CONSTRUCTIVE POWERS INITIATIVE: MANAGING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

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CONFERENCE REPORT

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WORKSHOP REPORT

Paul Heinbecker, Meliha Altunisik and Fen Hampson

INTRODUCTION

The Constructive Powers Initiative (CPI) regional conflict management workshop was held on June 2–3, 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey. The workshop was organized by The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University, Ottawa; The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo, Canada; and the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, Turkey. Participants included government officials and diplomats from Canada, Brazil, Switzerland and Turkey, and academics from Australia, Canada, Mexico, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey. Participants were recruited and invited after consultation with their respective embassies and high commissions in Ottawa. Participant bios are included in the Annex.

The CPI was launched on the premise that the existing post–World War II global governance architecture (exemplified by the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] and its permanent membership) has not kept pace with the changing global order. The world has moved from a bipolar to a multipolar order more quickly than anticipated, and the extant global governance architecture is struggling to grapple with new security challenges. The workshop’s conveners argued that there is a clear need for increased policy coordination and cooperation among “constructive powers” on security issues of mutual interest. Universal frameworks need to be accompanied by “minilateral” efforts for optimal effectiveness. Constructive powers are defined as influential, economically significant, non-nuclear-armed states with a proven track record of proactive and innovative diplomacy at the regional and global levels. The goal of the workshop was to solicit views from the invitees as to what are the most pressing security challenges facing their states, and ascertain the desirability and viability of increased policy coordination on those security challenges. Cooperation would thus be issue based.

In order to identify common security threats and areas for coordination, the workshop took stock of each state’s most pressing security challenges and explored the relationship between the Group of Twenty (G20) and constructive powers. Participants then took advantage of the locale to discuss Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. The workshop concluded by identifying common security challenges and interests among the constructive powers, and identified several options for moving the initiative forward in a way that engages policy makers in participating states.

The national presentations revealed significant diversity among threat perceptions, but also key elements of commonality. The participants identified a spectrum of pressing threats that ranged from traditional security challenges to more contemporary issues affecting the security interests of both peoples and states. These include shifting balances of power towards the Asia-Pacific region, the ongoing threat posed by North Korea, failed states, transnational crime (including narcotics trafficking) terrorism and cybersecurity, piracy and freedom of the seas, and non-traditional threats such as environmental degradation, natural disasters, nuclear safety, infectious and pandemic diseases, and unpredictable migrant flows. The individual national policy perspective papers following this report contain a more detailed assessment of each country’s security challenges.

Despite the heterogeneity of perspectives, narcotics trafficking and its security implications garnered significant attention in the initial discussions. While the global drug trade does not affect all of the countries at the table equally, it cuts across regional boundaries and has clear global dimensions as growing numbers of countries are used as transit routes, and producers increasingly target transit route states as potential markets. Participants generally agreed that the current supply-side approach to controlling the drug trade (using armed forces or police to dismantle trafficking networks) is ineffective. Current strategies exacerbate drug-related violence and encourage traffickers to find new transit routes, thereby globalizing a previously regional phenomenon. West Africa’s emergence as a transit route for the Western European market has raised the spectre of Africa — with its relatively weak government institutions and inadequate policing capacity — becoming a “narco-continent.”

The need for coordinated demand and supply management in North America is also evident: the United States is the key market for small arms and financing for Mexican cartels, while Mexico is the principal conduit for narcotics entering that market. Furthermore, Canada is also becoming a market for South American narcotics, and is a supplier of illegal substances to the US market. Afghanistan — the world’s largest opiate producer — is another case in point, and trafficking networks have spread throughout Turkey, Iran and Central Asia, delivering heroin to markets in Western Europe, Russia and points beyond. The Afghanistan case not only underlines the global nature of the illicit drug industry,
but also the complexity of the challenge and the need for coordinated multilateral and minilateral policy efforts.

Several other security issues were of general concern. These included nuclear proliferation and strengthening civilian nuclear safety standards (particularly in the wake of Fukushima); cybersecurity; managing migrant flows triggered by warfare or ecological or economic disasters; and the need to consolidate democracy in countries that are transitioning away from authoritarian rule and are at risk of reverting to their undemocratic past via pseudo-legal means such as the manipulation of constitutions and elections. This last issue — consolidating democracy — had several dimensions. These include how to reconcile principles such as non-intervention in states’ internal affairs with concerns about states’ human rights records, and the differential implications of failed and successful democratic transitions for international peace and security.

In sum, the states at the table were concerned with a diverse array of security challenges. Nevertheless, human security, transnational crime, economic stagnation, ecological crises, nuclear safety and proliferation, migrant flows and maritime governance were common concerns for all participants. All these threats and risks can easily spill across national borders and regional boundaries, underscoring the need for broadly coordinated policy responses.

**THE G20: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE POWERS**

The workshop then addressed the G20 and the broader global governance architecture. Three questions guided this discussion. First, does the G20’s narrow economic focus limit its effectiveness? Second, how relevant is the G20 for the nations participating in the workshop (given that all the participants except Switzerland are G20 members)? Third, can the constructive powers be relevant to the G20, to help shape its future and use it as a forum for coordinating policy beyond economic matters?

The G20’s unique membership and structure position it to act as a global steering committee. Its membership encompasses approximately 70 percent of the world population and 80 percent of global GDP, yet it is small enough to be a relatively efficient decision-making body. At the same time, its focus on largely economic and financial issues does not take full advantage of the global political leadership around the table. The convenors argued that there was a strong case for the group to expand its mandate to address issues with global security ramifications, such as transnational crime, nuclear proliferation and other challenges.

The G20 discussion led to general agreement on several points. First, many of the participants agreed that the G20’s focus is inexorably expanding beyond narrow economic and financial matters as demonstrated in the broader agendas of the Seoul and Cannes summits. Second, many thought that the G20 must address ongoing concerns about its legitimacy (or lack thereof). Third, most participants concluded that the constructive powers were more likely to find common ground on broadening the G20 agenda than on UNSC reform, given the competing views of some on the Security Council permanent membership, although the group could serve as a forum for fostering consensus on the latter.

The workshop identified some of the G20’s administrative deficiencies. The lack of a permanent secretariat prevents continuity and accountability from one meeting to the next, and promotes freelancing by the summit host. Other limitations include the brevity of the meetings (approximately one day), which leaves inadequate time for proper discussion; the imperatives of translation; and the presence of too many voices (beyond the 20) around the table. Particularly pressing is the need to develop a mechanism to facilitate cooperation with the countries and institutions that are not G20 members, but have crucial interests or competencies that can contribute to G20 deliberations.

Several participants suggested that the G20 could constitute a very useful minilateral complement to the UN system. This could, for example, take the form of a G20 caucus within the UN that would develop a coherent consensus position on a given issue and then commend that issue and position to the broader membership. More generally, there was some agreement that the G20 constituted an important governance tool, and that it was in the interest of constructive powers to maximize its effectiveness.

**SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARABIAN GULF**

Turkey’s foreign policy was discussed as a kind of case study of the foreign policy of a constructive power that borders on a politically unstable region. Workshop participants recognized that a unique combination of factors had converged to create the vibrant, thriving, modern country that Turkey is today. By virtue of its geographic position, its democracy, its Muslim identity and its economic dynamism, as well as its continuing close links to Europe and NATO, Turkey is a vital and influential power.

