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WORKING PAPER

Re-Shaping Diplomacy

Stretching the Model of “Coalitions of the Willing”

ANDREW F. COOPER

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
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Dr. Andrew F. Cooper is the Associate Director of The Centre for International Governance Innovation and a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, where he teaches in the areas of International Political Economy, Comparative and Canadian Foreign Policy, and Global Governance and the Practice of Diplomacy. He holds a Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford University, and has been a Visiting Professor at Harvard University, Australian National University, and Stellenbosch University in South Africa. He has authored and collaborated on a number of articles concerning diplomatic innovation, comparative foreign policy, and governance in a wide number of journals including *International Organization*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Washington Quarterly*, *International Studies Perspectives*, *Political Science Quarterly*, and *Third World Quarterly*. His most recent books include as author, *Tests of Global Governance: Canadian Diplomacy and United Nations World Conferences* (United Nations University Press, 2004), and as co-editor with John English and Ramesh Thakur, *International Commissions and the Power of Ideas and Reforming from the Top: A Leader's 20 Summit* (both from UNUP 2005).

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Abstract

Two models may be drawn up of coalitions of the willing. The first model is epitomized by the group of countries assembled by the United States for the mobilization of the 2003 Iraq war. The second model is the form of coalition associated with the anti-personnel landmines campaign and the initiative on the International Criminal Court in the mid to late 1990s. This paper will explore the relationship between these different types of coalitions. The former type is characterized by a top-down, state-centric, and coerced/opportunistic strategic form. The latter type by way of contrast takes a bottom-up, voluntary, mixed actor, diplomatic approach. Yet, along side these differences are some striking, but unanticipated similarities. Most dramatically, both types have been assembled on an intense stylistic basis with an eye to avoiding the frustrations associated with working via established institutions. By looking more closely at the external expression and inner workings of these modes of activity, the model of coalitions of the willing is stretched out in terms of their motivations, sense of ownership, and future trajectory.

1. Introduction

Wars are best fought by coalitions of the willing... The mission must determine the coalition”.¹

“To have real impact...means using new methods...to co-opt, not coerce; the power that comes when "coalitions of the willing" form around shared goals and mobilize support across the international community”.²

Coalitions of the willing have become commonly linked with the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. Indeed a good deal of the invasion led by the United States (US) was constructed and justified through the use of this mechanism. As evoked by President George W. Bush, when he spoke at a news conference just prior to the November 2002 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Prague, a marker was set between those ready to join in this campaign and those unwilling to do so. Choices had to be made by all nations as to “whether or not they want to participate.”³

What appears to be a new and exceptional mode of activity can be found, however, to have a far more complex trajectory. The move to locate coalitions of the willing at the core of US strategic doctrine, far from being a sudden and novel response to the exigencies of the moment, may be viewed as an outgrowth of the earlier crises in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo. Even more dramatically, the sense of exclusivity in terms of ownership for this model can be contested. At odds with the familiarity of its tight association with the foreign policy of the dominant global power, coalitions of the willing have an expanded identification as well with an alternative set of projects, ones based on extending a rules-based regulatory system via the introduction of innovative governance practices. Through this alternative

¹ Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, *Annual report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC, 15 August 2002, available online at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/>>.

² Lloyd Axworthy, *Address by the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs [Canada], to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights*, Geneva, Switzerland, 30 March 1998.

³ Jeffrey Donovan, “NATO: Transcript of RFE/RL’s Exclusive Interview with US President Bush,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 18 Nov 2002, available online at <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/19112002091308.asp>>; CNN, “Bush: Join ‘coalition of willing’,” *CNN.com/World*, 20 Nov 2002, available online at <<http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/>>.

format the model of coalitions of the willing is stretched beyond the Iraq invasion to those generated on a diffuse set of issues, most notably in connection with the campaign to prohibit anti-personnel landmines (through the so-called Ottawa Treaty of 1997) and the establishment of the International Criminal Court or ICC (via the Rome Statute of 1998).

At one level, the purpose of this paper is to simply trace the different models and meanings of coalitions of the willing. Although utilizing the same phrase or expression, the dynamics intrinsic to these models are exhibited in highly variant ways and offer divergent insights about how core elements of world politics interact. At another level, the argument is made that notwithstanding the distinctions between the two basic models of coalitions of the willing, they do not exist in solitude from one another. On the contrary, there is a good deal of interaction and blurring with respect to timing, styling and even some elements of substance. Finally, there is some examination of the presence of internal distinctions within the two types of coalitions of the willing. Instead of being cast in a rigid, one-size fits all fashion, both of the models allow for considerable variation in terms of their inner workings as well as external expression.

