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Policy Brief

Task Force 1: Transformative Technologies — AI and Quantum

A G7 Strategy for AI Competition and Consumer Rights

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Key Points

- The rapid evolution of foundation models poses significant challenges for global competition policy and artificial intelligence (AI) liability frameworks due to their high fixed training costs, low marginal deployment costs, and ability to perform diverse tasks after being trained on vast datasets

- Unregulated AI markets risk supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing costs, and perpetuated biases as dominant firms consolidate control, limit competition, and shape outputs in ways that harm competition and consumer rights

- G7 competition authorities should increase scrutiny of AI mergers, acquisitions, and exclusive partnerships, enforce fair and equal access to GPUs and cloud resources—meaning access that is impartial and available to all companies on the same terms—mandate interoperability, and prevent exclusive deals that stifle competition in AI infrastructure

- G7 economies should adopt AI liability frameworks that shift the burden of proof for AI-related harms onto AI companies, ensuring consumer protection by holding companies fully liable for high-risk AI harms unless safeguards are proven.

Introduction

The rapid development of foundation models (FMs) is transforming artificial intelligence (AI). Unlike traditional AI models designed for specific tasks, FMs are trained on very large datasets, making them adaptable to many different tasks across industries (Figure 1) and reshaping sectors from consumer software to enterprise solutions (Competition and Markets Authority 2023). Their influence raises two key challenges: market concentration and post-deployment liability.

Figure 1. Differences between traditional machine learning and foundation models (Ruiz 2023).



FMs are driving market consolidation, creating conditions that resemble natural monopolies, where a single firm can dominate more efficiently than multiple competitors, challenging traditional competition policies (Vipra and Korinek 2023). This has sparked concerns over inflated prices, stifled innovation, and the environmental impact of AI. In response, the G7 has taken steps to ensure fair competition in AI markets (G7 Competition Authorities and Policymakers' Summit 2024). However, recent tariff disputes among G7 members risk undermining regulatory efforts, potentially solidifying large firms' dominance in the AI sector.

At the same time, foundation models have exposed gaps in AI liability frameworks. While the G7 has focused on fairness and transparency, it has not addressed accountability for consumer harm caused by these systems, such as inaccuracies, unpredictable outputs, and privacy breaches (Noto La Diega and Bezerra, 2024). Existing legal frameworks are insufficient for AI-specific harms like emotional distress and reputational damage (European Commission, 2024). Without clear liability structures, consumers have limited redress options, and weak policies allow large firms to shape legal frameworks in their favor, restricting competition.

Addressing these challenges requires balancing competition regulations and accountability frameworks. Evolving market regulations will prevent AI monopolies, while liability laws must ensure companies take responsibility for the risks of their technologies. By refining these policies, the G7 can promote innovation, uphold fairness, and protect democratic values in the AI landscape.

AI Market Dynamics

The AI market is shaped by high fixed costs. As computational investment improves model reasoning, training costs have doubled every six months (Figure 2; Epoch 2024). GPT-3 cost

$4.6 million to train, while GPT-4 reached $100 million (Meyer 2024), limiting model development to a few firms despite low deployment expenses.

Figure 2. Hardware and energy cost to train notable AI systems (Our World in Data 2024).



The launch of DeepSeek, a Chinese language model, challenges U.S. market efficiency by claiming performance comparable to pricier U.S. models at a fraction of the cost. This highlights the risk of market concentration stifling innovation—if inflated costs persist, competing economies may gain an edge. However, DeepSeek's actual training costs remain disputed, with revised estimates placing its capital expenditures at $1.6 billion (Patel et al. 2025).

High fixed costs and low deployment expenses create strong first-mover advantages, reinforcing market concentration. Leading firms better absorb investments in product rollout, marketing, and distribution (Vipra and Korinek 2023) and more easily develop multiple models. Vertical integration strengthens this dominance, with firms securing critical inputs like compute power and data. For example, Google DeepMind uses specialized TPUs, while Microsoft serves as OpenAI's exclusive cloud provider, consolidating supply chain control.

