THE FABRIC OF PEACE IN AFRICA
Looking beyond the State

Pamela Aall and Chester A. Crocker, Editors
Foreword by Kofi Annan

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Governance Innovation

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Foreword

Kofi Annan

Those of us who have worked on conflict know the dangers of a breakdown of the social compact between state and society: instability, ethnic or religious discrimination, and a descent into violence. In extreme cases, governments become the agents of gross human rights abuses to their citizenry, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur and Syria. In the 1990s and 2000s, the United Nations led the international community to recognize that when a government is unable or fails to provide security for its citizens, the international community has a responsibility to act. We moved the concept of security beyond the state to embrace individuals, peoples and groups.

These developments are universal and they have direct relevance to the peace and security of Africa. The African continent has made important progress — political and economic — in recent decades, but some countries remain in the throes of violent conflict, while others are prone to relapses. As a result, Africa continues to host a majority of UN blue helmets. What has changed, however, is that African states themselves are playing a bigger role in their own collective security. The African Union has developed an impressive set of institutions to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, including early warning capacity.

These African solutions must also reach beyond the state. Soon after stepping down as UN Secretary-General, I worked to help organize a multi-stakeholder effort in the Kenyan electoral crisis of 2007-2008. It is not an exaggeration to recognize that the strength of Kenyan civil society institutions helped to bring the country back from the brink.

This brings me to this book. *The Fabric of Peace in Africa: Looking beyond the State* addresses the societal environment of conflict and the potential contribution to managing conflict of a wide range of social groups and institutions. These studies, edited and framed by scholar-practitioners Chester A. Crocker and Pamela Aall, bring together leading African and external experts

who make a significant contribution to our understanding of the challenges and possibilities of African efforts to build sustainable peace and security. This volume shines a light on the role that individuals, groups and social institutions play in peace and conflict.

The authors in this book delve into topics ranging from religion and education policy to migration and youth engagement in order to understand how these groups and organizations affect social attitudes and proclivities toward violence and peace. It is clear from this examination that all those institutions that respond to conflict — the United Nations, the African Union, the sub-regional organizations and non-government organizations — need to reach out beyond the state in order to build a firm foundation for peace. The book is a rewarding mosaic that looks at Africa's conflict challenges from the inside as well as the outside, and helps us understand the complexities of building peace and building equitable, accountable and inclusive societies.

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her thoughts on resilience, Andrew McPherson for research, as well as many others whose work has helped shape our thinking.

Finally, we would like to recognize Callisto Madavo, who passed away as this book was going to press. Dr. Madavo, a colleague of Chet's at Georgetown University and former vice president at the World Bank, supported fully the idea that lay behind this book project — that the wider social environment was key to bringing peace to troubled countries. He was persuasive in defining the role that the private sector could play and his chapter is a strong expression of a constructive and inclusive approach to resolving conflict. He will be missed by his many friends and colleagues.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	AU	African Union
		AUPSC	AU Peace and Security Council
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights	BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
ACtHPR	African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	CAR	Central African Republic
ADR	alternative dispute resolution	CAT	Convention against Torture
AFDB	African Development Bank	CBMs	confidence-building measures
AFISMA	International Support Mission in Mali	CBOs	community-based organizations
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command	CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
		CIGI	Centre for International Governance Innovation
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia	CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
ANC	African National Congress	CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture		
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb		
ASF	African Standby Force	COI	Commission of Inquiry

COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	FAB	Forces Armées Burundaises
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)	FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service	FDI	foreign direct investment
CSOs	civil society organizations	FDLR	Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda
CURRASW	Curriculum Assessment and Examinations	FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
CVE	countering violent extremism	FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)	GBV	gender-based violence
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur	GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	GNU	Government for National Unity
DFID	Department for International Development	HD Centre	The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys	HDI	Human Development Index
DKRI	Dandal Kura Radio International	ICC	International Criminal Court
DPA	Darfur Political Agreement	ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)	ICG	International Crisis Group
DPP	Darfur Political Process	ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
DW	Deutsche Welle	ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
EAC	East African Community	ICU	Islamic Court Union
EACJ	East African Court of Justice	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	IFFs	illicit financial flows
ECOMIB	ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau	IFIs	international financial institutions
ECOMIL	ECOWAS mission in Liberia	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	iPRS	interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
EFA	Education for All		
EUFOR	European Union Force		

ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham		MSN	Mediation Support Network
KCSE	Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education		MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
KMF	Knowledge Management Framework for Mediation Processes		NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
KNEC	Kenya National Examinations Council		NCA	National Constituent Assembly
LGA	local government area		NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
LNP	Liberian National Police		NGO	non-governmental organization
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army		OAU	Organization of African Unity
LURD	Liberians United for Reconstruction and Development		OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
LVB	Lake Victoria basin			
M23	March 23 rebellion		PEAP	Panel of Eminent African Personalities
MENA	Middle East and North Africa		PoW	Panel of the Wise
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa		PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR		PSGs	peace- and state-building goals
MISCA	International Support Mission to the CAR		R2P	responsibility to protect
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo		RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force		RECs	Regional Economic Communities
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad		RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
MODEL	Model for Democracy in Liberia		RFI	Radio-France Internationale
			RNP	Rwanda National Police
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC		ROs	Recognized Organizations
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC		RTNC	Radio-Télévision nationale congolaise
			SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council		SADC	Southern African Development Community
			SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
MRSB	Mara River sub-basin		SALW	small arms and light weapons

SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SATRC	South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
SMS	short message service
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOEs	state-owned enterprises
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-N	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement – North
SRSGs	Special Representatives of the Secretary-General
SSD	security sector development
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
SSR	security sector reform
SST	security sector transformation
SWAPO	South-West African People's Organization
TAWA	Tonj Area Women's Association
UCDP/PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute Oslo
UGTT	Tunisian General Labour Union
UN DESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNAMID	UN-AU Mission in Darfur
UNCST	Uganda National Council for Science and Technology
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	UN Support Office to AMISOM
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VMT	Verification and Monitoring Team
VOA	Voice of America

Part One
Introduction

1

The Social Environment and Conflict in Africa

Pamela Aall and Chester A. Crocker

The prevailing discourse about Africa in the peace and conflict realm paints a picture of a conflict-ridden continent, with the worst refugee and internal migration problem in the world. The discourse emphasizes that it is an extremely poor region, prone to barely containable epidemics, damaged by its colonial history and increasingly threatened by Islamic extremism. And indeed, Africa has seen dozens of conflicts over the past two decades concerning a variety of issues — land, resources, political power, profits, security, religion and identity. Often at the core of these conflicts are profound disagreements over the basic vision of what the nation is, struggles over state-society relations and contests over who gets to rule.

However, there is another side to the story. Some of these conflicts — for instance, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and South Africa — have come to an end. In other cases, early

action has prevented conflict from spreading. In 2008 in Kenya, for instance, a determined mediation effort by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stopped the post-election violence before it became widespread. Other countries are relatively peaceful. According to the *2015 Global Peace Index* of the Institute for Economics and Peace, eight African countries rank in the top 60 most peaceful countries: Mauritius (25), Botswana (31), Namibia (48), Senegal (49), Malawi (51), Ghana (54), Zambia (55) and Sierra Leone (59) (Institute of Economics and Peace 2015).

Responding to conflicts requires concerted action to manage crises of inter-communal violence, political discord and humanitarian consequences of prolonged fighting. There is also, however, a need to rebuild communities, societies and states torn apart by the conflict and to address the long-term social and economic impact of the conflict. Important questions are how well African states and societies

cope with these dual challenges and what role the international community plays in building up or undercutting conflict management capacity. Just as important, however, is the question of what accounts for the difference between societies that experience conflict and societies that manage to resist falling into conflict or resolve conflicts once they have broken out. It may be clear that the answer is both multi-dimensional and context-specific, and involves enlightened leadership, a stable neighbourhood, a degree of economic stability, legitimate governance and, at times, help from the international community. What is not so clear is how to achieve these ends.

In order to answer these questions, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) undertook a multi-year review of African conflict management capacity. The first part of the project examined how African institutions and partners in the international community cope with traditional security threats — power challenges, economic struggles, the inability of weak states to assert control and provide security over their territory, terrorism, arms flows and religious extremism. *Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change*, published in March 2016, marked the culmination of this first phase. *Minding the Gap* focused on the two principal instruments for managing these challenges: coercive or semi-coercive strategies (such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, armed intervention and sanctions) and political strategies (such as mediation, negotiation, facilitation, high-level groups, summits, commissions and other political instruments). In so doing, it looked at state-based and regional organizational capacity, as well as the contributions of civil society and international partners (Aall and Crocker 2016).

