

Evaluation of CIGI's G20 Activities

Draft Evaluation Report

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Our appreciation extends to CIGI's staff, management, and stakeholders who supported the evaluation by participating in interviews, filling out our survey, and participating in meetings.

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However, despite this assistance, any errors should be considered our own.

Sincerely,

Tasha Truant
Dane Rowlands
Louise Mailloux

Executive Summary

This evaluation should be viewed as an essentially positive one. Overall, the G20 Activities is a strong program, is well regarded by stakeholders, and is making important policy and institutional contributions.

The G20 Activities enjoy impressive access to policy makers (in foreign governments, international financial institutions, and other think tanks) in order to understand their needs for research and support. However, despite improvements in the structure of the program over the past two years, there are still not many processes in place to ensure that all projects are explicitly tied to the overall intended outcomes of the G20 Activities.

The evaluation has found that many of the G20 Activities are closely aligned with CIGI's overall mandate and priorities, despite a lack of process to ensure that this alignment will continue. Indeed, this is a signature program for the organization. However, some activities present an unstated secondary objective of the program (i.e. supporting or validating the G20 and its work).

With some historical variation, there is strong coherence between CIGI's work produced by the G20 Activities and challenges in the global economy and the work of the G20. For the most part, research produced by the G20 Activities has been both timely and relevant.

This work of the G20 Activities' largely continues to address a gap in global governance, particularly when addressing more technical issues in CIGI's core areas of strength. CIGI is widely recognized for such institutional achievements such as enabling the creation of the L20, Think20, and the Financial Stability Board.

The evaluation indicated uptake and support for unique policy recommendations developed by CIGI, demonstrating significant visibility in the early and later years of the program. However, the efforts of CIGI would be made more efficient through greater promotion and communication of this work, particularly within Canada.

The G20 Activities' have produced significant achievements in terms of agenda setting, technical advice, and the strengthening of global economic governance. The program can prepare for future successes by continuing to produce high-quality research and sustaining strong networks.

Recommendations:

1. CIGI should clarify, and formalize, the ultimate purpose and expected outcomes of the G20 Activities.
2. The G20 Activities should continue to increase its original research capacity.
3. CIGI should develop and overarching communications strategy for the G20 Activities.

4. CIGI should develop a networking strategy for the G20 Activities.

Introduction

Goss Gilroy Inc. (GGI) is pleased to present this report of the Evaluation of CIGI's Group of 20 (G20) Activities. This report contains the findings, conclusions, and recommendations stemming from this evaluation. The evaluation of CIGI's G20 Activities began in June 2015, and data collection took place over July and August. This is a first time this program has been the subject of its own evaluation, though CIGI as an organization has twice been the subject of an evaluation commissioned by the Government of Canada; first in 2008 and again in 2013.

Background

CIGI has been a leader for over ten years in work on the G20 as a viable summit process, beginning with key meetings in 2003 with then-Finance Minister Rt. Hon. Paul Martin who proposed to CIGI further investigation into the concept later called the "Martin Proposal."

CIGI's efforts demonstrate that existing international institutions (including the G8) are incapable of dealing effectively with impacts of globalization and that the inclusion of emerging economies is critical to managing global events and resolving key deadlock issues. A series of phases involving partnerships and network building, international workshops, policy briefs and papers, and briefing meetings with key officials probed the possibility of raising the G20 Finance Ministers group to the leaders' level.

Later phases of the G20 work and simulation summit preparatory process tested the results with representatives of think tanks and international organizations in a group called the Think20. Work on both the G20 and the Think20 is an ongoing priority at CIGI.

The work of the G20 Activities comprises both research activities as well as ongoing participation in high level fora. An annual mission is also undertaken by CIGI staff and fellows each year to assist the next host state in its preparations.

The work of the G20 Activities since inception can essentially be divided into six phases:

Phase 1 (2003-2004): Exploring the Concept of the G20 at Leaders' Level

The first phase of the collaborative G20 project included several meetings (formal and informal) held to explore the case that a G20 Leaders' meeting can help resolve issues that are intractable in existing multilateral Ministerial fora or summits.

Phase 2 (2004-2006): L20-Bridging the Gap in Global Governance

The second phase of the project looked at intractable global problems that a G20/L20 might address.

Phase 3 (2006-2008) Disseminating Research Results

The third phase of work on G20 featured a series of 11 meetings aimed at disseminating research results and moving the L20 concept closer to reality.

Phase 4 (2008 – 2009) Modernizing the G8 Summit

In the final stage of the L20 Project, the central premise was that the world requires a global network or steering group where government leaders can broker decisions leading to pragmatic solutions to global common problems. The 2008 global crisis was a catalyst for the G20 coming together to resolve the situation.

Phase 5 (2010 - 2013) G20 Outreach and Launch of the T20

With regular G20 Leader's Level meetings now taking place, the activities on the G20 shifted to forward-looking analysis and ongoing dialogue on issues confronting the global economy. CIGI also becomes a founding member of the Think20, which gathers scholars from 20 think tanks internationally to discuss issues of importance to the G20 agenda.

Phase 6 (2013 – Present): NEW THINKING ON THE G20

This phase is focusing on addressing gaps in global governance; discussing policy issues critical to Canada's position and role in the global economy; penetrating policy circles internationally; and gaining leverage through strategic partnerships.

Scope and Methodology

This section includes a description of the scope of the evaluation and the methodology used, as well as a logic model for CIGI's G20 Activities.

This evaluation was not conducted to fulfil an accountability requirement tied to funding, but rather as an internal learning exercise, designed and implemented in a way that would facilitate organizational improvements. As such, the program and other staff at CIGI provided inputs in the evaluation, and the evaluation questions reflect this focus upon areas of inquiry of most interest to CIGI. An Advisory Group was also formed, a body which provided useful input into the key design elements such as the data collection instruments to be used and the list of stakeholders to be engaged. Lastly, time was allocated to holding preliminary findings presentations to the management and Advisory Group in Waterloo in order to validate findings and solicit feedback before this report was written.

The scope of the evaluation extends back just over ten years, to the first phase of the Activities in which the G20 had not yet been raised to the leaders' level. However, it decided early on that the evaluation should focus on the past five years of the program's work. Additionally, the evaluation concentrated even more closely on the last two years, partially since that is the time period after which the last federal evaluation was published, and also because new staff have strongly shaped the character of the program since 2013.

The first major task of the assignment was to develop a logic model for the G20 Activities. While no such logic model exists for the Global Economy program, the new G20 logic model draws from CIGI's overall logic model. This G20 Activities Logic Model, found on page 5, incorporates direction from CIGI documentation such as the strategic plan, as well as early discussions with program staff.

Evaluation questions, indicators, and potential data sources were then identified in order to develop an evaluation matrix. This matrix can be found on page 6, and provides the overall framework to guide the evaluation.

A total of 17 key informant interviews were held for this evaluation, seven of which were with internal key informants and ten of which were external. Interviews were semi-structured, about an hour long, using the interview guides found in Appendix A.

An online survey was also developed. This survey was open for just over two weeks in August. While the key informant interviews posed questions that required a good understanding of the program, the survey focused more on questions of policy influence suited to an audience not necessarily familiar with the day-to-day work of the G20 Activities. The survey questions collected a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. The questions posed in the survey can be found in Appendix B.

A document review was also conducted, which looked mainly at questions of relevance as well as the reach of materials produced by the program. Additionally, an expert review was added as a line of evidence. This comprised a review of CIGI's publications, and G20 communiqués, in order to offer an expert opinion on a number of indicators.

Challenges

The evaluation encountered a few challenges and limitations, though none which threatened the overall quality of the study.

