministères?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It's not up to me to make recommendations to the committee on what it should do, but if the committee wanted to make that recommendation, I don't see why that would be a bad thing.

I was there when the place was put together in 1984. It was very difficult. It took years to get it. The lesson of all of these major reorganizations--reorganization, in my mind, should be an ongoing thing. The world changes, life changes. You have to keep adapting to it. Major reorganizations sometimes perhaps are necessary, but no one should think it's going to be easy and it's going to be over quickly. They've been working at that over at Foreign Affairs and the street rumour is that there's a lot of bad blood created by it, a lot of argumentation over this position, that position, and it isn't obvious to me how people can be going through that kind of a process and at the same time be concentrating to the extent they ought to be concentrating on the international negotiations which matter so much.

So if the committee wanted to make that recommendation--I'm not a parliamentarian, I don't know the rights and obligations and rules and so on--but if that's within your power to make such a recommendation, if that's what you think, I don't see why you wouldn't make it.
[Français]

**M. Pierre Paquette:** C'est qu'un des arguments évoqués par l'Opposition tient justement à la décision administrative. Elle avait été prise avant qu'on ait l'ensemble de la consultation sur l'Énoncé de politique internationale du Canada. Alors, au bout du compte, il me semble qu'il serait normal que le comité, sur la base des consultations qu'on fera, émette une recommandation à cet égard: comment organiser le travail sur les deux missions fondamentales?

Toujours dans la suite de cette idée du lien entre les affaires étrangères et le commerce international. Vous savez que les sociétés de la Couronne, comme Exportation et développement Canada et Corporation commerciale canadienne, ne sont pas tenues de respecter les engagements internationaux que contracte le gouvernement canadien. Rien dans la loi ne les oblige à respecter les obligations que le Canada a contractées sur le plan international.

Pensez-vous qu'on devrait, dans le cadre des lois qui créent ces organismes publics, inscrire que leur mandat doit être compatible avec les obligations prises par le Canada sur le plan international?

[English]

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** I guess I'm not sure exactly of the specific cases you're talking about, and I'm not sure I understand fully what the mandates of those particular organizations are. If we got into a situation where the policy of the Canadian government, pursuant to a treaty, was to safeguard nuclear materials and a Canadian crown corporation was not paying attention to that, that would obviously be a major problem.

I'm not aware of issues of that kind. Maybe if you could tell me more specifically, I might be able to react more intelligently than I am now.

[Français]

**Le président:** Monsieur Paquette.

**M. Pierre Paquette:** Le Canada a signé un certain nombre de traités, et on a proposé un amendement lors de la création d'Exportation et développement Canada, qui s'appelait alors Société de développement des exportations. On l'a suggéré afin que le travail de la corporation — qui aide finalement des projets, des promoteurs à exporter ou investir à l'étranger — donc cette mission soit conforme aux obligations qu'a contractées le Canada. Le projet a été battu par les libéraux.

Mon argument allait dans le sens que si cela ne posait pas de problème, on pouvait l'inscrire dans la loi. Il semble que cela pose des problèmes. Je ne sais pas, je n'ai pas de
cas très précis en tête. Mais imaginons que, dans le cadre d'une activité, Exportation et développement Canada finance un promoteur qui a un projet dans un pays considéré menaçant, en vertu d'un traité, eh bien! il n'y a pas d'obligation, en tout cas sur le plan légal, pour Exportation et développement Canada de renoncer à ce projet. Bien sûr, la société d'État a d'autres obligations prévues dans la loi.

Je voulais avoir votre idée. Je comprends aussi que ce n'est peut-être pas votre domaine d'expertise.


[English]

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** The UN reform is certainly necessary. His report is timely. The reform is necessary.

There are some questions about whether it's possible, and they're quite significant. I'm not talking about the UN Security Council and how many people get a permanent seat. Of all of the issues we have to deal with that is, in some senses, the least important one. Maybe it's the most important to the people who want the seats, but far more important is to get some kind of consensus on the grounds for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

When has the international community a right to intervene in another country? We would argue, under the responsibility to protect, that when that country is abusing its citizens, when there are massive human rights abuses with widespread death and destruction, the international community must temporarily assume the sovereign duty of that country to protect its people, the sovereign responsibility. That's not agreed upon internationally. The Iraq war created a lot of confusion over that and a lot of suspicion. First of all, the war was justified on the grounds of weapons of mass destruction, which weren't found, a connection with terrorism, which wasn't there. Then it became a human security issue: saving the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein.