This book grows out of the second part of the project and examines societal actors, norms and institutions in Africa that shape social attitudes toward peace and conflict. Understanding the role played by the wider society presents a number of challenges, not least because "wider society" is a flexible concept and can include any number of political, economic, social, religious, educational and cultural institutions

and groups. Some of these groups exist within the organized civil society space or, like elders, religious leaders and traditional authorities, have recognized roles in society. Others are less defined but potentially powerful collectivities (for example, youth, women or migrants). Some of these entities are official institutions (for example, schools and universities) that play key roles in shaping social attitudes; others, such as the news media, may reflect official views or offer an alternative to those views. Other official institutions — the courts and the police — exist in that borderland where individuals meet official authorities and develop opinions about their effectiveness and legitimacy. We use the term the "social environment" of conflict to refer to this open-ended universe of peoples, institutions and resources that have some potential to help societies become resilient in the face of risks of conflict onset or recurrence.

The ability to manage conflict is only partly a function of political leadership, good peacekeeping practice, effective mediation and the provision of sufficient official capabilities. The capacity also resides in the relationship between state and society, and among different identity and interest groups within a society. It lies in the teaching of civics and history, in the quality of professional associations, in ideas encouraged by traditional and social media, in the habits inculcated by old and new legal norms, in inter-religious behaviours, and in the arts and cultural events. These social relationships and attitudes can either knit together a society or tear it apart. Lost in the traditional approach to understanding conflict management is the contribution to peace and stability that may come from the groups and social institutions that inhabit the conflict zone. Looking at a number of these institutions and groups — including organized civil society, religion, education, the security sector, legal norms and traditions, private enterprise, the media, women's groups and youth groups — this book explores the impact of political, economic and demographic stresses on societal stability in Africa, as well as approaches to building conflict management capacity in the social environment of conflict.

Four Links between Society and Conflict

The link between conflict and various individuals, social groups and social institutions has been the subject of much scholarly and practitioner-oriented research, especially since the explosion of internal conflict in the 1990s. Analysis of the role that society plays in conflict typically focus on one of three characterizations: social groups and institutions as drivers of conflict, victims of conflict, or fixers of conflict. We identify a fourth characterization by examining the overall role that these institutions, groups and societal characteristics play in building or weakening a society's capacity to resist the outbreak of conflict or to recover from conflict once it has broken out.

Social Groups and Institutions as Drivers of Conflict

One view of the intersection between conflict and society emphasizes the role that social groups and institutions play as drivers of conflict. Much of this work revolves around individual and group attitudes and motivations, especially in determining why conflict becomes violent. Morton Deutsch, Herbert Kelman, Dean Pruitt, Louis Kriesberg and others have opened a broad avenue to understanding why people fight (Deutsch 1973; Kelman 1990; Pruitt 2005; Kriesberg 2007). They emphasize the psychological and social processes that lead to fighting, such as competition, isolation or mutually incompatible goals. Others have analyzed the motivations of terrorists and violent extremists, stressing that terrorists are often acting rationally within their own environments (Post 2007; Crenshaw 2000). Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) identify 12 mechanisms or avenues toward political radicalization, including personal victimization and political grievance at the individual level. At the group level, the mechanisms include extreme cohesion within the group or, conversely, extreme competition to dominate the thoughts and actions of the group.

Stephen Stedman's (1997) studies of spoilers provide a typology of political/military actors that can and may undermine peace processes. He makes the point that while some of them are insiders, others are outsiders and both may be leaders or followers. Recognizing the role of followers is important for understanding the relationship between spoilers and the wider public, because followers often provide the link to a broader community of players that have a stake in the outcome. Ted Robert Gurr (1970) examined the gap between a person's expectations about what he or she deserves and the reality of what they get. When expectations are higher than reality, it can lead to frustration, and if prolonged and deeply felt, can result in aggression against others. The same dynamic operates in social groups. Groups that feel relative deprivation vis-à-vis other groups may resort to violence out of a general frustration.

Frances Stewart and Graham Brown (2007) have also explored the effect of relative deprivation — or horizontal political, social and economic inequalities — and its link to conflict. They find that the extent to which the basic needs of certain groups in society are systematically denied and discriminated against by those in power can lay the seeds for conflict, especially if there is no legitimate way to channel those grievances through the political process.