Surveys of Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf states revealed that citizens across the region tended to view Turkey favourably. Many believed that Turkey had played an influential, constructive role in the greater Middle East and contributed to peace in the region. Turkey’s positive
image was cited as essential to its Middle East policy. The “Turkish model” (largely Muslim, broadly democratic, relatively wealthy and politically stable) is widely regarded in the region (and globally) as a “success story,” and is discussed intensely for its relevance to debates for transitional issues. Polls showed that Arab populations had grown to accept Turkey’s role as a mediator in the region, since they perceived Turkey as a non-threatening power that promoted modernity, facilitated transitions to democratic governance and sought a peaceful regional order. Turkey’s divergence from American policies (notably with regard to Ankara’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq, its willingness to speak its mind on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and its independent approach to Iran and its nuclear program) has also bolstered its image among neighbouring states. In short, Turkey’s democratic and economic transformation and its foreign policy have made it an attractive constructive power, and brought Turkey considerable influence in the region.

At the same time, Turkish foreign policy faces significant challenges, both internal and external. Since Turkey’s strategy of engagement and mediation relies heavily on its image as a success story, it will need to continue to reconcile the pulls of its Muslim cultural heritage with the principles of its secular democratic governance. Additionally, while the Turkish economy has made extraordinary gains in the last decade, becoming the largest exporter of manufactured goods in the region, Turkey will need to consolidate its own economic transformation and avoid stagnation. Further, Turkey’s strategy of diplomatic engagement will have to come to grips with the newly complex realities created by the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa where, like others, it faces an unenviable trade-off between its sunk costs in cultivating relations with autocratic regimes and its contemporary efforts to assist the populations of those same states achieve successful transitions to democracy.

Turkey’s “smart power” diplomacy has clearly paid dividends, enhancing Turkey’s profile and making it a constructive, stabilizing force in regional affairs. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the relevance of the Turkish experience for states transitioning away from authoritarian forms of government has been discussed extensively across the Middle East and around the globe. Coordinated action with other constructive powers could enhance Turkey’s influence and ability to help nascent democratic transitions elsewhere.

PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION AMONG CONSTRUCTIVE POWERS

The workshop concluded by taking stock of common positions and interests, and asked if pursuing the initiative further was worthwhile, and if so, how? Overall, participants were enthusiastic about the initiative, and emphasized that future workshops should be limited to two, or at the most three, agenda items. Participants broadly supported linking future CPI activities to the G20 process.

Most participants were of the view that improved international governance is central to tackling today’s regional and global security issues, and should feature on the agenda of each session. They suggested several specific security issues that could be areas for fuller cooperation, including transnational crime and narcotics trafficking, migration (including regulating flows and the treatment of migrants), nuclear safety, human rights and democracy promotion (including any instructive lessons from constructive powers that have undergone their own democratization process), and responding to natural and ecological disasters. Maritime governance, including anti-piracy measures and maintaining the free navigation of trade routes was also was also mentioned as a future topic for consideration.

The Mexican delegates offered to host the CPI’s next meeting prior to the 2012 Mexican G20 summit. That meeting will focus on international governance and transnational crime. Further meetings will proceed along similar lines, with the host country selecting one or two issues that are of general concern and of special significance to its foreign policy. Subject matter experts will be invited to these meetings to inform the discussion. As we look to the next meeting in Mexico and the future agenda of the group, we will also explore the possibility of inviting other countries to join. There was also general agreement that future meetings would follow the precedent set by the meeting in Istanbul to extend invitations to foreign ministry planning staffs to ensure an effective link with policy makers.

Finally, workshop participants suggested that a web secretariat could be established at CIGI in Waterloo, Canada, to maintain continuity between meetings and to facilitate communications and outreach to potential new members.

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Australia’s most recent Defence White Paper (Australian Government, 2009) appropriately recognizes that Australia’s strategic outlook and defence planning “have been shaped most fundamentally by the global distribution of power.” It also acknowledges, however, alternative sources of security challenges that the country faces — and the possibility that these will not only increase in number, but also be the most significant source of threat in the coming years. The White Paper notes that the “convergence of trends such as global demographic change and population movements, environmental and resource pressures…global public health risks and even transnational crime will increase the risk of conflict over resources, political instability in fragile states and potentially destabilising mass migration flows.” Consequently, it concludes: “Intra-state conflict, such as civil war and conflict involving non-state actors, is likely to be the most common form of conflict.”

The fragility of states in Australia’s immediate region became an increasing source of concern for Australian defence planners in the years following 9/11. Former Defence Minister Brendan Nelson spoke of the “arc of instability” around Australia’s northern coastline, stretching from East Timor through Papua New Guinea to the islands of the Southwest Pacific. Australia had longstanding concerns about stability in parts of the region — including increasing lawlessness and slow rates of economic growth in Papua New Guinea, and military coups in Fiji. After 9/11, the government worried that the fragile states of the region might host terrorist groups, and become bases for drug smugglers as well as local venues in which extra-regional rivalries were played out (especially competition for diplomatic influence between China and Taiwan). Moreover, some of the islands were potentially vulnerable to the effects of global warming, with the likely consequent displacement of their populations.

This new source of security threats produced a dramatic shift in the role of the Australian armed forces, with an increasing emphasis on what the 2009 Defence White Paper refers to as “humanitarian, stabilisation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and reconstruction interventions.” The majority of these interventions have been within the region: Cambodia, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, although forces have also been deployed on such missions to more distant arenas including the Sudan, southern Iraq and Afghanistan.

Beyond the immediate “arc of instability,” the Australian government has been concerned about state fragility in Southeast Asia, in part because these countries sit astride the sea lanes through which much of Australia’s trade with the world travels, and through which any hostile forces would have to operate in order to sustainably project force against Australia. As the White Paper notes, “A stable and cohesive Southeast Asia will mitigate any such threat and is in our strategic interests.” On this dimension, there have been positive developments in recent years, most notably the democratization of Indonesia. State fragility in the “arc of instability,” however, continues to be a challenge for Australian foreign and defence policies.

References


John Ravenhill is a professor and head of the School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
AUSTRALIA: MIND THE GAP — HARD POWER AND ASIA’S UNCERTAIN SECURITY FUTURE

Andrew Shearer

Australia’s region faces pressing security challenges as a result of weak states and transnational factors (outlined very well in John Ravenhill’s paper). But Asia also faces growing risks of a more traditional and potentially more dangerous nature, flowing from the burgeoning power of some states and shifts in the power balance to and within the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States remains the pre-eminent power in Asia, as it has been since the Battle of Midway. Despite its current economic problems, the United States remains dominant in all forms of comprehensive national power — economic, diplomatic, “soft” and, in particular, military power — that have underpinned Asia’s relative stability and remarkable prosperity for over 60 years. But US economic weakness since 2008 and the simultaneous rise of China and India, are narrowing the relative power gap and causing growing doubts about the sustainability of the longstanding security order that has served the region so well.

The implications will be global. For hundreds of years, the Asian security order tended to be derivative of the Western-led global order. But the shift of power to Asia means that what happens in Asia will increasingly shape the global order rather than vice versa.

It remains uncertain what shape Asia’s emerging security order will ultimately take. But some of the contours are becoming clearer:

• Asia’s security environment is increasingly congested and contested (resulting from a growing number of more powerful state and non-state actors); Asia’s new powers are not rising in a vacuum.

• Traditional regional flashpoints remain and are worsening in some respects (North Korean attacks on the South during 2010, growing Chinese missile threat to Taiwan despite their “diplomatic truce”).