Policy influence and agenda setting represent a notoriously "difficult to measure" area of evaluation practice. The ways in which policy makers are influenced to think about a given issue are complex. They involve processes that are dynamic, indirect, and largely invisible. A traditional approach to program evaluation, in which direct attribution is sought to account for stated outcomes, is not appropriate for a body of work such as the G20 Activities. Rather, an approach which tries to understand the contributions to the way policy makers seek out, understand, and interpret information about a given issue is more appropriate and perhaps more realistic. This is what this evaluation has tried to do, by tracing the awareness and acceptance of ideas advanced by the G20 Activities to understand uptake and impact.


A second challenge was the imprecise subject of the evaluation. At times it was not clear what constituted the G20 Activities versus the Global Economy Program versus CIGI overall. This is at

least partially explained by the cross-cutting nature of the Activities, which span all programs but are “housed” within the Global Economy Program.

The survey response rate was a little disappointing; out of approximately 300 people who were sent the survey, we received 58 responses. While this sample size was on the small size, the survey was designed to be informative rather than representative, and these 58 responses were still enough to reveal major indications.

While not a limitation, it should be noted that the respondents largely represented a critical middle level of influence in the policy making process. These individuals were, for the most part, not decisions makers themselves, nor working level staff, but rather those in the middle who provide advice to leaders with ultimate responsibility for agenda setting.

The logic model developed for this evaluation, followed by the evaluation matrix, can be found below.



Evaluation Matrix for the Evaluation of CIGI's G20 Activities

| Evaluation Question | Evaluation Indicator | Document Review | Interviews | | Survey | Expert Review |
|--|--|-----------------|------------|----------|--------|---------------|
| | | | External | Internal | | |
| Relevance | | | | | | |
| 1. Do the G20 Activities meet the needs of G20 leaders for policy research and advice? | 1.1 Evidence of information needs of G20 leaders | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| | 1.2 Evidence that project selection is informed by these needs | | | ✓ | | |
| 2. Has the research produced by CIGI reflected timely challenges in the global economy? | 2.1 Degree of linkages/match between topics of the Activities' research and governance challenges at time of publication | | | | | ✓ |
| 3. Is the work of the G20 Activities aligned to CIGI's priorities and mandate? | 3.1 Evidence of alignment | | | | | |
| Performance | | | | | | |
| 4. To what extent has there been uptake at the G20 of ideas advanced by CIGI's G20 Activities? | 4.1 Degree of linkages/match between the Activities' research and G20 discussions | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | 4.2 Degree of linkages/match between unique recommendations and G20 Communiques | | | | | ✓ |
| 5. Does the work of the G20 Activities continue to address a gap in global governance? | 5.1 Evidence that work of the G20 Activities address areas with incomplete/weak international governance regimes | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 6. To what extent are the G20 Activities visible to policy makers and decision makers? | 6.1 Degree to which the Activities' work is reaching its intended audience | | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| | 6.2 Perceptions of the Program/CIGI as source of expertise on global governance challenges | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| | 6.3 Identification of opportunities to expand the reach of G20 Activities' work and ideas | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| | 6.4 Relative impact of the Activities' different means of communication | | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Efficiency | | | | | | |
| 7. Are there alternative ways that the Activities could influence the G20 agenda that would be more efficient? | 7.1 Suggestions of alternatives that may offer efficiencies | | ✓ | ✓ | | |

| Evaluation Question | Evaluation Indicator | Document Review | Interviews | | Survey | Expert Review |
|--|---|-----------------|------------|----------|--------|---------------|
| | | | External | Internal | | |
| Lessons Learned | | | | | | |
| 8. What have been the G20s biggest achievements? Greatest shortcomings? | 8.1 Examples of achievements with respect to policy influence and/or agenda setting | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | 8.2 Examples of any unintended outcomes (positive or negative) | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| 9. What were the key factors that underpinned the success of the G20 Activities in its early days? Can these factors be adapted for use by other current/future CIGI programs? | 9.1 Identification of success factors | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | 9.2 Opinions on replicability / scalability | | ✓ | ✓ | | |

EQ1: Do the G20 Activities Meet the Needs of G20 Leaders for Policy Research and Advice?

FINDING: The G20 Activities have impressive access to international policy makers (in foreign governments, international financial institutions, and other think tanks) in order to understand their needs. Project selection is informally informed by the needs of G20 leaders. However, there are not many processes in place to ensure that all projects are explicitly tied to, and expected to contribute towards, the overall intended outcomes of the G20 Activities.

1.1 Evidence of information needs of G20 leaders

In assessing whether or not the G20 Activities meet the needs that G20 leaders have for policy research and advice, the evaluation first sought to understand the needs of these leaders.

From interviewees, the evaluators heard that the most senior-level decision makers may not always know their own needs. Rather, at the highest bureaucratic and political levels, decision makers are responsible for such a fast moving and wide range of files that one's own needs can be difficult to discern. One internal key informant said that instead of responding to leaders' articulated needs, the role of CIGI is "to identify emerging issues, and help governments anticipate the problems".

As with the key informants, the survey respondents were also asked which factors most greatly influence the ideas they learn about and use in their work. Seventy-six percent (76%) of survey respondents noted *source*, followed by *topic* (59%) as a factor that greatly influences their consumption of global economy information. This strongly aligns with the information provided by interviewees, who also stated that the credibility of the source (both people and organizations) plays the most significant role in the consumption of policy advice. One external key informant explained this process as follows:

You build a picture of someone's trustworthiness over time. You start triangulating ideas from different people. Sometimes you hear a persuasive argument, then find out later that person's evidence isn't there. When this happens, that think tank will fall off my list.

Exhibit 1: Factors that influence consumption of information

Q7: The factor(s) that most greatly influence the global economy information that I consume are: (check all that apply).

| Answer Choices | Responses |
|--|-----------|
| Source. The information comes from an organization or individual whose work I trust. | 76.47% 39 |
| Topic. The information relates to a specific topic for which I require more information. | 58.82% 30 |
| Timing. The information is available at a time in which I require policy advice. | 41.18% 21 |
| Format. The information is produced in a format that I am more likely to absorb. | 27.45% 14 |
| Other (please specify) | 3.92% 2 |
| Total Respondents: 51 | |

However, we heard that the influencers of decision makers are looking for well-researched, impartial, credible, and in-depth analysis of issues and innovative policy responses on precise questions in their specialization. For some of these interviewees, staying abreast of the technical issues in their areas of specialty, and discussing possible policy responses that may be required, is almost a full time job. The evaluation thus suggests that it is these middle-level influencers that may have the greatest need for the type of policy recommendations put forth by the G20 Activities, and are potentially the most receptive as well. CIGI appears to be effective at accessing and influencing this group, through cultivating personal relationships and, in particular, through annual missions to upcoming host countries.

In general, the narrative presented was that when looking to learn about a new topic pertaining to the global economy, people turn to individuals and organizations they trust to see what they are presenting on the issue. The format in which the information is presented (e.g. journal articles versus blog posts) played much less of a role than expected; respondents are willing to digest a variety of formats to get the information they need from sources they view as trustworthy. With regards to trustworthiness, it often seems to be directly tied to individuals. Many times respondents referred to individuals first, and their organizations or publications only second (if at all). For example, when delving into how these individuals came to learn about certain issues or take up particular positions, there were several references to closed email chain discussions. Clearly, the role of personal relationships and the credibility of the individual cannot be underestimated when it comes to questions of policy influence.

1.2 Evidence that project selection is informed by these needs

Next, the evaluation sought to assess the extent to which the needs described above inform the G20 Activities' project selection.

Internal stakeholders as well as documentation provided by CIGI describe project selection within the G20 Activities as influenced by various factors such as (not in any particular order): potential for impact, identified gaps, the perceived future needs of host countries, CIGI areas of strength, and the need for original research. CIGI's Strategic Plan notes the importance of the Global Economy Program remaining flexible in order to be responsive to international demand.

