PREPARATORY DOCUMENT FOR PARTICIPANTS

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SETTING THE SCENE

This year is on track to be the warmest on record for our planet, and the recent *State of the Climate in 2009* report from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) shows this is just one data point in a series of long-term global and regional climate trends now showing unequivocal change. Disappearing Arctic sea ice and glaciers; warming, rising and acidifying oceans; increasing humidity and shifting precipitation patterns; and a warming atmosphere, all point to the same unavoidable conclusion: our climate is already changing. Although not directly attributable as individual events to climate change, this summer’s extreme floods in Pakistan, fires in Russia, mudslides in China and record heat waves spanning several continents, have revealed how unprepared societies are to handle the consequences of our changing climate.

At the same time, we know what needs to be achieved. The core elements of global action required to effectively and equitably limit the risk of future climate damage are well understood. Global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 and decrease by at least 50 percent (relative to 1990) by 2050 to have at least even odds of limiting global warming to 2°C — the target now broadly accepted as the maximum acceptable warming. To achieve this, the populations of developed countries must significantly change both the amount and sources of energy we use — which requires changing our individual and social behaviour patterns — in order to meet our contribution of an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse emissions by 2050. It also requires most of the world’s population residing in developing countries to establish sustainable emission limits, supported by equitable climate financing from developed countries (to the estimated tune of between US$200 to US$300 billion annually by 2030) to enable low-carbon and climate-resilient development pathways.

While the collective results needed to limit climate change risks are clear, the means for achieving them are not. Realizing these goals will require transitions in infrastructure, technology and social patterns — shifts that generate uncertainty about future prosperity and social wellbeing. This reality underlies the contradictions clearly evident in the global climate discourse today. With the Copenhagen Accord, world leaders have trumpeted the need to keep global warming below 2°C, yet current national pledges to reduce emissions point to the earth warming by well over 3°C by this century’s end. Meanwhile, domestic constituencies are preoccupied with restoring economic growth, making even these non-binding pledges appear politically ambitious — most noticeably in the United States. The “Fast Start” (US$30 billion for 2010-2012) and long-term (US$100 billion per year by 2020) climate financing commitments of developed countries recognize the urgent and significant needs of developing countries. However, continuing uncertainty over where these funds will come from, combined with a lack of standards for how the increasing number of climate finance instruments should disburse, monitor and assess the impacts of their resources, mean that the true value of these commitments remain unclear. Even at full value, these commitments still fall short of the estimated long-term need for achieving and equitably coping with the climatic changes embedded in a 2°C target.

After the frenzied sprint into Copenhagen produced underwhelming results, there is warranted skepticism that new answers will emerge from the UNFCCC negotiating process any time soon. Deeply embedded political disagreements remain largely unaddressed, simmering just under the thin quasi-agreement of the Copenhagen Accord. These disagreements are rooted in long-standing tensions between: short-term national interest and long-term global welfare; recognition of historic responsibility and inaction, and fear of economic consequences from unbalanced action today; and understanding the reductions that are necessary and bafflement about how to persuade democratic populations and entrenched interests to want to change their behaviours. The structure and process of the all-inclusive UNFCCC negotiations have repeatedly proven unable to tackle these fundamental issues.

Thankfully, the story does not end there.
Innovative climate policy experiments and entrepreneurs are springing up at local through transnational levels, sparking hopes that green energy and economic transitions are beginning in earnest. These initiatives span sub-national carbon taxes and trading regimes, corporate programs enabling the green development of cities and energy systems, and civil society campaigns successfully prompting individuals, businesses and governments to immediately reduce their carbon footprints. Together, they represent a commitment by many millions to drive “bottom-up” climate action now, ahead of the global curve. In many countries, these actions have even received strong national boosts through green-focused economic recovery packages.