2. Towards a Typology of Coalitions of the Willing

The fundamental question posed concerning both models of coalitions of the willing (for the sake of convenience simply termed model one and model two) relates to how, why, with whom and under what conditions they have performed in practice. This exploration allows for a series of snapshots about the nature and extent of the distinctions between the two models.

The first and perhaps the most manifest difference between the two renditions of the coalitions of the willing relates to the contrasting means of organization. Consistent with a longer pattern of mobilization the overarching feature of the model one type of coalition of is its top-down, hierarchical and asymmetrical framework. The emphasis is tilted strongly – to use the phrase effectively promoted by Richard Haass – toward the sheriff not the posse.⁴ The primacy of the US is

⁴ Richard N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997).

privileged to the extent that the paramount trait of the coalition is taken to be not the coalitional aspect per se, but rather that of US leadership.

Situated in this version of a hub and spoke matrix the US as the central pivot is accorded full power of agency with an enormous amount of autonomy provided for its commitments and capabilities. One fundamental issue that can be connected to this theme (although its detailed exploration lies beyond the scope of this work) relates to the way this approach differs from and/or complements US unilateralism. Does a move towards a top-down coalition of the willing indicate a move from alliance leader (with a need for some sensibility to genuine if asymmetric partners) to an imperial project (with subalterns)?⁵ Or alternatively does this shift reflect an anxiety on the part of the US with over-stretch that has translated into a move towards shifting some of the burdens to others?⁶ From another angle, does this approach reflect a concern with instrumental delivery or with symbolic legitimacy? Is the emphasis on burden-sharing or on deflecting criticism concerning from widespread perception throughout the international community of the Iraq war as an illegal action?⁷

Regarded as spokes the coalition members for the most part have been relegated to background structure in a community of unequals. The United Kingdom (UK) through the robust efforts of Prime Minister Tony Blair in championing the model one type strove for a higher status as the US's first follower.⁸ So did Australia on a regional basis. Yet there were risks as well as advantages to buying into this coalitional model. The image of an "Anglo-sphere" was hardly attractive to those with memories of colonial domination. Prime Minister Howard constantly had to

⁵ G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2002): 44-60; Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Ignatieff, "The American Empire: The Burden," *New York Times*, 5 Jan 2003: 53-4.

⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, "The High and the Mighty: Bush's National Security Strategy and the New American Hubris," *The American Prospect*, vol. 13, no. 24 (Jan 2003); Sebastian Mallaby, "The Reluctant Imperialist," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002): 2-7; Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (London: Time Warner, 2002).

⁷ Guy Dinmore, "Ideologues reshape world over breakfast," *Financial Times* [London], 22 March 2003; John O'Sullivan, "The End of Unilateralism," *National Review*, 22 March 2004.

⁸ The International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA), *Coalitions with the US: Maximising the UK's Influence in the Formation and Conduct of Future Coalition Operations*, 1999, available online at <<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/orgs/icsa/Old/co-findings.html>>.

fend off charges by some Southeast Asian states – above all by Indonesia – that Australia was acting as the US’s deputy sheriff within the Asia-Pacific region.⁹

Consistent with the US-led tenor of this model, the main work of rounding up the coalition of the willing was restricted to Americans above all the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle, the Chair of the Defense Policy Board. The vocabulary used in this mobilization effort was culturally rooted within a highly US-centric linguistic tradition, as exemplified by the reliance on such concepts as sheriff and posse.¹⁰ When a large group of British Labour MPs rebelled against their own government’s decision to go to war in March 2003 Rumsfeld did not send a signal of support to the government of its key ally, but rather the message that the US was prepared to fight without the UK. The fixed image of this model one format of coalitions of the willing was one in which the membership was an extension of the US with little consideration of any political or cultural attributes that might promote contrasts as opposed to compatibility in outlook and expectations.