• Territorial disputes are endemic and also worsening (South China Sea, East China Sea, China-India); interpretations of the law of the sea/freedom of navigation are sharply at odds.

• Competition for resources (especially energy, food and water) is growing.

• This has the potential to exacerbate existing rivalries (China-Japan, China-Vietnam, China-India).

• Regional institutions are weak and largely ineffective.

• These problems are overlaid by the first stages of a serious strategic competition between China and the United States for pre-eminence in the Western Pacific.

• We are seeing rising competition in the maritime domain (modernization programs and proliferation of modern submarines, missiles and aircraft); maybe not yet an arms race, but potential for one. The number of dangerous maritime incidents is rising.

• Competition is also growing in other parts of the global commons, such as space and cyberspace; potential exists for serious nuclear-weapon competition, particularly if US allies were to lose confidence in extended deterrence.

• Diplomatic competition is playing out bilaterally and in regional institutions and holds back cooperation across a range of regional and global issues.

Australia’s Response

Like many other countries around the Western Pacific, Australia responded to increasing uncertainty in its external environment since the end of the Cold War by pursuing a complex hedging strategy. This was stated explicitly for the first time in the Australian government’s 2009 Defence White Paper. Key elements include:

• growing engagement with China, particularly commercial;

• building up Australia’s military capabilities, particularly maritime forces;

• strengthening the US alliance (through commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, defence acquisitions and industrial collaboration, intelligence cooperation, and — prospectively — US military facilities in Australia);

• developing new strategic partnerships, including with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, India, Singapore and potentially Vietnam;

• promoting open and inclusive regional institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit that reinforce US engagement in Asia; and

• actively supporting the emergence of the G20 as a global forum that reflects emerging power realities.
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From a Brazilian perspective, in the present international setting, no country is free from threats to its national territory, although many times they manifest themselves in a diffuse manner.

The following instability factors are possible causes of tension in the domestic and international sphere: territorial disputes, many of them in a latent state; trans-border criminal activities, such as narcotics and human trafficking; non-attained social aspirations; dispute for agricultural land, water resources and other natural resources; socio-economic inequalities; and insecurity in urban centres.

The regional vicinity of Brazil, in the South American subcontinent, is perceived as an area that has a history of interstate peace, but that is not free of tensions. It is a region endowed with abundant natural resources that has attracted increasing interest from overseas.

Within this South American space, Brazil works in the prevention of conflict through a strategy intended to promote regional cooperation and integration in every aspect of diplomacy, including infrastructure building and defence interaction. Brazil has excellent relations with all countries in the subcontinent, including the 10 with which it shares land borders. Two initiatives inspired by Brazil, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) and the Council of Defense of South America (CDS), are important steps for regional integration and conflict prevention.

The emergence (or re-emergence) of new global actors in the international scene (China, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil, among others, point to increasing care in the management of international relations in a pluri-polar world, since history shows that the redistribution of power among nations has not occurred without a reaction from those on the losing end.

Brazil has a defence policy that promotes the building of a conventional dissuasive military capacity.

Its international grand strategy favours an active diplomacy both in the political and in the economic-financial arenas.

Brazil believes that the new multi-economic polarity should be based on cooperation and the definition of “rules coexistence” that will assure an international environment that will favour growth and stability to developing economies, including the internationalization of enterprises from the developing world (Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East).

Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto is former ambassador of Brazil to Haiti (2005–2008) and Canada (2008–2010), and since 2011 has been the undersecretary-general for political affairs (Africa and the Middle East) at the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil.
Although Indonesia is now relatively more stable compared to the security situation a decade ago, there are major security challenges that need to be addressed in a systematic and holistic way. The transition from Soeharto’s authoritarian regime to a democratic political system in the late 1990s, led to the escalation of communal and separatist conflicts in various regions. Thanks to the successful process of democratic consolidation under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, political stability and economic recovery began to take place. With the exception of the continuing sporadic armed attacks by the rebel group in Papua, we can say that today Indonesia has managed to secure its territorial integrity. Having said that, a comprehensive conflict resolution in Papua necessitates a strong political will on the part of the central government to go beyond the current framework of special autonomy for that province. Being complacent with the current status quo means that the rebel group will continue to create security disturbances and seek international support for the Papuan independence.

A more serious threat to Indonesian national security is homegrown terrorism and its international link in Southeast Asia and beyond. Although the Indonesian police have killed or sent to prison a large number of terrorists, it is likely that new recruitments still take place and a major terrorist attack cannot be entirely ruled out. There are clear indications that Indonesian terrorist cells remain active and seek to recruit even more suicide bombers. The Indonesian security authorities now realize that the terrorist group has changed not only its method but also the targets. Reliance and attachment to a charismatic leader is no longer a crucial factor, as individual terrorists can work together in a small group and design their deadly attacks. The individualization of terrorist activities will surely make it more difficult for the national police to strategize any preventive action. The suicide bombing that targeted a city police chief during a Friday prayer at a mosque within a police compound in Cirebon, West Java province, was the first of its kind. It is clear now that terrorist attacks in Indonesia do not only target Western people or properties but also Indonesian government officials, especially the police.

The terrorist group in Indonesia has introduced a new pattern of recruitment by spreading its extremist interpretation of Islam among university students. Some of the terrorists that were involved in the plot to bomb Christ Cathedral Church near Jakarta in April 2011 were graduates from Islamic universities. The Indonesian security authorities now realize that no matter how effective the operation of the anti-terrorist squad, it will never be sufficient to eliminate the terrorist threat.

The Indonesian government has established The National Antiterrorism Agency (BNPT), which is a national policy-making agency and mainly responsible for preventive actions and interagency policy coordination. BNPT has designed de-radicalization programs by cooperating with other government agencies and NGOs.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has increased security cooperation among its members to address the transnational and regional dimensions of the terrorist networks. In addition to the issue of terrorism, some ASEAN members have to deal with border issues and their security ramifications. Unfortunately, ASEAN has not been able to develop an effective mechanism of conflict resolution among its members. The unresolved border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is a good illustration of how difficult it is for ASEAN to intervene into what its members perceive as domestic affairs. There is still a long way to go for ASEAN to be the real and workable security regime clearly stipulated in its charter.

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KOREA: THREE CONCERNS

Dong Hwi Lee

North Korean Question

1. Background

- Either out of overconfidence or anxiety to win attention
- Military tensions beneficial for strengthening domestic control
  - Nuclear development as a military and political superiority over the South
  - Domestic control and edge over the South would solidify power transition

2. China Factor

- From strategic asset to strategic burden
- Military first — worsen economic difficulties
- International criticism — possibility of isolation and nuclear proliferation
- Factional fissures — conflicts and inability to exercise political control

3. Challenges to Global Governance

- Military security: nuclear capability and conventional weapons
  - Economic security: economic power centre and interdependence
  - Humansecurity: hunger and dislocation

Intensifying Strategic Competition

- Merging spheres of influence
- Rising China, stagnating Japan
- Various strategic triangles
- “Indo-Pacific” area
- Regional initiatives as a stage for strategic competition
- US way vs. Chinese way (EAS as the stage)

Growing Common Security Threats

- Nuclear safety after Fukushima
- Connected to nuclear security
- Nuclear proliferation and nuclear security risks
- North Korea’s UEP
- Others coming from nearness and interdependence
- Natural disasters and pandemic diseases

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MEXICO: TAKING STOCK OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS

Carlos A. Heredia

Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking

• When he was sworn into office in December 2006, President Felipe Calderón launched an all-out war on drug trafficking and organized crime. While it has nailed down major drug lords, at the same time over 40,000 people have died.

