Canada Among Nations 2013
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This is the 27th edition of the Canada Among Nations series. While the series was conceived and developed at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University, it has, over the years, been produced in partnership with other Canadian institutions. This year sees the revival of the partnership between NPSIA and The Centre for International Governance innovation (CIGI), which was first forged for the 2005 edition. This partnership has been enhanced with the generous support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). This will be the first of three years in which NPSIA, CIGI and IDRC will work together on the series, and we all look forward to a productive and innovative collaboration.

Given the participating members of the consortium, it is not surprising that the topic for this edition focusses on a region where their mutual interests clearly intersect: Africa. But there is a deeper reason for this choice. The Foreword by the Right Honourable Paul Martin and the Introduction by the editors (Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy) highlight the timeliness (if not tardiness) of taking a closer look at Africa by Canadian researchers and policy makers. These chapters, and the Conclusion by Gerald Helleiner, describe the intersection of African and Canadian affairs and relations, and consider the future directions these relations may take. What emerges is the story of a continent where many (but not all) of its countries are poised to emerge from decades of frequent disappointment and neglect, with a new optimism that is creeping (sometimes even sweeping) across it. This nascent
Rohinton Medhora and Dane Rowlands

renaissance needs to be nurtured and accommodated. To maximize the benefits for Africans, and indeed for Canadians, our foreign policy must engage with Africa’s states and citizens in more imaginative and sustained ways. The task for the authors in this year’s volume of Canada Among Nations is to define what this new engagement should look like. Africa is not likely to become a Canadian foreign policy priority; few would argue that it should be. But the opposite of priority should not be neglect, benign or otherwise. A balanced and mutually beneficial partnership can be constructed with Africa just as Canada has done elsewhere, which we hope this volume demonstrates.

Canada Among Nations was established to explore different topics in order to shed light on how Canada’s foreign policies are formed, to provide the analysis by which those policies can be improved and to strengthen Canada’s research community around a particular theme. We at NPSIA and CIGI, with IDRC’s generous support, look forward to working together in coming years to continue this tradition.
The Right Honourable Paul Martin

The global significance of Africa’s growth over the past decade cannot be overestimated. As such, the 27th volume of Canada Among Nations explores our relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa at a pivotal time for the continent and for Canada. As Gerald Helleiner says in his concluding essay, “there is indeed a new Africa emerging, and Canada will have to respond to it.” This volume, with both retrospective and prospective prisms, provides a stimulating discussion on the need for Canada to strengthen its historic and, unfortunately, now waning relationship with the continent whose track is increasingly one of progress.

Africa currently has a population of just under one billion. In 2030, it will have a population of 1.5 billion, equal to or more than the anticipated populations of China or India. Of even greater significance, at that time, Africa will also have the largest population of young people anywhere on the planet. Coupled with the entrepreneurial instincts easily witnessed in its rapidly growing cities, a growing technology revolution and significant advances in health, Africa has the potential to become tomorrow’s engine of global growth, comparable to what China is today.

Although Canada is a wealthy country, our domestic market is simply too small to support our standard of living. If we are going to penetrate the new markets of the world, then we must do so when they need us, not just when we need them.
That said, age-old problems do not vanish because we wish them to. Economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty alleviation. The struggle for human rights and good governance remains a struggle. It is here that the moral and economic reasons for reviewing the declining interest in Africa by some of Canada’s “officialdom” become so urgent.

Canada’s long history in Africa is peopled by many, such as Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, whose devotion to human development led the way for the countless Canadian non-governmental organizations now working throughout the continent. Our bilingual nature gives us a distinct advantage over other international actors in that we are deeply involved with both Anglophone and Francophone Africa. Our mining companies are there, as are the African graduates of Canadian universities. We must not throw all of this away.

The rise of Sub-Saharan Africa has been led by the expertise and confidence of its own people. Although often referred to as a single narrative, individual countries have taken their own unique paths at addressing their challenges. For example, Nigeria has empowered the private sector creating economic growth that will build upon itself; Ghana has overcome the “resource curse” by reinvesting oil revenues to improve its schools and hospitals; Senegal’s civil society formed a coalition to help build a peaceful democratic transition in 2012; and Botswana is the textbook case for all developing countries.

Yet much remains to be done.

Five years ago, I co-chaired a High Level Panel responsible for submitting a report on a new strategic vision for the African Development Bank, the continent’s most important financial institution. One of the conclusions we drew was the need, building on the base of its many regional groupings, to build an African common market and the infrastructure required to make it possible.

The issue is quite straightforward. Africa’s small, fragmented and shallow markets offer no economies of scale and represent one of the most devastating consequences of colonialism. For example, although Rwanda and Saskatchewan are roughly equidistant from the ocean, Rwanda is landlocked while Saskatchewan has access to three oceans. The inability of so many African countries to achieve their export potential is surely an issue to be addressed. An even greater obstacle, however, is the inability of African countries to trade between themselves due to the lack of adequate rail and road infrastructure. Linking Africa’s distant home markets to each other
may not be a sufficient condition for economic growth, but it certainly is a necessary condition, as those of us who live in Canada’s vast geography can testify.