Potential projects are also informed by a variety of sources, including high-level and ongoing consultations with stakeholders. Uniquely, those working on the G20 Activities at CIGI conduct an exploratory advisory mission to each upcoming G20 host country, which (among other benefits) allows for an exceptional degree of intelligence gathering with respect to the interests and priorities of the forthcoming host government. The G20 Activities prominence within the T20 also facilitates the gathering of insight and ideas for future projects.

Internal record keeping of high level briefings support the opinions of key informants that CIGI enjoys impressive access to senior international policy makers. Between February 2012 and June 2015, high level G20-related meetings were held with representatives of foreign governments 26 times; with IFIs 16 times (mostly IMF); with international think tanks 5 times. This does not include working level meetings, which are not captured, nor informal communication vehicles such as email chains.

Potential projects are presented to CIGI's Board for approval, a due diligence process which ensures project selection is not arbitrary or unreasonable in terms of scope or available resources. However, all in all, project selection for the G20 Activities is fairly informal. In many ways, this informality allows for crucially needed flexibility. Indeed, the cross-cutting nature of this program, as well as the impermanent and shifting nature of the G20 itself, would be unsuited to a rigid approach to project selection.

However, this informal approach to project selection can lead to investments that are not necessarily in line with the needs of stakeholders or the priorities of CIGI overall. These factors may have played a role in the middle years of the program, characterized by stakeholders as years of "drift" (approximately 2004-2010). This lack of focus is detailed in the 2013 federal evaluation of CIGI, and only deserves brief mention here: that due to lack of in-house research capacity, too broad a focus, and a diminished emphasis on research and policy outcomes, the organization produced fewer outputs, but across a wider array of topics, than was expected.

EQ2: Has the Research Produced by CIGI Reflected Timely Challenges in the Global Economy?

FINDING: With some historical variation, there is strong coherence between CIGI's work produced by the G20 Activities and challenges in the global economy.

2.1 Degree of linkages/match between topics of the G20 Activities' research and governance challenges at time of publication

An important aspect of CIGI's work is the provision of research that addresses important global issues. To determine the timeliness and relevance of analysis the evaluation examined the portfolio of CIGI publications in the context of global events.

The analysis of publications suggests a strong coherence between CIGI's research and major global issues. There are numerous examples of this coherence. There was not a lot of G20 related research prior to the global financial crisis, and what was being produced tended to reflect broader issues of global governance (such as the creation of the L20 process) and a few enduring themes in global economic governance (e.g. reform of the international financial institutions, generic financial crises, emerging market countries, economic imbalances, food prices). With the onset of the crisis, however, the research and publications emerging from CIGI became more numerous and more sharply focused on issues of financial governance (e.g. sovereign debt, financial supervision, monetary policy).

The evaluation identified three competing research elements that appear to have shaped the evolution of CIGI's G20 publications. Initially, a dominant component of CIGI's G20 work focused on process, which can perhaps be best interpreted as being about the G20. Examples include the many early papers "about the G20": how it should operate, what sorts of issues it could address, and how well it was performing. In short, the G20 was often the subject of research. Since the crisis, however, there has been an increasing emphasis on research that can best be described as "for the G20" that is more specific in terms of what the G20 could do to address governance shortfalls. While the examination of the G20's operations has not disappeared from CIGI's work, it now constitutes a much smaller component of research output. This trend is understandable in so far as at the early stages of its work, and prior to the crisis, the G20 was itself a work in progress, without a clear operational framework or focus of activities. During this period, CIGI's promotion of the L20 process and its more aspirational work regarding the potential mandate and scope of the G20 reflected an opportunity to define the G20 as an instrument of global governance. With the G20's consolidation of process and pre-occupation with the financial crisis, CIGI's research shift is a reasonable reflection of the challenges, and opportunities, of the global economy.

A closely related trend in CIGI research is the increasingly technical nature of its research. The early process-oriented output offered advice about how the G20 could operate and what issues it could seek to address. More recently, and especially in the last two years, a large component of CIGI's G20 research is very focused on the "how" question related to what to do, with some very focused and often relatively technical specifics of policies. Examples include the extensive papers issued in 2015 (the "New Thinking and the New G20" series) that deal with topics such as financial regulation, the role of the renminbi, shadow banking in China, credit swap arrangements, capital flow regulation, and the adherence to the Basel III regulatory requirements.

The third element of CIGI's work on the global economy is the increasing focus on the specifics of enduring financial and economic issues. CIGI has in the past had a fairly broad range of issue areas in its G20 portfolio, reflecting the G20 predisposition to include on its agenda both longstanding areas of concern (reform of international financial institutions, macroeconomic coordination, and financial supervision) as well as current but transitory issues addressed in G20 communiqués (terrorism, epidemics, fragile states, development assistance). While CIGI has only rarely undertaken focused research on these temporary topics of interest, they often emerge as elements within a broader examination of the G20's agenda, mandate and activities. In terms of emphasis,

however, CIGI's work now seems to be more narrowly focused on the critical economic and financial topics that appear regularly, indeed continuously, on the G20's agenda.

EQ3: Is the Work of the G20 Activities Aligned to CIGI's Priorities and Mandate?

FINDING: The evaluation has found that many of the G20 Activities are closely aligned with CIGI's overall mandate and priorities; indeed, this is a signature program for the organization. However, some activities present an unstated secondary objective of the program (i.e. supporting or validating the G20 and its work), which may work against CIGI's overall aim of impartiality. The G20 Activities could increase its value as a trustworthy source to its stakeholders by producing more research on topics not well covered by other sources. Lastly, while annual planning for the Activities is in place, overarching objectives and multi-year plans that are characteristic of mature programs are yet to be developed.

3.1 Evidence of alignment

Typical of most evaluations, this one examined the extent to which the work of the program being evaluated is aligned to the organization's overall mandate and priorities.

CIGI's priorities and mandate are detailed in the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan, noting CIGI's mission to, "build bridges from knowledge to power, conducting world-leading research and analysis, and influencing policy makers to innovate". The Strategic Plan also indicates that "CIGI's independent and nonpartisan nature allows it to serve a critical role in bridging the divide between research and policy and the public." In addition, CIGI's logic model speaks to similar themes of enhancing policy dialogue and proposing solutions to governance problems.

The G20 Activities' work is diverse and wide-ranging, but can essentially be divided into two domains. For the purposes of this evaluation, we are referring to these domains as "For the G20" and "On the G20". In the former camp, we place the analytical outputs, technical research, and the development of innovative policy responses produced by the program. This work seeks to provide inputs to, and influence over, the agenda and discussions of the G20. In the latter grouping, we are referring to work that both examines and supports the G20 as a governance body itself, such as the advance missions to the next host country, as well as publications regarding its real or perceived relevance and performance.

Judging from documentation and interviews, the "For the G20" work fits squarely within CIGI's priorities of producing credible, original research that is policy-relevant and addresses gaps within global governance. The program's more recent work on sovereign debt, for example, was highlighted throughout the evaluation as a useful and needed area of work. In speaking to CIGI's ability to provide such concrete solutions, one external key informant proffered:


While there are many think tanks in the world, there are realistically only a handful that have the international stature to identify global governance gaps and gaps in the existing architecture of global institutions. CIGI is one of them. It is important going forward to identify practical solutions and deliver outcomes, like CIGI did around the Financial Stability Board.

However, the linkages between the “On the G20” efforts and CIGI’s overall priorities are more tenuous. Some of this work does not appear to be closely aligned with CIGI’s mandate to provide innovative governance recommendations. Given its implicit or even explicit support for the G20 as an institution, the program is not necessarily viewed as the most critical, impartial source of information on the G20’s achievements or significance.

In addition to its close alignment to the think tank’s overall priorities, the program’s “For the G20” work is also a closer fit with the type of work that many of CIGI’s stakeholders would like to see more of. When provided with a list of ways in which CIGI might increase its value as a trustworthy source, survey respondents most frequently (48%) chose “produce more research on topics not well covered by other sources”.