At the same time, old and new multilateral forums are tentatively foraging deeper into some aspects of climate policy, seeking ways to bypass the gridlocked global negotiations. Even as the G20 continues to grapple with global financial reforms, climate is edging further onto its agenda. The recently launched Major Economies Forum (a group of 17 countries collectively accounting for roughly 80 percent of global emissions) has been built around energy and climate policy. The tantalizing possibility — albeit slim — that regional groups or even bilateral partnerships could step forward to provide global leadership through bold unilateral commitments is not completely absurd. These multilateral “clubs” of select countries, along with several others (such as the WTO and OECD), offer the prospect of targeted near-term “wins” on specific elements of climate policy. Such wins might ease the current contradictions and tensions just enough to unlock new space for progress towards a future global deal.

There is no guarantee that any of these decentralized activities will add up to sufficient progress. The emergence of uncoordinated local climate regimes might even spark new tensions over harmonization that could further hamper international negotiations. At least in the short term, it appears that reducing future climate damage hinges on finding ways to leverage these scattered opportunities into tangible, coordinated progress towards the global action we know is needed.

This is the starting point for our conference. We know our climate is changing. We know that addressing the threat of climate change will require collective international action, ultimately coordinated through a global climate deal. Our unprecedented global challenge is to develop innovative approaches to international governance that will mobilize and coordinate a diverse array of actors and actions, spanning every level of government and society, to achieve this objective. This is a challenge in need of ideas for immediate action, and The Centre for International Governance Innovation is pleased to welcome your participation generating such ideas at CIGI ’10: Climate of Action.
THE STATE OF OUR CLIMATE

The State of the Climate in 2009 report (NOAA, 2010) provides the most up to date and comprehensive scientific review of the changes now underway in our climate system. Assembled by more than 300 scientists from 48 countries, the report details 10 separately measurable indicators that demonstrate that our climate is warming and changing, as detailed in a nine-page highlights summary.

The science linking these visible climatic changes to anthropogenic emissions is summarized in the Summary for Policymakers of IPCC WG1 (2007) and updated by the 2009 UNEP Science Compendium.

Though individual extreme weather events — such as the widespread heat waves, droughts and floods of this summer — cannot be scientifically attributed to climate change, the increasing number and intensity of such events can be. A recent Climate Compass blog post summarizes this important difference quite well.

THE STATE OF OUR RESPONSE: CARBON EMISSIONS

More than 110 countries have expressed support for the Copenhagen Accord and over 80 have submitted non-binding emission reduction targets (Annex I) or nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA) plans (Non-Annex I) to the UNFCCC. Interactive summaries of national responses are available from the US Climate Action Network and the Center for American Progress.

Independent scientific evaluations indicate that current pledges alone, even if fully achieved, are very likely to lead to warming of higher than 3°C by 2100 (for example, Nature, April 2010). An interactive evaluation comparing current pledges against the 2°C target is available from Climate Interactive.

Given the stalled status of climate legislation in the United States, the precondition of a binding global agreement for the aggressive target proposals of Australia, the European Union and Japan, and the vagueness in many NAMA plans, even current proposals may be politically ambitious.

THE STATE OF OUR RESPONSE: CLIMATE FINANCE

As part of the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries pledged both “Fast Start” (US$30 billion for 2010-2012) and long-term (US$100 billion per year by 2020) financing to begin meeting the low-carbon and climate-resilient development needs for most of the world’s population living in developing countries. By 2030, The World Bank estimates these needs could exceed US$250 billion per year.

While the sources and instruments of climate finance continue to proliferate, standards have yet to be established for ensuring transparency and effectiveness. (See, for example, The World Bank and Project Catalyst policy briefs on climate finance and the new Fast Start finance tracking website.)