The hardware market is similarly concentrated, with few firms producing advanced chips. NVIDIA dominates data center GPUs with a 92% market share (Iot Analytics 2023, Figure 3). Market concentration extends downstream, where OpenAI and Microsoft control 69% of the models and platforms market (Iot Analytics 2023, Figure 3). Microsoft continues consolidating its position through acquisitions, raising concerns over reduced competition (Blazek, 2024).

Figure 3. Market share of leading vendors in the foundation model market (Iot Analytics 2023).



Foundation models are expected to reshape the economy (Hatzius et al. 2023). With dominant players competing in core AI services, regulatory oversight is essential to ensuring fair competition (Lynn, von Thun, and Montoya, 2023; Hagiu and Wright 2025). Proposals for structural separations in the compute ecosystem are key to countering entrenched market power and mitigating risks from vertical integration and consolidation (Vipra and Myers West 2023; Radsch, von Thun, and Nie 2025). These dynamics underscore the need for nuanced regulatory intervention to address AI's complex, interdependent ecosystem.

Key Risks for Fair Markets and Consumer Rights

There are several risks G7 leaders must address to ensure competition and consumer rights in the AI market:

- Increased costs – High market-share firms can exploit limited competition to raise prices and reduce service quality, forcing consumers and client firms to shoulder higher costs or accept inferior performance, diminishing the productivity gains of AI. Self-preferencing—where dominant firms prioritize their own products or services over competitors'—and discriminatory pricing for downstream firms, which is already occurring in the GPU market, drive up costs (Vipra & Korinek, 2023).

- Reduced innovation – High training costs and resource demands create barriers for small innovators in the foundation model market. Established firms can exploit advantages like vast data, compute power, vertical integration, and restrictive cloud

contracts while acquiring startups to consolidate talent. These factors strengthen market concentration and stifle competition, ultimately hindering innovation.

- Unsustainable resource consumption – Meeting exponential increases in computational demands may require excessive use of energy, land, water, and rare earth minerals.
- Increased economic inequality – Market concentration in the foundation model market could enrich model owners while displacing jobs through data extraction and automation. Sufficient market concentration can enable foundation model owners to avoid paying for data and extract monopoly rents, which concentrates wealth and further entrenches power dynamics in the tech landscape.
- Perpetuated biases – Inequalities, stereotypes, and biases in training data are replicated by foundation models outputs which may systematically entrench inequalities when foundation models are adopted for automating key economic functions such as hiring, media generation, or risk assessment.
- Supply chain vulnerability – The concentration of cloud computing and GPU production among a small number of providers increases the risk of widespread AI disruptions due to cyberattacks, conflicts, weather events, or human error. Limited interoperability amplifies these threats by hindering redundancy and failover options. Current geopolitical tensions between G7 countries have further heightened these risks.
- Technical failure – Errors, vulnerabilities, or failures in widely deployed foundation models can cascade across industries, disrupting search, market research, customer service, advertising, and manufacturing. Homogenization increases the risk of systemic failures, as downstream adaptations inherent biases and security flaws. Concentration may also reduce incentives for safety, amplifying potential economic and societal harm.
- Democratic erosion – Economic concentration often translates into political influence, further entrenching power imbalances and limiting effective oversight. AI concentration could grant a small number of firms disproportionate control over information flows and political processes, undermining democratic norms. Their dominance could enable regulatory capture, weaken critical appraisal, or amplify lobbying power.

G7 Policy Framework for Fair AI Markets and Consumer Rights

1. Enhance scrutiny of anti-competitive practices in AI markets

To foster a competitive AI ecosystem and prevent monopolization, G7 regulators must take decisive action to regulate AI market concentration and mergers. Leveraging existing frameworks such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR), and the FTC Merger Guidelines, they should build upon the 2024 G7 Competition

Authority recommendations. As current political challenges may make new initiatives unfeasible, the most effective strategy is to strengthen existing regulations.

1.1 Increase scrutiny of AI mergers, acquisitions, and exclusive partnerships that reinforce market dominance, such as Nvidia acquiring AI startups or cloud giants buying foundation model developers. Block acqui-hires that eliminate competition by absorbing startup talent (Vipra & Korinek, 2023). Strengthen international coordination through initiatives like the OECD Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network and the G7 Semiconductors PoC Group to improve oversight of supply chain risks, market dynamics, and competitive pressures.

