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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Pamela’s research interests include conflict management, mediation, reconciliation, capacity building, international and regional institutions, civil society in conflict settings, civil-military relations, education and training, and the role of education in exacerbating conflict or promoting reconciliation. In addition to her research and management work, she has directed conflict transformation and capacity-building programs for Sudan, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Bosnia. She has also worked at The Rockefeller Foundation, the European Cultural Foundation and the International Council for Educational Development. In spring 2014, she was the Sharkey Scholar at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, and has taught at George Washington University.

Pamela has written and co-authored a number of articles and books, including the Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (USIP, 2000). With Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, she has written and edited a series of books on international conflict management published by USIP including most recently, Managing Conflict in a World Adrift (2015) also published by CIGI, Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (2007); Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases (2004); and Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World (2011). They are also series editors for the Routledge Studies in Security and Conflict Management.

ACRONYMS

ARCM African Regional Conflict Management
AFRICOM United States Africa Command
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CAR Central African Republic
CIGI Centre for International Governance Innovation
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CVE countering violent extremism
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NGO non-governmental organization
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Responding to violent conflict begins with a diagnosis of what the conflict is about — what are the causes and triggers that transform a disagreement into an armed struggle. Behind the immediate reasons, however, there are often assumptions about the enabling conditions that underlie the conflict, and these assumptions provide the framework for the diagnosis. This paper reviews three of the assumptions that underlie the analysis of what conflicts are about as they relate to Africa. These assumptions are: that conflicts result from zero-sum power politics among contending leaders; they are due to state weakness and the failure of governments to provide basic services and security; or they result from sharply differing views of culture and society.

Each of these diagnoses points to different remedies — using forceful means to change the zero-sum political dynamics among contending leaders; building institutional capacity in order to withstand violence; or building the capacity of societies to resist radicalizing narratives. While the diagnosis may be correct to a limited degree, it rarely captures the whole picture. The result is that the remedy may not fully address the problem. In addition, institutions tend to select the “remedy” that suits their own capacities, missing at times crucial components of the conflict management process. Collective conflict management — collaborative action among many institutions — would provide a more fulsome response, but is difficult to organize.

Recognizing the difficulty of diagnosing and designing remedies for the complex conflicts that Africa is facing, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) has launched a project on Africa and its capacity to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts. The principal aim of the project will be to understand African regional conflict management capacity, identify gaps and make recommendations to bridge those divides.

THE PROBLEM

Conflict management, like auto repair and medicine, is an applied field. Doctors and car mechanics base their work on matching analysis to action: making an accurate diagnosis of the problem and prescribing an appropriate remedy. So do conflict managers. This paper sets out the basis for a multi-year initiative that CIGI has undertaken on managing conflict in Africa, asking fundamental questions about the diagnosis of the problem — i.e., potential and actual violent conflicts — and the responses to that problem. Responding to these conflicts requires concerted action to manage the crises — the violence, the political discord and the humanitarian consequences of prolonged fighting. But it is also necessary to rebuild communities, societies and states torn apart by the conflict, addressing the long-term social and economic impact of the conflict.

This complex formula requires a multi-faceted approach and the cooperation of many different individuals and institutions. How well are African states and societies coping with these dual challenges? What are the prospects for a multi-faceted, collaborative approach to conflict management? In light of the significant international official and non-official engagement in peacemaking in Africa, how effective are the international efforts and how well do they work with African initiatives?

Conflicts in Africa are diverse and complex, and efforts at managing and resolving them are mixed. In some respects, the news is good. The number of conflicts seems to be on a downward trajectory since the 1990s and early 2000s (Themner and Wallensteen 2014; Burback and Fettweis 2014). Many African conflicts have been settled and peace has returned to a number of societies previously affected by organized violence. The creation of a tapestry of African regional organizations with relatively robust mandates in the peace and security arena provides an improving institutional basis that includes a strong network of continental and subregional organizations. A number of major regional figures, including the late Nelson Mandela, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, have played significant roles in mediation on the continent. A number of civil society institutions dedicated to public policy, peace and security and/or conflict resolution research provide a brain trust for policy development and lessons learned.

