

CIGI

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PAPER NO. 7 — MAY 2014

Tipping the Scale: An Analysis of Global Swing States in the Internet Governance Debate

Tim Maurer and Robert Morgus

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ABOUT ORGANIZED CHAOS: REIMAGINING THE INTERNET PROJECT

Historically, Internet governance has been accomplished *en passant*. It has emerged largely from the actions of computer scientists and engineers, in interaction with domestic legal and regulatory systems. Beginning at least with the 2003–2005 World Summit on the Information Society process, however, there has been an explicit rule-making agenda at the international level. This strategic agenda is increasingly driven by a coalition of states — including Russia, China and the Arab states — that is organized and has a clear, more state-controlled and monetary vision for the Internet. Advanced industrial democracies and other states committed to existing multi-stakeholder mechanisms have a different view — they regard Internet governance as important, but generally lack coherent strategies for Internet governance — especially at the international level. Given the Internet's constant evolution and its economic, political and social importance as a public good, this situation is clearly untenable.

A coherent strategy is needed to ensure that difficult trade-offs between competing interests, as well as between distinct public values, are managed in a consistent, transparent and accountable manner that accurately reflects public priorities. Guided by these considerations, CIGI researchers believe they can play a constructive role in creating a strategy for states committed to multi-stakeholder models of Internet governance.

In aiming to develop this strategy, the project members will consider what kind of Internet the world wants in 2020, and will lay the analytical groundwork for future Internet governance discussions, most notably the upcoming decennial review of the World Summit on the Information Society. This project was launched in 2012. The Internet Governance Paper series will result in the publication of a book in 2014.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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ACRONYMS

BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CSO	civil society organization
EU	European Union
FOC	Freedom Online Coalition
HDI	human development index
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICT	information and communications technology
ITRs	International Telecommunications Regulations
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
LDCs	least developed countries
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UN GGEs	UN Group of Governmental Experts
WCIT	World Conference on International Telecommunications
WEF	World Economic Forum
WSIS+10	World Summit on the Information Society

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In December 2012, numerous news outlets reported on the debate over Internet governance that took place at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai. It was the first time in nearly a decade that the topic attracted major international media attention. The conference ended in a diplomatic éclat with 89 states signing the new International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) and 55 publicly opposing them.

The WCIT demonstrated considerable state support for two different visions for Internet governance: on the one hand, a bottom-up model driven by various stakeholders including civil society, private companies and governments; and on the other, a top-down model driven primarily by governments and with a central role for the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). As Internet governance continues to rise from low to high priority politics, the stakes will increase and tensions and disagreements will become more likely.

A key aspect of the post-WCIT discussion has centred on the role of "swing states" in this global debate. So far, most of this work has been based on predefined groups of countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa (the "IBSA" group) or focused on countries based on anecdotal evidence of a vibrant tech community or existing relationships, for example Kenya or Ghana. The study discussed in this paper applied a more systematic approach, using the voting record at the WCIT. The research revealed some interesting patterns among certain groups of states. Based on this analysis, a core group of potential swing states — a total of 30 countries — are identified based on their voting behaviour at the WCIT, their various memberships and a range of relevant indicators. This list offers a road map for future in-depth studies. Ideally, it will also serve as a resource for practitioners and academics alike for comparison with current efforts and for future strategic planning that focuses on engaging other actors internationally.

RISING TO HIGH POLITICS: THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE DEBATE

Numerous news outlets reported on the debate over Internet governance that took place at the WCIT in Dubai in December 2012. It was the first time in nearly a decade that the topic attracted major international media attention. States convened to renegotiate the 1988 treaty governing international telecommunications, but the conference ended in a diplomatic éclat with 89 states signing the new ITRs and 55 publicly opposing them (see Annex II).[1]

1 For more details see Maurer 2012.

Usually states operate by consensus in this policy area, without formal votes, negotiating language until it is acceptable to all actors involved. At the WCIT, however, the deliberations took an unexpected turn. The main issue — to what extent the Internet would be part of the new agreement — remained unresolved until the end of the conference, when, long after midnight on the second-to-last day, the chairman suddenly asked for a "feel in the room," and member states used their name plates to show their agreement or not. Whether the chairman's action counted as a vote was hotly disputed and a point of contention on the final day of the conference. Ultimately, the differences could not be bridged and the conference ended with the international community split and in open discord.

As Internet governance continues to rise from low to high politics, the stakes will increase and similar tensions and disagreements will become more likely. According to Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith (2013), the WCIT "confirmed the existence of complex fault lines in the international community. A broad coalition led by Russia and China engineered the adoption of updated ITRs as well as International Telecommunication Union (ITU) resolutions affirming an expanded state role in Internet governance, and empowering the ITU to further debate and discuss Internet issues."

This debate will continue in the near future with major events already scheduled. The ITU's plenipotentiary and the selection of a new ITU Secretary-General will take place from October 20 to November 7, 2014, and the review of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+10) will culminate in 2015. The WCIT demonstrated considerable state support for two different visions for Internet governance: on the one hand, a bottom-up model driven by various stakeholders including civil society, private companies and governments; and on the other, a top-down model driven primarily by governments and with central role for the ITU. The role of non-governmental actors in Internet governance is therefore reminiscent of many similar debates in other policy areas and the push for non-governmental actors to have a greater role in global governance generally.

A key aspect of the post-WCIT discussion has centred on the role of "swing states" in this global debate (Ebert and Maurer 2013; Clemente 2013). So far, most of this work has been based on predefined groups of countries such as IBSA or focussed on countries based on anecdotal evidence of a vibrant tech community or existing relationships, for example, Kenya or Ghana (Kleinwächter 2013). This study applies a more systematic approach using the voting record at the WCIT. This type of data is rare in this field. The WCIT offered a unique glimpse at countries' positions and revealed some interesting patterns among certain groups of states. Based on this analysis, the paper identifies a core group of potential swing states, providing a road map for future research and a list that can be compared to current and future efforts and priorities (see Table 1).

TIPPING THE SCALE: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL SWING STATES

The research on swing states in the Internet governance debate builds on previous work on global swing states in the changing international system more broadly. According to Daniel Kliman and Richard Fontaine (2012):

> In the American political context, swing states are those whose mixed political orientation gives them a greater impact than their population or economic output might warrant. Such states promise the greatest

return on investment for U.S. presidential campaigns deciding where to allocate scarce time and resources. Likewise, in U.S. foreign policy, a focus on Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey can deliver a large geopolitical payoff, because their approach to the international order is more fluid and open than those of China or Russia. In addition, the choices that these four countries make — about whether to take on new global responsibilities, free ride on the efforts of established powers or complicate the solving of key challenges — may, together, decisively influence the trajectory of the current international order. The concept of global swing states offers a new framework for thinking about these four powers. It describes their position in the international system; however, it does not suggest an emerging bloc.

We adopt this conceptualization of swing states for this paper but move beyond a predefined small group of countries and examine a large group of countries using a range of indicators to identify a subset of potential swing states. Our definition also builds on Kliman and Fontaine but generalizes the terminology, especially by including capacity — "who have the resources to" — as a necessary condition for a swing state to be able to wield influence.

