



The Centre for International Governance Innovation

THE CARIBBEAN PAPERS

A Project on Caribbean Economic Governance

First, Do No Harm: The Role and Responsibility of Canada as a Destination Country in South-North Migration

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Caribbean Paper No.5

April 2008

An electronic version of this paper is available for download at:
www.cigionline.org

Abstract

Analyses of south-north migration usually focus on the consequences of migration for the sending countries and recommend measures to improve development outcomes. This paper instead examines the role and responsibility of migrant-receiving states, and constructs a framework of intervention areas for Canada from work conducted in other developed countries. One major concern is that wealthy, migrant-receiving countries are impeding their own overseas development efforts through migration-related policies that are contradictory or incoherent across such policy areas as migration, labour, trade, development, and international affairs. The paper concludes with a discussion of the reasons Canada should reverse this trend and embark on a new development partnership in its future relations with CARICOM states.

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors and /or Board of Governors.



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ISSN 1915-6413 (Print)

ISSN 1915-6421 (Online)

Letter from the Executive Director

It is my pleasure to introduce *The Caribbean Papers*, a product of our major research project on Caribbean Economic Governance. CIGI is an independent, nonpartisan think tank that addresses international governance challenges. Led by a group of experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debates, builds capacity, and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements.

This project convenes researchers and leaders within the private and public sectors to examine and provide substantive answers and policy prescription to current economic governance challenges facing the Caribbean region. The papers were initially presented at CIGI workshops, where their authors benefited from extensive comments and discussion on their work. Through this series, we hope to present and discuss policy issues pertaining to trade, investment, human capital, the fiscal outlook, and public sector management practices, among other issues relevant to the Caribbean region's economic future.

We encourage your commentary on these papers and welcome your thoughts. Please visit us online at www.cigionline.org to learn more about the Caribbean Economic Governance Project and CIGI's research programme.

Thank you,

John English
Executive Director



The Migration-Development Dichotomy

Developed countries such as Canada exhibit a certain amount of willful blindness when they profess a desire to contribute meaningfully to the development of poorer countries even as they siphon skilled workers from those countries to bolster their own workforces, which are shrinking as a result of aging populations. In the case of the Caribbean, for example, emigration has been used as a labour market safety valve during periods of unemployment. Now, however, emigration to countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is seen as a fast track to advancement for young, well-educated Caribbean nationals.

Concurrent with this phenomenon is the changing public discourse that used to frame emigration in terms of brain drain but now is increasingly focused on prospective economic returns from remittances and the development opportunities provided by the investment of skills and capital by diaspora communities and returning migrants. Much continues to be written on the issue of brain drain and brain circulation with a view to providing policy options for planners from developing countries. Little, however, has been written from the perspective of wealthy, receiving countries regarding their roles and responsibilities toward the economic and social development of the labour-supplying countries. Seldom do we turn the lens back on ourselves and ask what receiving countries can do to eliminate or at least mitigate the worst effects of brain drain on the economic development of our developing neighbours. This paper attempts such a reflective analysis, focusing on the broad research question: What can developed countries do to improve development impacts of south-north migration? Following from this general inquiry are lessons learned from other OECD states and a specific discussion of relations between Canada and member countries of CARICOM, the Caribbean Community. The goal of this paper is to outline an agenda for development-friendly

(or at least development-neutral) initiatives that can be linked to future migration-related policies and programs.

When it comes to migration and development, labour-importing states exhibit a form of dichotomous thinking that inevitably results in policy incoherence. In Canada, such dichotomous thinking becomes evident when one reviews the country's immigration policy statements. For the subgroup of newcomers defined as refugees, the official focus is on humanitarian and global development concerns. For most others, the focus is on economic and competitive concerns relating to labour market demand. Related to dichotomous thinking are policies and programs made in departmental silos. Although one can identify development concerns in Canada's foreign and security policies, they are all but absent in any policies related to permanent or temporary migration.

The migration-development dichotomy has been noted across a number of OECD states. Hans-Werner Mundt of the German Development Corporation attributes the problem to migration policies' having been designed according to the needs of receiving countries and, in some cases, even migrants, but not sending countries. Consequently, migration and development partnerships are rare. Where migration policies do produce beneficial development effects, they are "incidental rather than the result of deliberate efforts to take development issues into consideration" (quoted in Pinto-Dobernig (2005, 61). More common are situations of policy contradiction or incoherence, such as the recruitment of health professionals from South Africa even as that state struggles to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic.¹

¹ The negative relationship between health care recruitment in southern Africa and the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been repeated so often in migration literature as to be taken as a given. A dissenting opinion, however, comes from Clemens (2007), whose research suggests that health care worker migration is not among the major contributors to the deterioration in African health care and that, in fact, emigration might help to increase the number of health care workers in Africa.

Author Biography

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lation and managed migration, trade policy formulation, international negotiations, and public participation in policy development. Dr. Dawson has been a member of the CTPL faculty since 1997 and holds a joint appointment as Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

We can look for explanations for the migration-development dichotomy in a number of areas. First, there is a problem at the level of analysis, in that, although there is a tendency to situate development problems within a framework of macro-level factors (such as pandemics, inter- and intrastate conflict, and natural disasters), there is little systematic examination of the development implications of individual actions (such as the aggregate effects of countless individual decisions regarding transboundary movement). Second, institutional obstacles stem from the fact that some government departments whose work includes issues related to developing states (or their citizens) have a mandate to consider development in their policies and programs, but other such departments do not.