Without transparency and standards for the sources of these finances, developing countries remain concerned about whether these promised finances will be truly additional to existing, and thus far unmet, Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments.
CIGI ’10 OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW

CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES

There are two primary goals for CIGI ’10. First, to explore the potential for action at all levels of government and society — from the bottom up, through multilateral clubs, to the global negotiations — to create tangible progress towards the “Core Elements of Global Action” we know are needed (see box). Second, to produce specific recommendations for targeted actors and forums on how action across these levels can be mobilized and coordinated to maximize net progress. These targeted actors and forums include, but are not limited to, those represented at CIGI ’10:

• The national hosts and UNFCCC secretariat for the upcoming global negotiations in Mexico and South Africa;
• The national hosts for the upcoming G20 meetings in Korea, France and Mexico;
• The secretariat and members of the UNSG’s new High-level Panel on Global Sustainability (Terms of reference are available at the High-level Panel’s website);
• The emerging secretariat and broad array of stakeholders engaging in Rio+20 in 2012 (Official UN website, Stakeholder Forum website promoting engagement by a wide range of non-state actors and a timeline of preparatory meetings); and
• The emerging networks of sub-national government, corporate sector and civil society actors mobilizing climate action ahead of the global curve (more information is provided below in the section on Round Table Two).

CORE ELEMENTS OF GLOBAL ACTION

Based on the latest scientific and economic projections, the core elements of global action needed to effectively and equitably reduce the risk of future climate change damages, as they are broadly understood today, are as follows:

• Global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 and decrease by at least 50 percent (relative to 1990) by 2050;
• Developed countries need to reduce emissions by 80 percent by 2050 by reducing the amount and changing the sources of energy they use; and
• Developing countries need to set sustainable emissions targets, supported by international climate financing of US$200 billion to US$300 billion annually by 2030 for low-carbon and climate-resilient development.

The conclusions and recommendations of CIGI ’10 will be summarized in a public conference report, brief written and video commentaries (recorded on-site during the conference) from willing participants and private memoranda to targeted policy makers. We hope the recommendations generated will focus on a set of ideas for immediate action that, taken together, support steady and stable progress towards the necessary collective global action and international climate deal.
PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The conference opens with a private welcome dinner for participants and a public opening event on Friday evening. On Saturday morning the conference will move into one and half days of “Chatham House Rule” discussion between the roughly 60 leading international policy makers, practitioners and scholars in attendance. Two short presentations will set the scene. The first will review the scientific consensus and provide an update on the latest science of climate change. The second will summarize the core elements of global action needed to limit future climate risks.

The main forum for organized discussion throughout the conference will be a series of four round tables involving all conference participants. The format and layout (see figure below) of each round-table session will be the same. Each session will open with a moderator and six or seven discussants at the central table engaging in an unscripted conversion for approximately 40 minutes (discussants are requested to keep opening prepared remarks to about 2 minutes, aiming to stimulate a dynamic discussion). The moderator will then open the conversation to comments and questions from all participants seated at the surrounding tables for roughly 60 minutes.

These round tables will progress sequentially through the main topics of the conference:

- Understanding why international and national progress on the needed elements of global action is gridlocked;
- Exploring the potential of, and needed coordination for, bottom-up climate action;
- Examining the potential value and possible pitfalls of multilateral club climate action; and
- Determining how action across all these levels, including restructuring the global negotiations, can be mobilized and coordinated for the best results for our future.

To complement these round-table conversations, two interview-style presentations will provide further context throughout the weekend. The first will explore the interface between climate science and public policy, and the second will introduce the emerging governance challenges presented by geoengineering research. In addition, time is set aside throughout the agenda for informal discussion among the participants.

The following sections provide further framing for each round table, including motivating questions and links to additional resources. The motivating questions are meant to be launching points for discussion, and should not constrain the scope of the conversation. All web-linked resources in this document are for the reference of interested participants and are not considered expected reading for the conference.

CHATHAM HOUSE RULE

“When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.”
THE CONFERENCE AGENDA

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2010
17:00–19:00  Private Welcome Dinner for Conference Participants

PUBLIC OPENING:
19:00–21:00  The Road to a Global Climate Deal
Featuring Canada’s Minister of the Environment Jim Prentice and former UK Science Adviser Sir David King

CLOSED SESSIONS: SATURDAY–SUNDAY, OCTOBER 2-3, 2010

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2010
8:45–9:00  Welcome
9:00–9:30  Keynote One
The Call to Action: Review of the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change
9:30–10:00  Keynote Two
What We Know We Need: The Core Elements of Global Action

30-MINUTE BREAK

10:30–12:15  Round Table One
Where the Elements are Today: What’s Holding Us Back?
12:15–14:00  Lunch and Keynote Three
Improving the Interface Between Climate Science and Policy
14:15–15:45  Round Table Two
Tackling Climate from the Bottom Up: What Elements Can We get from Climate Action Ahead of the Global Curve?