We therefore define a swing state in foreign policy as a state whose mixed political orientation gives it a greater impact than its population or economic output might warrant and that has the resources that enable it to decisively influence the trajectory of an international process. The analysis explained in further detail below suggests the following group of top 30 global swing states (see Table 1). It essentially marries the voting record on the ITRs with a series of other indicators to identify patterns and the group of countries likely to act as swing states in the global Internet governance debate in the future due to path dependence, logic of appropriate behaviour and state interests.

Table 1: Top 30 Swing States

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Belarus*
Botswana
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Georgia
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Namibia
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Serbia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay

* Belarus is an outlier in this list as further explained below.

This study focusses on the 193 member states of the United Nations (UN) whose status allows them to vote in the General Assembly and in conferences hosted by organizations that belong to the UN system such as the ITU (as long as their memberships overlap).[2] This status also includes the power to enter into international agreements that are considered binding under international law. The following section outlines the process used to narrow the list of potential swing states (see Annex I for a colour-coded graphic display).

IDENTIFYING SWING STATES IN THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE DEBATE

The WCIT voting record provides data for 144 of these 193 member states; there is no data available for 49 of them (see Annex II for a colour-coded graphic display). A first examination of the voting data revealed some interesting patterns that informed the development of the methodology used to create the list of potential swing states. The research started without a specific number of swing states to be identified. Throughout the research, 30 eventually became the cut-off based on the indicators used to identify subgroup IV in table 2 as outlined in greater detail below.

"A STATE… WHICH HAS THE RESOURCES" — LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The first step in trying to narrow the group of 193 states focused on the aforementioned necessary condition of a swing state having the resources required to be able to influence an international debate. The group of least developed countries (LDCs), currently consisting of 48 states, was therefore excluded from further analysis of potential swing states regarding Internet governance. It is interesting to note that Gambia and Malawi opposed the ITRs, with 28 LDCs voting for the ITRs and no record for the remaining 18 LDCs. The remaining list was reduced to 145 states.

"A STATE WHOSE MIXED POLITICAL ORIENTATION" — WCIT AND THE OECD (PLUS THE EU) MEMBERS

In the second step, we examined the group of 55 countries that publicly opposed the ITRs more closely. One striking pattern emerged out of studying this group: most of them, 30 out of the 55 states publicly opposing the ITRs, are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In fact, all of the OECD's 34 members were opposed to the ITRs, except for three countries — Mexico, South Korea and Turkey — with no record for one of its members, Iceland. This indicates a strong alignment of views among OECD members.

The list of 145 states was therefore further reduced by excluding OECD member states, with the exception of the three voting for the ITRs. These three were automatically included in the list of potential swing states as subgroup II in Table 3. The assumption is that they will be under significant pressure from their OECD peers to change their behaviour in future negotiations, in line with the academic theory on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998; Johnston 2001). The remaining list was reduced to 114 states including the identification of three swing states as subgroup II.

The third step zoomed in on the members of the European Union (EU) to examine any potential divergence. Out of the 28 EU member states, 27

2 The ITU predates the creation of the United Nations and became part of the UN system as a specialized agency of the UN system as outlined in articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. The main forum for the coordination of the UN system is the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination chaired by the UN Secretary-General and consisting of the heads of the various UN agencies. See http://unsceb.org/.

opposed the ITRs (with no record for Romania). The OECD includes 21 of these 28 EU member states. The remaining seven EU members — Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania — were therefore also excluded from the remaining list of potential swing states. With regard to Romania, the assumption is that its behaviour will align with the rest of the European Union's members, not least due to the EU members' commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The remaining list was reduced to 107 states.

STATES WITH VERY SMALL POPULATIONS

After this initial process, we scrutinized the remaining list of 107 states. This list included states with very small populations in the thousands such as Liechtenstein, Micronesia, Nauru and Saint Lucia as well as states with populations in the millions such as Brazil, India and Indonesia. It became clear that the size of the population was another factor to be examined. We considered different thresholds and their impact on the number of states on the list, for example, excluding countries with a population of less than one, two, three, five and 10 million people. Ultimately, we decided to adopt the threshold of two million people used by the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) (2014), excluding an additional 32 states as potential swing states using World Bank data. The remaining list was reduced to 75 states.

"A STATE WHOSE MIXED POLITICAL ORIENTATION" — WCIT AND AUTHORITARIAN STATES

In an attempt to identify additional patterns beyond membership in an intergovernmental organization, our attention turned to different types of political systems informed by our initial findings relating to the OECD and the European Union. Studying different indicators on a country's political system, we selected the Freedom in the World index by Freedom House (based in the United States) and the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (based in the United Kingdom). The Freedom in the World index distinguishes among only three types — free, partly free and not free — whereas the Democracy Index differentiates between four types — full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime and authoritarian regime.

We focused only on the most extreme cases — those considered "not free" by the Freedom in the World index or "authoritarian regime" by the Democracy Index. This criterion identified a total of 57 states as being either "not free" or an "authoritarian regime" or both, with 43 states being both "not free and an "authoritarian regime" and 14 states either "not free" or an "authoritarian regime." Of these 57 states, a majority of 39 states voted for the ITRs — 28 considered both "not free" and an "authoritarian regime" and 11 considered either one of the two. There is no record for 16 states, including 13 meeting both criteria and three meeting one of the two.

Only two of the 57 states classified as either "not free" or an "authoritarian regime" opposed the ITRs, both are considered "not free" and an "authoritarian regime": Belarus and Gambia. Since Gambia is part of the LDCs and is therefore excluded, only Belarus is included in the list of the top 30 potential swing states in Table 1. Belarus is an obvious outlier compared to the other swing states (emphasized by the * in Table 1 and 3). Were it not for its voting behaviour at the WCIT, which warrants further analysis, Belarus would have normally been excluded based on its political system.

Based on these findings on the type of political system, we decided to include this variable in our analysis. At the same time, we opted for a conservative approach, only excluding those meeting both criteria and considered both "not free" and an "authoritarian regime," which resulted in a list of 22 states. The list

of 75 states therefore shrunk to 54 states (53 states plus the identification of an additional potential swing state, Belarus, in subgroup I).

TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT 54 STATES

The first phase of the study focused on identifying the group of swing states among the 193 UN member states. Narrowing the list to 54 countries was based on an analysis using the following indicators:

- status as a LDC;
- member of the OECD and the European Union;
- population of less than two million people; and
- status being "not free" and "authoritarian regime."

This process identified several groups of countries that are unlikely to be swing states in the future. LDCs do not have the resources, for example, and members of the OECD and the European Union overwhelmingly voted against the ITRs while countries considered "not free" and authoritarian regimes" voted for them, suggesting similar behaviour in the future. At the same time, a few states emerged as swing states, namely Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and Belarus. These four are part of one of the former groups — with Mexico, South Korea and Turkey being members of the OECD and Berlarus considered "not free" and "authoritarian regime"— but behaved differently than their peers.

STATES VOTING AGAINST THE ITRs

The first step in examining the remaining 54 countries focused on identifying those states that publicly opposed the ITRs. In addition to Belarus, there were 12 other states: Albania, Armenia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Georgia, India, Kenya, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, Philippines, and Serbia. These are automatically considered to be swing states — subgroup I of Table 3 — assuming that since these states have already publicly opposed the ITRs, they might take similar positions in the future. At least, their WCIT voting behaviour established path dependence, increasing the cost to change future behaviour and a public record other actors can use to influence these 12 countries. Together with the other four swing states, subtracting these 12 additional swing states creates a reduced list of 38 states requiring further analysis.