Exhibit 2: Increasing CIGI's value as a source

Q9: If you did not mention CIGI (or an individual associated with CIGI), is there anything CIGI could do to increase its value to you as a trustworthy source? (check all that apply)



| Answer Choices | Responses |
|---|-----------|
| Produce more research on topics not well covered by other sources | 48.00% 12 |
| Present more innovative ideas | 36.00% 9 |
| Other (please specify) | 32.00% 8 |
| Produce research that is a higher quality | 28.00% 7 |
| Present work by more well-respected individuals | 24.00% 6 |
| Total Respondents: 25 | |

Lastly, the evaluators were supplied with several documents which demonstrate that annual planning for the program is in place. However, the overarching mandate, multi-year planning documents, project charter, and expected achievements (i.e. logic model and performance measurement framework) of the G20 Activities – typically the first documents an evaluator reviews – are yet to be developed by the program. (Or, as is the case with the logic model, was developed by the evaluators).

Findings on Performance

EQ4: To What Extent Has there Been Uptake at the G20 of Ideas Advanced by CIGI's G20 Activities?

FINDING: The evaluation has identified strong and increasing coherence between CIGI's G20 work and the work of the G20. This uptake is advanced through, among other activities, CIGI's ongoing efforts to offer and provide support to the G20 host countries. While it is difficult to establish direct attribution, the G20 Activities are noted by stakeholders to have made important contributions in both policy and process aspects on the G20. CIGI has indeed managed to produce an increasing volume of work that is at the core of the G20's economic and financial agenda, especially reflected in its work since 2011.

4.1 Degree of linkages/match between the CIGI's research and G20 discussions

The evaluation of how CIGI's ideas have been reflected in the G20 is based on the interviews and survey, with some perspectives added by the expert review of CIGI's outputs and G20 activities.

There have been four main areas in which CIGI's work has been reflected in the G20. The first area deals with process and agenda. Many interviewees identified very specific and direct connections between CIGI's work and the G20. The two main ideas that were mentioned are those of the establishment of the G20 leaders' summit (CIGI's L20 initiative) and the more recent establishment of the Think20 (T20) framework for the collaboration amongst think tanks and their integration into some G20 events. While most interview and survey respondents were generally hesitant to assign direct causality between CIGI analysis and the G20, there was greater direct attribution regarding the L20 and T20 initiatives. To some extent these interview responses are corroborated by the survey results and by a review of the historical record. While direct attribution remains understandably difficult, as is the case of any attempt to trace policy influence, in these cases there is reasonable evidence of at least some direct influence. To a lesser degree this conclusion may also apply to CIGI's work on the Financial Stability Forum and its transition to the Financial Stability Board.

A second area in which CIGI was identified as having some immediate influence on G20 activities is in agenda setting. Several interviewees noted the CIGI's frequent consultations with G20 officials afforded it a unique opportunity to help shape the G20 agenda, as well as to ensure that its research aligns with the G20's emerging agenda. One internal key informant said, "We put ourselves on the inside, and contribute to the shaping of the agenda. We're in an influential position that way".

This process has been enhanced by the T20 initiative in which CIGI's leading role has allowed it to leverage not only its own influence and connections but those of other think tanks, especially those located in the host-country. CIGI's ongoing efforts to offer and provide support to the G20 host countries have helped to assure an alignment of its activities with G20 priorities. Several interviewees did note directly or indirectly that this influence varied significantly between hosts, with some countries (for example Russia) being largely impenetrable in terms of access, while

others being much more open. In general the smaller “middle power” countries afforded the most access (South Korea, Australia, Mexico, and currently Turkey), though it was noted that the UK government also appeared much more open to participation by groups such as CIGI.

The third area where CIGI is identified as having some impact or connection to the work of the G20 itself is in the broad area of economic policy and financial regulation. Interviews identified some specific aspects of this broader agenda in which CIGI has contributed substantively to international discussions reflecting the G20’s agenda, including sovereign debt restructuring, financial market supervision and regulation, and macroeconomic policy coordination. The survey results also point to global economic governance generally (and financial regulation more specifically) as the main topic of importance for the G20, and one with a strong match to CIGI’s work. That said, few of the survey respondents identified CIGI as their primary source of information on these economic governance issues; primary influence was instead attributed to larger official organizations such as the IMF or European Union. The survey results, however, were generally very idiosyncratic, and did not permit a more nuanced assessment of CIGI’s influence as a source of research. In addition, as issues increased in their specificity and technical nature, it became more difficult to specify a single dominant source of policy ideas.

Finally there are a few topic areas outside of the G20’s core issues of economic governance in which CIGI has been identified as providing leadership. The most commonly cited work is on financing for climate change, which was identified by multiple interviewees. This subject was also identified in the surveys, and is supported to a lesser extent by its documents. However there was less consistent reference to these other topics in the survey.

4.2 Degree of linkages/match between unique recommendations and G20 Communiqués

As noted, it is extremely difficult to assign influence over policy to a single organization. It is also challenging to be able to identify a specific and unique policy idea to a single organization, as such policy prescriptions often evolve out of a slow process of interactions between researchers and the cumulative discussion of policy ideas. That said, this evaluation examined CIGI’s work in terms of its coherence with G20 discussions and actions.

Overall, the review identified strong and increasing coherence between CIGI’s G20 work and the communiqués and announcements of the G20. As identified in the section examining EQ2, there are different phases and degrees of coherence, which reflect both global economic events as well as CIGI’s own evolution. There are three groups of issues that emerge from our analysis.

The first group are issues covered in CIGI’s G20 work that is not apparent in the G20’s own communiqués. Unsurprisingly, CIGI’s research “on the G20,” related to process advocacy, agenda setting, and assessment, is not itself reflected in the G20’s communiqués. CIGI’s work on the expansion of the G20 process to include a leaders’ summit, the transition of the Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board, and the creation of the T20 and its integration into some G20 activities, while not recognized directly by G20 communiqués, are none the less remarkable

in their eventual manifestation. Similarly, the G20 does not pronounce on its own self-assessments or speculate about its potential agenda, elements that feature especially in CIGI's earlier work. Rarely, however, has CIGI produced more specific and detailed research that has not had resonance with the G20's announced areas of concern and discussion.

The second group of issues are those covered by the G20 communiqués but which are not subject to specific research by CIGI. Many of these issues emerge on the G20 agenda in more recent years, as the immediacy of the global financial crisis has faded and events or host country preoccupations assume a larger role on the agenda. Topics such as energy markets, tax havens, accounting standards begin to appear in G20 communiqués in 2009, and indeed reflect an expansion of the agenda into aspects of economic governance that are related indirectly to the crisis. By 2011, however, G20 communiqués begin to mention topics in the domain of development, trade, security, and innovation, which move well beyond the early and focused post-crisis agenda. A few of these topics are identified in CIGI's broader and aspirational work identifying areas where the G20 would be helpful in addressing global concerns, and some topics such as climate change and climate change finance have emerged as research areas at CIGI in their own right. For the most part, however, these topics, including many specific ones in economic and finance (such as tax havens, or very specific financial market operations such as bond markets) have rarely been integrated extensively into CIGI's research program.

Finally, there is the large group of issues where the G20 communiqués and CIGI's research display considerable overlap. These topic areas are focused on enduring economic and financial governance issues. In this category are international financial institution reform, sovereign debt restructuring, monetary policy and coordination, macro-prudential supervision, global currencies, currency swaps, and capital controls. Therefore, while not covering all of the many detailed topics identified by the G20, CIGI has indeed managed to produce an increasing volume of work that is at the core of the G20's economic and financial agenda.

There are two dangers that CIGI does need to keep in mind regarding its research program. First there is a risk that in becoming more specific and technical in focus, CIGI's research agenda will generate inertia that leads to divergence with the G20's evolving priorities, as research expertise becomes narrower and researchers become committed to specific policy questions. The second danger is in seeking to be too comprehensive and opportunistic in following G20 agenda items. While it is too early to tell whether this divergence is occurring in any significant way, careful oversight is required to ensure that CIGI's research priorities remain closely aligned with the policy imperatives of the G20.