However, the need for conflict management outstrips demand. Non-traditional conflicts involving such groups as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Lord’s Resistance Army, have made world headlines for their violence and extreme hostility toward their governments and societies. These non-traditional conflicts involve non-state actors whose motivations and means of operating are only vaguely understood by official institutions (Agbiboa 2013; Walker 2012). Identity-based conflicts, reflecting ethnic, religious and tribal cleavages, have entered deep into society and require conflict management at the grassroots, social-institution levels, as well as at the national, political levels. Other elements — migration, health concerns — continue to be socially destabilizing (Green 2012). While the formal network of African conflict management institutions may be robust in appearance, its capacity is quite limited and relations between African governments can impede cooperation. Outside help has not been reliable either. The UN Security Council, polarized over the invasion of Libya in 2011, has not functioned well as an authorizing body for interventions in hot conflicts for some time (Iyi 2014). Only recently has the drawdown in Afghanistan and Iraq freed up more US military resources to augment the United States Africa Command’s (AFRICOM’s) counter-terrorism training in Africa (Cloud 2014).
Given this situation, understanding what works and what does not is critical. Most conflict management initiatives in Africa have involved one of two mechanisms — peace operations and/or mediation. The purpose of these missions has been to stop the fighting in order to allow a political process to develop. This, for instance, was the intention behind the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, mediated by General Lazaro Sumbeiywo representing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (known as IGAD) and with the support of the United Kingdom, Norway, the United States, Italy and others. The CPA mandated a cessation of hostilities between the North and the South, as well as creation of power-sharing government arrangements over a period of six years. That six-year period, which might have strengthened governmental structures, did nothing to bolster Sudan’s capacity as a nation-state. It seemed to serve mainly as a waiting period before the country split apart for good, as a result of the 2011 referendum, agreed to as part of the CPA. This outcome did not end the fighting — border skirmishes between Sudan and South Sudan as well as violence in Darfur continue, and power struggles divide South Sudan.

The Sudan example raises the question of whether mediation and peacekeeping are the best means of managing and resolving conflicts in Africa (Quinn et al. 2013; Mutanda 2013). With the interplay of political, social and economic factors at play in every conflict, even a highly sophisticated approach, such as a high-level UN mediation, can address only some of the conflict dynamics. In order to make peacekeeping and mediation more effective, how should they be planned and implemented, who should be engaged, under what conditions and when? How can they be strengthened, and what other approaches to managing conflict could complement — or replace — their activities?

**DIAGNOSIS AND REMEDY**

The first step in answering these questions is an effective diagnosis of the problem. However, diagnosis is difficult in Africa’s wars, which have occurred over a variety of issues — land, resources, political power, profits, security, religion and identity. In most cases, these issues intersect. Conflicts that start as elite struggles for power quickly turn into identity-based violence, as members of one religious or ethnic group target members of other groups.

These problems are compounded by other difficulties, some of which are universal (for example, corruption), and others are mostly associated with particular countries at the moment — i.e., rulers unwilling to step down despite constitutional term limits or election outcomes.¹ In volatile regions such as central Africa, the regionalization of civil strife intensifies the effect. The effects on the population are devastating — civilian killings, massive population dislocation, and breakdown of social and economic structures, including health care, education and employment. Not only are the effects severe, they are also widespread. Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa currently displaces more than 12 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015).

While each of these conflicts is different, they seem to share common elements — profound disagreements over the basic vision of what the nation is, struggles over state-society relations and contests over who gets to rule. They also share the risk of rapid expansion of conflict across borders, often creating conditions that promote foreign involvement, whether from a neighbour or from non-state actors.

How have different actors analyzed these conflicts and designed conflict management remedies based on that diagnosis? With the vast variety of contexts in Africa, it is difficult to generalize about the remedies. However, an initial review of African conflict management initiatives indicates that they often fall into categories that are common in other peacemaking efforts (Aall 2015). These approaches view conflict as a result of power struggles between or among several armed groups; weak states and weak state institutions incapable of providing security and services; or radically different visions of the future, due to identity differences. Decisions about responses or remedies reflect initial analysis. While these actions are not mutually exclusive and in fact often spill into each other, it is useful to look at them separately to better understand their premises.