• Five years later, drug-trafficking cartels have territorial control over key regions in a half dozen of the 32 Mexican states, where businessmen and ordinary citizens are often subject to extortion, kidnappings and forced payment of “protection” fees, which has spurred a exodus across the northern border.

• US-Mexico security cooperation has increased as a by-product of the Mérida Initiative, an agreement launched in 2007 under a framework of “shared responsibility,” designed to strengthen cooperation and build trust in the United States, Mexico and Central America to better combat drug trafficking and organized crime.

• However, the US says Mexico is not doing enough to halt the northward flow of drugs and undocumented workers, while Mexico argues the US does not do its share to stop the flow of assault weapons and “hot” money that end up in the hands of organized crime and feed the violence in Mexico.

• Mexico needs to dramatically strengthen its institutions by rooting out corruption, professionalizing its police, transforming its justice system, and improving the capacity of its military and intelligence services.

Low Economic Growth and Increasing Inequality

• Following a 30-year per capita income growth of 3 percent, since 1982 Mexico has experienced economic stagnation; over the last three decades, per capita economic growth has hovered around 1.5 percent per year, not nearly enough to absorb the new entrants into the labour market. Half a million Mexicans migrate to the US every year.

• Despite aggressive reforms that have opened Mexico to foreign trade and investment, helped it achieve fiscal discipline and privatized state-owned enterprises, the country’s economic growth trails behind nations such as Thailand, Turkey and Chile.

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SOUTH AFRICA AS A CONSTRUCTIVE POWER

Jakkie Cilliers

There are many lessons to be learned from current events in North Africa and the Middle East. Two are especially of relevance to understand the drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy: the need for the inclusion of both a development and a security dimension in identifying top regional security challenges and the need to engage with a diverse and sometimes conflicting range of cooperation partners in order to address these challenges.

South Africa’s Two Top Security Challenges

a) The development dimension: South Africa’s foreign policy is guided by a broad concept of security linking socio-economic development to political stability, peace and security. The change of name to Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2010 signalled a new approach to enhance the link between economic growth, development and foreign policy. At the domestic level, the relationship between socio-economic development and (in)security is also evident. Although the biggest African economy, South Africa still has high inequality (sixth-highest Gini coefficient in the world) and high unemployment (especially among youth). Similarly, the crime rate — and especially the rate of violent crime — is still high. Continentially, the security challenges arising from endemic poverty and underdevelopment in areas ranging from water and sanitation to health and education are even more evident. Lack of basic human security in Africa is of course a security challenge in itself. Besides, the negative side effect hereof is evident by Africa’s historical record of political instability and intrastate violence. Hence, South Africa’s top foreign policy objective is for Africa to enhance its economic development and alleviate poverty.

b) Conflict prevention/management: Fortunately, Africa’s economic development is, overall, moving in the right direction. Paradoxically, however, a more prosperous Africa does not necessarily mean a more peaceful one — at least not in the short/medium term. North Africa, the most prosperous sub-region in Africa, illustrates that a more prosperous and better-educated society yearns and eventually acts to access its political freedoms. These intrastate upheavals and popular demand for correcting democratic deficits are likely to be one of the key sources of future internal violence and instability, as the continent grows more prosperous. As African prosperity continues to improve, so will the demand for democracy and the demand for conflict prevention and management in fragile states. Hence, one of the main regional challenges for South Africa is to secure the future supply of African and international conflict prevention, management and post-conflict capacity that will meet future demand in Africa.

South Africa’s Preferred Strategy in Addressing Security Challenges

South Africa’s foreign policy is guided by the principle of multilateralism as the most legitimate and efficient strategy, with African ownership a key requirement. Solutions are sought through greater or lesser inclusive, as well as more or less institutionalized, cooperative platforms — ranging from the sub-regional and regional level (respectively, Southern African Development Community and African Union [AU]) to the inter-regional level (North-South and South-South of various kinds) and the international level (especially the UN).

African leadership: At the regional level, South Africa has been an important institutional entrepreneur (and economic contributor) behind the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is also the AU’s strategic framework to enhance economic development and human security in Africa as well as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which aims to enhance Africa’s own capability in crisis prevention and management through the Peace and Security Council and the African Stability Force.

African representative: That said, South Africa has to balance carefully between taking responsibility as a regional leader and not being perceived as a self-appointed hegemon and consistently underlines that the main purpose of cooperation at the inter-regional and global level is to promote the “Africa Agenda” in world affairs. A case in point is South Africa’s recent BRICS membership, which is supposed to benefit economic development in the whole of Africa. South Africa’s push for UN reform with the purpose of making global governance more representative of the global South is another. South Africa is careful to adhere to the Ezulweni consensus on UN reform — although it is evident that it wants a permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat. Its central role as a bridge-builder between the UNSC and the AU in regards to Libya also shows the difficulties of taking African leadership and being an African representative at the same time, without ending up being perceived as inconsistent by all parties and, hence, fail in both matters.

Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa.
MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SWITZERLAND

Fred Tanner

Even though the level of military threat has generally decreased, surveys show that Swiss citizens experience a greater sense of insecurity. This is due to increased interdependence and globalization, potentially causing even distant events or instabilities to become imminent.

“The located menaces and threats are real, but they can only attain their full and state-threatening magnitude under certain conditions. Nevertheless it is indispensable to address them” (NDB, 2010).

Security Challenges Facing Switzerland

1. Increased vulnerability of state and society through globalization, mobility and interdependence

“One of the experiences of the last years is that globalisation and interconnectedness have reached dimensions which may question the state’s capacity to act” (SIPOL B, 2010).

a) Energy security and interdependence:

• Risk of supply disruption in case of conflict.

• “Swiss dependence on imports of raw materials and energy causes a vulnerability to pressures by the politics of interest of other states” (NDB, 2010).

• Physical energy security, i.e., nuclear reactors, keyword Fukushima.

b) Digitalization and digital vulnerability:

• “Attacks on communication and information infrastructure is ‘attractive’ because attackers can cause damage from a far distance, with little effort and with a small risk of detection” (SIPOL B, 2010).

• “Activities in this form will increase: it could even become the standard way of forging conflict between states” (SIPOL B, 2010).

• “An expert group…will work out a comprehensive strategy of the federation against cyber threats” (NDB, 2010).

c) Increased mobility and immigration:

• Schengen, immigration and refugees, a challenge to human security? “It would be wrong to classify migration generally as a threat. But there are several links to security policy” (SIPOL B, 2010).

• Organized crime: “Organised crime could reach strategic importance….Switzerland serves not only as a refuge and a hub for finance but also as an operation scene for criminal organisations: …According to estimates of fedpol, cocaine-trade in Switzerland accounts for 369 to 520 million Swiss francs per year” (NDB, 2010).

• Risk of negative domestic reactions and local security problems: “violent left and right wing extremism threaten public calm and order” (NDB, 2010).

2. Europe caught up in crisis

“As a country, which lies in the geographic centre of the European continent, Switzerland is tied most closely to Europe’s developments” (Swiss Foreign Policy Report, 2010).

a) Unjustifiable status quo: more or less federalism?

• More integration and common solutions to common problems?

  - “The European Union reacts to the global shift of power mostly by intensifying its integration efforts” (Swiss Foreign Policy Report, 2010).