EQ5: Does the Work of the G20 Activities Continue to Address a Gap in Global Governance?

FINDING: The work of the G20 Activities largely continues to address a gap in global governance, particularly when addressing more technical issues in CIGI's core areas of strength.

5.1 Evidence that work of the G20 Activities address areas with incomplete/weak international governance regimes

Much of the evidence gathered for this indicator is quite similar to other areas already reported. Therefore, it will only be briefly summarized again here.

The G20 Activities do address global governance gaps, though not in a systematic manner. These gaps can be issue, thematic, or technical in nature (e.g. sovereign debt). Gaps may also be more closely related to institutional change.

The evaluation validated that newer research on sovereign debt, in particular, is seen as making a valuable contribution to an area that needs attention. However, work *on* the G20 does not seem to be filling a governance gap at this point, and further to this, CIGI may not be best positioned to impartially reflect upon the performance or role of G20. For example, when asked how CIGI could improve its work on G20-related issues, one survey respondent suggested to, "Take a more balanced approach by allowing more critical perspectives on the effectiveness of the G20 to emerge from the research". While some of the G20 Activities work may cautiously criticize the performance of the G20, generally it does not present a particularly neutral analysis. One external key informant simply advised, "Don't spend time on how the G20 is working or not working in general".

EQ6: To What Extent Are the G20 Activities Visible to Policy Makers and Decision Makers?

FINDING: The recognition and support for several unique policy recommendations developed within the G20 Activities' demonstrates significant visibility in the early and later years of the program. CIGI's large and impressive network plays no small role in this success. CIGI is best positioned to maintain a focus on economic and financial issues, and indeed, it is within these areas that the Activities' work is most greatly recognized.

The G20 Activities and CIGI in general, have access to an undeniably vast and impressive network of powerful individuals internationally, including foreign governments, IFIs, and international think tanks. To the extent that the evaluation can reasonably measure, key policy

recommendations appear to have been received and are supported by stakeholders. However, it is not always clear which messages are intended to reach whom, by what means, and to what end.

6.1 Degree to which the Activities' work is reaching its intended audience

In trying to measure the visibility of the G20 Activities' work, the evaluation has sought to understand the degree to which it has reached its intended audience. In particular, the survey design examined uptake of "unique policy recommendations" developed by the program over the years, by asking respondents to rate their familiarity and agreement with these recommendations.

The program identified the following five policy recommendations considered to be reasonably, if not wholly, the unique product of the G20 Activities' work. The year that these recommendations were produced by the program is also noted:

1. "Complex global challenges would be more effectively addressed if the Group of 20 Finance Ministers was elevated to a Summit of Leaders (2003)."
2. "A global non-partisan network of independent think tanks, representative of the countries at the G20 (i.e. Think 20), would be well positioned to effectively inform G20 discussions (2010)."
3. "The global economy needs a proactive sovereign debt mechanism that handles financial challenges before they become crises (2014)". (43% very/extremely familiar; 76% agree/strongly agree)
"The G20 should be the forum to push forward an agenda to establish a more globally consistent macroprudential policy framework (2015)".
4. "The G20 should be used as a forum for the discussion of sustainable development financing and climate change (2015)."

While the idea had been to trace which recommendations had garnered the most attention and support, in the end, the responses did not show clear distinctions. Respondents were very or extremely familiar with the recommendation 35% to 50% of the time (lowest for a network of think tanks, highest for macroprudential policy). They agreed or strongly agreed with the recommendations 62% to 76% of the time (lowest for the summit of leaders, highest for the proactive sovereign debt mechanism).

The support for an internationally-agreed upon sovereign debt restructuring framework by survey respondents is similar to positive perceptions of this work indicated by interviews. However, in general, these responses are close enough, and the survey response rates small enough, that a strong indication regarding relative degrees of visibility is not possible.

However, what was more revealing was the difficulty in identifying unique recommendations between 2004 and 2010. While we had hoped to examine recommendations developed across the

whole time period of the evaluation's scope (10+ years), the challenge in doing so matches evidence regarding lower analytical output in those years from interviewees and the review of publications.

While these questions sought to measure influence indirectly, both survey respondents and interviewees were also directly asked questions regarding the impact of CIGI's work on G20 policy-related discussions. Their answers indicated the following four areas as the most greatly recognized contributions of the G20 Activities:

1. The elevation of the G20 from Finance Ministers to the Leaders level. In tandem with current events at the time, CIGI is viewed by many (but not all) stakeholders as having been instrumental in this change through supporting research and advocacy.
2. The creation of Think20. CIGI is largely credited with establishing and strengthening this global network of think tanks that provides supporting research to the summit.
3. Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Aggregating comments on this work as a whole (and not a specifically framework or mechanism), the G20 Activities have been recognized for the creation of valuable research on this topic.
4. Financial Stability. The G20 Activities' contributions in the area of financial stability, in general, were appreciated and recognized by stakeholders. Specifically, CIGI was credited with assisting the transformation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009.

Clearly, the work most recognized by CIGI's stakeholders is a fairly good match with those areas that the program itself had identified as its contributions in the form of unique policy recommendations. One exception to this is the fourth area, the attribution to CIGI to the creation of the FSB. However, CIGI staff have indicated that the work of scholars such as Eric Helleiner were indeed instrumental in supporting this reform.

With respect to the "intended audience" part of the indicator, the evaluation found that the target of the G20 Activities is not always clear. Communication plans are developed on a year to year basis, and no overarching communications plan for the program yet exists. It is understood, generally, that the program wants to reach G20 decision makers and their influencers in Canada and abroad.. Lastly, deep engagement with the T20 would suggest other academics and think tanks are also considered a key target group.

6.2 Perceptions of the Program/CIGI as source of expertise on global (economic) governance challenges

As a more direct way of getting at the question of visibility, the evaluation also asked stakeholders about the sources they turn to for information on the global economy, and about the extent to which the G20 Activities are viewed as a source of expertise on such matters.

The evaluation found that CIGI is a top think tank on G20-related issues, particularly on those technical areas which inform current G20-related discussions. For the most part, stakeholders see the work produced by the G20 Activities focused, credible, and impartial.

When asked where they retrieved policy information and advice from, both interview and survey respondents most frequently cited informed media sources including the Financial Times, the Economist, the New York Times, and the Guardian. They also frequently cited multi-lateral publications, such as reports produced by (not in order of importance): the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD. Think tanks and academic sources that were referenced include CIGI, Peterson Institute, the Center for Global Development, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Brookings Institution.

Interestingly, there were quite a few references to the G20 research undertaken by the University of Toronto, such as that conducted by the G20 Research Group based at the Munk School. This group is led by John Kirton and also hosts the G20 Information Centre (a repository of documents regarding the G20). While there is no need for CIGI to replicate this group's work in assessing G20 compliance, it is worth noting that the University's research in analyzing the performance of the summits does seem to compete with the G20 Activities own work in similar areas (i.e. the "on the G20" work).

Within the above there were two themes to note. Firstly, that stakeholders value future-oriented information, i.e. projections regarding economic and political trends. Secondly, the value of domestic sources was also important, which is to say that Canadians valued Canadian sources and Turks valued Turkish sources. One key informant explained that national news outlets and think tanks are what policy makers/influences rely on most, because of a need to understand global challenges through the lens of one's own political context. Lastly, stakeholders without a formal connection to CIGI were, unsurprisingly, less aware of the work of G20 Activities and their associated publications.

6.3 Identification of opportunities to expand the reach of G20 Activities' work and ideas

While evaluation is largely a backwards looking exercise, this evaluation used the opportunity to ask stakeholders areas in which the G20 Activities might expand their work. In the spirit of a learning-centered evaluation, this was done to inform possible future projects. Respondents were asked about gaps in global governance that require attention from CIGI, as well as overall feedback on the program.