**Power Struggles as Sources of Conflict:** Violent conflict over power characterizes many conflicts, in Africa and elsewhere. Some of these conflicts have been leadership struggles between more or less equally resourced armed factions, as was the Mozambican conflict between FRELIMO (Front for Liberation of Mozambique) and RENAMO (Mozambique Resistance Movement), and the Angolan conflict between the MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola). Others have been challenges to sitting governments based on profound disagreements over governance and legitimacy (Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic [CAR], Mali, South Sudan, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]/

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¹ The list is extensive: Museveni (Uganda) in office since 1986; Biya (Cameroon) since 1975; Mugabe (Zimbabwe) since 1980; Dos Santos (Angola) since 1979; Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea) since 1979; Bashir (Sudan) since 1989; Deby (Chad) since 1990; Afwerki (Eritrea) since 1991; and Jammeh (The Gambia) since 1994.
Another approach to violent conflicts around contested leadership is to increase elite incentives to negotiate an agreement (or consent to elections), rather than using force to settle the dispute. Raising the cost of violence certainly lies behind a large part of international action to manage conflict in Africa, mainly through international military or security interventions. While international military action is often motivated by humanitarian concerns, it also serves to change the facts on the ground, raising the costs to all combatants of continuing to fight. There is a lot of activity in this area. In mid-2014, the United Nations was involved in nine active peace operations in Africa — Mali, Darfur, Abyei, South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, the DRC, Western Sahara and the CAR. In October 2014, the European Union had military operations in Mali, the CAR and Somalia, and security-oriented civilian missions in Djibouti, Tanzania, the DRC, Niger, Mali and Libya. Some of the operations are joint, some coordinated and some are sole-actor, but with 20 or more peace and security missions occurring in Africa in 2013 and 2014, it is a crowded field.

Another response is through limiting access to resources that can fund conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler analyzed a wide variety of Sub-Saharan civil wars and found a linkage between Africa’s “poor economic performance” and the outbreak of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 13–28). They also linked the establishment of rebel organizations to the availability of lootable natural resources to funding the establishment of the rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2011, 25). While their work has been criticized for its methodology and its conclusions, it has had a significant policy impact, which can be seen in the drive for more transparency and accountability by the World Bank, national aid agencies (such as the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom), and non-governmental organization (NGO) initiatives such as Publish What You Pay (Nathan 2008; Keen 2012). Whether or not Collier and his colleagues are right about the causation links, it is clear that limiting access to resources — through transparency measures, sanctions or aid suspension — may indeed change the equation, both for rebels and governments pursuing violent methods to promote their causes. Without access to easily convertible resources, funding war-related costs may prove prohibitive.

**Weak Institutions as Sources of Conflict:** Another diagnostic framework focuses on state capacity. In this view, conflicts occur in fragile, weak and failing states where national institutions have lost authority over their own territories, with limited ability to reach beyond their capital cities or provide security and services to their people. There are many definitions of what constitutes fragile, weak and failing states. Fragile states are often ranked in terms of their gross national income, with the lowest being most fragile. This is the typology (LICUS or low income countries under stress) developed by the World Bank in 2004 (Carvalho 2006). Robert I. Rotberg stresses the wide variety of weak states, noting that they form “a broad continuum of states that are inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints” (Rotberg 2003, 4).

Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick define weak states as “countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent and accountable political institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their population” (Rice and Patrick 2008, 5).

Definitions of failing and failed states, at times, incorporate elements of state predation and armed conflict between the government and its challengers, as the example of South Sudan illustrates (Rotberg 2003; Fund for Peace 2014). While this link has been observed in some conflicts, the central problem in others (Somalia and the DRC) is the lack of government, rather than its predation (Harpviken 2010). Barry Hughes, Jonathan Moyer and Timothy Sisk use the term “vulnerability to conflict” to capture the link between state weakness and conflict (2011, 8). Their typology of states of “red-level vulnerability” provides a classification of the kinds of conditions that produce fragile and failing states: autocratic regimes characterized by repression and misrule; weak states unable to address widespread or acute poverty, suffering or social grievances; states with deep internal ethnic and sectarian differences; and states still in transition from previous conflicts or peace-building efforts.
A third was specific in its immediate goals — to produce a zero-sum attitude toward shared governance. This complex brew pits group against group (Darfur, the CAR, Nigeria) and/or features groups forming and breaking temporary alliances for their own ends (Tuaregs and Islamic fighters in Mali). Linkages can also develop between homegrown and transnational groups, as the March 2015 pledge of allegiance that Boko Haram made to the Islamic State illustrates. Even conflicts that are primarily about elite-based power struggles — i.e., who gets to rule — may reflect deep cleavages over identity (for example, Côte d’Ivoire).