FREEDOM ONLINE COALITION MEMBERS

An additional step was informed by a 2012 assessment of the WCIT in *The Economist*:

> The main issue was to what extent the internet should feature in the treaty. America and its allies wanted to keep it from being so much as mentioned — mainly out of fear that any reference to it whatsoever would embolden governments to censor the internet and meddle with its infrastructure. For some time a compromise among the more the 600 delegates, who were confined to an oppressive convention hall, seemed possible: the binding ITR would indeed hardly make any mention of the internet, but China, Russia and many Arab countries would get a non-binding resolution on the internet…. Yet this package did not fly. (*The Economist* 2012)

In light of these concerns over the ITRs' implications for human rights, we compared the list of countries voting for the ITRs with the membership of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), which currently includes 22 countries. This coalition defines itself

as "an intergovernmental coalition committed to advancing Internet freedom — free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online — worldwide. In its founding document, the 'Hague Declaration,' the FOC declared that the same rights apply online as well as offline" (FOC 2014). FOC membership was not included in the first phase of the research because the FOC is still very young and not a full-fledged organization such as the OECD and European Union; peer pressure effects are therefore assumed to be weaker.

Ghana and Tunisia were the only FOC members voting for the ITRs. They form subgroup III in Table 3. Similar to the OECD member states, the assumption is that these two countries will be under significant pressure moving forward from their coalition peers to change their behaviour to be appropriate vis-à-vis the declaration they made and are therefore part of the list of potential swing states. To be comprehensive, the two countries are included in Annex IV among the 38 states that were ranked based on the various indicators to show how they relate to the other states examined for this phase of the study.

POTENTIAL SWING STATES BASED ON INDICATORS

We examined a variety of different indicators to analyze the remaining 38 states, with the assumption that a subset of countries from this group constitute additional swing states. Compared to the 16 swing states already identified, these countries are described as *potential* swing states because the data associated with them and the patterns differ in important aspects, such as the correlation of ITRs voting behaviour and organizational membership.

The indicators ultimately selected to be relevant and robust were grouped into six categories: international cooperation, political system, civil society profile, Internet access, tech economy and active government interest in the Internet policy area. A list of indicators initially considered but eventually discarded during the research process can be found in Annex III. These six categories include 12 indicators; six consist of general indicators relevant for this study and the other six consist of specific indicators directly relevant for the Internet policy area. Table 2 shows the 12 indicators and their sources.

These indicators were selected because we consider them relevant to our inquiry, methodologically sound and comprehensive to offer sufficient information for the countries examined. The rationale and assumptions underlying the selection of categories varied. With regard to the general indicators, the first category — international cooperation — was included because this study focuses on identifying swing states in an international negotiation process. General propensity to cooperate is, therefore, an inherent element and necessary variable to include for this research. Indicators for the type of political system were included based on the initial review of WCIT voting behaviour and the pattern that emerged relating to OECD and EU membership, as well as the correlation between states considered not free or authoritarian regimes. The indicator "effective power to govern" was included in this category to capture the general strength or weakness of a state in a given country, assuming that a weak state is less likely to be able to adhere to previously made commitments and to act as a swing state in a sustainable manner over time. The category civil society profile was included as a separate category for two reasons. First, previous analysis shows the importance of civil society in influencing a government's position on these issues (Ebert and Maurer 2013). Second, the current model of Internet governance is based on a "multi-stakeholder" governance model, with civil society being one of the key stakeholders.

Table 2: Indicators Used to Analyze Potential Swing States

Categories		
General Indicators	**Indicator**	**Source**
International cooperation	International Cooperation (BTI Q17)	BTI (2014)
Political system	Democracy Index: Score	Economist Intelligence Unit (2012)
	Freedom in the World Index (Free)	Freedom House (2014)
	Effective power to govern (BTI Q2.2)	BTI (2014)
Civil society profile	Civicus Enabling Environment Index	Civicus (2003)
	Civil society participation (BTI Q16.4)	BTI (2014)
Specific Indicators	**Indicator**	**Source**
Internet access	Internet penetration rate (users per 100 people)	World Bank (2012a)
Tech economy	Information and communications technology (ICT) goods exports (as a % of total)	World Bank (2012b)
	ICT services exports (as a % of total)	World Bank (2012c)
	ICT goods imports (as a % of total)*	World Bank (2012d)
Active government interest in the Internet policy area	WCIT participation	ITU (2012)
	Membership in one of the three UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGEs)**	Compiled by the authors

* The World Bank does not provide data on ICT services imports.
** The UN GGEs were created in the context of the deliberations in the UN General Assembly's First Committee on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

The other six indicators were selected because they are directly relevant for Internet governance. This includes Internet access using Internet penetration rates as an indicator for the importance of the Internet for a country and its population. The tech economy category tries to capture the economic dimension and business interests. The World Bank's data on the share of ICT exports and imports emerged as good indicators for this purpose. Ideally, information on competition for each country's telecommunications market would be included, but such data could not be found. Last but not least, these indicators also try to incorporate if a government has already shown an active interest in the Internet policy area. This is based on the assumption that an existing active government interest in this area creates path dependence, increasing the likelihood of such a government remaining actively interested in this area and acting as a swing state in the future.

Using these categories, we then ranked the 38 states for each indicator, with the top-ranked state listed first (see Annex IV). Having already identified a total of 18 potential swing states in subgroups I, II and III, we estimated that we would identify an additional seven to 17 potential swing states among

the remaining 38 countries to develop a meaningful group of potential swing states overall. We therefore set a general threshold of the top 15 states. Moreover, an analysis of the data (see Annex V) suggested the creation of specific thresholds for the rankings, namely with regard to Internet penetration rates, ICT goods exports, ICT services exports and ICT goods imports, which showed significant differences among states. For the Internet penetration rates, we only ranked states with an Internet penetration rate of more than one-third. For ICT goods exports, we only ranked states where those exports constitute more than one percent of the total; for ICT services exports, the threshold is over 10 percent; and for ICT goods imports, the threshold is over five percent. The assumption is that these levels are significant enough to convince the respective government that these numbers matter, influencing its behaviour.

After creating a ranking for each individual indicator, we aggregated the number of occurrences of each state in the top 15 across the 12 indicators. Participation in the WCIT counted as "+1," irrespective of voting behavior. The indicator "WCIT participation" is coloured inversely because it lists only those countries among the 38 states whose governments were not at the WCIT, therefore not counting "+1."

The aggregate numbers reveal a wide range among the 38 states, ranging from as low as one occurrence to as high as 11 occurrences out of the 12 indicators. This is summarized in Annex IV in the column "Swing states ranked based on aggregate occurrences in top 15 of 12 selected indicators." Only 13 of the 38 states appeared in the top 15 six or more times. These were identified as additional potential swing states

Table 3: Top 30 Global Swing States

Against the ITRs	For the ITRs but...		
I	II	III	IV
	OECD Member	FOC Member	Potential Swing States Based on Indicators
Albania	Mexico	Ghana	Argentina
Armenia	South Korea	Tunisia	Botswana
Belarus*	Turkey		Brazil
Colombia			Dominican Republic
Costa Rica			Indonesia
Georgia			Jamaica
India			Malaysia
Kenya			Namibia
Moldova			Panama
Mongolia			Singapore
Peru			South Africa
Philippines			Uruguay
Serbia			

— subgroup IV — with the exception of El Salvador. El Salvador's occurrences are limited to non-Internet policy specific indicators, except for participation in the WCIT, so it is therefore excluded from the top 30 potential swing states list (see Table 3).