Similarly, Africa needs a common energy policy. While the world remains focussed on its potential for oil exports, should domestic Africa not seek to develop its potential for hydroelectric power? The Congo River’s partially developed Inga Dam is in a lamentable state due to civil conflict. If it were to be completed, it could electrify all of Sub-Saharan Africa and, surely if the will was there, the local benefits could go a long way towards bringing peace to the region. Hydroelectric power is an area where Canadians have unparalleled engineering and financial expertise. Eventually someone will take the lead. The question is will Canada be there?

The collection of essays contained in this volume provides the basis for an up-to-date and dispassionate analysis, with sections on the themes of foreign policy and diplomacy, security and conflict management, trade, investment and governance as well as development and health. The candid views found herein will, without doubt, further our understanding of the challenges and opportunities ahead — hopefully contributing to a long-term framework for a fruitful partnership between Africa and Canada.

Quite simply, Canada’s relationship with Africa is too strong to let it wither. That is why this edition of Canada Among Nations is so timely. Its critical review of past, present and future policy should be read by all those who are interested in what Canada’s world and Africa’s world will look like 10 years from now.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACBF</td>
<td>African Capacity Building Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>African Economic Research Consortium</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDF</td>
<td>African Development Fund</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AHSI</td>
<td>Africa Health Systems Initiative</td>
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<td>AIR</td>
<td>African Institute for Remittances</td>
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<td>AMCOST</td>
<td>African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APCE</td>
<td>African Peacekeeping Centers of Excellence</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHS</td>
<td>Canadian Academy of Health Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADEM</td>
<td>Canada’s Civilian Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAfrica</td>
<td>Canadian Council on Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCGHR</td>
<td>Canadian Coalition for Global Health Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSRC</td>
<td>Canadian Centre for the Study of Resource Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Canada Fund for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Canadian Francophonie Scholarship Program</td>
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CGD  Center for Global Development
CHET  Centre for Higher Education Transformation
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
CIDP  Canadian International Development Platform
CIGI  The Centre for International Governance Innovation
CIHR  Canadian Institutes of Health Research
CIIED  Canadian International Institute for Extractives and Development
COHRED  Council on Health Research for Development
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO  civil society organizations
CSR  corporate social responsibility
DDI  Diamond Development Initiative
DFAIT  Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFATD  Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DFI  Development Finance Institution
DFID  Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ED  executive director
EDC  Export Development Canada
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENHR  essential national health research
EVIPNet  Evidence-Informed Policy Network (WHO)
FDI  foreign direct investment
FIPA  Foreign Investment Protection Agreement
FIPPA  Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
FOCAC  Forum on Africa-China Cooperation
G8  Group of Eight
GBS  general budgetary support
GCC  Grand Challenges Canada
GHRI  Global Health Research Initiative
GPSF  Global Peace and Security Fund
HDI  Human Development Index
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank
ICMM  International Council on Mining and Metals
IDA  International Development Association
IDRC  International Development Research Centre
IFC  International Finance Corporation
IFIs  international financial institutions
IIAG  Ibrahim Index of African Governance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Industrial Cooperation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Institute of Applied Economic Research</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Kimberley Process</td>
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<td>KPCS</td>
<td>Kimberley Process Certification Scheme</td>
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<td>KT</td>
<td>knowledge translation</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>least developed countries</td>
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<td>LMICs</td>
<td>low- and middle-income countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Market Access Initiative for Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>multilateral development bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Muskoka Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIMAP</td>
<td>Micro Impacts of Macro and Adjustment Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCH</td>
<td>Maternal, Newborn and Child Health</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPSIA</td>
<td>Norman Paterson School of International Affairs</td>
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<td>NPTCI</td>
<td>Nouveau PTCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-S</td>
<td>North-South</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTPs</td>
<td>non-traditional providers</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Partnership Africa Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Partnership for Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERPA</td>
<td>Political Economic Relations and Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>Program Support Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTCI</td>
<td>Programme de troisième cycle interuniversitaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB</td>
<td>regional development bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>regional member countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPI</td>
<td>Réseau de recherche sur les politiques industrielles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SMEs  small- and medium-sized enterprises
SPLA  Southern People’s Liberation Army
SSC   South-South cooperation
SSDC  South-South development cooperation
START Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TEHIP Tanzania Essential Health Intervention Project
UNAMID AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMISS UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UPeace University for Peace
WEF   World Economic Forum
WHO   World Health Organization
Introduction

Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy

This, the 2013 edition of Canada Among Nations, is about Canada’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, or Canada-Africa relations for short. It is a book that is untimely, but only in the sense that it is long overdue. It is timely because a new Africa (a narrative qualified further below) has emerged in the last decade. It is long overdue because Canada has never had a clear, coherent and overarching Africa policy. Writing about Canada’s relations with Africa almost four decades ago, Robert O. Matthews (1975: 568) concludes his article by saying: “Canada’s relations with Africa are thus neither wholly altruistic nor entirely self-seeking, though certain dimensions of these relations may approximate one end of the spectrum more closely than the other. For the most part, Canadian policies towards Africa reflect the ambivalent and often contradictory nature of Canadian interests.” To be sure, “coherence” is seldom a feature of any country’s relations with any other country, and scholars routinely decry its absence, while also recognizing that international relations are driven as much by long-term interests as they are by short-term exigencies. But Africa’s marginal status in Canadian foreign policy is a fact, as is the paucity of systematic analyses of the range of Canada-Africa relations.

This lack of a coherent policy may have been true in the past, and it is perhaps not surprising given that Canada has been largely preoccupied with managing its relations with its largest trading partner, the United States, as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. But times have changed; both the United
States and several European economies have been struggling in the last few years, while emerging markets are likely to drive global growth once again this year. Geoffrey York (2012), in the first of a six-part series on Africa in The Globe and Mail, has recently argued that the rise of Africa will have important implications for Canada’s aid policy, Canadian mining and energy companies, and Canadian manufacturers looking for future destinations for their goods. Many countries, most notably China, have already responded to the trend of “Africa rising” by increasing their presence in the region. In response to these trends, Canada needs clear guidance about its policy towards Africa and a thought-provoking discussion on what should define Canada-Africa relations in the coming years. The need to engage a rising Africa in an increasingly competitive environment is one of several themes that is discussed in this volume and was candidly debated during the authors’ meeting in Waterloo, Ontario. Additionally, despite the dramatic political changes that have swept across North Africa and the Middle East in the last two years, including Canada’s recent role in Libya, a conscious decision was made early on in the project to not include North African countries in the various chapters of this collection in order to strike the right balance between depth and breadth of analysis.

The objective of this current volume was thus to analyze the ebb and flow of Canada’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through different lenses over the past several decades by looking back and looking forward. The goal of the chapters in this book is to highlight both the opportunities and the difficulties that exist for Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa at a crucial moment in the latter’s development, and at a time when the current Government of Canada is sometimes slowly, but always surely, reshaping many elements of Canada’s foreign policy. To be fair, despite the lack of a comprehensive policy, Canada’s relations with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have a long history, which was initially driven mostly by humanitarian and development assistance that aimed to help the newly independent countries of Africa. Even if very ad hoc and reactive, Canada’s engagement, whether it was for developmental reasons, peacekeeping, nation building, democracy promotion or human rights, reflected familiar Canadian values. Commercial interests, although present, have never been a defining feature of that relationship. The influence that Canadian domestic politics, especially as it relates to Quebec and national identity questions, has had on Canada’s engagement with both francophone
and anglophone countries in Africa cannot be discounted. The collection of papers in this volume — written by academics, former government officials, as well as people from the non-governmental organization (NGO) and private sectors — cover a range of issues that have defined Canada-Africa relations under the following broad areas: security, peacekeeping, diplomacy and nation building; trade and investment (with special emphasis on the natural resource sector where Canadian firms are heavily invested, as well as corporate social responsibility); and development, health and research capacity. In the tradition of good academic scholarship, authors were encouraged to formulate their arguments clearly at the beginning of each chapter, to be critical and analytical, to take stock of what had been accomplished to date, and to offer their thoughts and recommendations going forward — no small feat given the severe time and space constraints that they faced.

“AFRICA RISING” AND CANADA-AFRICA RELATIONS

The narrative about Africa has become more optimistic in recent years. Whereas famine, conflict, disease and poverty made headlines in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as in the early post-colonial years, the recent discourse (for example, in articles in both The Economist [2011a; 2011b] and by Alex Perry in Time Magazine [2012]) have been about “Africa rising” as a result of several factors. First, and foremost, is Africa’s growth performance. Despite the 2007-2008 food crisis and the global financial crisis, a diverse group of countries that includes Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Rwanda, have been among the fastest-growing economies in the world over the 2001–2010 period, and several African countries are projected to grow at more than six percent over the next few years. Due to deficiencies in standard household surveys of wealth, income and consumption, the accompanying increase in living standards might have been systematically and significantly understated (Young, 2012). Still, in spite of this impressive growth and living standards performance, the number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa — defined as those living on less than $1.25 day — has increased in absolute terms from 1999 to 2008; however, because the population of many African countries also increased, the head-count ratio (the number of poor people relative to population) fell by more than 10 percentage points (see Table 1).\1
While the role of natural resources in fuelling the African boom is still much debated, according to a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, a decomposition of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000 to 2008 shows that one-third was from the natural resources sector (due to the boom in commodity prices), while the rest came mostly from the manufacturing and service sectors; the main explanations for this growth acceleration “were improved political and macroeconomic stability and microeconomic reforms” (2010: 2).