1.2 Enforce structural separations between market-dominating AI model developers, cloud providers, and chipmakers to prevent self-preferencing and lock-in effects, ensuring fair competition across the ecosystem (Sitaraman & Narechania, 2024). Restrict cross-subsidization practices that allow firms to leverage power in one sector (e.g. cloud computing) to undercut competition in another (e.g. model development).

1.3 Expand merger reviews to assess control over AI models, training data, and compute power beyond market share metrics (Hemphill & Wu, 2020). Broaden market definitions to include vertical and platform markets. Consider market valuations in merger reviews, not just revenue. Investigate anti-competitive practices like tying, bundling, and exclusive deals, such as Nvidia's CUDA ecosystem. Establish clear reporting criteria for planned M&As to national regulators.

1.4 Define AI "gatekeepers"—firms controlling key infrastructure like cloud services and AI models. The G7 Digital & Tech Working Group could create a dynamic list and define specific thresholds for gatekeeper designation (e.g. compute power controlled, training data access, AI service dominance) to provide a clear and consistent reference point for regulators.

These efforts will help prevent monopolization of the AI market and ensure that competition drives the development of cutting-edge technologies.

2. Enforce anti-discrimination rules for data, models, and cloud resource access

Addressing issues like high costs and market concentration through enforceable anti-discriminatory practices will foster a more competitive and inclusive AI ecosystem, while data transparency requirements for high-market-share model developers will ensure fair access to critical AI resources, driving innovation and reducing bias.

2.1 Enforce non-discriminatory rules for access to GPUs and cloud resources to prevent exclusive agreements, like OpenAI's deal with Microsoft, from stifling competition and ensure fair, transparent pricing. Use the EU AI Act's transparency provisions as a model to prevent dominant firms from restricting competition. Enforce existing interoperability rules for AI hardware and software (e.g., open CUDA alternatives, cross-cloud portability) to lower entry barriers, foster innovation, and reduce lock-in effects. Ensure professional rendering software supports non-NVIDIA GPUs (e.g., AMD) to prevent anti-competitive restrictions.

2.2 Require high-market-share foundation model developers to disclose data sources. The EU AI Act mandates detailed data summaries for general-purpose AI models, a standard G7 members should adopt (EU AI Act, 2024). Following the European General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, these summaries should outline data sources, processing steps, and diversity to improve inclusivity and reduce bias.

Enforcing anti-discrimination rules will enable G7 economies to create a more equitable AI landscape that encourages innovation, reduces economic inequality, and supports the responsible use of AI.

3. Fund development of open source models and public utility resources

To foster a competitive and equitable AI ecosystem, G7 regulators should prioritize funding for open-source AI models and public utility resources. This can reduce monopolistic control, promote innovation, and ensure broad access to critical technologies. Building domestic public resources can also build national supply chains that are resilient to trade hostilities between G7 economies.

3.1 Invest in public AI infrastructure to reduce reliance on monopolistic firms. Governments should fund compute resources to reduce reliance on monopolistic firms. Examples include Canada's CAD $1 billion investment in CAISI, public cloud initiatives like U.S. and Japan's supercomputers (Radsch & Montoya, 2024), and utility-based data center access (Radsch, von Thun, & Nie 2025; Hemphill & Wu, 2020). Joint efforts in semiconductor production, such as the U.S. CHIPS Act, can further strengthen AI infrastructure, but future funding and grants (e.g., federal land use) must be carefully allocated to avoid reinforcing market dominance (Sitaraman & Narechania, 2024).

3.2 Require government-funded AI models to be open-sourced to ensure transparency and accessibility. Following the EU's AI Act, G7 economies could leverage public procurement to mandate open-source publication of all government-funded models. Additionally, funding should be restricted to projects that publish research and open-source code, ensuring publicly funded advancements are available to the broader AI community.

3.3 Fund independent foundation model research by providing access to national datasets, public compute resources, and academic funding. Germany's LEAM initiative offers a model for supporting open-source AI development and fostering competition. Additionally, supporting open-source alternatives to proprietary platforms like CUDA (e.g. HIPIFY, ZLUDA) can reduce barriers for smaller developers and ensure professional rendering software supports non-NVIDIA GPUs, preventing anti-competitive practices.