The result of this analysis identified a group of 12 potential additional swing states — subgroup IV — that were added to the 18 states already identified as swing states — subgroups I, II and III. The resulting top 30 global swing states and the breakdown are shown in Table 3.

SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE TOP 30 GLOBAL SWING STATES

Swing States Voting against the ITRs

Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Colombia, Costa Rica, Georgia, India, Kenya, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, Philippines and Serbia are all states that voted against the ITRs, which is noteworthy because they are not part of any of the group of states identified in phase one of the research and therefore remained on the list of states to analyze further. They eventually emerged as swing states because their positions at the WCIT set a precedent for similar behaviour in the future. These states also have the resources to persuade other countries to change their behaviour and to significantly influence the outcome of Internet governance discussions.

OECD and FOC members

Ghana, Mexico, South Korea, Tunisia and Turkey all voted for the ITRs but are either members of the OECD or FOC, whose other members overwhelmingly voted against the ITRs. These five states also supported previous commitments by both the OECD and FOC, namely the OECD Principles for Internet Policy-Making specifically referencing the global multi-stakeholder institutions of Internet governance and the FOC's specific focus on a free Internet (OECD 2011). As a result, they are swing states because their membership and commitments are at odds with their ITRs voting record, suggesting mixed political orientations. Moreover, they are likely to experience significant pressure from their peers in the future to change their behaviour to be appropriate with their membership and commitments.

Potential Swing States Voting for the ITRs

Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Namibia, Panama, Singapore, South Africa and Uruguay are similar to the 13 aforementioned swing states voting against the ITRs in that they are not part of any of the group of states identified in phase one. However, unlike those 13 countries, these 12 states voted for the ITRs. They are potential swing states because several of the 12 indicators show the importance of the Internet for those countries and various characteristics of these states suggest that there are opportunities to engage with them to potentially change their behaviour in the future.

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this paper is to give practitioners and scholars alike a resource to compare their current priorities and efforts with our data and findings. Ideally, this study strengthens existing assessments, helps identify potential gaps and points to previously hidden questions. We hope that the list of the top 30 global swing states is useful for representatives of governments, businesses and civil society organizations who have been engaged in this topic and are planning their future activities, particularly in light of the WSIS+10 process and the transition of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority function by 2015.

It is clear that swing states are not only important in UN settings subject to the one country, one vote rule. The Internet governance debate is embedded

in a larger systemic shift in international relations transitioning from the unipolar moment of the 1990s to a more multipolar world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Brazil and India are only two of the countries that have attracted greater attention in the context of this debate over the future of the liberal world order (Ikenberry 2011). Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Ghana and Malaysia are others on this list. Their behaviour will shape what norms and institutions will govern various aspects of international relations in the future, including the Internet.

Our findings confirm some of the previous assessments of which countries constitute swing states in the Internet governance debate. While it is not surprising to find IBSA in the top 30, other details raise some interesting questions. For example, why did Belarus vote against the ITRs? And why did Brazil vote for the ITRs in spite of a vibrant civil society focused on this topic? What will determine if the 12 potential swing states change their behaviour in future Internet governance debates? And will peer pressure from other members of the OECD and FOC influence the mixed political orientation of Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, Ghana and Tunisia? If not, what factors will be more dominant?

Internet governance is not the only policy field where these dynamics exist and where swing states play an important role. Cyber security has been the subject of a similarly intense debate. Swing states will therefore have a significant diplomatic impact across a range of issue areas. In part, this debate is about political symbolism, for example, the Global South and Global North. It is also about specific demands or problems countries face. Future research may shed more light on these variables, including in-depth studies of actors at the subnational level and their transnational interactions.

A final note on methodology: this text attempts to make it easy for the reader to follow the process that led to the identification of the top 30 global swing states. While the step-by-step outline makes it easier to understand, the research process itself was more complex and included several iterative steps of examining certain patterns, running controls and discarding alternative hypotheses. One shortcoming of this study is that the indicators are static and do not show trends. This merits further research. The indicators-based analysis also underestimates the role individuals play in these policy debates and the relationships and networks among people that are often a decisive factor in a state's foreign policy. These individuals tend to rotate among jobs and a state's position can, therefore, change within the span of a few years depending on the individual's stature within his or her government. This is an additional important aspect that requires further study.

Previous efforts to create indexes and rankings have shown how difficult they are to develop and how easy it is to criticize them (as our own Annex III partly demonstrates). Our effort to identify potential swing states is no exception and includes several shortcomings and important caveats. One of the few means to address this reality is to be as transparent as possible regarding data collection (both in terms of selection and elimination), data analysis, underlying assumptions and conclusions. We have therefore tried to make our assumptions and rationale as explicit as possible. Moreover, we consider this paper to be only a piece of the broader research debate on this topic, not the end. Other scholars will, it is hoped, engage in similar exercises, selecting other indicators and drawing independent conclusions that will help advance this effort further.

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ANNEX I: IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SWING STATES

	COUNTRY	WCIT	LDC	OECD	EU	2 million	Not Free	Authoritarian	Not Free + Authoritarian
1	Afghanistan	1	1				1	1	2
2	Albania	0							
3	Algeria	1					1	1	2
4	Andorra	0				1			
5	Angola	1	1				1	1	2
6	Antigua and Barbuda					1			
7	Argentina	1							
8	Armenia	0							
9	Australia	0		1					
10	Austria	0		1	1				
11	Azerbaijan	1					1	1	2
12	Bahamas					1			
13	Bahrain	1				1	1	1	2
14	Bangladesh	1	1						
15	Barbados	1				1			
16	Belarus*	0					1	1	2
17	Belgium	0		1	1				
18	Belize	1				1			
19	Benin	1	1						
20	Bhutan	1	1			1			
21	Bolivia								
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina								
23	Botswana	1							
24	Brazil	1							
25	Brunei Darussalam	1				1	1	1	2
26	Bulgaria	0			1				
27	Burkina Faso	1	1					1	1
28	Burundi	1	1					1	1
29	Cambodia	1	1				1		1
30	Cameroon						1	1	2
31	Canada	0		1					
32	Cape Verde	1				1			
33	Central African Republic	1	1				1	1	2
34	Chad		1				1	1	2
35	Chile	0		1					
36	China	1					1	1	2
37	Colombia	0							
38	Comoros	1	1			1		1	1
39	Congo, Democratic Republic of the		1				1	1	2
40	Congo, Republic of the	1					1	1	2
41	Costa Rica	0							
42	Côte d'Ivoire	1						1	1