**Table 1: Selected Indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (%)</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>25.82</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>27.20</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>33.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>142.30</td>
<td>125.86</td>
<td>110.20</td>
<td>102.20</td>
<td>83.35</td>
<td>69.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>44.46</td>
<td>48.04</td>
<td>49.52</td>
<td>49.73</td>
<td>54.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and above)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>53.23</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>62.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head count (%), 2005 PPP* and $1.25/day PL*</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>51.45</td>
<td>56.53</td>
<td>57.89</td>
<td>47.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from World Development Indicators (World Bank), except for Human Development Index (UN Development Programme) and Headcount (PovcalNet). *PPP indicates purchasing power parity; PL indicates the poverty line.

*The Economist* identified several promising signs for the “Africa rising” narrative: the emergence of a middle class; improvements in labour productivity; increases in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows; declines in inflation, foreign debt and budget deficits; and a possible demographic dividend in the future (2011b). For example, FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa increased from US$1.2 billion in 1990 to reach US$40.9 billion in 2011, representing a more than 33-fold increase (Figure 1). Over
the same period, exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP has increased by seven percentage points, and both exports and imports of goods and services have more than quadrupled since 2000. Although there has been a slight improvement in recent years, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of world trade is very small, and the same is true of FDI (discussed below). However, there has been a diversification of trade towards emerging markets and an increase in intra-regional trade in recent years (Sundaram, Schwank and van Arnim, 2011). We note in passing that although concerns about the quality and intent of foreign aid persist, per capita aid to Sub-Saharan Africa by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) donors more than doubled from 2000 to 2010; net aid received by the region has been on an upward trend since 2000 and exceeded US$40 billion in the past few years.

In addition to the drivers of growth identified by the McKinsey Global Institute report, The Economist also considered the application of technology (such as increased cell phone use, and improved health care as a result of more and better bed nets to fight malaria and reduced HIV-infection rates) as an important factor (2011b). And who can fault them for being so optimistic when per capita income shrank in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 2000, and when the number of civil wars was at its highest in the early 1990s. A lot of progress has taken place on the political front as well. The wave of democratization that began in the mid-1980s has clearly transformed the continent in the last two decades. Governance has improved since 2000, according to the 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2012) and almost 60 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are now ranked as “free” or “partly free” by Freedom House (2013).
Once one gets past the headlines, however, cautious optimism seems to be more appropriate. Simply put, much of the discourse and the numbers that are presented are about Africa in the aggregate and on average. As such, the aggregate numbers do not reflect the trajectory of every particular African country. Indeed, when one examines country-level data, a different picture emerges because of the considerable variation in performance across countries. Given the volatility in Africa’s growth performance historically (Arbache and Page, 2007), it remains to be seen whether the kind of growth that has been observed in the last few years is sustainable over the long term.

Achieving sustainable growth in Africa is important because prolonged economic expansion is necessary in order to achieve meaningful poverty reduction, as has been the case in East Asia (and China specifically).

The increase in FDI (Figure 1) is another example of how overall numbers can be misleading. In the African (and Sub-Saharan African) case, the share of world FDI when compared to other developing regions is very small and highly concentrated in the mining and extractive industries; its impact on broad-based development is highly questionable, to the extent that it does not lead to significant job creation, export diversification or even the transfer of technology (Sundaram, Schwank and van Arnim, 2011). More broadly,
the question of the dominance of the raw materials sector in contemporary African development and policy remains a live one. The McKinsey results cited above thus sit at odds with the findings of other studies. There is a quite serious concern that the “renaissance” has not been accompanied by economic diversification or a significant strengthening of economic and political institutions (Ajakaiye and Afeikhena, forthcoming 2013); at the very least, the opportunities for exploiting the commodities boom to broaden and deepen development outcomes have not yet been adequately seized (Morris, Kaplinsky and Kaplan, 2012). The question of the sources and sustainability of Africa’s growth remains an open one, for scholarship and for policy. It is worth noting that in the past few years, much of the discussion has focussed on the new phenomenon of South-South FDI, especially from China and India, in resource extraction as well as other sectors such as infrastructure and telecommunications.