This ease with which the rationale has been changed has made a lot of countries very suspicious. It makes them suspicious in Darfur, and it makes it possible for the Government of Sudan to argue that this is one more case of the United States, or the west, or Christianity, or the old colonizers getting involved in its affairs. One of the things that the poorer countries, which feel themselves quite powerless vis à vis the big countries, one of their bulwarks against intervention and interference has been the notion of sovereignty and the principles of the UN that you don't interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In their own lifetimes these people have been colonized. They've lived in colonies. They've had other people coming and telling them what to do, and, in a lot of cases, it's been catastrophic, so they will not give up that bulwark of sovereignty easily.
That's where the consensus is lacking. That's why we can't get anywhere on Darfur. There's no consensus there. We think it's self-evident. People from Africa and other places think it's a lot less so.

Similarly, there is no consensus on the great issues of terrorism, weapons on mass destruction and so on.

Until you can get that kind of consensus, re-establish that kind of consensus, the UN is not able to help you very much. The UN is not an independent entity. There are some people who think that a real reform of the UN would be to make it a really independent entity, to give it the money, to give it a taxation authority, to give it the capacity to raise forces so that it could act independently. I don't think that's ever going to happen, or at least it's not going to happen for a long time, but in the absence of consensus on these major questions, the UN ends up being paralyzed.

It's no good blaming Kofi Annan for it because Kofi Annan is not responsible. The Security Council is responsible. He has proposed a number of very important things. On the use of force he's proposed a series of criteria which were derived from the Canadian-sponsored Responsibility to Protect report. Were that to be accepted by the Security Council, you would begin to get coherent behaviour on that issue, on when countries can intervene. That's extremely important.

He's said that the Human Rights Commission is an embarrassment and has to be got rid of. I don't think there's anybody in Canada probably who wouldn't agree with that statement. He's proposed a definition of terrorism, which is not perfect but which is extremely good and would take care of all those cases. Kenneth Roth was speaking to you, and he probably would have said the same thing. It means that the ends don't justify the means. You can never kill innocent people because you have a political agenda that you think is worthy of that. You can't go into a pizza parlour with a bomb.

It doesn't deal with state terrorism, and that's a weakness of it. It doesn't deal with terrorism that doesn't kill people. If somebody wrecked the Canadian communications network that would be an act of terrorism, but if nobody were killed by it, the definition wouldn't cover it. There are weaknesses in the definition, but, fundamentally, it covers most of what you have to have and it would be an enormous step forward.

If you can get some of those things plus the 0.7% which the secretary general is talking about, so you have more money flowing into the countries that can use it, I think that we can make an impact, a very broad based impact, but these things are really not easily done. And the last thing is changing the security council. The Germans and especially the Japanese argue that they put up so much budget money and there should be no taxation without representation. And the argument of most of the rest of the membership is “permanent” is a long time. Maybe some way should be found to reflect the contribution of some of these countries and a better way of representing them. The UN is not a
democracy. It's a representative body, and it needs to be more representative in its major decision making. But it isn't easy and there are a lot of people who argue that adding 10 members to the UN security council is not going to make it a more effective body, it's going to make it a more argumentative body.

😊  (1035)

**The Chair:** Thank you.

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** What it will do is it will make it much more difficult for the permanent members to cast their vetos because having a 23:1 outcome is even worse than having a 14:1 outcome, It would have probably an effect. It would probably diminish the use of the veto.

**The Chair:** Merci. Now we'll go for questions.

Ms. Phinney, please.

**Ms. Beth Phinney:** Yes, just on a short question, short answer.

This review included four departments. Some people have suggested it should also have included immigration. Could you just give a brief comment on that?

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** Yes, I think so. Immigration has operations aboard. It's a very significant part of our presence abroad. It's a very significant actor in our sort of national makeup, the immigration function.