Response: The conflict management community, including those in the non-governmental sphere, has often dealt with identity-based conflict through building relationships between the antagonists. This relationship building may take the form of dialogue processes, people-to-people programs or problem-solving workshops (Saunders 2001; Kelman 1996; USAID 2010). However, violent extremism and the mobilization of radical ideologues present challenges that go beyond the identity-based conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. The attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was specific in its immediate goals — to kill the editors, writers and cartoonists who produced inflammatory (in the eyes of the attackers) materials. And yet, the ultimate target was unclear. Was it an attack on the French government for its role in Syria and the Sahel? Or was it an attack on Western civilization in general for its relativist and amoral messages? Or was it an attack on the concept and practice of freedom of speech (CNN 2015)? The same uncertainty characterizes Boko Haram’s goals — is it fighting the Nigerian government, Nigerian social mores (including education) or democratic, liberal culture in general?

This imprecision in terms of target is a problem on the analytical side. But there is also a serious problem on the response side. Most of the tools of conflict management — military intervention, diplomacy, containment, sanctions, dialogue and problem-solving workshops — are not effective against terrorism. In order to contain this new threat, a number of countries have developed programs of “countering violent extremism” (CVE), an indirect approach that focuses on changing the conditions around the conflict, especially popular attitudes toward the extremists’ legitimacy (i.e., changing hearts and minds) (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011; Aldrich 2012; Department of Homeland Security 2014). Working on CVE changes the traditional roles of the institutions involved. It requires close cooperation between governments and civil society inside the conflict country. It requires the same close cooperation among official and non-official institutions in the outside parties that are helping to address the threat. It means a much deeper understanding of the role that social institutions — education, media, religion — play in defining the conflict environment. It also means taking cues from partners within the societies that are experiencing conflict (Wehr and Lederach 1991). In short,

Identity Divisions as Sources of Conflict: A third diagnostic approach centres around identity-based conflicts that produce deeply divided visions for the future of Africa. These existential, identity-based antagonisms are very difficult to deal with politically, in part, because they produce a zero-sum attitude toward shared governance. Ethnic rivalries have characterized conflict in Africa for decades, but the new wave of violent extremism has heightened sectarian antagonisms and conflict within and across borders. This complex brew pits group against group (Darfur, the CAR, Nigeria) and/or features groups forming and breaking temporary alliances for their own ends (Tuaregs and Islamic fighters in Mali). Linkages can also develop between homegrown and transnational groups, as the March 2015 pledge of allegiance that Boko Haram made to the Islamic State illustrates. Even conflicts that are primarily about elite-based power struggles — i.e., who gets to rule — may reflect deep cleavages over identity (for example, Côte d’Ivoire).

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it means a very different modus operandi than has been used in the past.

**GOING FORWARD**

Each of the above approaches to diagnosing the problem results in fairly distinct policy decisions on how best to resolve the conflicts. Those who believe that the desire for political power lies at the root of conflict will attempt to change the behaviour of the antagonists through concrete means — peace operations, diplomacy or other ways of altering the cost-benefit equation that governs their actions. Those who feel that weak institutions are the stress points will focus on institution building. And those who believe that deep identity-based animosities drive conflict will try to address these animosities through building enhanced relationships or by strengthening social resistance to inflammatory ideas. Mediation, of course, can play a central or supporting role in all these remedies.