30-MINUTE BREAK

16:15–17:45  Round Table Three
Multilateral “Clubs” for Targeted Elements: Progress or Patchwork of Climate Regimes?

TRANSPORTATION TO LANGDON HALL
18:30–21:30  Discussion Period for Participants — Informal Reception and Dinner

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2010
9:00–10:00  Keynote Four
Geoengineering Research and Politics: A New Governance Dimension

30-MINUTE BREAK

10:30–12:15  Round Table Four
Moving the Elements Forward: Linking Progress Between Levels and Rethinking Global Negotiations
12:15–12:45  Closing Session
13:00–14:00  Discussion Period for Participants — Informal Lunch
Collectively, we know what needs to be achieved, but as nations, corporations and individuals, we have not reconciled these collective needs with our varied arrays of perceived self-interests that drive our daily choices. This is not the first such collective action challenge that our global community has faced; however, we are now seeing that both carbon emissions and potential climate change impacts (some already emerging) pervade more deeply and in more complex ways into almost every facet of our diverse societies than any previous issue. Across developed and developing countries, these impacts entwine with multiple aspects of our livelihoods, our social identities, and our dreams of a better future for our children. More is perceived to be at stake, often unconsciously, in climate policy decisions than ever before. This has resulted in a broader range of distinct, frequently conflicting, interests having to be collectively renegotiated than ever before.

The two main objectives for this round table are to deepen our understanding of how and why climate politics have become gridlocked, and to identify opportunities for unlocking new progress. This gridlock is rooted in a variety of competing political narratives for defining the climate challenge. Therefore, the proposed starting point for this conversation is an exploration of: the prominent narratives driving both key national climate debates and the international negotiations; and how these narratives have interacted through the current negotiating processes to cause the present stalemate.

In most national contexts these narratives extend far beyond climate alone, linking or eclipsing climate change with issues such as job security, equitable development, economic growth, poverty alleviation and energy security. In contrast, the narrative often used to motivate the international negotiations — that climate challenge is a singular issue of existential global welfare, urgently requiring a binding international deal separate from other issues — has failed to resonate with key domestic constituencies. The current structure for the negotiations has left both negotiators and political figures trapped in the expanding gulf between national and global narratives. Yet despite this gulf, the focus of many national stimulus packages on green growth objectives has suggested that potential exists
for positively leveraging domestic issue linkages. One important challenge for this round table to consider is whether there are new political narratives that have the potential to empower leadership, nationally or internationally, on emission reduction commitments or transparent and effective climate finance.

**ROUND TABLE TWO**

**TACKLING CLIMATE FROM THE BOTTOM UP:**

**WHAT ELEMENTS CAN WE GET FROM CLIMATE ACTION AHEAD OF THE GLOBAL CURVE?**

**MOTIVATING QUESTIONS**

Could bottom-up climate activities add to notable emission reductions in their own right?

What are best practices for bottom-up activities seeking to play a catalytic role in developing and promoting green social, technological or political innovations?

How could expanded coordination and cooperation between bottom-up activities across different localities enhance the impact of various types of activities?

What mechanisms and institutions would be best suited to provide such coordination?

How can this range of bottom-up activities be most effectively interfaced with the international negotiations or other international processes, such as Rio+20, to help break the current gridlock?

What are the risks (for example, failed harmonization, increased costs, low effectiveness) created by expanded bottom-up action?