What Key Canadian Agencies Say

In its 2006 Annual Report to Parliament, Canada's Department of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) lists as a top priority the intention to "build bridges internationally to advance important social and humanitarian goals and position this country as a world leader in managing migration, while at the same time positioning Canada as a destination of choice" (Canada 2006a, 6). Laudable goals, but how are they to be pursued?

The main thrust of CIC's policy agenda is to use immigration to support economic prosperity and competitiveness. The humanitarian goals resurface in the report in relation to Canada's support for refugees and its efforts to assist victims of human trafficking. Other measures, such as streamlined processing of applications and family reunification, could also be construed indirectly as humanitarian efforts, but all focus on problems at the individual level rather than alleviating problems related to migration at the state or community level. Where are these international bridges Canada claims to be building? Are Canada's humanitarian goals outside its borders operationalized only through the process of selecting a fortunate few from refugee camps in order to grant them the gift of citizenship? A related problem is that humanitarian concerns seem to be localized within the permanent migration stream. In none of CIC's official statements related to temporary migration is there any reference to the humanitarian or development interests of individual migrants, or their countries of origin.

It is true that the development concerns of migrant-sending states are not reflected in the mandate of Canada's immigration ministry, but they do fall within the ambit of

the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Indeed, CIDA supports important work on issues of involuntary migration (refugees, child soldiers, human trafficking). It also supports various programs related to a range of migration and development concerns such as research on diaspora-led development and the impact of remittances from the perspective of the sending country. For example, together with the UK Department for International Development, CIDA funds an extensive Southern Africa Migration Project that "conducts applied research on migration and development issues, provides policy advice and expertise, offers training in migration policy and management, and conducts public education campaigns on migration-related issues."² Similar to CIC, however, CIDA seems to pay little attention to how the domestic policies and actions of other government departments affect international development concerns in the area of migration.³

Perhaps this is a development issue that exceeds the capabilities of a single department and should be tackled horizontally, through the whole-of-government approach advocated by the Harper government.⁴ The prime minister's vision for development is articulated in CIDA's 2007-2008 report to Parliament:

Canada will continue to play a stronger role in international affairs and to make a positive difference in the lives of impoverished and oppressed people around the world. On this basis, the Government is reviewing all of its priorities, including the countries of concentration, to strengthen the focus of Canadian aid, to allocate resources where Canada's impact will be greatest, and to demonstrate tangible results, in a manner consistent with Canada's foreign policy objectives. (Canada 2007-2008, 4)

Following from this logic, if aid policy is to be consistent with foreign policy, then why exclude immigration and economic policy from the equation? If Canada is to make a meaningful difference in the battle against global poverty, then coherence across policies areas and institutions should be a priority.

² Description from the Web site of the Southern Africa Migration Project; available at: <http://www.queensu.ca/samp>

³ Recognizing that a number of government departments carry out international technical assistance projects related to development, the point here is whether there is attention to how domestic policies affect foreign development.

⁴ A good discussion on development policy coherence, policy silos and the whole of government approach can be found in Picciotto (2004).

What the United Kingdom Says

Among receiving states, the United Kingdom is relatively advanced in its thinking regarding the role of developed countries in migration and development. A 2004 report of the House of Commons International Development Committee (IDC) notes that the debate on migration and development is at approximately the same level as the trade and development debate was ten years ago. While people are beginning to recognize migration's links to development, the IDC laments the lack of "joined-up thinking between national and international levels, and some resistance to connecting the issues" (United Kingdom 2004, 3).

The UK report further notes that the costs and benefits of migration are distributed unevenly between individuals and groups and between sending and receiving countries: "The balance and distribution of costs and benefits depends upon the nature of the migration in question, and on the link which migration establishes between places of origin and destination" (p. 3). Policy coherence, both within and between governments and other actors, is a first step to addressing these imbalances. Ideally, policies that affect migrants or migration should be mutually supportive, but, at minimum, they should not undermine each other (p. 76). I set out the IDC report's recommendations on policy coherence later in this paper; for the full text of the recommendations, see the Appendix.

What the United States Says

For the United States, the development-migration issue is framed in a different way. Rather than focusing on how US policies affect the development of emigrant-sending countries, US officials are more concerned with how the poverty and instability of neighbouring countries affects the flow of illegal immigrants to the United States. Indeed, US foreign and trade policy toward Latin America historically has been shaped by the desire to counter instability that could spill over borders and adversely affect US interests.⁵ Yet the United States has also tried to strike a fine balance with respect to illegal immigrants, since US economic productivity and lower prices rely on maintaining a core cadre of undocumented (and thus low-wage) workers in the services economy. The more restrictive border and immigration policies of the post-9/11 era, however, have complicated this effort.⁶

Given the magnitude of legal and illegal immigration and the United States' preoccupation with the domestic costs

and benefits of immigration, there appears to be little room in the official migration debate for considerations of the effect of US policies on migrant-sending countries. A number of US scholars are arguing, however, in favour of south-north migration as a development tool. Some of these arguments are based on economic analysis that identifies net gains for developing countries from remittances and diaspora investment, but other, more radical, suggestions are emerging as well. One that is receiving a fair amount of recent attention is that of Lant Pritchett (2003, 2006), who argues that the United States should open its borders to low-skilled workers, both for the good of the US economy and for the good of individuals from poor countries. The core of this argument is that, if a country is failing to develop, then its citizens should be able to seek development opportunities in other countries. Kapur and McHale summarize this approach as: "If you cannot bring good institutions to the poor, allow the poor to move to the good institutions" (2006, 138). It is not clear, however, to what extent these more radical proposals will penetrate US policy thinking since they would demand significant border opening during a period when anti-immigration sentiment is dominating the public mood.⁷

The Costs and Benefits of Importing Labour from Developing Countries

Whether or not south-north migration is pro- or anti-development depends on a number of factors: What are the terms of migration? How do we define development – is it when everyone in a state is better off or does it apply only at the individual level of economic opportunity and self-determination? Do we also include non-economic factors such as democratic rights, gender equity, and community sustainability?