However, as the above example of the “remedy” for identity-based conflicts (which has changed from dialogue processes to CVE programs) illustrates, the conflict analysis task is both complex and dynamic, especially as the conflicts themselves change in nature. Getting the analysis right is a central challenge to peacemakers, whether insiders or outsiders to a conflict. Misdiagnosis is costly and potentially dangerous. So are misaligned remedies. Misaligned remedies come about for many reasons beyond a faulty diagnosis. Conflict management institutions may favour one technique over another, because: they have a great deal of expertise in using the technique (the United Nations and mediation or peace operations, NGOs and dialogue); the remedy mirrors their own world view (European Union and institution building); or the activities support a larger global policy (the war against terrorism). At other times, the diagnosis may be appropriate to the situation but the conflict management institution is unable to gain traction as a recognized player. This was the case with the African Union effort to act as an interlocutor in the Libya conflict in 2011 (De Waal 2013).

**CIGI’S AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROJECT**

The challenges of appropriate diagnosis and remedy form the basis of CIGI’s African Regional Conflict Management (ARCM) Project. The purpose of the project is to understand ARCM capacity, identify successes and gaps, make recommendations to bridge those divides and identify areas for further research.

In order to examine these issues, the project asked security and conflict management experts and practitioners from government, academia and civil society to address these questions. The outcome of the project will be a series of policy-relevant publications on the topic, featuring African experts and analysts. The project will also produce recommendations for policy makers and practitioners, aimed at strengthening ARCM capacity. The project will be divided into two phases.

The first phase will look at how African institutions and partners in the international community cope with traditional security threats — power struggles, economic shocks, the inability of fragile states to assert control and provide security over their territory, terrorism, arms flows and religious extremism. This phase will review the traditional mechanisms of coercive or semi-coercive strategies (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, armed intervention and sanctions); and political strategies (mediation, negotiation, facilitation, high-level groups, summits, commissions and other political instruments). It will assess African and international institutional capacity for peacekeeping and mediation at and between national, regional and international levels (including issues of subsidiarity, coordination and hand-off). It will also examine the role that individuals play, particularly in the mediation area.

The first phase will focus on five main questions:

- How well understood are the sources and dynamics of conflict in Africa?
- How well are African institutions using peacekeeping or military force to stop fighting in order to allow a political process to begin and how effective are individual Africans or African institutions in mediating political agreements?
- How effective are international institutions in supporting African-led processes or in doing the peacekeeping and mediation themselves?
- How effective are these techniques (peacekeeping and mediation) in leading to sustainable peace?
- What are the gaps in dealing with conflict in Africa and what are their causes?

Among answers that the project will explore are that the gaps grow out of an inadequate understanding of the sources and dynamics of conflict and the resultant inappropriate responses (faulty analysis); a dependence on traditional responses — i.e., senior diplomat initiatives or military forces (if you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail); insufficient institutional capacity; a failure to

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2 The first phase of the project will result in the publication of a book, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Pamela Aall, with chapters authored by experts in the field. A complete list of the authors can be found at www.cigionline.org/activity/african-regional-conflict-management-managing-crisis-and-building-resilience.
reach beyond elite groupings to engage all of government and society in the conflict management effort; and the lack of a comprehensive approach to conflict management (easier to stop the killing than to build peace).

The second phase will examine a less-travelled terrain, looking at how resilient African states and societies are in the face of conflict. Resilience is a term with a long pedigree but little agreement on its meaning (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011). For some, resilience is a physical property found in material that can absorb energy — pressure or blows — and return to its original shape. Rubber, for instance, is many times more resilient than steel. Others use the concept of resilience to describe a psychological capability to absorb hardships and continue on — in this sense, a person, society or country may be resilient in the face of adversity. For others, resilience may be a result of specific governmental or societal action that institutions have taken to prepare for different outcomes, or the “unknown unknowns” (Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Chandler 2014).

These definitions suggest that the state of resilience incorporates an innate ability to be resilient (like rubber), with flexibility and a willingness to learn from experience. Another aspect that may be important is an intentional incorporation of redundancy (Sagarin 2015). This phase of the initiative will look for signs of all three kinds of resilience — physical, psychological and institutional. Its focus will be on governance, civil society capacity, the relationship between citizens and governments, the capacity of states and the region to respond to destabilizing events such as disease, natural disasters and conflict. It will examine how political, governmental, educational and social institutions create and support societal resilience against the onset and recurrence of violence.