The stark distinction in the type of self-reference and public commentary deemed appropriate for the leader as opposed to the larger membership in the coalition of the willing accents the top-down nature of model one. Every detail of US thinking and operational activity received close scrutiny. By way of contrast, the wider array of followers (or posse members) was systematically relegated to being names and numbers on various lists compiled about who belonged to the coalition, such as the Vilnius Eight or the Letter of Ten of Central/Eastern European countries waiting in line to join the Western Alliance. Cases in which countries escaped this group categorization were rare, the most obvious illustration being the special role accorded to Turkey. Though even in this latter case, the country was eventually treated with less sensitivity than might have been expected, had it been authentically deemed to be a core ally.¹¹

⁹ Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), “Australia plays down US president’s ‘sheriff’ remarks,” *Radio A*, 17 Oct 2003.

¹⁰ On the importance of the linguistic connection to diplomacy, see Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” *Millennium; Journal of International Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 627-651.

¹¹ Paul D. Wolfowitz, *Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz Interview with CNN*, 6 May 2003, available online at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030506-depsecdef0156.html>>.

Model two or the alternative formulation for building coalitions of the willing has a markedly different orientation. In contrast to the tight hierarchical contours of the model one version, the mobilization of initiatives such as the landmines campaign and the establishment of the ICC, as well as the campaign against the use of child soldiers and small arms and the formation of the Kimberley process on blood/conflict diamonds all operated as fluid networks with a bottom-up impetus in the international system. Although participation took place on a self-selective basis, the focus in this second model has tended to shift towards the collective and not to the individual members. More specifically, this coalitional model was viewed as a variant of a new form of complex and catalytic multilateralism.¹² While the diplomatic efforts of individual actors (whether through the high-profile agency of middle powers or individual diplomatic personnel through the use of expertise and reputation) was not overlooked, the main thrust of attention remained on the process of group interaction. As opposed to the command and control structure featured in model one, scrutiny of model two honed in on questions pertaining to issue-specific leadership, task distribution, the ability (or inability) to rotate functional responsibility, and the degree to which institutionalization (most notably, through the establishment in 1999 of the so-called Lysøen Group composed of eleven states and nine nongovernmental organizations NGOs) took place.

Highlighting the networking component of this second type of coalition does not automatically lead to suggestions of a flat structure. In each of the major case studies, whether it is the campaigns on landmines, the ICC, or any of the other illustrations mentioned above, a jockeying for stratified positions took place amongst the participants. If it made little difference to the overall campaign whether the location of a meeting or the signing of an agreement/convention was Oslo/Lysøen, Ottawa, Canberra, Vienna, Stockholm or other sites in a wide number of secondary states, it mattered a great deal to the individual actors involved. Nor, was the tendency simply to list membership (whatever the degree of commitment)

¹² Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 147-165; Fanny Bendetti and John L. Washburn, "Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference," *Global Governance*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 1999): 1-38; See also Robert W. Cox, "An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century," *Global Governance*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Jan-Apr 1997): 103-16; Michael G. Schechter, ed., *Innovation in Multilateralism* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Robert O'Brien, et al., *Contesting Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

avoided. To give one demonstration, the War Child Landmine Project drew up a list of “Good Nations”, who supported the call for a comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel landmines. Paralleling the US-led initiative such dichotomizing introduced a measure of “with us or against us” to the campaign. Kudos for those on side with the campaigns was accompanied by “naming and shaming” those off side, as exemplified by the appearance of a corresponding “Bad List” on land mines, a “Watch List” on children in armed conflict, and the so-called “Foul Report” on conflict diamonds (a play on the name of the main author of the report, Robert Fowler, Canada’s then Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations UN).

A second major axis of difference extends across the motivations for coalition membership. Power stood at the core of the motivations for the joiners of model one coalitions. The main question was what sort of power? To many of its keenest advocates, the joiners bought into the concept of coalitions of the willing because of the attractions of soft power associated with the US and the western alliance and connected with the power of ideas and the pattern of socialization.¹³ The willingness of the Central/Eastern European countries to jump on board, even when they had to openly disagree with France and Germany in doing so, especially stoked this argument. To its detractors, this argument smacked of either hypocrisy or delusion. Playing up the benefits of regime-change in terms of values, whether through the limitations placed on the role of authoritarian states, or respect for individual and collective rights, merely disguised the role of structural determinants related to economic and military power. States joined in not as part of a genuine search for a new just order, but because of the fear of disciplinary pressure and/or the pull of tangible benefits. Through one lens, coalitions of the willing then become transformed into coalitions of the coerced. Through another lens, they become coalitions of the bribed. In either case, the image was one of opportunism in which followership became linked not only to moral commitment or participation in a collective identity, but to a clear set of interest-based quid quo pros whether by omission (avoiding punishment through retaliatory action) or commission (gaining some material advantage through side-payments).¹⁴

¹³ Richard N. Haass, “Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities,” Remarks by Ambassador Richard Haass, Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Centre for International Studies at Georgetown University, Washington DC. 14 January 2003.