⁵ See, for example, Krugman (1993). A more recent example can be found in the United States Trade Representative's promotion of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement as an agreement to "help foster economic development in Colombia, and contribute to efforts to counter narco-terrorism, which threatens democracy and regional stability" (United States Trade Representative, Press Release, February 27, 2006; available at the Web site: www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/February/United_States_Colombia_Conclude_Free_Trade_Agreement.html.)

⁶ Post-9/11 US immigration policies are characterized by caps on entry quotas and stricter security screenings, but the United States is still the largest recipient of immigrants in the world. According to OECD figures, the inflows of foreign nationals for permanent-type migration in 2005 were over 1.1 million for the United States, while the second- and third-largest recipient countries, the United Kingdom and Canada, accepted fewer than 400,000 and fewer than 300,000, respectively (OECD 2007).


⁷ For an illustrative account of the debate in US communities over the integration of Hispanic migrants and policy backlash, see Kotlowitz (2007); see also Weintraub (2007).

The evidence regarding the development contribution of emigration is mixed.⁸ On the one hand, benefits arise from remittances and diaspora investment; on the other hand, social spending on the education of those who take their skills abroad leads to losses and community dislocation.⁹ In this paper, I treat migration only as a continuing phenomenon, without revisiting arguments for and against the movement of workers from poorer counties to wealthier ones.¹⁰ I also argue that wealthier receiving countries have the responsibility to ensure that their policies do not exacerbate the negative effects on sending countries. Furthermore, where there are prospects for positive development effects, receiving countries should attempt to ensure that their migration-related policies provide a "triple win" (United Kingdom 2004, 4) that benefits migrants, sending countries, and migrant-receiving countries. Before developing a prospective roadmap for policy interventions, in the next section I examine the extent and nature of Canadian immigration.

The Role Canada Plays

Canada is one of the largest recipients of settlers in the world and is becoming increasingly reliant on temporary workers to fill labour market gaps. With an aging population and low population growth, Canada's intake of both permanent and temporary migrants will only increase in the future. Newcomers to Canada are increasingly drawn from developing countries and, as Figure 1 reveals, such migrants are often well educated and are seeking to maximize the reward for their talents in wealthier countries.

Figure 1. Educational Profile of Canada's Permanent Residents from Developing Regions, 2006




Note: South Central America includes Caribbean source countries. Source: Canada 2006b.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada is the national gatekeeper regulating permanent and temporary migration. CIC's policy and programming objectives are focused

in two directions: first, to ensure that potential arrivals contribute to the social and economic interests of the country and meet its humanitarian commitments; second, to ensure that foreign nationals are assessed without regard to race, nationality, ethnic origin, colour, religion, or gender (Canada 2006a, 13).


CIC's criteria for selecting permanent residents are based on the ideal of a "a balanced immigration program that contributes to meeting labour market needs while fostering family reunification and honouring humanitarian principles of refugee protection" (ibid.). Approximately twice as many economic immigrants are admitted as family class

Figure 2. Distribution of Permanent Residents Admitted to Canada, by Immigration Category, 1997-2006



Source: Canada 2006b.

Figure 3. Permanent Residents Admitted to Canada in the Economic Category, 1997-2006



Source: Canada 2006b.

⁸ For a review of the evidence relative to the Caribbean, see Dawson (2007).


⁹ Mishra (2006, 18) argues that, for most Caribbean states, the net return from remittances and other emigrant transfers is negative after the cost of labour market disruption and social spending on education of emigrants is taken into account.

¹⁰ This is a similar approach to that taken by Barber, Black and Tenaglia (2005, 5).

entries (see Figure 2), and skilled workers make up the greatest share of the economic class (see Figure 3). Ontario is the largest recipient of percentage of permanent residents, absorbing more than 54 percent of the total in 2005, followed by British Columbia and Quebec with slightly more and slightly less than 17 percent, respectively. Certain temporary programs such as the live-in caregiver program also provide an avenue for permanent migration (live-in caregivers are allowed to apply for permanent resident status after two years), while certain classes of workers can achieve permanent resident status through provincial nomination programs in high-demand areas.


As Figure 4 shows, Canada's stock of temporary workers has been increasing gradually over the past several years. The enhanced labour mobility provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) help to rank the United States and Mexico as the top two source countries, but Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are also among the top ten (see Figure 5). Temporary foreign workers are selected on the basis that they are "needed to address labour market shortages and to provide other economic opportunities for Canada such as job creation and the transfer of new skills and knowledge" (Canada 2006a, 22). In addition, temporary workers must meet the conditions that apply to temporary residents: they must prove they are in good health, have no criminal record, pose no threat to Canadian security, have valid travel documents, and be willing to leave voluntarily at the end of the term of employment.

Figure 4. Canadian Stock of Temporary Foreign Workers, 1980-2006



Source: Canada 2006b.