Not everyone is trapped in the negotiation gridlock. In recent years, proactive sub-national government, corporate and civil society actors have launched a diversity of climate initiatives that far outpace their national leaders. Some of these take the form of sub-national policy experiments targeting near-term emission reductions (for example, California's auto emissions standards or the Western Climate Initiative), with a subset of those generating new sources of finance for green technology development and deployment (for example, British Columbia's carbon tax). Other initiatives take the form of hubs for practitioner-driven innovation networks aiming to advance low-carbon development across a range of localities and sectors (for example, Sustainable Cities). Still others take shape as social campaigns that raise awareness of the small steps that can be taken now to reduce our carbon footprints (for example, 10:10, a campaign that encourages individuals, companies and governments at all levels to commit in 2010 to reducing their carbon emissions by 10 percent within a year). Renewable feed-in tariffs, green venture capital funds, hybrid vehicle incentives, and many other forms decorate the landscape. The common thread among all of these activities is the clear commitment by various coalitions of the climate willing to take immediate action.

The common challenge for these coalitions is to leverage their limited resources and energies to achieve the greatest overall impact.

The main objectives for this round table are to explore the potential for “bottom-up” climate activities to catalyze technical, social or political innovations which may eventually add up to tangible emission reductions, and to identify opportunities for further coordination and cooperation that could improve their impact today. Particularly in arenas where national political leadership on climate has been scarce, such bottom-up activities are attempting to establish foundations on which future policy frameworks and commitments can be built. These activities introduce new climate narratives into their national contexts by demonstrating the concrete local benefits of taking early action on climate. They provide incentives, incubators and collaborative learning environments for green social and technological innovators. And some are already garnering international attention as exemplar models for how to stimulate green energy and economic transitions.
Successful bottom-up activities have also emerged, mostly in regions already predisposed to climate action, and with characteristics aligned to their local economic and political contexts. This raises hard questions about how much the innovations and learning — particularly on social and political fronts — are realistically transferable to more challenging, climate-hostile localities with very different contexts. This also creates the possibility of tension emerging between different regimes over the transboundary economic impacts of climate policies or the harmonization of different regulatory frameworks (such as the tensions raised by California’s emissions standard), which could further hinder efforts to develop coherent national and international climate policies. Although international mechanisms for promoting positive coordination and cooperation are beginning to emerge (for example, UNEP’s Green Economy Initiative), they are at an early stage of development and remain disconnected from the international negotiations. Based on this, an important question for this round table would be: What practices and coordination mechanisms, anchored in which forums, would be most valuable for helping these activities to achieve the strongest climate impact?

**ROUND TABLE THREE**

**MULTILATERAL “CLUBS” FOR TARGETED ELEMENTS:**

**PROGRESS OR PATCHWORK OF CLIMATE REGIMES?**

**MOTIVATING QUESTIONS**

What range of climate policy issues could a subset of nations acting in concert — as an international coalition of the climate willing — conceivably achieve substantive progress on?

How do these issues line up with existing multilateral clubs? What would be necessary to advance suitable issues onto these clubs’ agendas?

What role could informal bilateral or “minilateral” partnerships play in addressing targeted issues?

Are there new constellations of countries that could form more effective multilateral clubs around specific elements of climate policy?

What methods could formal clubs or informal partnerships employ to expand their legitimacy on sensitive climate issues, without sacrificing the negotiating efficiency of narrow membership?

Are there standard guiding principles for climate policy development — similar to those applied in the trade (for example, nondiscrimination) — which could help reduce conflict between different climate regimes?

What are the risks (for example, distraction, new tensions, failure and increased gridlock) inherent in multilateral clubs taking specific issues outside of the UNFCCC negotiations?