Addressing complex conflict systems will require a complex, multi-faceted response. The United Nations has recognized this complexity as it attempts to respond to current conflict in Africa. The mandate, for example, of the UN mission to the CAR includes protection of civilians, preservation of the government’s ability to control its territory, mediation, rebuilding of the criminal justice system, human rights protection, national dialogue processes and addressing root causes of violence (United Nations 2015). This list is comprehensive and shows a good grasp of the causes of conflict and the appropriate responses. What it does not reflect is the difficulty this list of tasks would pose for any one organization.

Coordination among institutions with different mandates, authorities, resources and capabilities has caused complications for the conflict management field for decades. While the “Wild West” days of the early 1990s, when competing interventions into the same conflict allowed belligerents to go on forum shopping sprees, are behind us, coordination and cooperation still test the practice of conflict management. Admittedly, the coordination is much improved, with the African Union handing off to the United Nations in both Sudan (Darfur) and the CAR. NGOs such as the Crisis Management Initiative and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue are keenly sensitive to the need to support official processes in the conflicts they operate in. The principle of subsidiarity — in which regional organizations play the primary role in addressing conflict — is an effort to bring sequencing to peacemaking and conflict management interventions.

Nonetheless, tensions continue to complicate collective conflict management efforts at every stage — diagnosis, formulation of remedy and implementation. In the end, however, the stakes are too high in terms of human lives and regional stability to allow these tensions to paralyze peace processes. It is clear that responding to current complex conflicts demands competencies beyond the reach of any single institution. A principal task over the next five to 10 years is to develop an effective network of organizations that bring different assets and abilities to the assignment. This network — joining international, regional, national and local institutions — would spread burdens, risks and responsibilities. It would also require considerable coordination. In order to gain traction in today’s complex conflicts, organizations need to learn how to expand their own competencies by collaborating with others in diagnosing the problem, designing the remedy and delivering the solution.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank CIGI Research Assistant Simon Palamar for preparing the charts that appear in this paper.
WORKS CITED


Canada has been almost continuously involved in major international peace and security enforcement operations since the early 1990s, as part of multilateral efforts to stop wars, monitor peace, avert genocide, promote development or, occasionally, to topple dictators and even win wars. It has deployed anywhere from 1,000 to 4,000 personnel overseas annually since the Gulf War, and participated in missions in Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Libya, East Timor, Iraq and Syria. This volume looks at Canada’s role as interventionist within three broad themes: the lessons learned from interventions in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti; the domestic side of intervention, including Canadian foreign aid and the gender equation in military interventions; and the responsibility to protect, addressing the larger principles and patterns that influence Canada’s engagements.

Elusive Pursuits: Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Abroad — the 29th volume of the influential Canada Among Nations series — examines Canada’s role in foreign military and security missions, including the country’s tendency to intervene under the auspices of international institutions. Canada is not just among nations in these efforts, but in nations on a regular basis. This book considers the longer-term impact of these interventions and draws the lessons to be learned from Canada’s past and current interventions, with the certainty that there will always be a next time.

Canada Among Nations has been the premier source for critical insight into Canadian foreign policy issues since 1984. This edition continues that tradition by providing students, policy makers and practitioners with a timely compendium of expert opinion on how Canada’s past and present military and peacekeeping missions can provide guidance for engagement in the future.

Price: CDN$25
Pre-order available

Coming Fall 2015
Pre-order Today
Managing Conflict in a World Adrift

Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall
Foreword by Martti Ahtisaari

The eagerly anticipated follow-up to Leashing the Dogs of War

In the midst of a global political shift where power moves from central institutions to smaller, more disbursed units, another landmark text edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall provides essential insights and practical guidance. In Managing Conflict in a World Adrift, 40 of the world’s leading international affairs analysts examine the relationship between political, social or economic change and the outbreak and spread of conflict. They then consider what this means for conflict management.

This panoramic study is the latest volume in a series of titles on conflict management edited by Crocker, Hampson and Aall and follows up on their seminal work Leashing the Dogs of War (2007). For more than a decade, this series of titles has been the definitive resource for students and practitioners of conflict management who want a better understanding of the most contemporary thinking about what causes conflict and how to prevent and manage it. Hallmarks of this book include:

- Innovative thinking from 40 of the world’s leading analysts
- New approaches and methodologies
- Current situations and relevant solutions
- Wide spectrum of perspectives in both theory and practice
- Strategies and tactics for the realities of conflict management today

Emerging systemic and societal transformations call for thought leadership grounded in the reality out in the field. Peace builders of today and tomorrow will gain from this text a broad knowledge of new forces and dynamics at play along with a full range of strategies for preventing and resolving conflict.