• Less integration: risk and renationalization.

b) EU’s pillars are shaking:

• Euro-crisis: The EU’s internal difficulties posed by an endangered monetary union are not subject to any direct influence by Switzerland. The Swiss export economy, however, is confronted with uncertainties, which concern firstly the volatility of the exchange rates, and the dynamic of one of its most important markets” (Swiss Foreign Policy Report, 2010).

• Lisbon Treaty: future of integrated policies?

  - Intervention in Libya has manifested the difficulties of the CSDP.

  - “The EU engages itself more in security policy. But single states have national interests and priorities which cannot be shared by all member states” (SIPOL, 2010).

  - “The fact that even after the Lisbon Treaty different actors will be responsible for the foreign and security policy realm…will pose a great challenge
for the future of the EU in positioning herself towards central international actors” (Swiss Foreign Policy Report, 2010).

• Schengen Treaty questioned.

c) Dysfunctionalities of the European security architecture

• For example, Russia vs. Georgia war in 2008.

• “For Switzerland, the EAPC and PfP are the main pillars of the European Security Architecture” (Swiss Foreign Policy Report, 2010).

d) The community of values to which Switzerland belongs is destabilized, thus posing problems to Switzerland, which brings to the fore Switzerland’s inherent dependence on Europe’s security architecture.

3. Residual risk of military attack

“The Federal Council regards the possibility of a military attack on Switzerland in the near future as very low. However, it cannot be discounted because of its enormous consequences” (SIPOL B, 2010).

• Risk of terrorist or other non-state groups acquiring greater military means with farther reach.

• Guided missiles of medium or great reach can become a military threat to Switzerland.

Some Thoughts on the MENA Region

“Switzerland is not only affected by this upheaval, but also challenged...In a long term perspective, it can be assumed that chances can develop for Switzerland, a potential field of action....But it has also to be taken into consideration that multiple risks will linger on...: migration pressure, insecure energy supply, potentate funds, organised crime, etc” (NDB, 2010).

Relevant Documents


Ambassador Fred Tanner is the director of the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP).
TURKEY’S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Ali Tuygan

Turkey’s security challenges have always shown great diversity and intensity. During the Cold War, Turkey was NATO’s southern flank and shouldered heavy defence responsibilities.

With the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself in the middle of three major conflict areas.

For over 10 years, the disintegration of Yugoslavia kept Turkey busy. Since the Balkans are Turkey’s gateway to Europe, trade, transport and communications were adversely affected. Thousands of refugees came over.

The disputes in the Caucasus, in particular the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, have created similar problems. These remain.

Finally, there was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the aftermath of which had a most negative impact on Turkey’s security, trade, oil supplies and investments.

Turkey played no part in the creation of any one of these problems but suffered the consequences. The country responded individually and collectively by promoting dialogue between adversaries, participating in peacekeeping operations and providing humanitarian assistance.

The Arab Spring marks the beginning of a welcome change, but the pains of transformation may create new challenges in the short term, such as disruption of economic cooperation, trade, energy supplies and influx of refugees.

As for Turkey’s bilateral problems with neighbours, Bulgaria, Syria and Greece, remarkable progress was made. The fruits of change have been very substantial for all.

September 11 had a dramatic impact on the global agenda, and important repercussions for Turkey. In October 2001, operations started against the Taliban. March 19, 2003 marked the beginning of the US invasion of Iraq. This is Turkey’s neighbourhood and again she felt the tremors.

At the time of the Cold War, the battlefield was essentially ideology. Tools employed were primarily politico-military, emphasis being on the latter. Since 9/11, however, the world increasingly finds itself in the arena of culture in the widest sense embracing elements such as politics, governance, tradition, religion and ethnicity, among others.
Dear Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to be here tonight with such a distinguished group of people from different corners of the world representing “constructive powers,” and have the opportunity to discuss global issues of common interest to us all.

Indeed, the initiative that calls for increased partnership among constructive powers is something that I followed with great interest from the early stages of its intellectual inception and I feel truly privileged to be able to host this dinner on the occasion of its very first formal meeting.

Taking this opportunity, allow me to extend my congratulations and sincere thanks to all who helped this initiative come to this point, but above all to Professor Hampson, Ambassador Heinbecker and of course to our dear Professor Meliha Altunışık.

Their dedication and hard work turned this wonderful idea into something real and thus here we are standing along the Bosphorus ready and willing to chart together into the deep waters of global peace and security.

And I cannot think of a better starting point for this important initiative than Turkey, which not only straddles continents and regions geographically, but also enjoys a central position with respect to many issues on our common agenda, ranging from Arab Spring to WMD proliferation, from terrorism to cultural polarization.

Furthermore, Turkey in many ways signifies what a constructive power could or should be. With its increased soft power assets based on its economic and democratic achievements and active foreign policy seeking to generate peace, stability and prosperity in its wider region, Turkey is one of those countries capable and willing to bring about positive change in the face of the many complex global challenges affecting us.

And the fact that we want and try to do so in cooperation with our partners is also very much in tune with the underlying spirit of this initiative which calls for like-minded countries able to make a constructive impact on global politics to join their hands and rise to the occasion in a collective way.

Timing-wise too, I believe our meeting today is an excellent occasion to reflect on the challenges and the rapid changes of our time, as well as to find the right ways and means to cope with them.

Indeed, today the most crucial topic of the international system is the global transformation that we are still going through. Change has never been this fast and interaction this intense. Amid rising opportunities and evolving threats, the world is yet to find order.

In this regard, despite increased opportunities for prosperity and welfare, many parts of the world are still grappling with conflicts, crises and unresolved issues. The lasting peace, security and stability we all yearn for remains elusive. To steer this profound global change in the positive direction, we have to act quickly, responsibly, effectively, and most important of all, collectively.

Quickly, because in today’s fast-paced world politics, months, days and even hours count to make a difference. Responsibly, because no one has the luxury of being a mere spectator in international relations anymore. Effectively, because our success or failure today will determine the fate of generations to come. And collectively, because no single country has the ability to make a difference alone and cooperation is most needed especially among the emerging powers of this new era.

These are precisely the reasons that make this initiative about partnership among constructive powers all the more important and necessary. Moreover, given the fact that the current global governance structures are yet to be reformed or transformed to adequately deal with the challenges of our time, sowing the seeds of practical cooperation among the countries represented here today becomes even more pressing and relevant.

Therefore, it is high time for partnerships to be built among constructive powers in order to tackle the common problems that we face. It doesn’t really matter whether these partnerships are built upon structured mechanisms or flourish as a means of more flexible and issue-oriented collaboration. What is essential is that all capable countries that are concerned about the challenges of today come together and seek common solutions.

While I acknowledge the essentiality of international and regional organizations in setting and pursuing the global or regional agenda, we cannot expect them to address all the challenges of today with the same efficiency. In other words, we should step up to the plate.

In doing so, we must be proactive, aiming first at foreseeing and preventing rather than reacting to the crises. We must also embrace a comprehensive approach
and act with a vision rather than ad hoc, piecemeal responses which fail to bring lasting solutions. And we must be creative in our foreign policies both in terms of innovation and productivity to cope with the new and evolving risks, threats and opportunities alike.

This is precisely what Turkey on its own merits is striving to do in its own wider region and beyond. And this is why you see a much more active and dynamic Turkish foreign policy particularly within the last decade.