Figure 5. Annual Flow of Temporary Workers to Canada by Top Ten Source Countries, 2004-2006



Source: Canada 2006b.

At the federal level, the government has committed to an integrated immigration policy framework, with the goal to build "the work force of the future," that includes better cooperation with other government departments and the provinces, as well as communities, employers, and non-governmental organizations (Canada 2006a, 44-45). While leaving undefined the means to operationalize this vision, the federal government has stated that it intends to use immigration policy as a key instrument for Canada's future economic, social and cultural development.

An account of Canada's immigration and labour mobility policy framework must also include the role of the provinces. A number of provincial programs exist to fast track immigrants into targeted regions and sectors for reasons ranging from labour shortages in critical sectors to population growth. Particularly when dealing with labour shortages in lower-skill sectors, the provinces seem to prefer to use temporary programs. Canadian labour lawyer Colin Singer argues that this is because poor migrants with low levels of skills are not desirable as permanent residents: "Politicians are uncomfortable with low-skilled worker programs that offer permanent residence because such individuals are less likely to change vocations and more inclined to draw upon public assistance when the economy falters" (Singer n.d.).

The four largest recipients of temporary workers are Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia. Most provincial support policies are targeted at integration efforts (such as language training and settlement services). However, a growing number are focused on improving the capacity of new arrivals to maximize their economic contribution and rewards through improved recognition

Table 1. Prospective Areas of Policy Intervention by Migrant-Receiving Countries

Areas of Intervention	Newland (2003)	United Kingdom (2004)	Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005)	Policy Areas
Source-country push factors		Reducing push factors such as poverty and instability that accelerate immigration		Development; trade; foreign; education
Recruitment and costs of movement		Issue related to those leaving and those left behind	Costs associated with migration; potential exploitation by recruiters	Industry; labour + cooperation with private sector, trade unions provinces, regulated professions
Rights of individuals in destination countries	Legal status of workers; workers ability to benefit from legal rights and protections	Tackle human smuggling and illegal migration; streamline procedures regarding entry and status; access to services' protection of rights	Balance between government-controlled and employer-controlled systems of worker protection; temporary workers' ability to access rights in destination country	Immigration; security; justice; human resources; labour
Remittance and other financial flows	Transaction costs associated with remittances	Transaction costs; incentives to remit	Access to financial institutions and instruments for senders, receivers; repatriation of taxes and fees paid in destination countries; prospects for channelling private remittances to public infrastructure	Finance; international financial institutions + cooperation with commercial banks and financial institutions
Residual benefits from work abroad			Provision of training; relevance of training to source-country development	Development; industry; labour
Incentives to return to source countries	Financial incentives to return (such as transferability of pensions)	Flexible and sustainable systems of temporary and circular migration	Policy gaps and loopholes that permit overstays; cooperation between source and destination countries	Immigration; labour; industry; trade
Inter- and intragovernmental policy coherence and coordination	Coordination of migration and development policies	Mutually supportive policies from different areas of government; include stakeholders in design development-friendly migration schemes; include diaspora to understand development needs and opportunities	Bilateral agreements with detailed rights and responsibilities	Immigration; development; industry; labour + diplomatic dialogue and cooperation with private sector

Note: Implicit in the list of policy areas is cooperation and coordination with source-country counterparts wherever possible.

of foreign credentials and streamlined licensing and certification processes.¹¹ While such initiatives are important, a more holistic approach would look beyond integration of new arrivals and explore the development effects of the actions of receiving states on migrant-sending countries. Although this might be too much to ask of the provinces alone, it is a task that could be shared among levels of government.

Toward a Framework to Guide Policy Intervention

Both the open-borders solution and the development-through-remittances approach provide somewhat simplistic portrayals of the migration-development link. Both views fail to consider the role that destination countries might play in contributing to a development partnership with source countries. They place no responsibility on the receiving state other than to receive. What are the alternatives?

Although this is an area that has been insufficiently examined, a few analyses look directly at what receiving countries could or should do to minimize the harm and improve

the benefits of south-north migration. These include the 2004 analysis of the UK House of Commons International Development Committee (United Kingdom 2004) and the work of Newland (2003) of the Migration Policy Institute in the United States and Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005) from the UK-based Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. All three sources provide detailed lists of areas of intervention that can be grouped as follows:

- source-country push factors;
- recruitment and costs of moving;
- the rights of individuals in destination countries;
- remittances and other financial flows;
- residual benefits from work abroad;
- incentives to return to source countries; and
- inter- and intragovernmental policy coherence and coordination.

¹¹ For example, Ontario's Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act (2007) insists that provincial regulators provide a faster, fair, and open registration process that includes clear assessment of academic credentials, timely responses to applicants, and reasonable fees.

The following discussion elaborates on these areas of intervention in general terms, with attention to specific areas of policy focus for Canada where applicable. The intervention areas are summarized in Table 1. While the following section discusses Canada's operational areas, it is important to emphasize that the Canadian counterparts in the migrant-sending country – whether governmental, non-governmental, or private sector – should be also be engaged in the process wherever possible.

Source-Country Push Factors

As long as a significant wage differential exists between developing countries and OECD states, there will be economically motivated emigration. The magnitude of such flows can be increased or decreased, however, as a result of the presence or absence of other domestic push factors. Such factors include a lack of domestic opportunity in one's chosen profession, a poor climate for domestic investment and entrepreneurship, the social and economic effects of widespread poverty, natural disasters, warfare, government instability, ineffective national institutions, and discrimination against groups and individuals.