3.4 Promote global data-sharing to ensure fair access to essential data for AI development. Dominant firms often maintain their advantage through proprietary data and partnerships (Radsch, 2024). Governments should create public data warehouses to ensure that data from public platforms (e.g. search, maps) remains accessible for AI development, preventing monopolistic control and fostering a level playing field for smaller competitors and researchers.

Prioritizing funding for open-source models, public computing resources, and independent research can create a more inclusive and competitive AI landscape within G7 economies.

4. Require environmental standards for leading firms

To enhance transparency and sustainability in AI development, G7 regulators should mandate environmental standards for AI infrastructure. By holding major AI firms accountable for their energy consumption, governments can promote responsible AI development while balancing competitiveness and environmental commitments. Smaller firms should be exempt from excessive regulation to foster competition.

4.1 Enforce energy efficiency standards and transparency in AI compute usage to prevent monopolistic resource consumption and environmental harm. AI data centers consume vast electricity, water, and rare earth elements, exacerbating resource scarcity. To mitigate these effects, G7 regulators should require leading firms to disclose their AI-related environmental impact and compute usage, enabling regulators to track resource consumption, enforce sustainability measures, and prevent excessive hoarding of critical infrastructure.

4.2 Incentivize energy-efficient AI research through targeted tax policies. To support sustainable AI development, governments should offer tax exemptions for carbon taxes on model training for small-scale, academic, and nonprofit AI projects. This would prevent high energy costs from disproportionately burdening independent researchers and public-interest AI initiatives while ensuring that the largest commercial AI deployments adhere to stricter energy efficiency standards.

These measures will hold dominant AI firms accountable for their resource consumption while fostering a competitive and sustainable AI ecosystem.

5. Establish a liability framework for AI-induced harms

G7 regulators must establish clear liability standards that protect consumers, shift the burden of proof onto AI firms, and enforce shared responsibility across the various actors in the AI supply chain. However, it is important to avoid overly strict AI liability laws which raise compliance costs, negatively impacting startups and emerging economies.

5.1 Adopt liability frameworks that shift the burden of proof onto AI companies to strengthen consumer protection. Governments should ensure that consumers only need to demonstrate a causal link between an AI system and harm, with companies bearing full liability for high-risk AI unless they prove all reasonable safeguards were in place. Drawing from the EU Product Liability Directive, G7 members should consider presumptions of liability for opaque or defective AI systems and cases where causality is difficult to establish.

5.2 Promote the establishment of AI ombudsperson bodies to investigate consumer complaints and enhance accountability. The G7 should facilitate knowledge-sharing and best practices by convening an international working group to support member countries in developing independent AI-specific ombudsperson frameworks aligned with the G7 AI Principles and Code of Conduct.

5.3 Update liability frameworks to address a broad spectrum of AI-related harms, including both tangible and intangible damages. Drawing from the EU AI Act's risk-based approach, governments should require AI developers to disclose potential risks in AI safety audits and risk assessments, ensuring accountability and transparency.

5.4 Create a tiered AI supply chain liability framework that accounts for shared responsibility based on control and compliance with AI safety standards, as shown in Figure 4. Mandate liability insurance for AI supply chain actors while exploring exemptions for open-source, non-profit, and academic models. Create an AI compensation fund to ensure redress when liability is unclear.

Figure 4. Actors involved in the AI supply chain and their roles.



By shifting liability to AI companies, strengthening regulatory oversight, and ensuring consumers have accessible redress mechanisms, G7 members can create a fair and enforceable framework for addressing AI-induced harm.

6. Develop an AI incident reporting and post-deployment risk mitigation system

Given the increasing presence of AI systems in the public domain, it is essential to establish a post-deployment framework to monitor and mitigate incidents, particularly in high-risk systems (O'Brien et al., 2023).

6.1 Establish publicly accessible AI incident reporting platforms with clear guidelines for determining what constitutes a reportable incident based on the OECD common framework for reporting AI incidents, including specific thresholds for different types of harm, defining standardized reporting formats for AI incidents, including near misses and potential harms, timely disclosure of AI-related failures, with penalties for non-compliance and developing data security and privacy protocols to protect individuals' information (OECD, 2025).