When we examine data from the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2013 Human Development Report, we find that even though the average Human Development Index (HDI) score for the region has improved over time, the gap with other regions has also widened since the 1980s; the 10 worst performers on the HDI are all from Africa (UNDP, 2013: 151). The demographic dividend which the continent is expected to benefit from is not guaranteed unless economies are democratized to allow greater participation of citizens, and unless people are educated and jobs created for them. Concerning political stability and overall security, the current situation in Mali is a reminder of how quickly things can change. More generally, although the number of civil wars has declined to about half of what it was in the early 1990s, several countries remain in a precarious position. The top five countries on the 2012 Failed States Index, which is an annual ranking of countries based on their levels of stability and capacity published by the Fund for Peace, are all from Sub-Saharan Africa (Fund for Peace, 2012). Several other Sub-Saharan African countries are in the top 20 and all of these fragile states will not meet most of the UN Millennium Development Goals. When one examines Freedom House data more carefully, the peak in the percentage of countries ranked “free” or “partly free” was reached in 2005, and since then has dropped by about 10 percentage points (Freedom House, 2013). According to the IIAG, countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and South
Africa have seen deteriorations in safety and rule of law, and participation and human rights, in the last six years (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2012).

In light of the above, the narrative of “Africa rising” or an “African renaissance” is one that deserves qualification, and we hope we have made a case for being more cautious when examining the evidence. But more importantly, how do Canada-Africa relations fit into all this? “Inconsistent,” “episodic,” “narrow,” “disconnected” and “difficult” are some of the qualifiers used by the authors of this volume to describe Canada-Africa relations as it relates to development, trade and investment, nation building, post-conflict reconstruction and relationships with South Africa. A Canadian presence on the continent through trade and investment remains very limited today, even if there is a feeling that our initial engagement in Africa, which had to do with our “humane internationalism” as reflected in development, poverty reduction and promotion of human rights, has given way to a more commercial relationship. Less than one percent of Canada’s exports go to Africa, while Canadian imports from Africa were about three percent in 2011, according to data from Industry Canada (Industry Canada, 2011). Likewise, Canadian direct investment to Africa was 0.5 percent of the total stock of investments abroad (Government of Canada, 2011). But, as suggested in the chapter by Schorr and Hitschfeld in this volume, this is perhaps an opportunity for the Canadian government to be more proactive and help the private sector develop more trade and investment relationships. The mining sector is an important part of Canada’s investment abroad, and, after Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa was the second destination of Canadian mining assets abroad in 2009 and 2010. Canadian aid, which has been the subject of much criticism in recent years, is still an important component of Canada-Africa relations. Although eight African countries were dropped from the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA’s) list of countries of focus in 2009 and seven African countries remained, Canadian aid to Sub-Saharan Africa continued to increase and was US$1.3 billion in 2011 after reaching an all-time high of US$1.4 billion in 2010 (OECD DAC, 2011). To the extent that aid is a proxy for our “humane internationalism,” the data thus does not fully support the view that the latter is declining, notwithstanding the fact that our relationship with Africa seems to be more on a commercial basis as highlighted above. The trend going forward, and the nature of Canada’s
assistance to the continent, remains open to conjecture, and forms an abiding preoccupation in many of the chapters in this volume.

These elements — of change on the continent, change in the Canada-Africa relationship, tension in the Canadian response, and the need to forge a clearer sense of why we deal with Africa and how we do so — run throughout the chapters in this volume, and are reprised by Gerald Helleiner in the concluding essay.

We provide an overview of the different chapters in the next section.

THE CHAPTERS

The chapters of this book on Canada-Africa relations are organized according to the following five broad themes: diplomacy and foreign policy; security and conflict management; trade, investment and governance; development and health; and research capacity.

In the first section on diplomacy and foreign policy, David C. Elder takes us through a rich tour of Canada’s diplomatic engagement in Africa over the past century, focussing on how relations were established with countries of the Commonwealth as they became independent, as well as the establishment of relations with countries of French-speaking Africa and other countries, arguing that the latter was part of a less-structured process. Rather than an expression of the overarching conception of the role Canada should play in international affairs or based on an assessment of Canada-Africa relations, Elder argues that it was a combination of factors such as the geopolitical and security situation and relations with its allies, humanitarian factors, concerns for equity and social justice, development imperatives, and economic and commercial interests, that have shaped Canada’s foreign policy towards Africa. Over time, other factors such as immigration to Canada and increased mobility of Canadians have become more important; however, as trade and investment promotion were prioritized, reporting on political matters declined and resources have been cut, especially on relations with Canada in countries of secondary accreditation. David J. Hornsby examines Canadian engagement with South Africa and argues that this relationship has declined in recent years, even if historically the two countries were quite close — for example, each country seems to be less important to one another when one examines aid and trade flows. However, given South Africa’s regional
importance, Hornsby argues that this relationship should be important to Canada as it attempts to engage with the region, because South Africa is still comparatively well-governed and democratic, an economic powerhouse on the subcontinent and a leader in many regional forums. According to Hornsby, this engagement could take place via areas of mutual interest that include a focus on regional economic development, international agricultural liberalization, regional security issues and democracy development. **David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Dacia Douhaibi** make the case for Canada to develop a diaspora policy that will both shield diaspora groups from being used instrumentally by the state and prevent the state from being captured by diaspora interests. Drawing on an analysis of two African diaspora communities (Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia) within Canada, they point out how these diaspora communities currently interact with their home countries, how they might affect policy in the future and how Canada could potentially leverage these communities to aid in its foreign policy and help stabilize and develop each respective diasporas’ home country. In their view, Canada currently lacks a coherent diaspora policy, which is problematic because diaspora groups in Canada are rapidly growing and because such groups can have a large influence on Canada’s foreign policy. In an examination of Canadian nation building in Africa, **Chris Brown** concludes this first section by arguing that the history of Canada’s official engagement has been “episodic” and “inconsistent” over time and across countries. The episodic nature of Canada’s foreign policy in Africa results from the fact that Canada lacks any core national interests in the subcontinent. After parsing the concept of nation building and reviewing 50 years of Canada’s diplomatic engagement in Africa, Brown identifies a single consistent and common thread throughout Canada’s decades of engagement — namely, that when and where Canada has engaged Africa, it has done so with an eye toward building the Canadian nation, with all the ambiguity that that concept might imply.