This was another re-organization by the way. It took place in about 1993 when Immigration and Foreign Affairs separated and the immigration function was done separately. I don't think that was a very good separation either because immigration's just integral to what our missions abroad do. It's integral to our interests abroad, and it seems to me that--now the shortest paper here is 20 pages I think on commerce. Maybe immigration, it would be difficult to make a case for 20 pages, maybe you'd have to settle for 10.

**Ms. Beth Phinney:** Thank you.

**Mr. Paul Heinbecker:** But it is an integral part of our foreign relations, without any doubt about it.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

Do you have any questions, Ms. McDonough? Go ahead.

**Ms. Alexa McDonough:** Thank you.
Mr. Heinbecker, I'd like to go back to the millennium development goals. The reason I want to do so is because of the extremely powerful testimony that we received from Jeffrey Sachs, from James Wolfensohn, from Robert Greenhill, I mean everybody who's addressed this issue has made it clear that if you are truly committed to the elimination of poverty in the world and if you are truly serious about the importance of governments as it relates to genuine development and human progress, then at a minimum, the donor nations meeting .7% is critical. And secondly, that the millennium development goal magic, if I can put it that way, the power that lies in this major commitment is that it does deal with governance, that in fact to the extent possible, that there is true accountability attached to those governments that are receiving donor dollars that are part of rolling out their programs to achieve the millennium development goals.

In view of that, I guess I want to come right back to your very candid comments at the beginning about Canada trying to recover from 10 years of--you didn't use all these words but these are the words that have been used again and again before the committee “the withering reputation”, “the dwindling reputation”, “the deteriorating reputation” of Canada as a serious contributor to making poverty history, to achieving the elimination of poverty and so on.

I guess my question is how do we even see ourselves anymore as serious multilateralists and how are we seen by other serious players in the world as serious multilateralists if we talk about millennium development goals as something that's really important but we don't do the single most important thing on which the success of millennium development goals depends namely donor nations contributing to .7%? And I don't know whether you agree with the assertion of Jeffrey Sachs, I believe it was Sachs who said that if every donor nation actually delivered on .7%, we could literally make poverty history in maybe not today's world but tomorrow's world.

The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: In the back of my mind there's a caution and that is that it's about more than money.

To some extent I think there's some reaction internationally to the idea that all that's missing is the money. You put the money there and all of the other things will therefore follow.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: In due respect, if I can just say that wasn't at all the position put to us again and again by those who said money is an essential element. Money is a precondition, but the reason the millennium development goal is worthy and that we should make a serious commitment is because it does deal with much more than money.

The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker, I want to hear the answers.
Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If I understand correctly--excuse me.

The Chair: I want to hear the answer. Please go ahead.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The argument of Sacks, and I do think I understand correctly because I just organized a conference on UN reform, including this, is that the bulk of the money is not sufficient, that there are countries that are sufficiently well governed. Because part of the argument is then made “Well, it's a lot of money and we don't want to waste it and these countries can't absorb it and we can end up throwing it away. Then, a reaction is going to set in and we're going to have a backlash”.

The response is that there are a whole list of countries that are well enough governed that they could use the money well and they're not getting it now. That's one thing.

The second thing is the millennium development goals, he argues that they really will work, that it's not enough to halve poverty. It's not enough to do what's in the millennium development goals, but that the millennium development goals are achievable if you spend the money now.

If you wait even to the end of the year, according to people who work with Sacks, it's too late. You have to make the commitment now. You have to get this going by September because we're five years into the process, and if we don't start doing it now it just becomes mathematically--it starts becoming impossible. It adds up to too much money. Then it can't be absorbed.

So there is a very--I'm not sure what your specific question was, but if it was that the issue fundamentally is that most of the developed countries, with the exception of the United States, are going in the direction of accepting 0.7 because they think it's important symbolically, it's practical financially and it's practicable in development terms.

And if we don't do that, then people will draw some negative conclusions.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Heinbecker, I just have one last question. You just pinpointed and it's concerning Mr. Paquette's question and the fact that you just mentioned that your centre has recently had a major conference on reforming the United Nations.