The rapid elevation of the G20 to a leaders’ summit with the onset of the global financial crisis and its subsequent spate of action towards financial system reform, demonstrate the type of international leadership that can emerge when domestic political necessities align across nations. Conversely, the last-minute, closed-door negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by the leaders of the US and the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), despite the unprecedented gathering of 155 heads of state in Copenhagen, demonstrates the suboptimal results that can occur when domestic constituencies remain divided and disengaged, and governments perceive national interests differentially and narrowly. Even as climate settles firmly onto a host of bilateral and multilateral discussion agendas, the underlying test remains whether national leaders can align international and domestic commitments. Where the all-inclusive global negotiations necessarily entangle a complex array of interests and issues (including emission targets, climate finance, energy security, economic consequences and development pathways), multilateral clubs offer the prospect of narrowly targeted agendas. Fewer participants and focused agendas do not necessarily imply readier agreement, however. The challenge remains for each club to identify climate policy actions that meet the test of domestic acceptability within its members, while still being recognized as legitimate by the rest of the international community.
The main objectives for this round table are to examine the prospects of climate action by prominent multilateral clubs, and to propose specific climate policy issues that targeted clubs should take up over the next year. The G20 provides a valuable launching point for this conversation, particularly given its roots in financial sector reform and the need for increased clarity on the sources and instruments for climate financing commitments. (President Sarkozy has already indicated that climate finance will be on the French G20 agenda in 2011.) Other forums also offer potential venues for targeted climate policy issues. These range from formal clubs (such as the WTO, OECD and the recently constituted Major Economies Forum) to more informal bilateral and “minilateral” partnerships (such as the negotiators of the Copenhagen Accord), and the possibility that new constellations of countries could formally launch further issue-specific clubs. Each venue offers at least the potential for focused discussions on issues as direct as emission reduction targets for the world’s largest emitters, or as complex as frameworks for harmonizing various trade and climate regimes.

Even more than for sub-national climate regimes, the emergence of a patchwork of narrowly focused international climate discussions, each encompassing different subsets of countries and policy issues, could cut both ways. The potential for international tensions to flare when it becomes necessary harmonize the disparate discussions, regimes and the international negotiations could overshadow any gains from limited policy wins. Identifying climate agendas for targeted clubs that strike an appropriate balance between efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy will be a central challenge for this round table conversation.

ROUND TABLE FOUR
MOVING THE ELEMENTS FORWARD:
LINKING PROGRESS BETWEEN LEVELS AND RETHINKING GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

MOTIVATING QUESTIONS
What reforms would enable the UNFCCC negotiations to better support or leverage the catalytic potential of bottom-up climate activities within key domestic contexts?

What reforms would enable the negotiations to empower or coordinate more efficient progress on narrow climate policy issues by select multilateral clubs?

What are the prospects for such process and structure reforms of the negotiations? What are the avenues (for example, Rio+20, UN High Level Panel) for stimulating such reforms?

What other international/global institutions are necessary to mobilize and coordinate the needed global action?

What are the prospects of gradually increasing coordination and effectiveness over time, if the starting point is a complex array of fragmented regimes?

How can climate action, spanning every level of government and society, be mobilized and coordinated to achieve what is necessary to preserve our global well-being? This question is at the heart of the international governance challenge posed by climate change today. It is also the core question for our final round table on Sunday morning.

Global progress on climate must inevitably be comprised of billions of individuals changing their actions and choices. Underlying the push for an immediate and binding international climate deal is the premise that such changes are most effectively and equitably brought about by top-down economic incentives and regulatory frameworks. Of course, the uphill battle has been convincing politically empowered domestic populations to voluntarily bind themselves to such incentives and frameworks (Round Table One). In some places, this has begun to happen (Round Table Two). In these cases, however, emerging top-down structures appear to be more the aggregate product of
climate choices by proactive individuals, rather than the cause of these choices in the first place. And climate policy issues where multilateral clubs might generate new progress are likely to be those that already align with the domestic interests of the participating nations (Round Table Three).