There have also been examinations in both the scholarly and practitioner worlds of how social institutions can contribute to conflict. Some have looked at the effect of schools, curriculum and teaching on creating or preserving positive or negative impressions of other groups. These analysts point out the critical influence of these institutions on the formation of attitudes and behaviour (Korostelina, Lässig and Ihrig 2013; Williams 2014; Smith 2011).

During the Bosnian conflict, for instance, each of the three ethnic groups actively used the education system to promote adverse images of the others. After the conflict was over, the international community tried to reform the education system in Bosnia by pushing for a system of joint education.

A 2010 report on the state of Bosnian schools pointed out that after 15 years, Muslim and Catholic students were still learning in segregated classrooms. They attended the same school but used separate entrances (Magill 2010; Reed 2014). The conflict, while officially over, was perpetuated by the education system. The growing hostility between Christian and Muslim communities in Africa may be similarly fostered in education systems around the continent. Educational resources may also become the object of conflict when competing political or social groups argue over their allocation.

The Bosnian example illustrates how difficult it is to develop a response to groups and institutions that act as perpetuators or drivers of conflict. Changing social institutions such as schools not only involves bringing change to institutions that transmit core values of a society, but also generally involves engaging ministries of education. In those cases in which the government has been a party to the conflict, government ministries often reflect the same hostilities and suspicion of the other side as the political leaders. While there have been attempts at inoculating societies from radicalization through programs aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE), the growing number of recruits to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) and other radical groups indicates that scholars and practitioners have not yet fully understood how to prevent extremism or de-radicalize individuals and groups that have embraced an extremist agenda.

Social Groups and Institutions as Victims of Conflict

Another approach to looking at society and conflict explores conflict's harmful effect on social groups and institutions. Conflict has always resulted in civilian casualties and suffering. However, the tactics of today's combatants places special emphasis on this element. In 2014, for instance, Boko Haram — the extremist Islamic rebel group operating in northeast Nigeria — kidnapped 250 students from a girls' school in Chibok in Borno State. A year later, Al-Shabaab staged a gruesome attack on Garissa University in Kenya. Schools have become targets for groups spreading terror in the new conflict environment, just as have other places important to community life, such as churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, markets, shopping malls, train stations, major thoroughfares, restaurants and places of entertainment. Journalists, too, find themselves at risk in a number of conflict zones. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (2016), hundreds of journalists have been killed in combat over the past 25 years, and many more have been murdered or killed on dangerous assignments in the same period. The prevalence of sexual violence in conflict situations, kidnapping and forced conscription of children, and massive refugee crises have highlighted the plight of individuals in today's conflicts.

The human rights field has long focused on the deleterious effect that conflict has on individuals. In the 1990s, this perspective entered into the security field as well. A common tactic in the brutal civil wars of the 1990s was to target civilian non-combatants as part of the war campaign. In these wars, it was apparent that governments could not protect their civilian populations. Worse still, in a number of conflicts (Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo), the government or government troops were the source of the threat to civilian life and safety. These experiences introduced changes in the conception of security from the safety of the state to the safety of the individual. In addition, many held that in circumstances where the state itself was the problem, the international respect for national sovereignty had to yield to the protection of human lives. In other words, the international community had a responsibility to protect individuals against the predations of the state (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001).

A number of scholars and practitioners helped to develop the concept of human security (United Nations Development Programme 1994;

Hampson 2001; Commission on Human Security 2003; Owen 2013). A common element among these works was the focus on the individual and the protection of the integrity of that individual. Beyond that, however, there was disagreement over whether the concept should be applied broadly to cover all threats to individuals (disease and natural disaster as well as conflict), or more narrowly to encompass only the threats to individuals from conflict (Owen 2004). In addition, some analysts criticized the whole concept for its lack of clarity and definition (Paris 2001; Newman 2010).

Despite its shortcomings, an international endorsement of the human security concept came rather rapidly. Using the narrower concept of threats to individuals from conflict, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty developed its recommendations on the responsibility to protect (referred to as R2P) in 2001 and, four years later, 191 heads of states endorsed this principle at the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, UN General Assembly 2005). This endorsement, however, has not led to consistent policy, principally because the international community has not agreed on implementation. As a result, cases of clear violation of human security have met with insufficient international reaction to make a difference.