Both survey respondents and key informants, when asked about areas in which the G20 activities might concentrate, suggested the following (in descending order).

1. Maintaining work already in motion. In particular, sovereign debt, followed by macroprudential policy, were cited as important contributions the program was making and should continue.

2. Climate financing. This area was of interest to many stakeholders, particularly survey respondents.
3. Internet governance. This was also of interest, only slightly less than climate financing.
4. Economic governance reform. Many stakeholders would like to see more research on this subject, and especially focused on IMF reform.

However, interest was high for information pertaining to general economic governance issues. Many respondents signaled that CIGI is best positioned to maintain a focus on economic and financial issues. Or, to identify and focus upon the economic aspects of broader issues, referred to by one key informant as “finding an issue and “G20-ifying it”.”

6.4 Relative impact of the G20 Activities’ different means of communication

In understanding the question of visibility, the evaluation also sought to assess which means of communication were more effective than others. It was hoped that evidence gathered on this subject would lend itself to conclusions and possible recommendations on which formats the G20 Activities should prioritize over others.


However, the evidence for this indicator is both weak and reveals mixed results. Firstly, performance data is not currently collected by type of format. For example, if the G20 Activities produced work on a certain topic, and this is published in a journal article, a policy brief, and a blog post, the statistics are not collected and clustered in a way which would allow one to know which of those formats was outperforming the others. Data does show that traffic to the CIGI website has been growing. Furthermore, that video has been more heavily viewed, though this correlates with an overall rise in the popularity of streaming video online.

We did ask survey respondents about preferred means of communication, who indicated that they are most likely to gather information on the global economy from op-eds/commentary (59%), a policy brief (57%), or an academic paper (41%).

When asked, survey respondents also stated that they would be most interested in receiving updates via CIGI’s newsletter (56%); social media/blogs (43%), and CIGI’s website (42%).

Exhibit 3: Importance of Format

Q11: From which format are you most likely to gather new information on global economy issues? (check 3 most important)



| Answer Choices | Responses |
|--|-----------|
| An op-ed or commentary | 59.09% 26 |
| A policy brief | 56.82% 25 |
| An academic paper | 40.91% 18 |
| At an event such as a conference | 38.64% 17 |
| Social media | 27.27% 12 |
| A blog post | 15.91% 7 |
| In meeting through the course of my work | 13.64% 6 |
| Other (please specify) | 11.36% 5 |
| Total Respondents: 44 | |

Please note that while some definitions of social media include blogs, others exclude it. For the purposes of the survey, respondents were asked separately about each. However, combining these response categories would mean that 43% of respondents are open to increased digital engagement in these formats placing the combined “social media” and “blog post” category above “academic paper.”

However, as mentioned earlier, both the interviews and survey indicated that format was not a particularly important factor in the consumption of policy advice. All that to say, the evaluation did not strongly indicate which means of communication should be favored over others - only that more robust promotion overall may be needed (see more on this under indicator 7.1).

Findings on Efficiency

EQ7: Are There Alternative Ways that the Activities Could Influence the G20 Agenda that Would Be More Efficient?

FINDING: The efforts of the G20 Activities would be made more efficient through greater promotion and communication of this work, particularly within Canada.

7.1 Suggestions of alternatives that may offer efficiencies

As was mentioned earlier, this evaluation did not have a strong emphasis on examining the question of efficiency, and no attempt was made to assess the relationship between resources expended and results achieved. Rather, stakeholders were simply asked for other ways in which the expected outcomes of the program, namely influence over the G20 agenda, might be achieved more efficiently.

The responses gathered largely spoke to the issue of promotion. Stakeholders frequently stressed their view that communication of the G20 Activities was a weak point for CIGI. These stakeholders would like the work of the G20 Activities to be easier to find, and to be more actively promoted through channels in which policy makers are inclined to look. Many times their suggestions implied that greater outreach to the general public was required. One key informant advised, “While direct connections and contact is critical for success and influence, CIGI also needs a wider communications strategy to give it coverage on topics in more widely accessed venues and media. A focus on communications is essential”.

Furthermore, the importance of maintaining, growing, and renewing the G20 Activities’ professional network was raised in various contexts, with key informants feeling it was important to ensure that the right people attend the right meetings in order to achieve the desired impact. As one external key informant suggested, “It always seems to be the same suspects that go to meetings, presents at seminars, etc. They should broaden their circle”. Speaking to the same issues, another external key informant said, “Bringing people together is only useful if it’s the right people”. This finding is also important in light of the importance of networks and personal relationships in policy influence described in Section 1.1.

Concomitantly, respondents (especially key informants) posited that the work of the G20 Activities is better known internationally than in Canada. It was felt that a stronger position within Canada would lend authority and validity to the work of the program. This was identified

as an important strategic challenge for the program (and perhaps the organizations as whole). Internal record keeping demonstrates that high level briefings with Canadian officials are dwarfed by those with international ones. However, it must also be acknowledged that this issue has already been identified internally, and that CIGI is working hard to strengthen relationships on the domestic front. In fact, in the time period in which this evaluation was being conducted, a series of meetings and seminars were booked with very high level officials in Ottawa, described by staff as a “breakthrough”. This follows a similarly high profile event in the spring of 2015, demonstrating that the credibility the program has worked hard to develop over the past few years is now demonstrating payoffs.

Alongside these points was the issue of CIGI’s location in Waterloo. The location of CIGI, and in particular its distance from Ottawa, was raised as a limitation. The importance of maintaining a presence in Ottawa was also documented in the 2013 federal evaluation of CIGI. As one external key informant put it, “Everyone who is responsible for these things is in Ottawa”.

The scope of the evaluation did not permit a review of CIGI’s digital presence. However, the interest from stakeholders in hearing more from CIGI online, as well as the suggestions that greater promotion of CIGI’s work is needed, would suggest that a brief summary of best practices in social media for think tanks is worth mentioning:

- Social media is used most effectively when it is mainstreamed throughout an organization and not kept within the communications team.
- Concomitantly, engagement on social media by think tanks tends to be more effective when scholars themselves engage rather than through institutional profiles.
- Think tanks need to carefully consider their target audience when building up their presence on social media; if the general public is not a target audience, some channels may be irrelevant for engagement.
- A widely read blog can actually replace other forms of publication. In doing so, there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy to be made. The blogosphere generally accepts that thinking online evolves over time, an allowance not always granted to traditional media such as books.
- Effective engagement on social media requires time, not only to generate content, but to reciprocate by engaging with others. Two-way engagement, rather than “broadcasting”, is generally a more effective means of communication.
- Social media for think tanks is most effectively used to engage in debate and provoke discussion, rather than simply publicizing work produced by an organization.

Several of these promising practices dovetail well with earlier findings regarding the value that CIGI’s stakeholders place upon the trustworthiness of the source. Given the strong reputation of CIGI’s scholars, there are likely natural ways to parlay this influence into the online world as well.

EQ8. What Have Been the G20 Activities' Biggest Achievements? Greatest Shortcomings?

FINDING: The G20 Activities' have produced significant achievements in terms of agenda setting, technical advice, and the strengthening of global economic governance. Its greatest shortcomings were felt to be a lack of focus in the middle years of the program, which has since been addressed.

8.1 Examples of achievements with respect to policy influence and/or agenda setting

The questions posed under the lessons learned section of this evaluation are somewhat historical in nature, in that they examine the program's whole history (10+ years) in an attempt to identify pertinent teachings applicable to the future work of the program. The first question, which looks to acknowledge achievements and learn from shortcomings, seeks in the first indicator to simply to identify examples of each.