	COUNTRY	WCIT	LDC	OECD	EU	2 million	Not Free	Authoritarian	Not Free + Authoritarian
43	Croatia	0			1				
44	Cuba	1					1	1	2
45	Cyprus	0			1	1			
46	Czech Republic	0		1	1				
47	Denmark	0		1	1				
48	Djibouti	1	1			1	1	1	2
49	Dominica					1			
50	Dominican Republic	1							
51	Ecuador								
52	Egypt	1					1		1
53	El Salvador	1							
54	Equatorial Guinea		1			1	1	1	2
55	Eritrea		1				1	1	2
56	Estonia	0		1	1	1			
57	Ethiopia		1				1	1	2
58	Fiji					1		1	1
59	Finland	0		1	1				
60	France	0		1	1				
61	Gabon	1				1	1	1	2
62	Gambia	0	1			1	1	1	2
63	Georgia	0							
64	Germany	0		1	1				
65	Ghana	1							
66	Greece	0		1	1				
67	Grenada					1			
68	Guatemala	1							
69	Guinea		1					1	1
70	Guinea-Bissau		1			1	1	1	2
71	Guyana	1				1			
72	Haiti	1	1						
73	Honduras								
74	Hungary	0		1	1				
75	Iceland			1		1			
76	India	0							
77	Indonesia	1							
78	Iran	1					1	1	2
79	Iraq	1					1		1
80	Ireland	0		1	1				
81	Israel	0		1					
82	Italy	0		1	1				
83	Jamaica	1							
84	Japan	0		1					
85	Jordan	1					1	1	2

	COUNTRY	WCIT	LDC	OECD	EU	2 million	Not Free	Authoritarian	Not Free + Authoritarian
86	Kazakhstan	1					1	1	2
87	Kenya	0							
88	Kiribati		1			1			
89	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of						1	1	2
90	Korea, Republic of	1		1					
91	Kuwait	1						1	1
92	Kyrgyzstan	1							
93	Lao People's Democratic Republic		1				1	1	2
94	Latvia	0			1				
95	Lebanon	1							
96	Lesotho	1	1			1			
97	Liberia	1	1						
98	Libya	1							
99	Liechtenstein	0				1			
100	Lithuania	0			1				
101	Luxembourg	0		1	1	1			
102	Macedonia								
103	Madagascar		1					1	1
104	Malawi	0	1						
105	Malaysia	1							
106	Maldives					1			
107	Mali	1	1						
108	Malta	0			1	1			
109	Marshall Islands	0				1			
110	Mauritania		1						
111	Mauritius	1				1			
112	Mexico	1		1					
113	Micronesia					1			
114	Moldova	0							
115	Monaco					1			
116	Mongolia	0							
117	Montenegro	0				1			
118	Morocco	1							
119	Mozambique	1	1						
120	Myanmar		1				1	1	2
121	Namibia	1							
122	Nauru					1			
123	Nepal	1	1						
124	Netherlands	0		1	1				
125	New Zealand	0		1					
126	Nicaragua								
127	Niger	1	1						
128	Nigeria	1						1	1

	COUNTRY	WCIT	LDC	OECD	EU	2 million	Not Free	Authoritarian	Not Free + Authoritarian
129	Norway	0		1					
130	Oman	1					1	1	2
131	Pakistan								
132	Palau					1			
133	Panama	1							
134	Papua New Guinea	1							
135	Paraguay	1							
136	Peru	0							
137	Philippines	0							
138	Poland	0		1	1				
139	Portugal	0		1	1				
140	Qatar	1					1	1	2
141	Romania				1				
142	Russia	1					1	1	2
143	Rwanda	1	1				1	1	2
144	Saint Kitts and Nevis					1			
145	Saint Lucia	1				1			
146	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines					1			
147	Samoa					1			
148	San Marino					1			
149	Sao Tome and Principe		1			1			
150	Saudi Arabia	1					1	1	2
151	Senegal	1	1						
152	Serbia	0							
153	Seychelles					1			
154	Sierra Leone	1	1						
155	Singapore	1							
156	Slovakia	0		1	1				
157	Slovenia	0		1	1				
158	Solomon Islands		1						
159	Somalia	1	1				1	1	2
160	South Africa	1							
161	South Sudan	1	1				1		1
162	Spain	0		1	1				
163	Sri Lanka	1							
164	Sudan	1	1				1	1	2
165	Suriname					1			
166	Swaziland	1				1	1	1	2
167	Sweden	0		1	1				
168	Switzerland	0		1					
169	Syria						1	1	2
170	Tajikistan						1	1	2
171	Tanzania	1	1						

	COUNTRY	WCIT	LDC	OECD	EU	2 million	Not Free	Authoritarian	Not Free + Authoritarian
172	Thailand	1							
173	Timor Leste		1			1			
174	Togo	1	1					1	1
175	Tonga					1			
176	Trinidad and Tobago	1				1			
177	Tunisia	1							
178	Turkey	1		1					
179	Turkmenistan						1	1	2
180	Tuvalu		1			1			
181	Uganda	1	1						
182	Ukraine	1							
183	United Arab Emirates	1					1	1	2
184	United Kingdom	0		1	1				
185	United States	0		1					
186	Uruguay	1							
187	Uzbekistan	1					1	1	2
188	Vanuatu		1			1			
189	Venezuela	1							
190	Viet Nam	1					1	1	2
191	Yemen	1	1				1	1	2
192	Zambia		1						
193	Zimbabwe	1					1	1	2

ANNEX II: SIGNATORIES OF THE ITRs (89 STATES IN GREEN)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIE	ALGÉRIE	ALLEMAGNE	ANDORRE	ANGOLA	ARABIE SAOUDITE	ARGENTINE	ARMÉNIE	AUSTRALIE
AUTRICHE	AZERBAÏDJAN	BAHREÏN	BANGLADESH	BARBADE	BÉLARUS	BELGIQUE	BELIZE	BÉNIN	BHOUTAN
BOTSWANA	BRÉSIL	BRUNÉI DARUSSALAM	BULGARIE	BURKINA FASO	BURUNDI	CAMBODGE	CANADA	CAP-VERT	RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
CHILI	CHINE	CHYPRE	COLOMBIE	COMORES	RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO	RÉPUBLIQUE DE CORÉE	COSTA RICA	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	CROATIE
CUBA	DANEMARK	DJIBOUTI	RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE	EGYPTE	EL SALVADOR	EMIRATS ARABES UNIS	ESPAGNE	ESTONIE	ETATS-UNIS
FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE	FINLANDE	FRANCE	GABON	GAMBIE	GÉORGIE	GHANA	GRÈCE	GUATEMALA	GUYANA
HAÏTI	HONGRIE	INDE	INDONÉSIE	RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN	IRAQ	IRLANDE	ISRAËL	ITALIE	JAMAÏQUE
JAPON	JORDANIE	KAZAKHSTAN	KENYA	KOWEÏT	LESOTHO	LETTONIE	LIBAN	LIBÉRIA	LIBYE
LIECHTENSTEIN	LITUANIE	LUXEMBOURG	MALAISIE	MALAWI	MALI	MALTE	MAROC	ILES MARSHALL	MAURICE
MEXIQUE	MOLDOVA	MONGOLIE	MONTÉNÉGRO	MOZAMBIQUE	NAMIBIE	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGÉRIA	NORVÈGE
NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE	OMAN	OUGANDA	OUZBÉKISTAN	PANAMA	PAPOUASIE-NOUVELLE-GUINÉE	PARAGUAY	PAYS-BAS	PÉROU	PHILIPPINES
POLOGNE	PORTUGAL	QATAR	KIRGHIZISTAN	SLOVAQUIE	RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÈQUE	ROYAUME-UNI	RWANDA	SAINTE-LUCIE	SÉNÉGAL
SERBIE	SIERRA LEONE	SINGAPOUR	SLOVÉNIE	SOMALIE	SOUDAN	SOUDAN DU SUD	SRI LANKA	RÉPUBLIQUE SUDAFRICAINE	SUÈDE
SUISSE	SWAZILAND	TANZANIE	THAÏLANDE	TOGO	TRINITÉ-ET-TOBAGO	TUNISIE	TURQUIE	UKRAINE	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	VIET NAM	YÉMEN	ZIMBABWE						

Source: ITU (2012).