Social Groups and Institutions as Fixers of Conflict

Until the 1990s, there was limited space for civil society organizations in the conflict resolution sphere. The end of the Cold War, however, provided an opening for new voices and new actors. The internal conflicts of the late 1980s and the 1990s — for instance in Mozambique and Rwanda — drove conflicts deep into society. Governments did not have the skills or experience to deal with the social or ethnic violence that resulted from these civil conflicts. The United Nations and its

specialized agencies also were overstretched and unprepared to deal with multiple civil wars, and in need of support from other actors. The private, non-governmental sector stepped into this gap to help meet the demands these new conflicts brought about.

In the 1990s, research on the non-governmental organization (NGO) community tended to focus on international NGOs and their impact on peace and conflict (Stephenson 2005; Perito 2007).[1] Over the past 15 years, both practitioners and academics have increasingly turned their attention toward the civil societies within conflict states (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Paffenholz 2010).[2] However, even in those early years, scholars such as John Paul Lederach (1997) pointed to the role that "insider partials" — peacemakers from within the conflict environment — play in effecting reconciliation. In another study, Herbert Kelman (1990) developed a model of problem-solving workshops that brought together influential individuals who represented different camps in a conflict.

1   While NGOs had been a growing presence in the international sphere since the mid-nineteenth century, their growth exploded after World War II. There were only about 3,000 international NGOs in 1945, but there were over 13,000 in 1990 and nearly 40,000 by 2006.

2   Definitions of civil society abound. A useful one is found in "Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding" by Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk (2006):
   • "Civil society is the sector of voluntary action within institutional forms that are distinct from those of the state, family and market, keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred;
   • It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations, often competing with each other and oriented to specific interests. It comprises non-state actors and associations that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere; and
   • Civil society is independent from the state, but it is oriented toward and interacts closely with the state and the political sphere."

In sectarian conflicts, the practice of interfaith dialogues has engaged religious leadership and laity in efforts to bring peace (Abu-Nimer, Welty and Khoury 2007; Wuye and Ashafa 1999). Other forms of dialogue, including national dialogues, have involved individuals, social groups and institutions in conflict resolution processes in a way that builds social cohesion (Ramsbotham 2010). Pressure on the United Nations and national governments to increase the inclusion of women in peace processes reflects this growing understanding that women's perspectives — which, as a result of their roles, often reflect grassroots concerns — are essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Through its focus on the need to move beyond political actors and the "guys with guns" to engage civil society and social groups in peace building, the conflict resolution field has moved closer to the field of economic and social development (Hughes et al. 2014).[3] The challenge for both fields is to understand how best to develop capacity in local actors. Here, it is important to note the difficulty in a conflict situation of identifying the local organizations that have the legitimacy and credibility to act as peacemakers. As Sharath Srinivasan (2016) points out, Western donors often focus on those civil society institutions that have mastered the intricacies of developing proposals

and producing reports to be read by Western partners. These, however, are not necessarily the organizations that are the most effective in engaging and representing their communities or the wider society.

Social Groups and Institutions as Sources of Social Cohesion and Resilience

In addition to these three views of the societal environment, one can also look at the ability of social groups and institutions to resist or overcome conflict. This fourth view looks at the intersection between conflict and groups or institutions that affect social attitudes and build social cohesion and resilience.

Resilience is a term with a long pedigree but little agreement on its meaning. Some have used the term resilience to capture the characteristics that allow a society to resist or recover from conflict. In their review of works on resilience (for a Rockefeller Foundation project on building resilience in poor and vulnerable communities in the face of climate change), Patrick Martin-Breen and J. Marty Anderies (2011) identify three principal definitions of the concept of resilience. The first definition, and the one most commonly identified with the term, emphasizes the ability to return to the *status quo ante*, "… to withstand a large disturbance without, in the end, changing, disintegrating, or becoming permanently damaged…" (ibid., 5-6). For this definition, for instance, resilience resembles a physical property found in material like rubber that can absorb energy in the form of pressure or blows and return to its original shape.

The second definition recognizes that change will be part of the outcome no matter how well an entity can "withstand a large disturbance." Nonetheless, the entity is able to adapt and keep functioning, delivering services and carrying out its mission. This definition, which focuses on systems, holds that "resilience…can be defined as maintaining system function in the event of a disturbance" (ibid., 7). Resilience in this case might describe a

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3   The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, endorsed by the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, Korea, in 2011, changed the formula for development. Instead of avoiding the political obstacles that can hinder social and economic development, the New Deal put forward goals that touched the heart of the relationship between state and society — inclusive politics, citizen security and access to justice. The New Deal also included voices from the recipient countries: the g7+ (a group of endorsing countries that includes among others Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste) have volunteered to implement the New Deal, including the governance principles. This model is very different from the traditional development approaches that stressed foreign aid and individual development projects.

psychological capability to absorb hardships and continue on. In this sense, a society or country may be resilient in the face of hardship.