In its present form, the international climate negotiations have failed to catalyze the domestic support needed for effective global action. Conversely, although bottom-up and multilateral action may offer catalysts for technical, social and political change, such actions still must be knit together to create a package that adds to an effective and equitable global response to climate change. Various proposals for how to approach this knitting have been made, including: the creation of an overarching global environmental organization; living with the current climate regime complex; and an emergent polycentric climate governance framework. The grand challenge for this conversation is to examine these ranging ideas alongside the learning of the preceding round tables to generate ideas for both improving the current negotiations, and for building a better interface with potential catalytic activities in domestic and multilateral arenas.
FURTHER CONTEXT

The two additional context-setting discussions will take place at lunch on Saturday and first thing on Sunday morning. These discussions will begin with brief (10-minute) presentations by the speaker, followed by an interview-style discussion between the speaker and a knowledgeable media moderator (20 minutes). The remainder of each session will be an open Q&A and discussion with all participants.

IMPROVING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN CLIMATE SCIENCE AND POLICY

There has been strong scientific consensus for over a decade that climate change is happening and driven by anthropogenic greenhouse emissions, but public and policy-maker opinions and actions have lagged far behind. In the past year, news stories about “climategate” and “glaciergate” have set back hard-won public opinion gains of recent years, reinvigorated long-standing debates among scientists about the line between advice and advocacy, and even led to reviews of the Nobel Prize-winning IPCC.

This discussion will focus on questions such as: What roles should science and scientists play in national and international policy making? How should we design processes and institutions at the interface between scientists, policy makers and the public that are effective at fulfilling these roles?

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

A six-page UNESCO policy brief entitled How to Improve the Dialogue between Science and Society provides a succinct overview of many key issues.

The allegations stemming from the unauthorized release of University of East Anglia (UEA) emails last fall — dubbed “climategate” — have been investigated by both scientific and political reviews. All have found the underlying science to be completely sound, while making recommendations regarding the conduct of the scientists themselves. Important reviews include:

- The UK House of Commons S&T Committee Review
- The Independent Climate Change Emails Review
- The International Review of UEA

The concerns stemming from factual errors and citation practices in the IPCC’s latest report — dubbed “glaciergate” because the mistakes had to do with the rate of glacier disappearance — have also been investigated. Proposals for new governance, transparency and review practices were made by the recently concluded InterAcademy Review of the IPCC.

GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND POLITICS: A NEW GOVERNANCE DIMENSION

Spurred by the lack of progress on global mitigation and increasing concern about near-term climatic changes, some scientists and policy makers are starting to seriously consider geoengineering — the deliberate, large-scale alteration of the climate system — as a potential response to climate change. But even research into technologies for
engineering the climate systems poses unprecedented international governance challenges — particularly as some geoengineering technologies could be developed and deployed unilaterally.

This discussion will outline emerging geoengineering research and explore key questions it raises: Who should develop and control such technologies? How should decisions be made about testing these technologies on the global climate? How will geoengineering impact the international climate negotiations?

**ADDITIONAL RESOURCES**

Two short opinion and policy articles in the leading journals *Science* and *Nature* published in January 2010, provide an overview of the key policy and governance challenges raised by geoengineering research.

The report entitled *The Regulation of Geoengineering* by the UK Parliamentary Committee on Science and Technology provides a detailed overview of the social, political and governance challenges raised by emerging geoengineering research.

The UK Royal Society’s 2009 report entitled *Geoengineering the Climate*, provides a complete review of the science and uncertainties underlying current geoengineering proposals.
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ABOUT CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank that addresses international governance challenges. Led by a group of experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research forms networks, advances policy debate, builds capacity, and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events, and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI conducts in-depth research and engages experts and partners worldwide from its extensive networks to craft policy proposals and recommendations that promote change in international public policy. Current research interests focus on international economic and financial governance both for the long-term and in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis; the role of the G20 and the newly emerging powers in the evolution of global diplomacy; Africa and climate change, and other issues related to food and human security.

CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, co-CEO of RIM (Research In Motion) and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario. CIGI gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the Government of Canada to its endowment fund.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, cochef de la direction de RIM (Research In Motion). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et leur exprime toute sa reconnaissance pour leur soutien. Il remercie tout particulièrement le gouvernement du Canada pour sa contribution à son Fonds de dotation, de même que le gouvernement de l’Ontario.