None of these problems is amenable to easy solutions. Remediation demands considerable effort on the part of source countries, but countries that receive migrants from developing countries must remain cognizant of their ability to alleviate or exacerbate these problems. For example, at the broad level of development assistance, funding to assist populations to recover from natural disasters reduces the numbers of homeless people who must go abroad to try to rebuild their lives. Development assistance can also contribute to democratization efforts, improved governance, and economic stability.

What about the liberalized migration policies of developed countries? Do they have any effect on push factors? One area where push factors are magnified is when critical skills are lost and certain sectors are hollowed out. For example, the loss of a substantial number of active-duty nurses makes the jobs of those who remain behind much more difficult and might induce them to leave as well. Similarly, the loss of those with specialized skills, such as surgeons, oncologists, and civil engineers, can lead to a rapid deterioration of the quality of life for those left without access to their knowledge (Kapur and McHale 2005, 108).

Another link between the emigration of the well-educated and deterioration of source-country quality of life is related to sustaining democracies. Kapur and McHale (*ibid.*) note

how the exodus of educated workers depletes the middle class, which is an important building block for democracy. They cite data from the World Values Survey showing a strong correlation between education, class, and support for democracy. However, the survey also indicates a positive link between income and support for democracy, so it might be possible that remittances help to create a new domestic middle class after the old one has departed.¹² Kapur and McHale suggest that "social remittances" – the transmission of new ideas through diasporic networks – might also go some distance to reshaping attitudes in favour of democracy in source countries (2005, 109). Missing from this new middle class, however, are the educational levels associated with a true middle class. As well, the prospects for democratization might be affected if incomes are increased through transfer payments rather than earnings. The "democratic deficit" that can be created by the loss of the middle class emphasizes the need for attention to governance and democratization in Canada's development assistance and foreign policy efforts.¹³

Recruitment and Costs of Moving

The UK IDC report (United Kingdom 2004) pays particular attention to the implications of leaving and being left behind. In specific terms, Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005) point to two problem areas: the costs associated with migration and potential exploitation by recruiters (which I deal with in the next section, on the rights of individuals in destination countries).

The issue of costs of migration has to do not only with fees paid to recruiters but also with the financial burden of cross-border migration, including the costs of travel and relocation, visa and residency fees, and travel to the destination country for pre-employment interviews or to write professional certification examinations. In addition, there are long waiting times for recognition of foreign education and professional credentials.

Much has been written about the cost of such obstacles to workers and to destination-country economies (see, for

¹² The literature linking development and democratization can be traced to the modernization theoretical work of Seymour M. Lipset (1959). Although it is not clear to what extent incomes affect democratization or what other conditions must be present, work by Londregan and Poole (1996) suggests that the democracy-promoting effect of rising incomes is statistically significant.

¹³ This might be one area of future focus for CIDA's new Office for Democratic Governance, formed in 2006 in recognition of the importance of democratic governance to poverty reduction and sustainable development. See the CIDA Web site at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CanadaCorps>.

example, Watt and Bloom 2001). The implications of high-cost migration for source-country development are that workers must pay off debts incurred during the movement process before they can begin sending remittances home. As well, higher-skilled, educated workers who decide to emigrate often find themselves underemployed (engineers as taxi drivers, nurses as nannies). This "brain waste" reduces the contribution migrants could make if their wages were higher and their prospects for new skills development were better.

The issue of how to make cross-border employment less expensive for migrants while ensuring that workers meet destination-country standards of skills and experience needs to be examined on a sector-by-sector basis. However, federal and provincial governments could play a leadership role in working with employers to develop more efficient practices and in encouraging regulators to reduce unnecessary obstacles and "brain waste." Ontario's *Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act* offers a prospective model to lower costs and facilitate professional certification. Similarly, a good example of balancing high professional standards with accessibility is the practice of allowing US-bound nurses to write the National Council of State Boards of Nursing examinations in developing-country locations, including the Philippines, India, and Mexico.¹⁴

The Rights of Individuals in Destination Countries

The problem of exploitation by recruiters and others involved in the migration process is linked to migrants' lack of knowledge of how to secure appropriate employment and ensure that their rights are maintained during their term of employment. In Canada, workers' rights issues and complaints about recruiters tend to be more prevalent in programs for lower-skilled temporary workers such as agriculture, construction labour, and domestic services (see Gibb 2007). Since many such workers encounter language difficulties, do not know their rights in Canada, and have little money to pursue redress of complaints and violations in any case, demand is increasing for government or other official bodies to exert tighter regulatory control and supervision.

There are, however, tradeoffs between regulatory control and efficiency. Someone has to bear the cost of these administrative measures, which would exert upward pressure on the cost of imported labour and dampen demand. Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005, 8) also point out that, when external institutions assume control for protection of workers, the worker-employee connection is weakened

and the employers' responsibility for their workers is relegated to government. This suggests that public-private sector cooperation is required to achieve a balance between cost-effective labour and the protection of migrants' rights.¹⁵

Remittances and Other Financial Flows

All of the authors whose recommendations contribute to the intervention framework I present here place major emphasis on what wealthy countries could do to improve the effects of remittances on development. The predominant theme is that efforts should be made to reduce the costs of sending money home. Two priority areas are reducing the transaction costs of transfers and improving the access of overseas workers (and their families) to banks and financial institutions so that they can use transfer mechanisms that are less costly than commercial services such as Western Union and Moneygram.¹⁶ In Canada, Scotiabank and Caisses Populaires Desjardins have remittance programs tailored specifically for seasonal agricultural workers from Mexico. Scotiabank controls the Mexican bank *Inverlat*, making it easier to obtain and verify the identification documents of Mexican migrants before they come to Canada (Gibb 2007, 9).