6.2 Ensure independent oversight bodies oversee the incident reporting system. G7 member states should ensure independent oversight bodies have oversight of the incident reporting system and develop an adaptive post-deployment framework based on ISO/IEC 42001:2023 standards, which establish lifecycle governance,

requiring post-deployment monitoring and mechanisms for rapid response and mitigation of emerging risks (O'Brien et al., 2023).

6.3 Promote proactive risk mitigation incentives for AI companies by certifying AI systems and offering financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks, grants) to companies that invest in AI safety research and compliance.

6.4 Establish impact metrics and data-sharing protocols to evaluate AI liability and incident reporting, ensuring collaboration among governments, industry, academia, and civil society.

A robust AI incident reporting platform and post-deployment framework enhance transparency and trust, ensuring safer AI deployment and broader societal adoption.

Next Steps for the G7

G7 regulators have a critical opportunity to foster competition and protect consumer rights in the rapidly evolving AI market. By enhancing regulatory oversight, preventing monopolistic practices, and ensuring fair access to resources, the G7 can create a more level playing field. Strengthening liability frameworks, promoting open-source models, and incentivizing responsible AI development will help protect consumers from discriminatory practices and high costs, while driving innovation. These efforts will ensure that AI technology benefits society, fostering a competitive landscape that aligns with democratic values and prioritizes consumer protection and market fairness.

Table 1. Risk assessment for fair markets and consumer rights in the AI market

Risk Category	Risk	Likelihood	Severity	Rationale for Risk Rating
Economic	Increased costs	High	Medium	Market concentration is already raising prices (e.g. GPU market)
Economic	Reduced innovation	Medium	Low	Innovation slowdown is a concern, but effects are gradual
Environmental	Unsustainable resource consumption	Medium	Medium	Energy, water, and land use is increasing, but mitigation efforts exist
Social	Increased economic inequality	Medium	Medium	AI market concentration exacerbates wealth gaps
Social	Perpetuated biases	High	Medium	Biases in AI outputs reinforce societal inequalities
Systemic	Supply chain vulnerability	High	High	AI dependence on few providers makes failures widespread
Systemic	Technical failure	Medium	High	Broad AI adoption increases systemic failure risks
Systemic	Democratic erosion	Low	High	While concerning, political influence is indirect and long-term

Table 2. Overview of G7 Policy Framework for Fair AI Markets and Consumer Rights

Action to be Taken	Sub-Action	Responsible Party	Initiatives to Strengthen	Importance	Feasibility
1. Enhance scrutiny of anti-competitive practices in AI markets	*1.1 Increase scrutiny of AI mergers, acquisitions, and exclusive partnerships*	G7 competition authorities	EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), FTC Merger Guidelines, UK Enterprise Act, G7 Semiconductors PoC Group, OECD Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network	High	High
	1.2 Enforce structural separations	G7 competition authorities	EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), FTC Merger Guidelines, UK Enterprise Act	High	Medium
	1.3 Expand merger reviews	G7 competition authorities	EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), FTC Merger Guidelines, UK Enterprise Act	HIgh	Low
	1.4 Define AI "gatekeepers"	G7 Digital & Tech Working Group	Digital Markets Act (DMA)	Low	High
2. Enforce anti-discrimination rules for data, models, and cloud resource access	*2.1 Enforce non-discriminatory rules for access to GPUs and cloud resources*	G7 competition authorities	EU AI Act, G7 Semiconductors PoC Group, OECD Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network	High	High
	2.2 Require high-market-share foundation model developers to disclose data sources	G7 competition authorities	EU AI Act, General-Purpose AI Code of Practice	Medium	Low
3. Fund development of opensource models and public utility resources	*3.1 Invest in public AI infrastructure*	G7 science and technology ministers	U.S. CHIPS Act, Canadian AI Safety Institute (CAISI), Canadian AI Compute Access Fund	High	Medium
	3.2 Require government-funded AI models to be open-sourced	G7 science and technology ministers	EU AI Act	Medium	High
	3.3 Fund independent foundation model research	G7 science and technology ministers	Large European AI Models (LEAM) initiative, French National Strategy for AI	Medium	High
	3.4 Promote global data-sharing	G7 digital and tech ministers	Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)	Low	Medium
4. Require environmental standards for leading firms	*4.1 Enforce energy efficiency standards and transparency in AI compute usage*	G7 environment ministers	OECD Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory, G7 Industrial Decarbonisation Agenda (IDA), European Union's Digital Green Deal	High	Medium
	4.1 Incentivize energy-efficient AI research through targeted tax policies	G7 finance ministers	G7 Industrial Decarbonisation Agenda (IDA), U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)	Medium	Medium
5. Establish a liability framework for AI-induced harms	*5.1 Adopt liability frameworks that shift the burden of proof onto AI companies*	G7 digital and tech ministers	EU Product Liability Directive, Canadian Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA), OECD AI Principles	High	Medium
	5.2 Promote the establishment of AI ombudsperson bodies	G7 digital and tech ministers	G7 AI Principles and Code of Conduct	Medium	Low
	5.3 Update liability frameworks to address a broad spectrum of AI-related harms	G7 digital and tech ministers	EU Product Liability Directive, Canadian Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA), OECD AI Principles	Medium	Low