In fact, one can see such an evolution in many counties’ foreign policies, particularly those of emerging new powers, which bring about a rebalancing of world politics and make it more versatile and multi-polar. But let me briefly elaborate on Turkey’s case.

Maybe the main difference in Turkey’s case is that we are situated at the epicentre of the Afro-Eurasian geopolitical landscape, which contains much of the risks and opportunities that would have effects on a global scale. In this wide region, where conflicts are more common than not, Turkey is actively trying to sow the seeds of a different culture, one of dialogue, cooperation and mutual benefits based on a win-win mentality.

Our policies vis-à-vis our neighbours is a concrete reflection of this vision. We are also an active supporter and promoter of regional cooperation. Because we know that working our way from the regional to the global level is imperative.

Looking back, I can say that we are moving in the right direction with a view to achieving the goals we have set for ourselves. We are by no means where we want to be. But, by making use of the existing opportunities and taking the right steps at the right time, we have started putting in place the necessary cornerstones for creating a zone of cooperation and dialogue around us.

As a result, today we have much improved relations with almost all our neighbours, which represent a truly diverse group. We are also actively promoting several regional cooperation projects in our vicinity, which help form a positive regional identity and a sense of ownership.

In parallel to that, we have also taken great strides in developing our relations with the emerging powers of Asia, Latin America and Africa. In this context, it is worth noting that Turkey is now one of the three strategic partners of the African Union; enjoys observer/partner status with a diverse group of organizations such as OAS, ASEAN and the Arab League; plays a leading role in the OIC; and chairs the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

While expanding the scope of our foreign policy, we, however, by no means ignored the strategic partnerships we carried from the past, particularly with the US and the EU. With the US for instance, we are committed to deepen our relationship under the rubric of “model partnership,” which calls for equal emphasis on all aspects of our relations, be it economic, political or social.

With the EU on the other hand, despite certain political obstacles created by some members we are committed to move forward with our accession process, and full membership to the EU remains a strategic goal for us.

We also believe that the new activism and wider outreach of Turkish foreign policy allows for a more substantive and fruitful cooperation between us and our partners in the EU or the US.

In any case, expanding and deepening our outreach to new regions made us even more sensitive to the conflicts in those areas and propelled us to be more active in helping their resolution. We have done so through various facilitation/mediation initiatives and regional cooperation schemes we have launched over the recent years.

In this context, the two different trilateral dialogue processes we have started among Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia; the trilateral cooperation initiative among Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan; our efforts to reconcile differences among domestic political parties in Iraq and Lebanon; and our facilitation of dialogue between Iran and the E3+3 are particularly noteworthy.

We also support the reform dynamic in countries around us and remain ready and willing to share our own democratization experience with those wishing to benefit from that. Indeed, as the whole world continues to seek a new global order, we are aware of the importance of a value-based system to emerge at the end of this rather long transition period and exert every effort to this end.

Our approach to the recent developments in the Middle East, for instance, has from the very outset been a principled one emphasizing promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law and overall the accountability of the regimes.

Likewise, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative we have co-sponsored with Spain represents the strongest response ever to the radicals and extremists trying to polarize the world along cultural and religious fault lines. Turkey’s role in this project as a predominantly Muslim nation with contemporary universal values makes it even more relevant and powerful. And today, we are proud to see more than 120 countries in the
United Nations joining this initiative and working for its success.

Within the United Nations, another important area where Turkey has started playing a prominent role is development issues. Turkey has now become an emerging donor country filling the gaps and acting as an enabler in the developing world through many bilateral and multilateral assistance projects that our Development Agency (TICA) sponsors.

In this regard, the Least Developed Countries (LDC), which host many of the political, military and economic challenges of the globe, are particularly important and Turkey is determined to help them with a long-term commitment. The LDC Summit we hosted in Istanbul last month was a milestone event in charting out an ambitious action plan for the next 10 years with a view to supporting sustainable development in these countries and we are committed to make this plan work.

Both our mediation/facilitation initiatives and development assistance efforts also show that we are not merely a free rider of the new international system, but rather take over increasing responsibility for the global goods it entails.

Let me not go any further in explaining Turkish foreign policy since I know that you all represent countries with the same disposition and commitment. This is why I am very much hopeful that this initiative, which brings together academicians and practitioners from the emerging constructive powers of our time, is well poised to produce the necessary synergy and ideas needed to tackle the challenges facing us.

After all, today a country’s own capabilities and intentions are not enough to make a positive difference. You need partners to work with you towards shared objectives. It is also a fact that hard military power cannot yield all the desired results and that elements of soft power, which by nature call for cooperation rather than confrontation, are more effective in accomplishing peace and stability.

This is why Turkey on its part will continue to reach out and explore opportunities for cooperation with your countries to achieve our common goals. We will do so in every possible bilateral or multilateral fora, but certainly within the United Nations where we are constantly increasing our profile and activities. Particularly the Security Council, where we had the chance to take a seat after almost half a century in 2009 and 2010, requires the constructive contributions of our countries.

Our experience is that this body is in dire need for reform, but that this is unlikely to happen any time soon. So, as the Council will continue to be the principal forum for the maintenance of international peace and security, we need to make sure that it works as effectively as possible. To this end, we need to consult more on the issues that are on the Council’s agenda and provide the necessary inputs to the work of this body.

Besides, we also believe that the countries represented around this table need to have their voice heard in the Council more often than not. Again our experience showed us that capable constructive countries like ours can indeed make a positive impact on the work of the Council, especially if they work in close coordination and cooperation among themselves. In this regard, I would also like to inform you that Turkey has recently announced its candidature for another term in Council for the years 2015-16.

On the other hand, we also attach great importance to our membership and cooperation within the framework of the G20. This group, which is more representative than any other current global governance structure, is an extremely important forum for consultations not only on financial matters, but on all issues related to economy and development.

Therefore, we need to make sure that this body delivers the expectations and thus shows to the entire world that when the international community acts with the right players in lead, the solutions are well within reach.

It is with these thoughts that I would like to conclude my remarks and wish you productive and constructive deliberations tomorrow.

Thank you.
**ANNEX**

**PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES**

**Mensur Akgün**

Mensur Akgün is the director of Global Political Trends (GPoT) Center, a research unit under the auspices of Istanbul Kültür University (IKU) and is also an associate professor at the Department of International Relations at IKU. He received two bachelor’s degrees from the Middle Eastern Technical University and Oslo University, in international relations and social anthropology respectively, and completed his master’s degree in political science at Oslo University and his Ph.D. at Boğaziçi University. Prior to heading GPoT Center, he was director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), where he is still chief adviser. He has been published extensively in international relations and is currently a columnist for the Turkish daily, *Star*.

**Rafet Akgünay**

Ambassador Rafet Akgünay was born in Ankara, Turkey in 1953. He holds a B.Sc. from Middle East Technical University (METU) (1975), an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1976), and a Ph.D. from METU’s Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences (1992).

Since 1977, he has held a range of positions in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including postings in Tel Aviv, Washington, D.C., and at the NATO Defense College. Among other positions, he has been head of section, Department of International Security Affairs, head of department, Department of NATO Military Affairs, minister plenipotentiary, chief of cabinet to the president of the Republic of Turkey, senior foreign policy adviser to the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey, and deputy undersecretary for general political affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ambassador Akgünay has also served as ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the People’s Republic of China, and since 2008 he is the ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Canada. Ambassador Akgünay is married and has two sons.