The UK IDC further advocates efforts to improve the investment climate in source countries to attract diaspora investors (United Kingdom 2004, 5). It is but a short step, however, from a government's attempting to improve the domestic climate for diaspora investment to its attempting to appropriate remittances through taxes or other measures. Barber, Black, and Tenaglia warn against this:

Clearly migrant workers' remittances have become a significant source of overseas finance for many developing countries, but at the same time these are the private earnings of individuals, and there are limits on how much states can and should seek to lever this money for wider public gains. (2005, 17)

¹⁴ See the Web site of the National Council of State Boards of Nursing at: www.ncbsn.org.

¹⁵ Foreign workers have limited but growing representation through trade unions. One reason for the low level of union activity among lower-skilled workers in Canada is that agricultural labour traditionally has been blocked from union representation. The United Food and Commercial Workers of Canada (2006) advocates on behalf of migrant workers in Canada and operates five support centres for temporary agricultural workers in Ontario and Quebec.

¹⁶ Novel pilot projects are also under way in Latin America to allow remittances to be used as collateral for loans and mortgages. For information on such projects, see Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund, Remittances, available at Web site: www.iadb.org/mif/remesas.cfm?language=EN&parid=4&itemId=2

Another source of financing that could be directed toward development are the taxes and fees that temporary workers pay while working in the destination country. Some temporary workers participate in a compulsory savings program and receive their funds only after they return home.¹⁷ This encourages workers to channel money directly to their families and provides destination countries with a useful tool to prevent illegal overstays. Other workers, however, are obliged to pay employment taxes from which they can claim no benefits.¹⁸ Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005, 14) argue that, in such cases, the taxes collected should be sent to the source-country governments.

Residual Benefits from Work Abroad

Proponents of brain circulation argue that the skills, networks, and knowledge that emigrants acquire abroad can stimulate development in their home countries. However, this view may be overly optimistic. As Parthasarathi (2006) argues, evidence of the benefits of brain circulation comes from "the very specific circumstances of the substantial contributions expatriate Indians based in Silicon Valley in the United States made to the growth of India's [information technology] sector." South Korea and Taiwan offer similarly positive stories of returning emigrants filling key roles in local research and development initiatives, but these high-tech incubators were already well advanced as a result of government investment and were not created by the returning migrants themselves. This suggests, as Parthasarathi (2006) says, "the pre-existence of considerable 'absorptive capacity' is a necessary condition for successful brain circulation." If this is the case, should we expect returning migrants who lack these special incentives to bring back any useful skills?

Since studies from Germany, Turkey, and Thailand suggest that nonprofessional migrants do not tend to acquire new formal skills during work terms abroad, Barber, Black, and Tenaglia recommend that governments at least ensure that temporary workers receive training in the official language(s) of the destination country. Even if knowledge of the local language is not required for work-related duties, it would help to reduce the social exclusion of temporary workers and help them to protect their own rights while in the country (2005, 11).

The issue of residual benefits for temporary workers brings us back to the equity versus efficiency debate introduced in the previous discussion on protecting the rights of temporary workers. Greater development gains might be possible if wealthy destination countries invested more in

building the skills and capacities of their temporary workers. However, since few employers would be willing to bear such a cost, especially for temporary workers, government support (both financial and administrative) likely would be required. The prospective costs of such programs would oblige governments to contain them within "managed migration" initiatives, whereby a limited number of countries and sectors conduct their temporary worker programs according to an agreed-on set of carefully defined rights and obligations of participants in both source and destination countries (See Barber, Black, and Tenaglia 2005 16).¹⁹

Incentives to Return to Source Countries

There are few empirical studies of the propensity of an emigrant from a developing country to return home. However, there is an intuitive belief among academics and policy makers that, if given a choice, most temporary workers would stay in the destination country permanently. For evidence of this, we need only look at the proliferation of undocumented workers in the United States, who reside there permanently despite the difficulties they face as a result of their illegal status. Closer to home, the Live-In Caregiver Program is the only Canadian temporary labour program that offers an opportunity to apply for permanent resident status after two years of service. This program yielded more than 6,000 new permanent residents in 2006 and, although CIC does not publish the exact numbers of applicants, it appears that virtually all who qualify under the program seek permanent resident status for themselves and their dependents (Canada 2006b).

Experiments in other countries with programs to encourage return migration have been expensive and largely unsuccessful. Barber, Black, and Tenaglia (2005, 16) attribute this failure to the negative macroeconomic or political climates of source countries, to which migrants do not want to return no matter what incentives might be offered. Because most migrants prefer to stay in the destination country for as long as possible, it is important that temporary labour

¹⁷ Canada's Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) includes a compulsory savings scheme; see Gibb (2007, 8).

¹⁸ For example, SAWP participants must pay into Canada's employment insurance (EI) program but cannot collect insurance benefits from outside the country, and they must leave the country after their work term is finished. Recently, however, SAWP participants have received advice and assistance from Canada's labour movement in collecting parental benefits under the EI program; see United Food and Commercial Workers of Canada (2006, 17-18).