The first definition emphasizes the ability to preserve. The second definition brings in the ability to adapt. A third definition — resilience in complex adaptive systems — includes the ability to innovate, to "withstand, recover from, and reorganize in response to crises" (ibid., 7). Here, resilience may be a result of specific governmental or societal action that institutions have taken to prepare for different outcomes. Together, these three definitions suggest that resilience incorporates an innate ability to preserve core functioning with flexibility in the face of change, and a willingness to learn from experience and to innovate.

Our focus in this book is on resilience in the face of conflict, on the ability to resist and recover from violent disruptions of peaceful social order. Resilience in the sphere of conflict management shares many of the characteristics of the definition above, particularly in the ability to both endure and adapt. However, given the political nature of conflict, resilience to conflict also incorporates a political element — the interaction between a government and the social institutions and groups in the wider society. Lauren Van Metre (2014) has identified three key components of a society resilient to conflict: a sense of shared meaning and solidarity among society members; appropriate distribution of resources, services and rights; and inclusive forms of governance. Building on her work, we will focus on three elements of resilience: social cohesion; a sense of fairness and equity; and an ability to participate in decision making.

Research and understanding on how to build and support a resilient society is still in its early stages. It is also important to recognize that resilience is a relatively neutral property in terms of the goals of the resilient institution. Governments can be resilient — at least for a period of time — whether or not they embrace accountability and transparency or introduce democratic practices.

The resilience of a number of African elected leaders who have imposed constitutional changes in order to stay in office is a case in point. And, at times, the ability to endure and adapt inhibits the demand for change, as may be the case in Zimbabwe. These examples illustrate the point that resilience can sometimes promote social unrest and violence.

The Shape of the Book

In order to understand this complex social terrain, this book brings together an impressive set of guides from Africa, Europe and North America. Each author brings years of research and analysis on African conflict management to the task. As a whole, they have produced a volume that reaches far beyond conventional analyses of the sources of conflict and the means to address them. The overarching questions that these authors explore are what constitutes social cohesion and resilience in the face of conflict; what are the threats to cohesion and resilience, how can the positive elements be fostered and by whom?

The first several chapters in the book examine deeply the major stresses that contribute to conflict in the African setting: stresses over governance, identity, economic differences and environmental change. By so doing, these chapters help to deepen understanding of the nature and complex interactions involved in social conflicts. Pierre Englebert points out that while social conflict may be associated with ethnic or religious divisions within a state, it is often intensified by battles over the vision of the state and over control of the power and resources. He argues that the "plural softness" — that is, the state's inability or lack of desire to privilege one ethnic group over all others — that characterizes many African states, serves to reduce the possibilities of revolt against a sitting government. Eghosa Osaghae's chapter on the ethnic conflicts involving Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria, however, shows the difficulties of maintaining a sense of *balance* among ethnicities

when dealing with groups whose identities are nomadic and not bound by borders.

Arnim Langer and Leila Demarest add further depth to understanding the link between the outbreak of violent conflict and the unequal distribution of economic, social and political opportunities and status among groups. They point out that in situations of horizontal inequalities, violence may be initiated by the more deprived and excluded groups. On the other hand, it may be a tool of the more privileged groups that wish to preserve their standing and advantages. Or, it may arise out of other circumstances. In the case of Boko Haram, the presence of marginalized and unemployed youth in northern Nigeria provided an endless flow of recruits to its cause. Violence does not arise from inherent ethnic, cultural or religious differences, but from group marginalization and the absence of fair treatment and equal opportunity. The chapter by Donald Anthony Mwiturubani shows how climate change can produce stress and potential conflict at different levels of society. This is a cause for concern for areas experiencing drought and other climate-induced challenges, but it also indicates that resilience is important at the level of family, community, state and region, and should be supported at each of these points.