¹⁴ William D. Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, “Buying a Coalition,” *The Nation*, 17 March 2003; Jim Krane, “Coalition partners seek payback for their support,” *Associated Press*, 27 Sept 2003; Phyllis Bennis, et al. “IPS Releases Report on U.S. Arm-twisting Over Iraq War” (News Release), Institute for Policy Studies, 26 Feb 2003, available online at <<http://www.ips-dc.org/coalition.htm>>.

Model two shifts the bias away from structural or situational imperatives to the non-material incentives for voluntarism. Rather than constraints, the lure and expectation that the membership of this type of coalition could make a difference in terms of normative and institutional development (at least on a single issue) served as the trigger for activity. The landmines campaign and the other initiatives were all attractively wrapped in a cloak of good international citizenship, with a focus on the creation of transnational regimes to regulate or judicialize activity. While such claims allowed these alternative coalitions of the willing to both get off the ground and build support from a wide range of participants, it must be cautioned that these benefits did not free this alternative model from some additional problematic baggage. With the promotion of norms came status seeking, as supposedly like-minded states vied with others to show off their credentials within the international system. Whatever the attraction of this appeal on the basis of good international citizenship, moreover, the membership of this variant of coalitions of the willing lacked the clout to alter the preference of the larger actors in the international system. In none of the key case studies of bottom-up multilateralism was the coalition able to change the official mindset of the US. What is more, the US was joined by other major players in the adoption of a resistant stance in each of these cases. India, China, and Russia opposed the landmines treaty. China and Israel refused to accept the Rome Statute on the ICC.

The third axis along which the two types of coalitions of the willing split relates to the question of actorness. Model one remains resolutely state centric. The approach continues to privilege a framework of unitary states operating on the basis of their perceived interests with little need or appreciation of non-state actors. The pivotal points of decision-making revolve around a small cluster of political leaders namely President George W. Bush, Prime Ministers Tony Blair, John Howard or Silvio Berlusconi. The only exception in the case of the first model, arguably, is in regard to the intrusion of Halliburton (one of the world's largest management and service providers to the oil and gas industries), Bechtel Corporation (a leading multinational corporation in engineering, construction and project management) and other major American companies into the mix of the machinery of government. And even this military/industrial nexus showcases the inter-connection between the US political and economic elites, not the autonomous space carved out by firms themselves.

The actorness on display in the coalitional model two stretches these boundaries beyond recognition. At the state level, two features stand out. One is the name recognition established by a number of state officials: most notably through the landmines initiative, ranging from Lloyd Axworthy, the foreign minister of Canada to Ambassador Jacob Selebi, the head of the South African delegation who chaired the conclusive 1996 Oslo conference which produced the landmines draft treaty. The other is the sheer scope of participation. In addition to the amplified role of many established middle powers, including the Nordics, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, an extended group of activist states became involved. Of these countries the “new” South Africa stands out. Taking a cue from the classic middle power copybook, it played a huge role both on the landmines campaign and within the “Lifeline Nations”, a group of states advocating an independent court and independent prosecutor as opposed to an ICC under the control of the Security Council.

What provided the coalitional model two with its most distinctive brand, however, was not its extended associational pattern at the state level, but its innovative element of partnership between state and non-state actors. The networking style attendant to the alternative model of coalitions was quite distinct in its horizontal nature and open-endedness. The NGOs engaged with the campaigns on landmines and the ICC shared a coincidence of outlook with the middle powers at the head of these campaigns in terms of both means (a bias to moral arguments) and ends (an enhanced rules-based regulatory machinery). They could also blend their comparative advantages. Working with select “like-minded” state partners allowed NGOs greater access to decision-making bodies. Harnessing themselves to the NGOs in turn provided these same states not only with some additional sources of expertise, but also with a greater ability to mobilize public opinion through a reframed type of discourse and publicity production.