¹⁹ A design for a managed migration program is discussed in Dawson (2006).

programs be designed with incentives and regulatory mechanisms to encourage timely return when the work period is finished. Unfortunately, the reluctance of so many migrants to return home also means that the source country does not benefit from the skills and knowledge transfers that otherwise would have occurred.²⁰ As Newland (2003) points out, even well-intended policies such as family reunification and community integration programs can diminish the prospects for development through migration and return.

Discussions of previous policy areas have noted that compulsory savings schemes that involve withholding a portion of earned wages until after the worker returns home can be used as an incentive for voluntary returns. Newland (2003) also recommends that transferability of foreign pensions earned abroad serve as an inducement. The right to return could also be an incentive for voluntary compliance. Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program gives workers the opportunity to reapply for work on an ongoing basis. France even offers a "retirement card" that allows workers to move freely between their home countries and France after they have completed 15 years of temporary employment in the country (Parthasarathi 2006). The UK IDC report (United Kingdom 2004) points to the need for flexible and sustainable systems of temporary and circular migration, with overstays discouraged through penalties, bonds, re-entry options, and financial incentives. There are, however, no simple means to building effective and efficient systems.

With the proliferation of labour mobility agreements for lower-skilled workers, there is a growing need to develop effective return mechanisms. The labour mobility provisions that exist in trade agreements such as the NAFTA govern market access – that is, the number or classes of persons permitted to work in another territory – but not the responsibilities of workers or employers. Provisions on temporary labour in future trade and related agreements, therefore, need to include measures to ensure that temporary movement is indeed temporary.

Inter- and Intragovernmental Policy Coherence and Coordination

All of the preceding discussion on areas of intervention has implicitly demanded some degree of policy coherence and coordination among policymaking and program-delivery entities. Indeed, the current the lack of internal and multilateral policy coherence means that migration and development policies are not mutually supportive.

Reversing this situation will not be easy. The last column in Table 1 provides a partial list of policy areas in which action is needed to improve the development effects of migration. The list includes, in destination countries, government departments at the national level responsible for immigration, labour, industry, development, trade, and finance, and related bodies at the subnational level. There are also governmental counterparts in source countries, as well nongovernmental stakeholders, business, and international organizations. It is a daunting task.

Effectively managed programs that benefit migrants, source countries, and destination countries alike – the "triple wins" – should be narrow in scope and focus on small numbers of employers, recruits, and stakeholders. Most important, however, a broad range of stakeholders, including members of the diaspora community, needs to be included in the design phase of such programs. Barber, Black, and Tenaglia make this point very well:

What is striking about temporary worker schemes... is the apparent lack of participation by temporary workers themselves – or indeed anyone from developing countries in their design. Such participation could contribute to the openness and transparency of schemes, an issue that lies at the heart of many abuses in the current system. (2005, 18)

Conclusion: What's at Stake for Canada

At each point in the migration cycle, there are opportunities for development intervention to improve the outcomes of temporary migration for the poor. Effective interventions, however, require planning, cooperation, and investment. Why, then, would Canada make these investments if our immigration goal is simply to "build the workforce of the future"? An approach that centres on the health of the domestic labour market would be a low-cost alternative for Canada in the short run, but the long-run cost of this approach would be paid by our neighbours in developing countries, through increasing demands for humanitarian assistance and perhaps even threats to our own security.

The areas of intervention for temporary migration identified here are tied to Canada's foreign and development policy objectives of regional and global security, stability,

²⁰ Remittances and diaspora investment can still occur following permanent migration, although remittance rates tend to be lower for permanent migrants who have brought families to or established them in destination countries.

and good governance. A general objective to guide the process of policy coherence is for Canada to seek to achieve national economic growth that does not diminish the growth and development prospects of its neighbours. It is in Canada's interest to take seriously the migration and development linkage, since our future economic competitiveness will rely on the sustainability of our temporary and permanent migration programs.

Reconciling Migration and Development in Canada-CARICOM Relations

Nearly 400,000 permanent residents of Canada were born in one of the CARICOM states and a further 9,000 CARICOM nationals come to this country each year under temporary worker programs (see Table 2). Although these numbers are small relative to Canada's total immigration, Canada is a leading destination for emigrants from the small island nations of the region.

Table 2. Flow of Temporary Workers from the Caribbean to Canada, 2002-2006

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Jamaica	5,557	5,943	5,953	6,155	6,313
Trinidad and Tobago	1,678	1,627	1,659	1,606	1,479
Barbados	628	539	566	494	447
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	235	241	256	293	323
St. Lucia	123	158	149	197	188
Grenada	336	296	163	166	177
Dominica	116	104	139	153	118
Haiti	47	65	69	46	69
Dominican Republic	109	56	76	60	65
Guyana	39	90	29	83	57
St. Kitts-Nevis	--	45	16	14	24
The Bahamas	20	12	17	19	20
Antigua and Barbuda	6	7	5	--	7
Belize	--	--	9	--	5
Surinam	5	--	--	5	--
Nevis	0	0	0	--	0
Anguilla	0	--	0	0	0
Total, CARICOM	8,899	9,183	9,106	9,291	9,292
Total, Americas region	22,172	22,220	22,618	24,779	26,424

Source: Canada 2006b

Caribbean migrants are represented in virtually all classes of Canadian migration, from skilled worker and family reunification to student and temporary worker programs. Because of the scale and opportunity constraints of Caribbean economies, outward migration has always represented an important economic and social dynamic of the region. Remittances from workers abroad provide

an important source of income to the region, exceeding both foreign direct investment and official development assistance. Indeed, the Caribbean region is the largest recipient of remittances relative to gross national product (GNP), followed by South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Mishra 2006, 19). The World Bank (2006) estimates that, in 2003, remittances represented 24.8 percent of Haiti's GNP and 17.4 percent of Jamaica's; in monetary terms, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica were the largest recipients, with US\$2.3 billion and US\$1.4 billion, respectively.