My question is very simple: Are there any conclusions coming out of that conference that could be useful for our committee in order to advance the reforms that are most needed? Is there anything coming out of your conference?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It was a conference that was a little--it was almost as much of a retreat as it was a conference.
We brought together the President of the General Assembly and about 20 ambassadors, about an equal number of academics and another equal number of NGOs. All together it came to far more than we were expecting, but it was intended to be able to bring these people out of New York and have them sit down and talk across the table about what's possible and what they should do to implement it.

What it revealed was on the one hand that they all thought that the UN needed reform. On the other hand, there are still a lot of differences on the fundamentals of it and even on the wisdom of it.

But I think what I could say is the outcome was that we helped these people who will be on the floor trying to carry this process forward understand what's possible and what's not possible and a little bit about how to do it.

I'd be glad to give the committee a copy of our report. I'm not sure that it would be helpful in that sense, but it doesn't have clear cut things saying you must not change the Security Council. It's pretty much on the one hand and on the other.

**The Chair:** If you don't mind to provide a copy to our Clerk. The Clerk will provide it to all the members.

**Mr. Bernard Patry:** I think it was your experience.

Votre sagesse dans le domaine international, ce fut très intéressant pour nous ce matin.

Once again, thank you very much. Now, we are going to proceed to committee business. We're over with you.

I think we've got one minute for recess and we'll be back in one minute.

(1045)

**Le président:** Le comité n'est pas fini. Passons maintenant à un mot du comité *Committee Business*, Mme McDonough.
**Le président:** En attendant Mme McDonough, je vais tout simplement demander à tous mes collègues, vous qui avez reçu une liste de témoins suggérés en priorité concernant l'examen de l'Énoncé de la politique internationale du Canada, je demanderais donc à tous les collègues de bien vouloir faire valoir et donner vos préférences à notre greffier concernant les témoins qui vous sont suggérés pour que nous puissions aller de l'avant au mois de mai.

Mme McDonough s'en vient pour sa motion.

*English*

**Hon. Dan McTeague:** Could I speak to that motion? I just to be certain that's fine.

**The Chair:** Okay. In the meantime, Mr. Day has a motion also concerning observer election monitoring, election in Ethiopia.

**Mr. Stockwell Day:** Yes, Mr. Chair. I believe it's fairly straightforward. The elections in Ethiopia are very critical at this juncture in their development and we have received concern from human rights groups and others that the elections be properly monitored and deemed as fair.

The government has indicated that by proxy that we would have some observers there using possibly people who are going to be there already through the European parliament.

The various Ethiopian groups and expatriates here in Canada are concerned and would like to see actual Canadians present, that it would add great credibility to the election process and would work to possibly, if there were going to be any irregularities, it would be a deterring effect on possible irregularities.

And so the motion is in fact asking that the government supply observers even as we did in a very abundant and aggressive way on the Ukrainian elections, that the Government of Canada would do something similar related to the Ethiopian elections and that's what this motion is asking for.

♂ (1050)

**The Chair:** Mr. McTeague.

**Hon. Dan McTeague:** Mr. Chair, I understand the purpose of the motion but I wanted to remind the mover of the motion that Canada has always advocated quite strongly in keeping with the aid effectiveness principles for a harmonized approach to election support which would have the effect of maximizing the efficiency and minimized risks of multiple potentially contradictory observer statements.

Mr. Day may not be aware that the European Union and the Carter Centre will field over 200 short and long term observers as well as local observers. And with a good
contingent of international observers, Canada feels additional observers at this stage would probably not be required and for them to be effective, should be in place well before the election which is scheduled for May 15.

I understand the purpose of what he is trying to establish and what he is trying to do. We've certainly heard here from Mr. Axworthy who was here not a month ago and did not suggest that Canada should take that approach. And I suspect that we would not certainly want to redouble or duplicate or be redundant in terms of the effort and we believe that what Canada has done and what will be done there through various observatory organizations, monitors, is more than sufficient and certainly given the time constraints where they are already deployed. We would recommend not supporting this.

The Chair:

Fine.

Ms. McDonough.