It was this fundamental division about actorness that has done the most to stretch the models of coalitional activity apart from each other. The US-led model one staked its claim to legitimacy on the willingness of individual sovereign states to join the coalition. Consequently, in operational terms this type of coalition took shape not only via extensive interaction at the apex of power, but through a web of contacts through foreign/ defense ministries. Leaders and ministers held joint press conferences and attended meetings to make significant decisions at various times

on Iraq. These vertical networks remained not only closed to non-state participation, but to revised assessments concerning the sources of danger on a global scale. Terrorism continued to be treated in state-based terms, whether in response to the Taliban, Saddam's Iraq, or other so-called "rogue" states.

Model two made a virtue of normative development in the promotion of global governance challenging some conditions of state sovereignty. Links between mixed state and non-state like-minded actors were honed and consolidated, whether through one central group (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines or ICBL) or multiple partners (diverse groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on the ICC). At the same time, deep inroads were also made into forging informal partnerships in some distinctive arenas of what can be termed the "un-likeminded". As a result of the well-known actions of Jody Williams, the Vietnam Veterans of America, and Senator Patrick Leahy, one of most dramatic elements of the landmines campaign was its penetration into the US political fabric at least at the nongovernmental and legislative level. A prominent group of retired US military officers was even persuaded to back this campaign, albeit not on normative grounds as a "scourge against humanity," but on the basis that these weapons were not necessary in military terms. Notwithstanding, because so much of the alternative coalitions of the willing was directed at and opposed at the US state level, a counter-movement of opposition was easily generated at the non-state level. "Poke in the eye" diplomacy directed at "Washington D.C." was not a characteristic exhibited exclusively by middle powers, but also by many prominent American citizens.

The fourth axis of differentiation between the two models is concerned with the triggers for mobilization. The coalitional model one was linked explicitly with the core priorities of the lead actor that pertained to its hard security agenda. They are driven by a conflation between national interest and a sense of crisis, extending from the attacks on September 11, 2001 to the targeting of weapons of mass destruction, and the build-up of "Operation Iraqi Freedom". The mobilization for the Iraq invasion put a heavy onus on a military doctrine of strategic flexibility and tactical maneuverability at the expense of overwhelming force (at least in terms of ground troops), long-term reconstruction planning, and an exit strategy. The alternative bottom-up coalitions were an outgrowth of both the relaxation of parameters of activity at the end of the Cold War and the concomitant ascendancy

with respect to an extended security agenda. Built into cases such as the campaign to ban landmines and the promotion of the ICC was a strong sense of voluntarism or niche-selection. The activist states, or for that matter the NGOs, taking the lead positions on these campaigns signified a considerable range of choice about the focus of their activity. They also had a longer trajectory to build support for their initiatives.¹⁵ The ICBL initiated its campaign in 1992 and drew inspiration from both visionary principles (the extension of humanitarian law) and practical purposes (the protection of development workers on the front lines of conflict zones). The initiative on the ICC came as a reaction to the deep flaws in the international system as exposed by the crimes and traumas associated with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The campaign pushed for an expansion of international norms to allow for a collective duty to prosecute in cases where individual states hid behind their sovereign rights.

3. Some Blurring of the Models

Identifying how the model of coalitions of the willing can be stretched according to this set of criteria is a valuable, but incomplete exercise. As will be discussed below, it neglects the nuances of internal differentiation within as well as between the two models. With reference to their external projection, this depiction overlooks the salience of the temporal condition. The impression that the dominant expression of coalitions of the willing originates exclusively from the 2003 Iraq war has to be reconsidered. A more accurate appraisal is that this model owes its creation to the reactions vis-à-vis two earlier crises. The first of these arises out of the 1991 Persian Gulf War in which the administration of President George H. Bush put together a broadly based coalition (variously calculated to be between twenty-eight to thirty-six states) to engage Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. In conformity with the coalitional model one, this earlier mobilization constituted a form of ad hoc coalition building led by the US. It also featured a blend of material inducements and threats of diplomatic/economic retaliation.