**Meliha Altunişik**


**Alexandra Bugailiskis**

Alexandra Bugailiskis is a career diplomat with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where she served as assistant deputy minister for Latin America and the Caribbean (2007–2010). She is currently on a one-year secondment as a senior distinguished fellow at the NormanPaterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Ms. Bugailiskis has served as Canada’s ambassador to Cuba (2003–2007) and to the Syrian Arab Republic (1997–2000). In Ottawa, she has held various senior management positions in the geographic and UN bureaus and at the Privy Council Office. Ms. Bugailiskis has received special recognition for work on the Summit of the Americas (2001) and on Haitian relief and reconstruction (2010) and was named Canadian Foreign Service Officer of the Year (1990).

**Esen Caglar**

Esen Caglar has worked at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırmaları Vakfı [TEPAV]) since 2005. An expert in industrial policy and competitiveness, Mr. Caglar has coordinated TEPAV’s various projects in the areas of industrial policy design, cluster policy and investment climate assessment. Since 2006, Mr. Caglar...
has coordinated the technical studies of the TOBB Industry for Peace Initiative that has focused on private sector development in the Palestinian territories through developing and managing industrial estates in the West Bank and Gaza. In 2006-07, he was appointed as the rapporteur of the Industrial Policy Ad-Hoc Commission for the Ninth Development Plan of the State Planning Organization. In 2008, he coordinated the Industrial Strategy Design Project of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In 2009, Mr. Caglar worked as a consultant for UNDP’s project on Şanlıurfa’s industrial restructuring and for the EU-funded Development of a Clustering Policy for Turkey project. Prior to joining TEPAV, Mr. Caglar worked as a consultant for the World Bank’s Ethiopia country office in investment climate assessment and privatization projects, and as a technology policy adviser for Gebze Organized Industrial Zone. Mr. Caglar holds a master’s degree in public administration and international development from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and a B.A. in politics and political economy from Princeton University.

Jakkie Cilliers

Jakkus Kamfer (Jakkie) Cilliers is the executive director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). He has a B.Mil. (B.A.) from the University of Stellenbosch and a Hons. B.A., M.A. (cum laude) and D.Litt. et Phil. from the University of South Africa (UNISA). Awards he has received include the Bronze Medal from the South African Society for the Advancement of Science and the H Bradlow Research Bursary. Jakkie Cilliers co-founded the ISS in 1990 and played an important role in the transformation of the South African armed forces and the institution of civilian control over the military in the period from 1990 to 1996. At present, most of his interests relate to the emerging security architecture in Africa as reflected in the developments under the banner of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, as well as issues around African futures.

Jakkie Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and published a number of books on various matters relating to peace and security in Africa. He is a regular commentator on local and international radio and television and has attended a large number of international conferences. He is an extraordinary professor in the Centre of Human Rights and the Department of Political Sciences, Faculty Humanities at the University of Pretoria. He also serves on the International Advisory Board of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in Switzerland and as a member of the board of advisers of the Center on International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University, New York.

Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto

Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto has been undersecretary-general for political affairs III (Africa and the Middle East) at the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, Brasilia, since January 2011. Mr. Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto was born in Salvador, Brazil in 1953. He holds a bachelor of arts in history from UNICEUB in Brasilia and is a graduate of the Rio Branco Institute (the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy). Since 1977, he has held a range of positions in the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, including second secretary, permanent delegation of Brazil to the UN in Geneva (UNCTAD affairs), director, Center for Strategic Studies – Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, Presidency of the Republic, and counsellor at the Brazilian Mission to the UN in New York. He has also served as ambassador to Haiti and Canada.

He has received the Brazilian Order of Military Merit, Knight Commander, and the Brazilian Order of Rio Branco, Knight Grand Cross. He has been married to Mrs. Vera Lucia Ribeiro Estrela de Andrade Pinto since December 4, 1976 and they have three sons: Pedro (1978), João Mateus (1980) and Gabriel (1989).

Niall Cronin

Niall Cronin is deputy director for outreach in the policy staff at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The role of the policy staff is to analyze emerging trends in the global environment and to translate those assessments into strategic advice for the deputy minister of foreign affairs and the deputy minister of international trade as well as for both ministers. The outreach team is responsible for ensuring views from outside of government are incorporated into the policy process earlier than perhaps has been the case in the past. Prior to joining the policy staff, Niall worked on the department’s Afghanistan Task Force. He has also held a number of positions within the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Niall has served outside of Canada at the Canadian High Commission to Pakistan and with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Bosnia Herzegovina.

Levent Gümrükçü

Levent Gümrükçü is head of the policy planning division at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He holds a B.A. in political science from the Middle East Technical University. He has previously held positions in the Turkish embassy in Washington, D.C. and at the embassy in Tehran, was first secretary and counsellor at the Turkish delegation to NATO in Brussels, and was first counsellor at the Turkish delegation to the UN in New York.
Fen Osler Hampson

A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Fen Hampson is the chancellor’s professor and director of The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, where he also received his A.M. degree (both with distinction). He also holds an M.Sc. (Econ.) degree (with distinction) from the London School of Economics and a B.A. (Hon.) from the University of Toronto. He has been a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Fen Hampson is the author/co-author of nine books and editor/co-editor of more than 25 other volumes. In addition, he is the author of almost 100 articles and book chapters on international affairs. He is a frequent commentator and contributor to the national and international media. His articles have appeared in The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, Foreign Policy Magazine, the National Post, the Ottawa Citizen and elsewhere. He is a frequent commentator on the CBC, CTV and Global news networks.

Fen Hampson is a senior adviser to the United States Institute of Peace and has been a consultant to the International Peace Academy in New York, the Social Science Research Council in New York, the United Nations Commission on Human Security, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the MacArthur Foundation, the International Development Centre and Foreign Affairs Canada. He is a member of the board of directors of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Parliamentary Centre and the Social Science Foundation Board at the University of Denver. He served as chair of the Human Security Track of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, a joint initiative of the governments of Finland and Tanzania. He was also chair of the Working Group on International Institutions and International Cooperation oversight coordinator for the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, which was held in Madrid, Spain, on March 8–11, 2005.

Paul Heinbecker

A former career diplomat with assignments in Ankara, Stockholm, Paris (at the OECD) and Washington, Paul Heinbecker served as Canada’s ambassador to Germany, 1992–1996, and as permanent representative of Canada to the United Nations, 2000–2003, where he represented Canada on the Security Council. From 1989 to 1992, he was Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s chief foreign policy adviser. From 1996 to 2000, he served as assistant deputy minister of global and security policy in the Department of Foreign Affairs, where he led the development of Canada’s human security agenda, and headed the Canadian delegation to the UN Climate Change negotiations in Kyoto. As G8 political director, he helped to negotiate the UN resolution that ended the war in Kosovo. A frequent commentator on radio and television, and an author, he is the inaugural director of the Centre for Global Relations at Wilfrid Laurier University, and a distinguished fellow at CIGI in Waterloo. Mr. Heinbecker is married to Ayşe Köymen.