Certainly, the G20 Activities' direct access to decision makers and influencers is impressive. As mentioned earlier, key informants have suggested that the program has more influence abroad than within Canada, which is validated by internal records showing only 7 domestic high level briefings between 2012-2015 (out of a total of 58). While this is contrary to expectations, it is already being addressed by the program. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that specific examples of policy influence relate more to international than domestic influence. With the strong caveat that such attribution to a particular program is quite difficult, stakeholders did proffer the following examples:

- Policy influence in London during the global financial crisis regarding economic stimulus.
- Policy discussions and agenda shaping with respect to the issue of macroprudential policy.
- The G20 Activities' influence over the agenda of the T20, and a strengthening of the relationship between the T20 and the G20 (particularly in Turkey).

While these three examples certainly do not encompass the total sum of the G20 Activities' achievements with respect to policy influence and/or agenda setting, they were some of the most specific and most commonly raised.

8.2 Examples of any unintended outcomes

Stakeholders were also asked about unintended outcomes that may have resulted from the work of the G20 Activities, in the form of identifying any shortcomings they have seen in the program.

Many of the key informants, and in particular the internal stakeholders, felt that the program had lost focus during the middle years of the program. This “drift” period was characterized by straining to diversify and rushing outputs; of producing research that was not sufficiently rigorous or focused; of convening for the sake of convening; of many distractions. In the words of one internal stakeholder, CIGI was “a bit of a wild west”. In tandem with this point, it was emphasized that a strong track record is required to build a reputation in any given area. This reputation takes a long time and much work to establish, and yet can be very quickly lost.

Lastly, some questions were raised regarding if the program has become beholden to its own legacy. The ultimate objective of the Activities would seem to be a stronger global economy, whether or not that is through the G20. However, others have argued that a stronger G20 and a stronger global economy are one and the same.

EQ9: What Were the Key Factors that Underpinned the Success of the G20 Activities in its Early Days? Can these Factors Be Adapted for Use by Other Current/Future CIGI Programs?

FINDING: Early G20 Activities were enabled by circumstance, the need for original research, and the strength of personal relationships. While some of these aspects are not replicable, the Activities can continue to prepare for such windows of opportunity by continuing to produce high-quality research and sustaining strong networks.

9.1 Identification of success factors

9.2 Opinions on replicability/ scalability

Lastly, the evaluation sought to understand what factors have driven the success of the G20 Activities’, especially in the program’s early days. Given that CIGI is often credited with playing a significant role in moving the G20 from the Finance Ministers’ level to the Leaders’ level, the evaluators sought to identify what factors led to this success, and most importantly, are any of those factors replicable for future work undertaken by the G20 Activities or CIGI at large? While getting at these is largely an exercise in gathering the opinions of stakeholders involved at the time, such a reflective exercise is helpful in order to direct this institutional memory towards future programming decisions.

There are some respondents from this evaluation who feel that the creation of the L20 was simply the result of necessity, brought on by the global economic crisis and the search for a forum in which to address it. In the words of one stakeholder, the G20 was simply a “vehicle of convenience” for the crisis, since it already dealt with economic and financial issues. However, the majority of stakeholders felt that CIGI did play a role, and their opinions coalesced around some

commons drivers. The major factors put forth by respondents, both replicable and not, are presented below.

1. Circumstance. Certainly, the constellation of events that resulted in the creation of the G20 did indeed involve the happenstance of the global economic crisis. Major international events such as these, while a major driving force for change and innovation, are neither predictable nor replicable.
2. Need for original ideas and analysis. When discussions began in earnest around the creation of an L20, there was a need for research on the topic. Crucially, this thinking had already been developed and advocated for by the G20 Activities before the crisis hit. The success factor here is the element of preparation in areas where original innovative research is needed. While being able to divine which areas will erupt in crises is not replicable, the development of a body of research in an area where there is a gap can certainly be done again.
3. Personal relationships. Lastly, many of the anecdotes regarding these early successes had to do with the ability to effectively leverage personal connections. Indeed, the importance of strong personal relationships was raised not only in the context of replicable success factors, but also in other ways in which the G20 Activities can be effective in its work.

These three factors present a mix between what can and cannot be accounted for in future programming. The main lesson here seems to be that the G20 Activities should continue to develop credible research in areas in which there is a need, as well as build and maintain its networks - so that when the moment for change presents itself, CIGI is well-positioned to affect this change.

Balancing these factors is not easy, and depends on the policy environment. Effectiveness requires research to have breadth (to increase the probability of relevance to emerging but unpredictable circumstances) and focus (to have sufficient depth and sophistication to attract attention as a source of expertise). When access to senior policy makers is high, breadth provides the flexibility needed to provide advice on a range of important matters that might arise. When access at senior levels is more limited, a long-term strategy of accumulated expertise in a few areas of focus is more desirable in order to fit into earlier stages of the policy process. Building a wide network within the policy community is a useful strategy to help strike the right balance, since contact will allow CIGI's research agenda to reflect as closely and as early as possible the enduring and emerging policy priorities, as well as the identification of access points for the resulting research.

Conclusions & Recommendations

Conclusions

Overall, the G20 Activities is a strong program, is well regarded by stakeholders, and is making important policy and institutional contributions. Over the course of more than a decade, the program demonstrated significant early achievements, followed by some years of aimlessness, followed by the current period of renewed focus and increasing credibility.

The main conclusion is that after some drift in the middle years of the program, the G20 Activities are essentially “back on track”. Our main concerns are about overtly stating, and formalizing, what the program is trying to achieve so that its future projects and strategies make certain that this success is sustained.

Many organizations, particularly those that deal in policy or otherwise intellectual work, tend to implicitly know what it is they want to achieve. However, there is significant value in making these objectives both explicit and documented. This is not simply a paper exercise. Spelling out exactly what the G20 Activities is trying to achieve – and the steps that will be taken to achieve it – will go a long way to making sure that the successes noted in the evaluation report are sustained. It will allow others within CIGI to understand what the program staff already know, thereby contributing to organizational learning. It will make certain that any new ideas of what the program can do will not derail the program from this path (i.e. its “causal logic”), thereby aligning potential investments. It will also support other functions, such as communications, to be able to develop their own strategies as outgrowths of the program’s overall strategies.

The G20 Activities are highly tied to one individual, with few safeguards in place to ensure activities are aligned with what CIGI and the program is hoping to achieve overall. Secondly, G20 Activities are highly tied to CIGI’s legacy in supporting the L20. The advantage to this legacy allows for an impressive degree of access to policy and decision makers, particularly with respect to host countries. However, it also presents an unstated secondary objective of the program, namely to support and strengthen. Again, these tensions simply support the need to define the ultimate purpose of the G20 Activities.

Recommendations

1. *CIGI should clarify, and formalize, the ultimate purpose and expected outcomes of the G20 Activities.*

The logic model developed for this evaluation was created by the consultants, and may require updating given the findings of the evaluation. Once this is established, processes to ensure alignment with these intended outcomes should be developed. In particular, a more formal project selection process should be created to ensure that all new investments directly contribute to these expected outcomes.

2. *The G20 Activities should continue to increase its original research capacity.*

The benefits of having increased original capacity since the last evaluation are already becoming realized. The G20 Activities should continue to build its capacity to conduct original research, in areas of need to its stakeholders, and in line with the Activities' expected outcomes. This may require hiring additional staff who can bring both technical expertise in the G20 Activities' recognized areas of strength (i.e. economic and economic aspects of larger issues) as well an influential network.

3. CIGI should develop and overarching communications strategy for the G20 Activities.

Once the expected outcomes of the Activities' are determined and formalized, an overarching multi-year communications strategy should be developed. This communications strategy should clearly identify who the program is trying to influence (i.e. the target audience(s)) and what the communications efforts are intended to achieve (i.e. objectives). The means of communication used (academics publications vs meetings vs social media) should be tailored to these various audiences. Data should be collected in such a way that allows for a comparison between types of formats produced to understand the relative impact of these means of communication. This strategy should aim to vigorously promote the work of the G20 Activities so that stakeholders receive CIGI's policy ideas rather than having to search for them.