The obvious differences between the two cases, however, dim this sense of lineage. Unlike the 2003 Iraq coalition, the 1991 Persian Gulf coalition received

¹⁵ On this process more generally, see Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

support from the UN Security Council through a number of mechanisms, most decisively by Resolution 678 authorizing members to use “all necessary means” to remove Saddam’s forces from the territory of Kuwait. Through the declaratory image of the “New World Order”, Bush senior provided some positive vision by which the Gulf War coalition could coalesce. Abundant support, including some forms of participation at least by the mainstays of the 2003 “coalition of the unwilling” (Germany, France, Soviet Union/Russia) was thus obtained relatively easily.

The comprehensive prototype for the 2003 Iraq coalition of the willing was established through the US-led coalition’s response to the 1999 Kosovo crisis. In the same manner as Iraq, Kosovo blurred the picture between what could be deemed necessary from a humanitarian perspective and what was considered to be correct from the perspective of international law (as reflected in the Kosovo Commission’s distinction between illegal and legitimate actions). Consistent with the coalitional model as it was operationalized in 2003 (and unlike the 1991 Gulf war case) the Kosovo campaign constituted an end-run around the UN system, in that the NATO action (“Operation Allied Force”) received only retrospective endorsement from the Security Council. Kosovo just as crucially pointed to what should be avoided if this model of coalitions of the willing was to work again in the future. The frustrations generated by the NATO mode of operation in Kosovo, fighting “by committee”, fed into a push for a refinement of the coalition of the willing framework by the time of the 2003 Iraq invasion. That is to say, the constraints imposed by the need for consensus during Kosovo reinforced the perception of US strategic planners that the key to success in the future lay in their ability to free themselves from consultations, so they could concentrate on flexible and ad hoc mechanisms.¹⁶ The application of this lesson was voiced most forcefully in the statement by Donald Rumsfeld, the engineer if not the architect, of the US-led model one as it was stretched into shape through the rationale that the “mission must determine the coalition.”¹⁷ Yet, the main thrust of this strategic transformation, the notion that the US should avoid “talking shops” at times of crisis, was an echo of what General Wesley Clark had laid out during the Kosovo crisis.¹⁸

¹⁶ Richard Norton-Taylor, “A Lame Duck?” *The Guardian* [London], 22 May 2003; For the frustrations of some other NATO members, most notably France on US leadership on Kosovo, see Mark R. Brawley and Pierre Martin, *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

¹⁷ Rumsfeld, *Annual report to the President and Congress*.

¹⁸ Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

If the coalitional model one morphed out of the Kosovo intervention, the model two has had a far more diverse trajectory. The campaigns to ban child soldiers and the use of children in armed conflict, together with the initiative to implement a UN-sponsored regime for the certification and regulation of trade in rough diamonds, replicated many of the same compelling features associated with the land mines and ICC initiatives: a concerted push towards an extension of international humanitarian law, a mixed middle state and NGO coalition, and a robust public campaign. Yet, as in the model one, it is the variations as much as the commonalities that stand out. On the small arms case, the strength of the NGO coalition in favor of a new treaty instrument (encompassing disarmament and arms controls groups, development organizations, and humanitarian and human rights groups) has been countered by strong resistance from the very “unlike” non-state actor: the US gun lobby, led by the National Rifle Association. The campaign against child soldiers has focused attention on not only the need for a new regulatory framework in zones of conflict, but on practices in the militaries of the developed world (the recruitment by the US military of volunteers under the age of 16 and the treatment of child combatants by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan). The campaign against blood or conflict diamonds stretched the parameters of action in different directions. Unlike the cases of landmines and the ICC in which the business community did not play a distinct role, the initiative on diamonds was constrained by the severe initial tensions between the NGO community (led by Global Witness) and De Beers, the dominant firm in the global diamond market prior to the establishment of the tripartite working group known as the Kimberley process. Equally though by incorporating an explicit “name and shame” approach, the campaign on diamonds demonstrated the tendency of middle powers to co-opt tactics developed by NGOs to build momentum on this type of initiative.

Stepping beyond the internal dynamics of the two models of coalitions of the willing, some cases can be located where features associated with the US-led model one and alternative model two commingle. A number of UN authorized operations highlight the emergence of a hybrid model in which elements of both models are filtered into the mix. One illustration of this blending is the format developed in the Italian-led coalition of the willing in Albania.¹⁹ The 1999

¹⁹ Carlo Scognamiglio-Pasini, “Increasing Italy’s Output,” *NATO Review*, vol. 49, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 26-7, available online at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-07.htm>>.