	5.4 Create a tiered AI supply chain liability framework that accounts for shared responsibility	G7 digital and tech ministers	EU Product Liability Directive, Canadian Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA), OECD AI Principles	Low	Medium
6. Develop an AI incident reporting and post-deployment risk mitigation system	*6.1 Establish publicly accessible AI incident reporting platforms*	G7 digital and tech ministers	EU AI Act, Canada's Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA)	High	Low
	6.2 Ensure independent oversight bodies oversee the incident reporting system	G7 digital and tech ministers	OECD AI Principles, European Commission's AI High-Level Expert Group, ISO/IEC 42001:2023	Medium	Low
	6.3 Promote proactive risk mitigation incentives	G7 digital and tech ministers	EU AI Act, US National AI Initiative (NAII)	Low	Medium
	6.4 Establish impact metrics and data-sharing protocols to evaluate AI liability and incident reporting	G7 digital and tech ministers	OECD AI Data Governance Framework	Low	Medium

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Johanna's research in Information, Communication and the Social Sciences focuses on the political economy of AI. She investigates how we can make AI more worker-friendly by changing the systems of its development and deployment.

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Appendix. Actions Taken by G7 Members to Address AI Competition and Consumer Rights

Member	Action	Responsible Party	Date
	Adopted the **National Strategy for AI** to support the growth of the national AI ecosystem by developing training and research centers, providing easier access to compute for start-ups, and calling for projects that develop a creative digital commons for databases and AI models (Krasavina, 2023)	President of France	Sep 2021
	Filed an administrative complaint to block the vertical merger between Nvidia, a graphics chip supplier, and Arm, a computing-processor designer (FTC, 2021)	Federal Trade Commission (FTC)	Dec 2021
	Proposed the **Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA)** to protect individuals and communities from the adverse impacts associated with high impact AI systems; has not yet passed into legislation (ISED, 2023)	Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)	June 2022
	Enacted the **CHIPS and Science Act** which authorizes roughly USD $280 billion in new funding to boost domestic research and manufacturing of semiconductors in the United States (Sitaraman & Narechania, 2024)	United States Congress	Aug 2022
	Proposed the **Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive (AILD)** as a new liability regime to assist consumers' liability claims for damage caused by AI-enabled products and services; not yet passed into legislation (EC, 2024a)	European Commision (EC)	Sep 2022
	Brought **Digital Markets Act (DMA)** into effect, forcing 26 services provided by 6 "gatekeeper" companies to comply with provisions preventing them from abusing market power and allowing new firms to enter the market (EC, 2022a)	European Parliament (EP) and Council of the European Union	Nov 2022
 	Developed **TTC Joint Roadmap for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management** to develop shared terminologies, cooperation in trustworthy analysis of AI, and monitoring and measuring AI risks between the United States and the European Union (EC, 2022b)	EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC)	Dec 2022