ANNEX III: INDICATORS INITIALLY CONSIDERED BUT ULTIMATELY DISCARDED

National Replies

National Replies refers to the submission of documents by UN member states in the context of the deliberations in the UN General Assembly's First Committee on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. This was initially considered as a potential indicator for active government interest in cyber policy, but was discarded in favour of membership in one of the three UN GGEs. We consider the latter to be a more accurate indicator because becoming a member of a GGE requires a more significant diplomatic effort and indicates active government interest in this policy area more directly.

Sponsors of UN resolutions

This variable examined the list of sponsors of the UN resolutions titled "Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security." Like National Replies, this indicator was initially considered as an indicator for active government interest in cyber policy, but was discarded in favour of the UN GGE membership variable for the same reasons as outlined above.

G20 Membership

The G20 is a group consisting of the world's 20 leading economies. This indicator was initially considered as an indicator assuming that a global leadership role will lead to indirect government interest in cyber policy as the latter continues to rise from low to high politics. This indicator was discarded because we ultimately decided that this link is too indirect to be meaningful for the research question underlying this study.

UN Security Council Membership (+/– 5 years)

The list of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council from the past five years and the next five years was initially considered as an indicator assuming that a global leadership role will lead to indirect government interest in cyber policy as the latter continues to rise from low to high politics. This indicator was discarded because we ultimately decided that this link is too indirect to be meaningful for the research question underlying this study.

Economist Intelligence Unit's Cyber Power Index

The Cyber Power Index is a model developed by The Economist measuring attributes of the cyber environment. This index was initially considered as an indicator of indirect government interest in cyber policy but was discarded because the countries were preselected based on G20 membership.

World Economic Forum: Network Readiness Index

The World Economic Forum's (WEF's) Networked Readiness Index measures the propensity for countries to use the opportunities offered by information and communications technology. The Network Readiness Index was initially considered as a potentially useful indicator. However, after a thorough review of the methodology it was found to be largely survey based and a lacked a clear description of the methodological approach for these surveys. We were therefore unable to scrutinize the methodology used and to assess the indicator's quality.

WEF: Use of Virtual Social Networks

This indicator is a component of the WEF's Network Readiness Index. It is based on polling asking "How widely used are virtual social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn) for professional and personal communications in your country? [1 = not used at all; 7 = used widely]." This indicator was initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual tech profile. It was discarded primarily because we were unable to find sufficient information about the method of surveying people and thus the method of compiling each individual country's rating. We were therefore unable to scrutinize the methodology used and to assess the indicator's quality.

WEF: Access to Digital Content

This indicator is a component of the WEF's Network Readiness Index. It is based on polling asking: "In your country, how accessible is digital content (e.g., text and audiovisual content, software products) via multiple platforms (e.g., fixed-line Internet, wireless Internet, mobile network, satellite)? [1 = not accessible at all; 7 = widely accessible]."This indicator was initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual tech profile. It was discarded primarily because we were unable to find sufficient information about the method of surveying people and thus the method of compiling each individual country's rating. We were therefore unable to scrutinize the methodology used and to assess the indicator's quality.

WEF: Capacity for Innovation

This indicator is a component of the WEF's Network Readiness Index. It is based on polling asking: "In your country, how do companies obtain technology? [1 = exclusively from licensing or imitating foreign companies; 7 = by conducting formal research and pioneering their own new products and processes]." This indicator was initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual economic tech profile. It was discarded primarily because we were unable to find sufficient information about the method of surveying people and thus the method of compiling each individual country's rating. We were therefore unable to scrutinize the methodology used and to assess the indicator's quality.

Web Index: Political Party Use of Web for Mobilization

This indicator is a component of the Web Foundation's Web Index. It is based on polling asking: "To what extent do political parties use the Web to mobilize members or other citizens to take action, such as attend a political rally or vote?" We were unable to scrutinize the methodology used in detail and to assess the indicator's quality. We therefore did not use data based on the Web Index.

BTI Status Score

The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) analyzes and evaluates whether and how developing countries and countries in transition are steering social change toward democracy and a market economy. We initially considered the index itself as an indicator but opted to use specific indicators of the index that were more specific and relevant for our research question instead. In order to not double count certain indicators, we eliminated the overall index.

BTI: Interest Groups

For this BTI indicator, experts rate "interest groups" on a 1–10 scale. This indicator was initially considered as a proxy for a state's propensity to cooperate internationally. It was ultimately discarded on the basis that "government as a credible partner" is a better indicator of a country's propensity to cooperate internationally.

BTI: CSO Traditions

In this BTI indicator, experts rate "Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Traditions" on a 1–10 scale. We consider civil society participation, which is part of the 12 indicators selected to identify the top 30 potential swing states, to be a better indicator of the civil society environment overall than CSO Traditions. We therefore discarded the latter.

US Agency for International Development: USAID NGO Index — NGO Sustainability

The USAID NGO Index measures the sustainability of each country's CSO sector based on seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure and public image. The data is based on regions, but did not cover enough countries to provide additional meaningful information for this study.

Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom Index

The Press Freedom Index, published annually by Reporters Without Borders, measures the level of freedom of information in 179 countries. It is based partly on a questionnaire that is sent to a network of partner organizations, correspondents and journalists, researchers, jurists and human rights activists. Choosing among the various indexes relating to political systems and freedom, we selected the Freedom in the World index by Freedom House and the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit instead as more relevant indicators.

Freedom House: Freedom of the Net Index

The 2013 Freedom of the Net report ranks 60 countries based on the level of Internet and digital media freedom. It builds on the Freedom House index used in this paper but is limited to only 60 countries, which is why we did not include the Freedom of the Net Index in our methodology even though its focus more directly relates to the topic of this study.

World Bank: Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers

Fixed broadband Internet subscribers are the number of broadband subscribers with a digital subscriber line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology. Initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual tech profile, it was discarded in favour of Internet penetration rate. We consider the latter to be a more useful indicator for this study's research question and scope.

World Bank: International Internet Bandwidth

International Internet bandwidth (kb/s) per Internet user was initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual tech profile. We discarded this indicator because we consider Internet penetration rate to be a more relevant indicator of a country's tech profile.

World Bank: Mobile Phone Penetration Rates

Initially considered as an indicator of a country's individual tech profile, this indicator was discarded because Internet penetration rate was deemed a more relevant indicator of a country's Internet capacity. Mobile phone penetration rates also face the methodological challenge of individuals having multiple subscriptions and aggregate data to provide meaningful information.

World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators — Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including

politically motivated violence and terrorism. This table lists the individual variables from each data source used to construct this measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators. We initially considered these indicators as a component of a country's human capacity profile, but eliminated it along with all other human capacity profile indicators once we established that human capacity was not directly relevant for the research question.

US Census Bureau: Percentage of Population Aged 15–29

This indicator was eliminated with all other human capacity profile indicators once we established that human capacity was not directly relevant for the research question.