Australian mobilization of the East Timor intervention also fits with this model.²⁰ So, even more contentiously, does the connection between the US-led coalition of the willing and the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with major contributions by countries such as Germany and Canada. In each of these cases, there is a strong theme of normative and institutional development, as well as status seeking as featured in the coalitional model two. Yet, in common with the model one approach, each of these initiatives depended on US leadership, resources and co-ordination.

The most striking trait of commonality, however, remains not in substance but in the manner in which they built impetus for their activities. Both types of coalitions owe a great deal of their existence and profile to a shared sense of impatience about how the international system works. From the perspective of the model one US-led type of coalitions, established institutions (even one as vital as NATO, never mind the UN) had to be circumvented. In the face of strenuous resistance, this effort did manage to mobilize the support of up to three-dozen states on Iraq (a force encompassing at the height of participation some 26,500 non-US troops). Sharing this “can do” attitude the model two coalitional type for its part made appeals directly to opinion leaders and the mass public avoiding the caution embedded in the more traditional diplomatic culture. If the time line for the mobilization of the landmines and ICC initiatives was far more extended than found in their model one counterparts, the burst of intensity at the end of the negotiating process was similar.

These characteristics imparted both coalitional models with a determined style that continued to be a common hallmark feature of their activities. Still, as boundary spanners both variants remained constantly in flux. On top of these problems of encouraging entry to the coalitions, multiple dilemmas have come into play concerning exit options as the risks of participation became accentuated. This exit scenario has come to the fore in the Iraq case. Spain, with the victory of Jose Luis Zapatero’s Socialist party, turned from being a steadfast deputy to the US (with 1300 troops in Iraq) to a member of the coalition of the unwilling with close

²⁰ Kofi Annan, *Address by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on Visit to Southeast Asia*, New York, 29 Feb 2000, available online at <<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/BSG.htm>>.

ties to France and Germany.²¹ By the end of 2004, Poland opened the door to an exit strategy and became another addition to the ranks of this new “coalition of the leaving” in terms of its 2500 personnel. Leszek Miller, the then Polish Prime Minister, stated: “When people see dramatic scenes in which soldiers are killed, there will be more pressure for a pullout.”²² Prime Minister Berlusconi has come under mounting pressure to pull Italian troops (3000 personnel) from Iraq after a number of hostage-takings involving Italian nationals and the much-publicized killing of an Italian senior intelligence officer by US forces.²³

Nor it must be added is the coalitional model too immune from the internal problems related to keeping coalitions together. If there are positive forms of adaptation towards a more inclusive coalitional style unavailable to the US-led variant, rivalries and tensions did pose some difficulties for these initiatives. Competition for status continued at the state level. Moreover, suspicions remained on both sides of the state-societal continuum about whether governments were taking civil society “hostage” or if states were co-opting NGOs.²⁴ And as the small arms case reveals splits could appear among non-state actors as well.

4. Future Directions of Coalitions of the Willing

The attempt to stretch the lines of analysis concerning both models of coalitions of the willing gives rise to very different scenarios about their respective future trajectories. The strong inclination to juxtapose the two models along different and self-contained axes presents them as a microcosm of a fundamental chasm located in today’s international system; a reflection of a split between those actors that favor a Hobbesian self-help mode of operation versus those that support the expansion of Kantian institutionalism (or in its updated version modern versus post-modern or even a Mars versus Venus contrast).²⁵ Reinforcing this notion of

²¹ John B. Roberts, “Spain in Revolt,” *Washington Times*, 18 March 2004.

²² David Osborne, “Iraq in Chaos: Is ‘Coalition’ Unraveling as Rampant Violence Daunts Allies?” *The Independent* [London], 10 April 2004; Judy Dempsey, “Poland unexpectedly says troops may quit Iraq in 2005,” *International Herald Tribune*, 5 Oct 2004.

²³ John Hooper, Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Berlusconi to pull troops from Iraq,” *The Guardian* [London], 16 March 2005.

²⁴ Cameron, “Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model.”