	Launched the **Large European AI Models (LEAM)** initiative to develop open source and freely available European AI ecosystem (LEAM, 2023)	KI Bundesverband	Jan 2023
	Developed voluntary **Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RFM)** to help foster responsible design, development, deployment, and use of AI systems by recommending best practices (NIST, 2023)	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)	Jan 2023
	Released assessment of competition concerns in generative AI (FTC, 2023)	Federal Trade Commission (FTC)	Jun 2023
	Released a report proposing guiding principles to ensure competition in the market for foundation models, including access to key inputs like data and computational power, diversity of closed and open source business models, interoperability, fair dealing, and transparency (CMA, 2023)	Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)	Sep 2023
	Initiated G7 launch of the **Hiroshima AI Process**, which includes guiding principles on AI and a voluntary Code of Conduct for developers (G7 Hiroshima Summit, 2023)	G7 Digital and Tech Working Group	May 2023
	Announced EUR 600 million fund to invest in start-ups with the potential to develop breakthrough technologies to automate public institutions' processes (Bonfanti, 2023)	Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale (ACN), Dipartimento per la Trasformazione Digitale	Aug 2023
	Hosted **G7 Competition Authorities and Policymakers' Summit** where G7 leaders committed to addressing anticompetitive conduct and mergers in the digital economy, building internal capacity for technological expertise, undertaking market research to understand business practices in digital markets, and sharing updates on approaches to promoting competition in digital markets (G7 Competition Authorities and Policymakers' Summit, 2024)	Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), Secretariat of Headquarters for Digital Market Competition of the Cabinet Secretariat (HDMC)	Nov 2023
	Released the **2023 Merger Guidelines** confirming commitment to enhanced scrutiny of mergers that may harm labor markets, eliminate potential new market entrants, limit access to products or services that rivals use to compete, are part of a pattern of multiple acquisitions (DOJ, 2023)	Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ)	Dec 2023

	Launched inquiry into generative AI investments and partnerships with major cloud service providers, investigating partnerships between Microsoft and OpenAI; Amazon and Anthropi; and, Google and Anthropic (FTC, 2024)	Federal Trade Commission (FTC)	Jan 2024
	Began checking whether Microsoft's investment in OpenAI is reviewable under the **EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)**, later dropped investigation (EC, 2024b)	European Commission (EC)	Jan 2024
  	Released a **Joint Statement on Competition in Generative AI Foundation Models and AI Products** to identify risks to competition for foundation models and AI products as well as principles for protecting competition in the AI ecosystem including: securing fair dealing among high market-share firms, promoting interoperability, and encouraging consumer choice between AI products (G7 Competition Authorities and Policymakers' Summit 2024)	European Commission (EC), Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission (FTC)	Jul 2024
	Put Nvidia under investigation for anti-competitive practices (Chee, 2024)	Autorité de la concurrence	Jul 2024
	Brought the **Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act)** into effect, placing restrictions on providers of AI systems in a professional context based on assessed risk of its applications and proposing transparency requirements for foundation models, with reduced requirements for open source models (EC, 2024c)	European Parliament (EP) and European Council	Aug 2024
	Introduced **Artificial Intelligence Civil Rights Act of 2024** to regulate consequential algorithms to by prohibiting discrimination, mandating audits, and allowing human rights appeals; not passed into legislation (Crosman, 2024)	United States Senate	Sep 2024

	Hosted two day **G7 Competition Summit** to discuss effective international cooperation contributing to fair, open and contestable AI services (G7 Competition Authorities and Policymakers' Summit, 2024)	Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)	Oct 2024
	Initiated an investigation into possible antitrust violations by Nvidia (Luna, 2024)	Department of Justice (DOJ)	Oct 2024
	Launched the **Canadian Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute (CAISI)**, the **AI Compute Access Fund**, and invested CAD $1 billion to build public supercomputing infrastructure (ISED, 2025)	Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)	Nov 2024
	New **Product Liability Directive (PDL)** came into force, expanding EU-wide consumer compensation rules to include digital products and AI and making producers liable for harm caused by their software (EP, 2025)	European Parliament (EP)	Dec 2024
	Developed voluntary **Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI** for reducing risks (e.g. data poisoning, model obfuscation, indirect prompt injection, operational differences associated with data management) in deployed AI systems (DSIT, 2025)	Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT)	Jan 2025