Remittances thus make an important contribution to national incomes in aggregate terms, but the Caribbean nations also face the negative side effects of emigration, particularly the depletion of skilled workers in specialized sectors such as health care and education. Social dislocation can also be linked to absent family members working abroad. As well, there is some doubt as to whether social expenditures on secondary and tertiary education are recoverable through remittances when those who are educated in the Caribbean move abroad. In some countries, there are well-founded claims of brain drain, with rates of emigration of those with university or college education surpassing 80 percent (see Docquier and A. Marfouk 2004, 2005).

Compared with the number of temporary and permanent immigrants from China, India, and the Philippines, the number of Caribbean migrants to Canada is relatively small. But Canada also shares a regional, cultural, and historic affinity with the Caribbean, Canadian business interests are strongly represented in the region, and Canada has announced its intention to negotiate a free trade agreement with CARICOM. The Caribbean diaspora is one of the most active in Canada's cultural mosaic, particularly in the urban centres. As well, Canada's official development commitment to CARICOM traditionally has been very strong, and the Harper government has pledged some \$60 million per year in official development assistance to the region over ten years (beginning in 2007). Viewed as a whole, this picture suggests the need and the opportunity for specialized cooperation between Canada and its CARICOM partners to support mutual interests while reducing or reversing the negative development implications of south-north migration.

Appendix

Excerpt from *Migration and Development: How to Make Migration Work for Poverty Reduction* (United Kingdom 2004, 76-77).

Towards policy coherence for development

What policy coherence means and why it matters

151. Coherent policies are mutually supportive, or at the very least do not undermine each other. Policy coherence matters in circumstances where policies on one issue impact upon the likelihood of policies on another issue achieving their objectives. It also matters when policies pursued by one country impact on the likely success of policies pursued by another. Policy coherence matters in the sphere of migration and development because patterns of migration shape and are shaped by a range of other issues such as economic development, trade, agricultural subsidies, urbanisation and environmental degradation. Therefore, policies to manage migration are likely to have impacts in other spheres, and policies to shape other spheres are likely to have implications for migration.

152. In some cases there may be a complementarity or synergy between policies; in other cases there may be a tension between policies, reflecting the competing priorities or objectives which they are designed to achieve. The path to policy coherence begins with the recognition of interdependence between issues, and objectives and policies, both within and between countries. The next step is to understand whether and how policies can be made more coherent. In some circumstances policies to make migration more development-friendly will fit well with policies to achieve other objectives; in other circumstances, there will be competing priorities. The next step is to assess how far from the ideal of coherence current policies are. And the most important step is, through the use of effective mechanisms, to move towards policy coherence.

153. In our view poverty reduction and development should be given a higher priority, and policy coherence should be *policy coherence for development* [emphasis in original]. But no matter what priority is accorded to development and poverty reduction in designing policies to shape migration, migration should not be

considered in isolation. Greater attention must be paid to ensuring that policies relating to migration, and policies relating to other issues, are coherent, both within and between countries. For example, if policy on issue A (providing export subsidies to European farmers to support a particular form of agriculture) is at odds with policy on issue B (providing aid to developing countries so that their farmers can be enabled to sell their produce, and as a result remain on the land rather than migrating to the cities), then one or both of these policies ought to be changed, on efficiency grounds if nothing else. If policies are at odds, the first question for policy-makers is, are there ways of achieving both objectives? Or, if the objectives are fundamentally in contradiction, the question is which objective matters more? By committing themselves to achieve greater policy coherence, and establishing mechanisms to this end, governments can become more effective, and – by making explicit the fact that there are competing priorities – more accountable too.

154. During the course of this inquiry we have come across many instances where the possibility of migration delivering developmental benefits is undermined by other objectives and policies. IIED [The International Institute for Environment and Development] gave the example of cotton farmers in the Sahel, pushed off the land, in part by cotton subsidies, and drew attention to the migration implications of agricultural mechanisation and poorly planned rural development. [The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] noted that refugee crises and migration problems are compounded when these issues are isolated from issues of human rights, democracy, good governance, trade and sustainable development. The Campaign Against the Arms Trade drew attention to the possibility that UK arms exports might contribute to human rights abuses, reduce spending on basic needs, and lead to more migration. The Corner House raised the issue of UK support for projects such as pipelines which may not take adequate account of their environmental, social and human rights impacts, and thus may contribute to migration. And Friends of the Earth drew our attention to the knock-on environmental, and in turn migration, effects of investments in pulp and paper projects.

155. Many of the written submissions emphasised the need for improved policy coherence both as regards the UK's policies on immigration and development, and as regards UK-supported development interventions in poor countries. Oxfam argues that: "Migration

policy needs to be joined up with asylum, development, humanitarian, trade and foreign policies in order both to effectively address the root causes of migration, safeguard the legal obligations towards forced migrants and ensure the best and most equitable migration outcome for the individual, host and sending countries." Focussing more on interventions in developing countries, IIED suggests that any "poverty reduction initiative that does not include an understanding of the role of migration in the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable groups risks being seriously flawed".

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