Carlos Heredia

Carlos Heredia is chairman and professor, Department of International Studies, Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Mexico City. Heredia is a graduate of McGill University and also attended Université Laval. He is a former member of the Mexican Congress. His research topics include North American integration, Mexico-US migration and Mexico-China relations. His most recent publication is “Mexico and the United States: In Search of a Strategic Vision,” with Andrés Rozental, in Lowenthal, Abraham, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead, The Obama Administration and the Americas: Looking Forward, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Nam-sik In

Nam-sik In is currently an associate professor at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Government of the Republic of Korea), and he holds positions as an adjunct professor at Hankun University of Foreign Studies and a lecturer at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Middle East politics from the University of Durham, UK(2003) and has a B.A. in political science from Yonsei University (1993) and an M.A. in comparative politics from the same university (1996). His areas of expertise include Middle East security issues, terrorism and Islamic affairs. His current research focuses on democratization in the Middle East, protracted conflicts in the region, security issues in the Middle East and Islamic politicization. His most recent publication deals with political upheaval in and around the Middle East and its broader implications (Analysis on International Affairs Series, Seoul, 2011).

Aleksius Jemadu

Aleksius Jemadu is a professor of international politics in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Karawaci Tangerang. He got his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Sciences KU Leuven Belgium in 1996. He is currently dean of the School of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Pelita Harapan, Indonesia.

Raimund Kunz

Raimund Kunz was born in 1948 at Grosswangen (Canton Lucerne, Switzerland). He completed his degree in history and security policy at the Universities of Fribourg and Geneva. He joined the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in 1980 and completed his diplomatic traineeship in Berne and at the Swiss Delegation to the OECD in Paris. In 1982, he returned to the ministry headquarters in Berne, in the capacity of diplomatic officer in charge of international security, nuclear affairs and disarmament. In 1988, he took up his new assignment at the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the International Organisations in Vienna, where he was promoted to the rank of counsellor in 1991. In 1992, he was appointed head of the OSCE unit in Berne. In 1995, he took the lead of the coordinating unit of the Swiss Presidency of the OSCE, with the rank of ambassador. In 1997, the Swiss Federal Council appointed him commissioner to the first “Periodic Meeting on International Humanitarian Law.” He then took the lead of the Political Affairs Division III, International Organisation, Peace and Security, between 1998 and 2001. In September 2001, he took up his subsequent assignment as ambassador of Switzerland to Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan with residence in Cairo. Prior to his nomination as ambassador of Switzerland to the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Raimund Kunz was the director of the Directorate for Security Policy at the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, between October 2004 and January 2009. He is currently the ambassador of Switzerland to the Republic of Turkey. Ambassador Kunz is married and has two children.

Dong Hwi Lee

Dong Hwi Lee is a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Government of the Republic of Korea, and a senior associate to the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He was a dean of research at the IFANS with a deputy ministerial rank from 2000 to 2004. He was also a senior visiting scholar in 2009 with the G8 and G20 Research Groups of the Munk School of Global Affairs in the University of Toronto, Canada. His research interests include the political economy of East Asia with a special focus on North Korea and China, global governance, regional cooperation and analysis of international negotiation.


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Masanori Naito was born in Tokyo in 1956. He holds an M.Sc. in geography from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in social sciences from Hitotsubashi University. Masanori Naito is currently a professor and dean of the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University. He also serves as a representative for the Asia-Pacific region on the Scientific Advisory Committee to UNESCO Social and Human Science Sector/MOST, and is a member of the Scientific Council of Japan. He has also served as a research associate at the University of Tokyo, has been a professor at Hitotsubashi University, and has been a visiting professor at Ankara University.

Soli Özel

Soli Özel holds a B.A. in economics from Bennington College (1981) and an M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University (1983). Mr. Özel is currently a full-time professor at Kadir Has University. He is also a columnist at Habertürk Daily newspaper, and an adviser to TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association). He edits TÜSİAD’s magazine, Private View. He has guest lectured at Georgetown, Harvard, Tufts and other US universities. He is a regular contributor to German Marshall Fund’s
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Simon Palamar

Simon Palamar is currently a Ph.D. candidate in international affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. He holds a joint honours B.A. in history and peace and conflict studies from the University of Waterloo and Conrad Grebel University College, and an M.A. in global governance from the University of Waterloo.

John Ravenhill

John Ravenhill is professor and head of the School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (ANU). He co-directs the ANU’s MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Initiative project. After obtaining his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley, he taught at the University of Virginia and the University of Sydney before joining ANU in 1990. In 2000, he took up the chair of politics at the University of Edinburgh for four years. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Geneva, the International University of Japan, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, and the University of California, Berkeley. His work has appeared in many of the leading international relations journals. His most recent book, co-edited with Andrew MacIntyre & TJ Pempel, was Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political Economy. He was the founding editor of the Cambridge University Press book series, Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies. He is a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.

Andrés Rozental

Andrés Rozental was Mexico’s ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1995 to 1997. He was a career diplomat for more than 35 years, having served his country as deputy foreign minister (1988–1994), ambassador to Sweden (1983–1988), permanent representative of Mexico to the United Nations in Geneva (1982–1983), as well as in various responsibilities within the Mexican Foreign Ministry and abroad. Since 1994, he holds the permanent rank of Eminent Ambassador of México.

Currently, Ambassador Rozental holds non-executive board positions in several multinational corporations in Brazil, United States, France, the United Kingdom and Mexico. He is the president of his own consulting firm, Rozental & Asociados, which specializes in advising multinational companies on their corporate strategies in Latin America. He is also active in several non-governmental projects relating to global governance, migration policy, Latin American politics and promotion of democracy.

Ambassador Rozental obtained his professional degree in international relations from the Universidad de las Américas in Mexico, and his master’s in international economics from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of three books on Mexican foreign policy and of numerous articles on international affairs.

Andrew Shearer

Andrew Shearer is director of studies and a senior research fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. He is a frequent commentator on foreign policy and strategic issues in the Australian media and has had opinion pieces published in a range of international publications including The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, The Spectator, Pragati – the Indian National Interest Review and the Jakarta Globe. Andrew has extensive international experience in the Australian government, most recently as senior foreign policy adviser to former Prime Minister John Howard. Previously he occupied a senior position in the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C. and was strategic policy adviser to former Defence Minister Robert Hill. He occupied various positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Office of National Assessments.

Andrew has honours degrees in arts and law from the University of Melbourne. He was awarded a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Chevening Scholarship and has an M.Phil. degree in international relations from the University of Cambridge.

Fred Tanner

Ambassador Fred Tanner, a Swiss national, is the director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Prior to this appointment, Fred Tanner was deputy director of the GCSP, in charge of academic affairs and training. At the same time, he was a visiting professor at the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (GIIDS/IHEID) and was responsible for its Diplomatic Studies Programme. From 1994 to 1997, on secondment from the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), he was director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) in Malta. Over the course of his distinguished academic career, Fred Tanner held teaching and research positions at universities such as Harvard (CFIA), Johns Hopkins (SAIS) and Princeton (CIS). Among other responsibilities, Fred Tanner is a member of the High-level Expert Panel on Early Warning
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Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University in 1966. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. He has held various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Ankara between postings abroad. In 1987, he became private secretary to the president of the republic. Later, he was ambassador to Canada, ambassador to Saudi Arabia, deputy under-secretary for political affairs at the MFA in Ankara, ambassador to Greece, again deputy under-secretary for political affairs, and under-secretary, permanent delegate to UNESCO. He retired in 2009.

Cevdet Yılmaz

Cevdet Yılmaz is currently third secretary in the Directorate General for Policy Planning in Management of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He holds a B.A. in management from Boğaziçi University. Previously he has worked at the Turkish Social Security Institution, and at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. He is married and has one son.
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CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, co-CEO of RIM (Research In Motion) and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, co-chef de la direction de RIM (Research In Motion). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.

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