World Bank: Literacy Rate

The literacy rate is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, "literacy" also encompasses "numeracy," the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator was initially considered as a component of a country's human capacity profile, but was discarded because the data was insufficient, as it only covered a small portion of the states on the list, and we established that human capacity was not directly relevant for the research question.

Human Development Index

The first Human Development Report introduced a new way of measuring countries' development in addition to the traditional GDP indicators. It combines indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite human development index, the HDI. We ultimately decided that the HDI does not provide information directly relevant to the research question and therefore discarded it.

ANNEX IV: 38 POTENTIAL SWING STATES — RANKINGS

	I. International Cooperation	*II. Political System*		
	International Cooperation (BTI Q17)	**Democracy Index: Score**	**Freedom House Index (Free)**	**Effective Power to Govern (BTI Q2.2)**
1	Uruguay	Uruguay	Argentina	Uruguay
2	Brazil	Botswana	Botswana	Botswana
3	El Salvador	South Africa	Brazil	Namibia
4	Botswana	Jamaica	Dominican Republic	Brazil
5	Singapore	Brazil	El Salvador	El Salvador
6	Ghana	Panama	Ghana	Ghana
7	Malaysia	Argentina	Jamaica	Dominican Republic
8	Indonesia	Indonesia	Namibia	Jamaica
9	Jamaica	Thailand	Panama	Panama
10	South Africa	Dominican Republic	South Africa	South Africa
11	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Uruguay	Macedonia
12	Panama	Malaysia		Bolivia
13	Nigeria	Papua New Guinea		Nicaragua
14	Honduras	Paraguay		Tunisia
15	Namibia	Namibia		Argentina
16	Macedonia	Macedonia		Bosnia and H.
17	Paraguay	Ghana		Ecuador
18	Guatemala	Ukraine		Indonesia
19	Kuwait	Singapore		Honduras
20	Kyrgyzstan	Guatemala		Paraguay
21	Sri Lanka	Honduras		Egypt
22	Bolivia	Bolivia		Nigeria
23	Morocco	Ecuador		Côte d'Ivoire
24	Côte d'Ivoire	Sri Lanka		Ukraine
25	Argentina	Tunisia		Guatemala
26	Lebanon	Nicaragua		Kyrgyzstan
27	Tunisia	Libya		Lebanon
28	Libya	Venezuela		Thailand
29	Egypt	Bosnia and H.		Papua New Guinea
30	Ukraine	Lebanon		Iraq
31	Papua New Guinea	Kyrgyzstan		Libya
32	Ecuador	Pakistan		Sri Lanka
33	Thailand	Egypt		Malaysia
34	Nicaragua	Iraq		Singapore
35	Iraq	Morocco		Morocco
36	Bosnia and H.	Kuwait		Kuwait
37	Pakistan	Nigeria		Pakistan
38	Venezuela	Côte d'Ivoire		Venezuela

	III. Civil Society Profile		*IV. Internet Access*
	Civicus Enabling Environment Index	**Civil Society Participation (BTI Q16.4)**	**Internet Penetration Rate (users per 100 people)**
			Threshold: over 1/3
1	Uruguay	Uruguay	Kuwait
2	Argentina	Brazil	Singapore
3	Brazil	Bolivia	Malaysia
4	South Africa	Botswana	Bosnia and H.
5	Botswana	El Salvador	Macedonia
6	Panama	Ghana	Lebanon
7	El Salvador	Indonesia	Argentina
8	Ghana	Kyrgyzstan	Uruguay
9	Ukraine	Jamaica	Morocco
10	Macedonia	South Africa	Brazil
11	Guatemala	Macedonia	Jamaica
12	Namibia	Argentina	Panama
13	Bolivia	Honduras	Dominican Republic
14	Bosnia and H.	Paraguay	Egypt
15	Indonesia	Lebanon	Venezuela
16	Dominican Republic	Namibia	Tunisia
17	Thailand	Tunisia	South Africa
18	Malaysia	Bosnia and H.	Ecuador
19	Ecuador	Ecuador	Bolivia
20	Honduras	Guatemala	Ukraine
21	Nicaragua	Thailand	
22	Kyrgyzstan	Libya	
23	Venezuela	Malaysia	
24	Morocco	Singapore	
25	Iraq	Morocco	
26	Egypt	Kuwait	
27	Nigeria	Dominican Republic	
28		Panama	
29		Nicaragua	
30		Egypt	
31		Nigeria	
32		Côte d'Ivoire	
33		Ukraine	
34		Papua New Guinea	
35		Iraq	
36		Sri Lanka	
37		Pakistan	
38		Venezuela	

	V. Tech Economy		
	ICT Goods exports (as a % of total)	**ICT Services Exports (as a % of total)**	**ICT Goods imports (as a % of total)**
	Threshold: over 1%	*Threshold: over 10%*	*Threshold: over 5%*
1	Singapore	Lebanon	Singapore
2	Malaysia	Brazil	Malaysia
3	Thailand	Argentina	Paraguay
4	Panama	Botswana	Thailand
5	Tunisia	Indonesia	Brazil
6	Indonesia	Kuwait	Argentina
7	Morocco	Malaysia	Panama
8	Ukraine	Namibia	South Africa
9	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Indonesia
10		Macedonia	Tunisia
11		Singapore	Ecuador
12		Guatemala	Venezuela
13		Morocco	Guatemala
14		Pakistan	Uruguay
15		Ukraine	Nigeria
16		Nicaragua	El Salvador
17		Thailand	Honduras
18		Kyrgyzstan	
19		Uruguay	
20		Iraq	
21		Venezuela	
22		Bolivia	
23		El Salvador	
24		Honduras	
25		South Africa	
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	VI. Active Government Interest		**Swing states in alphabetical order: aggregate occurrences in top 15 of 12 selected indicators**		**Swing states ranked based on aggregate occurrences in top 15 of 12 selected indicators**	
	WCIT participation**	**UN GGEs**				
1	Bolivia	Argentina	Argentina	10	**Brazil**	11
2	Bosnia and H.	Brazil	Bolivia	2	**Argentina**	10
3	Ecuador	Egypt	Bosnia and H.	2	**South Africa**	10
4	Honduras	Indonesia	Botswana	8	**Panama**	9
5	Macedonia	Malaysia	Brazil	11	**Uruguay**	9
6	Nicaragua	South Africa	Cote d'Ivoire	1	**Botswana**	8
7	Pakistan		Dominican Republic	6	**Indonesia**	8
8			Ecuador	1	El Salvador***	7
9			Egypt	3	**Jamaica**	7
10			El Salvador***	7	**Malaysia**	7
11			Ghana	6	**Namibia**	7
12			Guatemala	4	**Dominican Republic**	6
13			Honduras	2	**Ghana**	6
14			Indonesia	8	**Singapore**	6
15			Iraq	1	Macedonia	5
16			Jamaica	7	Guatemala	4
17			Kuwait	3	Lebanon	4
18			Kyrgyzstan	2	Morocco	4
19			Lebanon	4	Paraguay	4
20			Libya	1	Thailand	4
21			Macedonia	5	Tunisia	4
22			Malaysia	7	Ukraine	4
23			Morocco	4	Egypt	3
24			Namibia	7	Kuwait	3
25			Nicaragua	1	Nigeria	3
26			Nigeria	3	Venezuela	3
27			Pakistan	1	Bolivia	2
28			Panama	9	Bosnia and H.	2
29			Papua New Guinea	2	Honduras	2
30			Paraguay	4	Kyrgyzstan	2
31			Singapore	6	Papua New Guinea	2
32			South Africa	10	Sri Lanka	2
33			Sri Lanka	2	Cote d'Ivoire	1
34			Thailand	4	Ecuador	1
35			Tunisia	4	Iraq	1
36			Ukraine	4	Libya	1
37			Uruguay	9	Nicaragua	1
38			Venezuela	3	Pakistan	1

** The countries listed in this column do not appear in the ITU's WCIT outcome table (see Annex II) indicating a lack of active government interest incorporated accordingly in the overall weighting.
*** El Salvador is not included in the top 30 potential swing states list because it only appears in the top 15 of non-Internet policy specific indicators except for WCIT participation.