A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support

Jeremy Kinsman and Kurt Bassuener

In recent decades, the conduct of international relations among and within states has been very considerably altered. Today, the content of these relations relies as much on international professional and civil society networks as it does on state-to-state transactions.

The role of the Internet has been fundamental in widening communications opportunities for citizens and civil society, with a profound effect on democracy transition. In consequence, diplomacy has taken on a much more human and public face. Twenty-first century ambassadors and diplomats are learning to engage with civil societies, especially on the large themes of democratic change — an engagement that is often resisted by authoritarian regimes.

A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support presents a wide variety of specific experiences of diplomats on the ground, identifying creative, human and material resources. More broadly, it is about the policy-making experience in capitals, as democratic states try to align national interests and democratic values. The Handbook also documents the increasingly prominent role of civil society as the essential building block for successful democratic transitions, with each case study examining specific national experiences in the aspiration for democratic and pluralistic governance, and lessons learned on all sides — for better or for worse.

While each situation is different — presenting unique, unstructured problems and opportunities — a review of these experiences bears out the validity of the authors’ belief in the interdependence of democratic engagements, and provides practitioners with encouragement, counsel and a greater capacity to support democracy everywhere.

The Handbook was proposed by Community of Democracies board member and former US Ambassador to Hungary, the late Mark Palmer. Directed by former Canadian Ambassador to Russia, the Italian Republic and the European Union, and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Jeremy Kinsman, and joined by Kurt Bassuener, a political analyst and advocate based in Sarajevo, this third edition continues to respond to the need to support reform-minded groups and individuals as they struggle to introduce and improve democratic governance and human rights.
Governance and Innovation in Africa
South Africa after Mandela
Edited by Robert I. Rotberg

South Africa is no longer the post-apartheid transformational state over which President Nelson Mandela presided so magnificently and with such hope. Under his successors, South Africa has become a slow-growing, often cranky, one-party-dominant state that only partially succeeds in providing the basic education, health services, housing, electrical power and human security that its 55 million citizens demand and expect. Moreover, especially under President Jacob Zuma and the ruling African National Congress (ANC), rampant corruption engulfs South Africa, distorting priorities and inhibiting economic growth. Zuma and the ANC are also challenging the democratic foundations of South Africa, too. This book calls for a renewed strengthening of governance in the country — for action to be taken before it is too late.

The chapters in this volume, most written by committed South Africans, explain how South Africa can bolster its core governance and improve the lives of its people. This book presents the key alternatives facing South Africa’s political rulers during the remainder of this decade and in the decades to come. Courageous, intelligent, bold and principled political leadership is required if South Africa is going to build upon Mandela’s legacy and successfully address the major problems that engulf the nation and restore South Africa to primacy in Africa.

On Governance
What It Is, What It Measures and Its Policy Uses
Edited by Robert I. Rotberg

Spreading good governance is a key goal of political leaders and reformers — whether it is to improve cities, nations, regimes or institutions — because better-governed people are more likely to avoid civil conflict and obtain significant social returns.

But just what is meant by “governance” at the national or international level? Is it a fuzzy concept, or is it a clear set of rules or norms? How can it help to strengthen societies and drive better policy?

On Governance: What It Is, What It Measures and Its Policy Uses answers these questions. By proposing new theories for national and global governance, examining more than 100 governance indexes and analyzing best practices in governance, this volume suggests how policy makers can use governance theory and governance indexes to improve both domestic and multilateral decision making.

World order depends on strengthened governance. On Governance spells out the meaning and the potential benefits of governance innovation for civil society and national policy makers. Building on the measured effects of policies in many dimensions of human existence, this book provides a guide to creating more positive outcomes for people everywhere.
ABOUT CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI’s current research programs focus on three themes: the global economy; global security & politics; and international law.

CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.

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