The next section of the book looks at several institutions that lie in the borderland between state and society and play important roles in forming social attitudes toward peace and conflict. It is clear from these chapters that many governments in Africa have failed to establish institutions or policies that promote tolerance and social cohesion. Sometime this failure is the result of unintended consequences. Charles Olungah's chapter examines the result of expanding the number of higher education institutions in Kenya in order to educate increasing numbers of people. He notes, however, that the new institutions are tribally based and serve to reinforce ethnic and tribal differences and unequal access, rather than build a national or regional identity. Other

failures are the result of attempts at reform that were not well conceived, were cast too narrowly, or were based on wrong assumptions, as Mariama Awumbila's chapter on urban migrants clearly shows.

The chapter on rule of law and the role of justice by Allan Ngari and Raeesah Cassim Cachalia, on the other hand, focuses on the weakness of government institutions that deal with justice in many African states and the consequent lack of respect for the rule of law. They argue that the reform of legal systems needs to be a central part of post-conflict reconstruction, but warn that this period carries danger for strengthening legal systems. Following this theme, Mathurin Houngnikpo's chapter on security sector reform looks at the experience in six countries, noting that leadership motivations and uses of the security sector explain the key differences, and concludes that reform needs to involve a whole-of-government approach in order to be effective.

In the pursuit of elements that strengthen the ability to knot together fractures, the book then turns to the complicated issue of inclusion in peace processes and post-conflict governance. Alex de Waal's chapter sets the stage, developing a framework for understanding different concentric circles of inclusion in peace negotiations, from armed belligerents to civil society. Rejecting the argument that increasing participation is inefficient in a peace process, he argues that the increased legitimacy of an inclusive process can make it more efficient. The chapters that follow — Gilles Yabi on civil society, Callisto Madavo on the business sector, Akinyi Walender on women, and Marc Sommers on youth — give powerful illustrations of the potential of these groups to play a constructive role for peace and the systematic ways that both national governments and international actors exclude them from peace processes, political negotiations and in some cases from playing a part in society in general.

The last section of the book focuses on current approaches to strengthening resilience and social

cohesion. I William Zartman examines the under-explored area of indigenous methods of conflict resolution in African societies and notes that these methods emphasize restoration over retribution, with the desired objective to re-establish the status quo and "proper functioning of social relations." The modern era may have eroded these approaches and delegitimized the customary authorities that exercised them, but it has not erased them completely. National dialogues in post-transition or post-conflict situations have received both national and international support as effective ways of increasing participation and resolving conflicts. Susan Stigant and Elizabeth Murray examine the record of these dialogues in Africa and conclude that dialogue processes can increase the sense of participation in the process of envisioning the future, but only if political authorities are willing to listen. Lacking political support, they are window-dressing exercises, giving the central authorities the appearance of popular support rather than a real mandate.

Alex Thurston's chapter notes that religion is only one factor in the complex conflicts on the continent. He is skeptical of the major approaches to resolving conflicts with a religious character: entrenching conservative religious leaders in positions of power, inter-religious dialogues and strategies to counter violent extremism. Instead, he echoes some of Pierre Englebert's conclusions about plural softness, and suggests that the growing fragmentation within the religious communities in Africa provides opportunities for engagement, encouraging different points of view and increasing democracy, accountability and conflict resolution within and perhaps between religious communities.

The David Smith and Stephanie Wolters chapter on media in Africa notes that as the principal source of news, radio can help to build social cohesion in post-conflict communities. However, as long as governments — and international aid groups — overlook smaller, less dominant communities, they will not be able to reach those groups on the marginalized end of the horizontal inequality spectrum. Unless broadcasters make efforts to reach these communities through their programming, radio broadcasts may serve to widen long-standing fractures rather than bridge them.

Why are some regions more resilient than others in resisting and recovering from conflict? Alexandre Marc, Neelam Verjee and Stephen Mogaka consider this question by looking at the history and current status of west Africa, a region in Africa that has seen the outbreak of civil conflict decrease markedly since 2000. Reasons for this trend seem to lie in the increasing democratization of the region, and the opening up of a more inclusive political space. Responsive regional organizations and the growth of civil society have also contributed to increasing ability to arrive at political or legal solutions for contested issues.

Finally, Princeton Lyman reminds us of the critical importance of leadership in building up resilience, but he also sets a challenge to civil society organizations to act. He underscores the point that resilience does not mean acceptance or quiescence in the face of conflict. It means building the ability to preserve core functions while allowing changes that will make society more inclusive, tolerant and cohesive. In order to strengthen the fabric of peace in Africa, you need to look beyond the state to understand how various actors in the larger social environment help to weave the tapestry.

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