ANNEX V: 38 POTENTIAL SWING STATES — DATA

		I. International Cooperation	*II. Political System*		
	Country	**International Cooperation (BTI Q17)**	**Democracy Index: Score**	**Freedom House Index (Free)**	**Effective Power to Govern (BTI Q2.2)**
1	Argentina	6.0	6.84	1	8
2	Bolivia	6.3	5.84		8
3	Bosnia and H.	5.3	5.11		8
4	Botswana	9.0	7.85	1	10
5	Brazil	10.0	7.12	1	9
6	Côte d'Ivoire	6.3	3.25		6
7	Dominican Republic	8.0	6.49	1	9
8	Ecuador	5.7	5.78		8
9	Egypt	6.0	4.56		7
10	El Salvador	9.7	6.47	1	9
11	Ghana	8.7	6.02	1	9
12	Guatemala	7.0	5.88		5
13	Honduras	7.7	5.84		7
14	Indonesia	8.3	6.76		7
15	Iraq	5.7	4.1		4
16	Jamaica	8.3	7.39	1	9
17	Kuwait	7.0	3.78		2
18	Kyrgyzstan	6.7	4.69		5
19	Lebanon	6.0	5.05		4
20	Libya	6.0	5.15		3
21	Macedonia	7.3	6.16		8
22	Malaysia	8.7	6.41		2
23	Morocco	6.3	4.07		2
24	Namibia	7.7	6.24	1	10
25	Nicaragua	5.7	5.56		8
26	Nigeria	8.0	3.77		6
27	Pakistan	4.0	4.57		2
28	Panama	8.0	7.08	1	9
29	Papua New Guinea	6.0	6.32		4
30	Paraguay	7.0	6.26		7
31	Singapore	9.0	5.88		2
32	South Africa	8.0	7.79	1	8
33	Sri Lanka	6.7	5.75		3
34	Thailand	5.7	6.55		4
35	Tunisia	6.0	5.67		8
36	Ukraine	6.0	5.91		6
37	Uruguay	10.0	8.17	1	10
38	Venezuela	3.3	5.15		2

		III. Civil Society Profile		*IV. Internet Access*
	Country	**Civicus Enabling Environment Index**	**Civil Society Participation (BTI Q16.4)**	**Internet Penetration Rate (users per 100 people)**
1	Argentina	0.61	6	55.8
2	Bolivia	0.52	8	34.2
3	Bosnia and H.	0.52	5	65.4
4	Botswana	0.58	7	11.5
5	Brazil	0.59	9	49.8
6	Côte d'Ivoire		4	2.4
7	Dominican Republic	0.51	4	45.0
8	Ecuador	0.48	5	35.1
9	Egypt	0.4	4	44.1
10	El Salvador	0.56	7	25.5
11	Ghana	0.56	7	17.1
12	Guatemala	0.54	5	16.0
13	Honduras	0.45	6	18.1
14	Indonesia	0.52	7	15.4
15	Iraq	0.4	4	7.1
16	Jamaica		6	46.5
17	Kuwait		5	79.2
18	Kyrgyzstan	0.43	7	21.7
19	Lebanon		6	61.2
20	Libya		5	14.0*
21	Macedonia	0.55	6	63.1
22	Malaysia	0.5	5	65.8
23	Morocco	0.41	5	55.0
24	Namibia	0.53	5	12.9
25	Nicaragua	0.44	4	13.5
26	Nigeria	0.38	4	32.9
27	Pakistan		3	10.0
28	Panama	0.57	4	45.2
29	Papua New Guinea		4	2.3
30	Paraguay		6	27.1
31	Singapore		5	74.2
32	South Africa	0.59	6	41.0
33	Sri Lanka		3	18.3
34	Thailand	0.5	5	26.5
35	Tunisia		5	41.4
36	Ukraine	0.56	4	33.7
37	Uruguay	0.73	10	55.1
38	Venezuela	0.43	3	44.0

* All information is based on 2012 data except for information marked with a "*," which is based on 2011 data because no 2012 data was available for this country.

V. Tech Economy					*VI. Active Government Interest*		
	Country	**ICT Goods Imports (as a % of total)**	**ICT Services Exports (as a % of total)**	**ICT Goods Imports (as a % of total)**	**WCIT Participation**	**UN GGEs**	**Freedom Online Coalition**
1	Argentina	0.10	46.01	8.29	1	1	
2	Bolivia	0.00	11.79	3.24			
3	Bosnia	0.19	5.55	2.68			
4	Botswana	0.19	40.89	2.45	1		
5	Brazil	0.55	55.75	8.82	1	1	
6	Côte d'Ivoire	0.05*		3.08*	1		
7	Dominican Republic	0.93	4.35	3.24	1		
8	Ecuador	0.07		6.43			
9	Egypt	0.24	7.28	3.43	1	1	
10	El Salvador	0.37	11.47	5.01	1		
11	Ghana	0.05		4.42	1		1
12	Guatemala	0.32	21.88	5.65	1		
13	Honduras	0.29	11.19	5.00			
14	Indonesia	4.06	38.23	7.08	1	1	
15	Iraq		11.97		1		
16	Jamaica	0.39	9.45	2.50	1		
17	Kuwait		34.46		1		
18	Kyrgyzstan	0.08	15.90	2.34	1		
19	Lebanon	0.65	56.76	2.18	1		
20	Libya				1		
21	Macedonia	0.31	23.99	4.01			
22	Malaysia	27.92	27.86	23.09	1	1	
23	Morocco	3.08	21.80	3.51	1		
24	Namibia	0.65	26.99*	3.10	1		
25	Nicaragua	0.18	18.65	4.13			
26	Nigeria	0.00	4.39	5.54	1		
27	Pakistan	0.24	20.06	4.36			
28	Panama	7.87*	8.08	8.08*	1		
29	Papua New Guinea	0.01		2.21	1		
30	Paraguay	0.09	1.94	19.11	1		
31	Singapore	28.40	23.96	23.41	1		
32	South Africa	1.05	10.56	7.64	1	1	
33	Sri Lanka	0.50	24.62	3.72	1		
34	Thailand	16.04	16.19	11.82	1		
35	Tunisia	7.38*	9.56	6.63*	1		1
36	Ukraine	1.10	19.21	3.77	1		
37	Uruguay	0.09	15.87	5.64	1		
38	Venezuela	0.01*	11.91	6.39*	1		

* All information is based on 2012 data except for information marked with a "*," which is based on 2011 data because no 2012 data was available for this country.

ABOUT CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI's interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

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CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l'appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l'Ontario.

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