Under the second theme of security and conflict management, **Robert I. Rotberg**’s chapter on state fragility in Africa compares and contrasts the features of strong and fragile African states and argues that poor governance, and poor leadership in particular, are the primary causes of state fragility in Africa. In his view, donors such as Canada should focus their efforts on building the leadership capacity of future African leaders, by, for example,
holding leadership workshops that bring together carefully selected groups of likely persons of future influence, similar to the African Leadership Council in 2004. The next two chapters, by **Evan Hoffman** and **Edward Ansah Akuffo**, examine the issue of peace building. Hoffman argues that there are number of problems with the way that Canada currently approaches peace building. In particular, he criticizes Canada for spending too much on responding to humanitarian issues and not enough on peace building, shifting away from its traditional image as a mediator nation, and for focussing too selectively on individual countries when many issues are regional in nature. Hoffman makes this argument by looking at the peace-building opportunities Canada has taken and missed in recent years, which he then uses to suggest ways in which Canada can chart a way forward. He concludes by suggesting that Canada should become more transparent about its interests and goals, recognize the interdependence between peace building and economic growth, and spend more resources on peace-building activities. Using a constructivist framework, Akuffo argues that Canada’s peace and security efforts in Africa have been primarily driven by efforts to maintain its identity as moral actor, which has prevented it from developing a long-term strategy to promote Canada’s national interests. Such an approach is not sufficient to ensure its continued importance in Africa during the current period of dynamic African growth, and Canada will need to back its moral identity with substantial, long-term support of the African Union’s efforts to promote peace, stability and development.

**Victoria Schorr and Paul Hitschfeld** open the section on trade, investment and governance by arguing that the attention of Canadian businesses has not kept pace with the growth rates of a “rising Africa,” which in their view might increase even further if Africa can harness its demographic dividend. However, they also recognize that Canada-Africa trade numbers are relatively very low for the following two reasons: first, government programs such as foreign investment and protection agreements and Market Access Initiatives for Least Developed Countries have not gotten a lot of traction in African markets; and second, Canada and Africa have a lot of commonality in some export lines, such as natural resources, so trade between Canada and Africa in these areas is unlikely. The authors conclude by considering what can be done to increase trade and economic interaction between Canada and Africa. They argue that Canada should engage more with African countries, and it
also needs to address the erroneous perception among Canadian business and investors that Africa does not present a wealth of opportunities for Canadian companies. In the following chapter on mining codes in Africa, **Hany Besada and Philip Martin** focus on four stages or “generations” of regulation and deregulation. In particular, they highlight that an initial period of liberalization and deregulation has, over the past decade or so, given way to an increase in self-regulation via the emergence of corporate social responsibility principles that now guide the extractive industries. The authors highlight that while there are some good things to come from the newest round of “industry self-regulation,” it is not as effective because host states lack the capacity to enforce standards onto companies. They then describe some of the activity of Canadian mining companies in Africa and point out that Canada’s current approach to the extractive industry sector is a combination of public and private collaboration, which aims to allow the extractive sector to operate while also ensuring that the economic activity of the miners contributes to economic growth in the host country. Lastly, and echoing the previous chapter, they describe the growing importance of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries in the extractive industry in Africa. They note that more mining companies results in more competition for contracts, which can provide African states with more leverage to get development enhancing deals. However, they also note that much of the involvement of BRICS companies in African countries takes the form of “land grabs” or is perceived as unaccountable by locals. The authors conclude that Canada needs to focus on promoting transparent and accountable mining contracts, and call for a “re-imaging” of current legal codes and “refocussing” of efforts for promoting broad-based economic development through natural resources.