²⁵ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

polarization is the dichotomous language used to describe these coalitions. The UK left-wing weekly *New Statesman* advocates the need for “new” coalitions of the willing to deal with non-traditional threats dealing with the environment and health issues.²⁶ Elements of the US conservative media have called for narrower coalitions of the trusted for dealing with future crises such as Iraq.²⁷ Stretching the parameters of analysis even further, some experts point to an extended spillover of this division from the security domain into other spheres of activity. Jagdish Bhagwati, for instance, has expressed apprehension that the US will tilt its focus away from institutionalized multilateralism towards “trade coalitions of the willing” in the post-Cancún atmosphere with favoritism towards “bilateral agreements with ‘will-do’ nations.”²⁸

These dichotomous contours are reinforced by a divergent attitude towards the salience of diplomacy. In the US-led coalition on Iraq, diplomacy remained subordinated to military preparedness as epitomized by Rumsfeld’s statement, “I don’t do diplomacy.”²⁹ From an outward-looking perspective, this attitude mirrored the impatience of US strategic thinkers with institutional constraints. Rumsfeld concentrated his efforts on buttressing the position of the “willing” (whether in his comments about the virtues of “New” Europe or in his support for US/ coalitional troops on the ground in Iraq) not on converting the “unwilling”. From an inward perspective, the robust attitude adopted by the Pentagon could be contrasted with the formal “by the book” approach favored by the Department of State. Taking up this theme, Rumsfeld’s intellectual supporters were quick to point out the ineffectiveness of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s diplomatic activities. Max Boot pointed out for instance that Powell traveled less than any secretary of state in 30 years (and failed to get key actors such as Turkey on board through high-profile visits).³⁰

²⁶ “We need a new coalition of the willing,” *New Statesman*, vol.132, 14 July 2003; Ramesh Thakur, “Rectifying NGO Practice: New Coalitions of the Willing Seek Change,” *Japan Times*, 21 March 2004.

²⁷ Karl Zinsmeister, “Time for New Allies,” The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), 28 Oct 2003, available online at <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19359,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>.

²⁸ Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Don’t Cry for Cancun,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 2004): 52-63.

²⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, *Address to Town Hall Meeting*, Baghdad, Iraq, 30 April 2003, available online at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030430-secdef0139.html>>.

³⁰ Max Boot, “The Legacy of a Failed American Salesman,” *Financial Times* [London], 18 Nov 2004.

What the top-down model one did not attempt to do was to encourage a wider campaign of public diplomacy on behalf of the coalition.³¹ Support by key decision-makers outside of the US was deemed to be enough. A closed and controlled atmosphere was maintained in terms of getting the message out. On the rare cases where the US Secretary of Defense was confronted by critical voices, he sounded confrontational not conciliatory.

In contradistinction, the alternative model two sought effectiveness and legitimacy through an extended form of diplomatic networking. It made appeals directly over the heads of all governments/negotiators through the use of the mass media, information technology, and the mobilization of key change-agents among individual celebrities (Princess Diana most notably on the landmines case) as well as state officials and NGOs. The bottom line throughout the campaign was to transform diplomacy from a narrow confined vehicle of statecraft to embracing a wider and diffuse dynamic.

As rehearsed throughout this paper, establishing the two types of coalitions as polar opposites draws the dichotomous condition too sharply. Because of the evidence of some blurring of style and substance, the way lies open not to sharp divergence, but rather to modes of functional convergence. Given the philosophical and operational gap between them, accentuated by the changes in personnel within the second administration of President George W. Bush, it is likely though that this process of reconciliation will remain fuzzy, fragmentary, and awkward. Yet given the compelling claims of so many non-traditional issue-areas such as disaster prevention and relief and pandemics, there could still be space for some movement towards hybrid styles of coalitions of the willing in a more selective and possibly low-key manner.

With all the repercussions from the Iraq invasion, and the results of the US presidential election, any blended improvisation and merger between the two models is bound to meet with conceptual suspicions, if not outright practical dismissal. The division between them may simply be too far apart to allow for

³¹ On this criticism, see Suzanne Nossel, "Reimagining Foreign Policy: How America can get its groove back" (with commentary from Mitchell Cohen, Stanley Hoffmann, and Anne-Marie Slaughter), *Dissent* (Fall 2004): 31-43; See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why The World's Superpower Can't go it alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

hybridization. Whatever the future contours of coalitions of the willing, however, it is clear that any variants of coalitions of the willing, or what has often been termed à la carte multilateralism, will not be composed or conducted according to one precise script. Nor, despite its high profile use in the Iraq invasion, should this mode of activity be recognized as the property of one owner, even such a dominant one as the US. The model has been stretched across a far more diffuse normative and practical terrain and needs to be analyzed in such contexts.

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