**Ms. Alexa McDonough:** On a point of information, I wonder if the parliamentary secretary could indicate whether we now know or if he could find out, advise the committee, whether there is a Canadian contingent in the delegation under the umbrella of the Carter Centre. If there is not, whether to express, I think, the support and the intent of what is intended by the motion before us, whether it's possible for us to ensure that there is a Canadian contingent among those 200 representatives who could in fact report back to us in the direct way that I think would be much appreciated and desired.

The Chair: Mr. McTeague.

**Hon. Dan McTeague:** From what I understand here, at this stage there is no Canadian contingent with the Carter Centre, as relates to this election. There may be Canadians who are there. What I have here is that, of course, there is no separate Canadian technical support in the election. This is, of course, respecting the harmonization principles that were put forward under the UNDP.

As far as I know, there was agreement originally with the European Union that the greatest value of leading the observation process in fact on behalf of the entire donor community emphasized the European element as opposed to bringing in or inviting Canadians to do the same. I think we want to be faithful to that request by the Carter Centre and by the principles under which the observer status, or the observer mobilization was requested.

Canada's not been requested to do that. It might be nice to offer that, but at the risk of being both late to the game as well as being redundant, it may have the unintended effect of creating confusion where we want to really focus on the outcome of the election, and make sure that it is fair and that it is, in fact, conducted in a way that is transparent.
Le président: Madame Lalonde.

Mme Francine Lalonde: Monsieur le président, je voudrais profiter de l'occasion pour demander au secrétaire parlementaire ou à nos adjoints de nous fournir des renseignements sur ce qui fait office de politique actuelle au ministère des Affaires étrangères relativement à la participation aux élections dans les pays où l'on pense que cela peut être utile. Le Canada a envoyé plus de 500 personnes en Ukraine, et par ailleurs on ne sait pas s'il y en a dans d'autres pays qui pourraient avoir besoin de moins que cela. C'est une question dont on devrait débattre, de même que celle de la participation des parlementaires. J'avais manifesté que je voulais me rendre en Israël et en Palestine, et on m'a dit d'appeler une ONG qui s'appelle Khan—j'ai oublié son nom de famille—et finalement je n'ai jamais eu de nouvelles.

Le président: Très bien. Monsieur Paquette.

M. Pierre Paquette: Je voudrais ajouter, par rapport à ce que Mme Lalonde a dit, que dans notre cas il ne serait pas possible que quelqu'un du Bloc québécois se rende le 15 mai, compte tenu de la situation très particulière que nous vivons.

Le président: Merci.

M. Pierre Paquette: Il est difficile d'appuyer quelque chose auquel nous ne participerons pas.

The Chair: Very briefly. If we want to vote on this, we have four minutes left.

Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I understand.

Canada has contributed $1 million to the emphasis on this election. It is the fourth largest donor after Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Of course, we have put another $900,000 as part of a second component, which has been recently provided under the UNDP, the United Nations Development Program, as part of a harmonized funding arrangement, managed jointly by all donors.

I should point out that Canada reserves the right to express its own opinion in the elections without having its own observers, and may field a small embassy contingent observers on election day. For its overall assessment, Canada intends to rely on the European Union and U.S. observers, as well as our numerous civil society sources.
I want to tell you,

[Français]

Madame Lalonde, je veux souligner que dans le Centre Carter, il y a des Canadiens. Ils ne sont cependant pas déployés. Nous avons fait en somme beaucoup de démarches pour s'assurer que le Canada participe de façon légitime, de même qu'au plan financier.

[English]

The Chair: Merci.

Ms. McDonough, rapidly.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'd like to support the request for the policy of the department to be shared because there were many serious concerns raised about the process whereby 500 delegates were sent to Ukraine, and not pretty stories about people who had been given indication that they would be given an opportunity to participate, who had appropriate training, who had been on track for some time to do so, who were bumped for what appeared to be completely unacceptable, narrow, partisan reasons. I think there is a bigger issue about the policy.

Secondly, my question would be if we are in fact sending a finders to the Parliamentary Secretary close to $2 million in aid of this monitoring effort by the Carter Commission, I wonder if the Parliamentary Secretary could clarify if that means there are not any Canadians being sent to be part of that, or is that formally, officially, the word is there aren't, and in fact we're going to find out in the same way that happened with respect to the Ukraine delegation, that there is some other process going on that is not open to public scrutiny, and that doesn't exist within an established set of policy guidelines that are transparent.