**Ian Smillie’s** chapter focusses on the specific case of global governance of conflict diamonds through the Kimberley Process. After reviewing the history of diamonds and their connection to conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and pointing out how the brutal conflicts in these countries were exacerbated by the presence of alluvial diamonds, he outlines the positive role that Canada has played, both via non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Partnership Africa Canada and at the United Nations, in identifying the link between conflict and diamonds. Smillie also outlines the positive role that Canada played in the Kimberley Process, which restricted
the sale of rough diamonds. He concludes by pointing out that unless the Kimberly Process is reformed to better deal with non-compliance and avoids the pitfalls of a consensual decision-making process, new processes will likely emerge, whether unilaterally or multilaterally. Given that diamonds are important to its northern communities, and that it is a major international player in other extractive industries, Smillie argues that Canada has much to gain from making this process work, in its own right and as a possible model where other minerals and other kinds of conflict are concerned. Another area for potential Canadian leadership is in finding solutions to generic development issues such as the problems of artisanal miners.

The first two chapters of the section on development and health, by Stephen Brown and Bill Morton, deal with aid policy. Brown argues that Canadian aid to Africa has responded to different imperatives and motivations over time, and has been increasingly driven by commercial self-interest in recent years. The latter, he argues, will lessen the impact that Canadian aid has on poverty reduction as it is increasingly shifted to countries with natural resources that are of interest to Canadian companies. Morton also examines Canadian aid policy, but specifically in terms of how it relates to aid from non-traditional providers (NTPs). After reviewing the policies and practices of two important NTPs of aid to Africa, namely Brazil and China, Morton discusses what these mean for Canadian aid policy. In particular, he suggests that there are three areas where Canada needs to respond to the growing role and influence of NTPs in Africa: making aid delivery more speedy and predictable; providing aid with fewer conditionalities and giving partner countries more control of the use of aid provided to them; and acknowledging that its aid is provided for both altruistic and self-interest reasons (in order to create a more transparent and mature relationship). Both Brown and Morton make the point that Canada lacks an overarching framework for its development cooperation, as well as any strategic framework for its engagement in Africa. Betty Plewes and Brian Tomlinson examine the engagement of Canadian civil society organizations (CSOs) in Africa since the 1960s. They identify five key trends and challenges for future CSO roles in Africa: crowding out by international NGOs; a government that has moved away from supporting CSOs that engage in policy and advocacy work; declining engagement by Canadian citizens; difficulty in securing stable funding for long-term partnerships; and difficulty in securing funding for longer-term
reconstruction and peace building, relative to shorter-term humanitarian assistance. The authors lament the fact that a once “collaborative, responsive and flexible” relationship has been damaged by the current government, and conclude that it is high time that Canadian and African CSOs meet and discuss how best to respond to the shifting environment in which CSOs now operate. **Bruce Montador** examines Canada’s relationship with the African Development Bank (AfDB), arguing that it played an important role through its above-average contributions, especially during the recent financial crisis, and its role as an “honest broker.” He points out that the AfDB is in turn an important multilateral partner for Canada, because the bank’s continent-wide coverage allows Canada to demonstrate its continued commitment to all of Africa, despite the increasingly focussed nature of its bilateral aid. Montador concludes by highlighting a number of areas in which Canada could continue to advance its role on the AfDB, such as encouraging more participation from emerging donors, stressing the need for regional integration, and helping countries develop the regulatory framework to deal with resource boom-and-bust cycles. In the view of the author, Canada could do more by building on past contributions and current common interests, and such a re-engagement would be timely given a renewed interest in Africa’s economic prospects. This would make up for the political engagement that several contributors to this volume have noted as lacking. **David R. Black** examines the Muskoka Initiative (MI), which focussed on promoting maternal, newborn and child health, with most of the funding designated for Africa. Black argues that the MI “needs to be understood, in part, as an effort to refresh and recast the ethical identity of the (Conservative-led) Canadian state, and that it was indeed a ‘good initiative.’” However, despite being an admirable undertaking, it was compromised by the secretive and controversial process by which it was implemented, by the government’s inability to clearly articulate and analyze the gender dimensions of the initiative, and by the disconnect between its goals and the way in which Canada has actually focussed its aid. In Black’s view, such weaknesses echo the ongoing failure of Canadian policies in Africa, in particular, as they relate to global health. This finding provides a nice segue to the next chapter by Dr. Victor Neufeld, whose central argument is that, despite modest improvements, Canada’s efforts to promote health research in Africa are still hindered by a number of problems, such as fragmented investments, imbalanced research partnerships and the
need for better knowledge translation. Dr. Neufeld reviews several Canadian health research initiatives since 2000, and argues that Canada’s footprint is very small when compared to other high-income countries. He concludes that Canada needs to better align its health research investments with the priorities of its African partners, ensure that asymmetries between nations do not become barriers to collaboration, and work to translate discoveries into practical outcomes. He specifically makes a case for the continuing support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian francophone health research community.

In the final section on research capacity, John Cockburn and Diéry Seck argue that past engagement between Canada and francophone countries has led to an increase in human capacity in many African countries, but that recent cuts endanger the gains that have been made. Focussing on the efforts of the IDRC, they describe how Canada’s assistance has helped develop capacity in francophone countries through grant funding, an emphasis on socio-economic elements of development, graduate training and a pooling or networking of research talent. Their conclusion is that Canadian efforts have been too diffuse and should thus be more focussed in order to be effective. They propose that Canada renew its commitment to research focussed on socio-economic policy in francophone Africa, focus on tertiary school and graduate training, and more thoroughly incorporate local expertise into development initiatives. Jeffrey C. Fine and Peter Szyszlo review three elements of academic links between Canada and Africa, namely doctoral education, research and institutional capacity building. Focussing on the first two elements exclusively, they note that there is a rapidly growing demand for post-secondary education in Africa, but that resources and capacity to meet that demand are lacking. Furthermore, although collaborations with Africa used to play a larger relative role, they argue that there is now more interest to establish partnerships with China, India and even Latin America. They suggest by way of recommendations that the linkages between Africa and Canada should be recast as something other than development assistance and that the engagements should be done as equals. Additionally, Canadian funding institutions should provide “global bonus” grants to help maintain and develop more linkages between Africa and Canada.

In the concluding chapter of this book, Gerald Helleiner notes that more than ever there is a need for policy-relevant research by Africans
and Canadians on Canada-Africa relationships and that “open criticism be encouraged and welcomed.” Recognizing the “enormous diversity of African experience,” Helleiner outlines four major themes from the above chapters. First, Africa is changing, and while problems persist, there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that there is a “new Africa” emerging, one that will be richer and more assertive than before. Second, Canada-Africa relations are also changing and, increasingly, Africa has become assertive and vocal about what it wants from this relationship. Given the changing nature of the relationship from one that was traditionally dominated by development imperatives to the now growing role of commercial opportunities and the private sector, new policy and institutional instruments will be required. Third, Helleiner points out that there are tensions in how Canada is responding to a “new Africa,” especially as they relate to policies of CIDA; in particular, when the interests of African states and Canada conflict, whose interests are to be prioritized? Existing policies are “inconsistent and confused” and more clarity of where we stand is needed. Fourth, and more generally, Helleiner summarizes that Canada needs a coherent strategy towards Africa. The incoherent nature of Canada’s foreign policy towards Africa has limited its influence and effectiveness in African countries and Canada-Africa relations would benefit from a “transparent and predictable road map.”

Just as the manuscript for this volume was being finalized, the Government of Canada announced in its annual budget the amalgamation of CIDA into the now renamed Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). Several of the chapters in this volume assess the implications of this move on specific aspects of the Canada-Africa relationship. By definition, it is early days to do anything but speculate. We are clear, as are many of the authors in this volume, that Canada’s engagement with Africa goes well beyond aid, and that a policy that strikes a balance between the various imperatives — poverty alleviation, trade, security, democratization — while recognizing changes on the continent itself, is in order. At the broadest possible level, the amalgamation appears to point in the same direction. But whether policy “coherence” follows the organizational change, and indeed whether it is a “coherence” wherein the aid/poverty agenda is entirely subsumed in an economic or ideological imperative is unknown.

Lost in the multitude of analyses of the disappearance of CIDA into DFATD is the wider question of how Canada engages with the developing
and formerly developing world. This world, Africa very much included, still contains multitudes of poor, is making advances on the democracy and good governance fronts, and increasingly has the means, financial and intellectual, to address its own challenges. We trust this volume accurately portrays the profound transition underway in Africa currently, and provides the basis for a sound discussion on policy and scholarship on how best the Canada-Africa relationship might evolve.

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ENDNOTES

1 Using data on PovcalNet, the World Bank’s online poverty analysis tool.
2 Using data from the World Development Indicators, World Bank.
3 It is 2.4 percent of world merchandise exports in 2011, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development statistics database, available at www.unctad.org
4 This is based on the Armed Conflict Database from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Armed conflicts are coded using a low threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year.
They are Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Chad (a high-growth performer) and Zimbabwe, respectively. Although South Sudan was not ranked because of incomplete data, it would have ranked in the fourth position.

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Morris, Mike, Raphael Kaplinsky and David Kaplan (2012). *One Thing Leads to Another: Promoting Industrialisation by Making the Most of the Commodities Boom in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Available at: http://tinyurl.com/CommoditiesBook.


A wave of optimism has swept the African continent in the past decade. The pace and extent of social change in recent years, when measured in life expectancy, child and infant mortality rates, literacy, numeracy and the completion of higher education, is quite remarkable. The urban middle class is emerging and expanding in many African countries, while political democracy is developing and strengthening. These positive changes are generating economic growth and attracting foreign investment across the continent, especially in the resource sector. But Africa is still viewed by many as the “dark continent” dealing with serious problems — civil wars, ethnic division, corruption, HIV/AIDS, poverty, food security and the disastrous effects of climate change — and these issues may well impede the upward trajectory of Africa.

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