The Chair: Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Ms. McDonough, the Ukraine experiment, I think by all objective analysis, went very well. If there was any complaint that may have come of this it's the overall enthusiasm of so many Canadians who wanted to participate. Specifically to this issue there is nothing hidden as far as I know. We're transparent and I've given you pretty much all that I can give you as it relates to Canada's significant contribution to the selection.

Canadians may have a question about whether there are in fact observer statuses, but I think it is incumbent on us to reinforce the leader organizations. The Carter Centre, of course, has an excellent reputation, and it has made decisions. If we want to attach individuals to ensure the money is properly spent, which I don't think is the intent of your question, I think we do that through our mission there. More importantly, I think
Canada's contribution can not be gainsaid, it's a strong contribution and it's one that we on this side are very comfortable with.

**The Chair:** Mr. Day, are you ready for the question or do you want other comments?

We've one minute left.

**Mr. Stockwell Day:** Just a comment and then I guess we'll call for the question.

Mr. Speaker, everything I've heard here from the government raises more questions than settles them. The fact that we've put over $1 million into the election process, the groups with whom I've met, Ethiopian expatriates, and others who are still there, indicate to me that there is little or no recognition of that money, or where it went. I'm not suggesting anything untoward here, but the impact of it is minimal, if in fact nonexistent. The situation in Ukraine warranted and was followed by a gigantic world-wide response. The number of monitors there was huge, and appropriately so. It was proven to have a deterring effect.

Quite frankly, Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, King,

**A Voice:** Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Stockwell Day:** I fail to see why Canada would not see the Ethiopian situation in just an extreme light. Frankly, the discussions that we're having here are not going to have any effect on the ground in Ethiopia. They're not calling for parliamentarians themselves. I've recognized, and my Bloc friends have recognized the difficulties with any of us actually going at this time, but they've asked for up to 100 Canadian monitors. There is no question in my mind that if that call went out, even from those who already have experience in the Ukraine situation, we would have 100. The money that's already been set aside for this to go to Ethiopia, that pool of money could easily be tapped into for the funding.

Here's the big question, Mr. Chairman, that I'd like my colleagues to consider. In the situation, for instance, related to Darfor, constantly this question arises internationally, if it's happening in a European context, or North American context, our cultural context, there seems to be a response, but when it happens in an African context, when there's possible suffering going on....It's just a question they ask, and I'm not suggesting there's anything untoward here. There's no cultural bias, but I'm telling you that's the question that comes up, and to answer the question, put it to rest, and help the Ethiopian people, Canadians on the scene would be a tremendous asset there.

I just call for the question on that.

😊 (1100)

**The Chair:**
Okay. You made your point.

Mr. McTeague for 10 seconds only.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Chair, I completely and utterly reject the insinuation of Mr. Day about the question of where money is put--

Mr. Stockwell Day: It is not coming from here. It comes from over there.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Day, I listened to you. Please listen to me because I think it's important. You put some very dangerous things on the record here, sir, and I don't think we have any point here in trying to do anything more than ensure that we are helping the people over there.

This government has been faithful in its commitment. You made substantial, wild allegations about where money is potentially going. I can only tell you that as it relates to elections, as it relates to our commitment through international organizations, Mr. Day, which you seem to have a problem with, we are prepared to commit and to continue to help the people of Ethiopia and we've done so in a very substantial way.

As for your accusations, your innuendo and other forms of intrigue, Mr. Day, that is not the kind of thing I think that comes of the effort that we're trying to make collectively as a Parliament. Sir, I think your comments there, regardless of how you have tried to sort of distance yourself from these things, is unfair and unacceptable.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chair, my remarks have been clear. There's been no insinuation whatsoever.

The Chair: No, please. I'll call the vote when I call the meeting to an end. Do you want to vote or call the meeting to an end?

Mr. Stockwell Day: Yes. Call the question, yes.

Le président: I call the vote on the motion of Mr. Day. You all have the motion.

All in favour of the motion of Mr. Day?

Against?

Motion carried.

The meeting is over. Thank you.