4. CIGI should develop a networking strategy for the G20 Activities.

In tandem with the communications strategy, CIGI should give due consideration to networking. This networking strategy should take into account the various levels of influencers that can be reached, and how to adapt when the top level officials are not responsive to policy advice. This strategy should continue to recognize the value of CIGI's dialogue in Ottawa, the need to ensure the Activities are not overly tied to one individual, and the need for continual renewal of CIGI's network. Again, this strategy should be closely aligned to, and expected to contribute to, the intended outcomes as discussed in the first recommendation.

Appendix A: Interview Guides

Internal Key Informants

1. Please tell me about your current work, and how it relates to CIGI's G20 Activities? What is your relationship with the Global Economy Program?
2. How would you describe the information needs of policy and decision makers as it relates to the G20? How and to what extent has this influenced projects undertaken by CIGI?
3. In your opinion, to what extent do CIGI's G20 Activities respond to the needs of leaders? How so?
4. In your experience, what role does CIGI's G20 research play in the G20 agenda and discussions? Upon what are you basing this opinion?
5. Can you think of any examples of a G20-related discussions which have been directly affected by a CIGI activity?
6. To what extent is CIGI called upon as source of expertise on global governance challenges? In your opinion, how does this compare to other think tanks working on similar issues?
7. What would you identify as CIGI's most significant contributions to the G20 over the past ten years? What factors led to these successes and could they be replicated by other programs?
8. What would you identify as CIGI's greatest shortcomings as they relate to the G20 over the past ten years? Could these have been prevented or mitigated?
9. In your opinion, which gaps in global governance require the most attention going forward?
10. In your view, what is - or should be - the role of think tanks in addressing contemporary challenges in global governance?
11. Do you have any other suggestions for how CIGI's work on G20-related issues could be more effective or efficient?

External Key Informants

1. Please tell me about your current work, and how it relates to the G20. How familiar are you with CIGI's work on the G20?

2. How would you describe your information needs as they relate to the global economy generally, and the G20 specifically? What factors most greatly influence the information that you consume?
3. Which people and/or organizations do you turn to most frequently for policy-related advice, information and recommendations on the global economy? Why?
4. On which issues related to the G20 would you say you have most frequently sought information over the past 5 years? What did you use this information for?
5. Can you think of any examples of a G20-related discussion which has been directly affected by a CIGI activity? Do you remember the source?
6. What would you identify as CIGI's most significant contributions to the G20 over the past ten years? What factors led to these successes and could they be replicated by other programs?
7. What would you identify as CIGI's greatest shortcomings as they relate to the G20 over the past ten years? Could these have been prevented or mitigated?
8. In your opinion, which gaps in global governance require the most attention going forward?
9. In your view, what is - or should be - the role of think tanks in addressing contemporary challenges in global governance?
10. Do you have any other suggestions for how CIGI's work on G20-related issues could be more effective or efficient?

Appendix B: Survey

Thank you for agreeing to take this survey. This survey is being conducted in support of the Evaluation of CIGI's G20 Activities. Your responses are completely confidential and will only be reviewed by the consultants. We want to know more about how policy advice is consumed and used. Therefore, we are interested in your views whether or not you are familiar with CIGI's work.

This survey should take about 20 minutes to complete. Thank you in advance for your time and contribution.

About you

1. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Other

2. How old are you?

Under 20

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71-80

Older than 81 years

3. In which country do you currently reside?

4. Which best describes your current and main source of employment (check only one):

- The national government of my country
 - The government of my country at the sub-national level
 - A think tank or research centre/institute
 - A non-governmental organization
 - A university or college
 - A multi-lateral organization
 - An international financial institution
 - A media organization
 - Consultant to government
 - I am a student
 - I am retired
 - I am an employee/formally affiliated with CIGI
- Other (please specify)

Your involvement with the G20

5. How many G20 summits have you been involved in, i.e. you took part in any policy discussions, agenda setting, planning, media, etc.?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 or more

6. What role did you play in the G20 Summit in which you were most involved?

Direct. I am a decision maker who has been involved in a G20 agenda and/or discussions.

Indirect. I have provided advice to policy advisors and/or decision makers involved in the G20.

Tangential. I have worked on G20-related issues (e.g. I produced research, policy analysis, media), though I was not involved in the summit's agenda and discussions.

None. My work is not related to the G20.

Other (please specify)

How you learn about the global economy

7. The factor(s) that most greatly influence the global economy information that I consume are: (check all that apply).

Source. The information comes from an organization or individual whose work I trust.

Timing. The information is available at a time in which I require policy advice.

Format. The information is produced in a format that I am more likely to absorb.

Topic. The information relates to a specific topic for which I require more information.

Other (please specify)

Sources of information on the global economy

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

8. Please note up to five sources (people or organizations) that you follow the most for information on the global economy:

9. If you did not mention CIGI (or an individual associated with CIGI), is there anything CIGI could do to increase its value to you as a trustworthy source? (check all that apply)

Present work by more well-respected individuals

Produce more research on topics not well covered by other sources

Present more innovative ideas

Produce research that is a higher quality
Other (please specify)

Timing of information that you need

10. Please note the timing in which you are most likely to require such information:

- 18 months before a summit
- 12 months before a summit
- 6 months before a summit
- In the weeks immediately *before* a G20 summit
- In the weeks immediately *following* a G20 summit
- On an ongoing basis
- Occasionally, based on major events
- Other (please specify)

Format of information you need

11. From which format are you most likely to gather new information on global economy issues?
(check 3 most important)

- An academic paper
- An op-ed or commentary
- A policy brief
- A blog post
- Social media
- At an event such as a conference
- In meeting through the course of my work
- Other (please specify)

Topics

12. On which issues related to the G20 have you most frequently sought information over the past 5 years?

- Global economic governance generally
- Financial markets and regulation
- Economic development
- Energy, resources and the environment
- Specific themes identified by the next host state
- Other (please specify)

Policy ideas

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

13. What are the most important G20 policy-related ideas that you have brought forward into discussions?

The first idea (that you indicated above)

The second idea (that you indicated above)

The third idea (that you indicated above)

The fourth idea (that you indicated above)

The fifth idea (that you indicated above)

14. If you can remember, what were the original sources (people or organizations) of those ideas?

Not at all familiar A little familiar Moderately familiar Very familiar Extremely familiar

15. Please review the following list of recommendations (both past and present) related to the G20. Please rate them according to your familiarity with them.

Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree

1. Complex global challenges would be more effectively addressed if the Group of 20 Finance Ministers was elevated to a Summit of Leaders (2003).
2. A global non-partisan network of independent think tanks, representative of the countries at the G20 (i.e. Think 20), would be well positioned to effectively inform G20 discussions (2010).
3. The global economy needs a proactive sovereign debt mechanism that handles financial challenges before they become crises (2014).
4. The G20 should be the forum to push forward an agenda to establish a more globally consistent macroprudential policy framework (2015).
5. The G20 should be used as a forum for the discussion of sustainable development financing and climate change (2015).

16. To what extent do you agree with those same recommendations?

CIGI's Impact

17. How familiar are you with CIGI's work on issues affecting the G20?

Very familiar: I closely follow their work on G20 issues.

Somewhat familiar: I sometimes read material produced by CIGI on G20 issues and/or attend related events

A little familiar: I am aware of material produced by CIGI on G20 issues and/or related events but have not read it in detail/attended events

Not familiar: I am not familiar with CIGI's work on G20 and G20-related issues.

18. Can you think of any examples of a G20-related discussion which has been directly affected by a CIGI activity?

No

Yes (please describe)

19. What would you identify as CIGI's most significant contribution to the G20 over the past ten years, if any?

Other feedback

20. In your opinion, which of the following gaps in global governance require the most attention from CIGI going forward?

Climate financing

Economies in crisis

Emergence of China as a global power

Intellectual property

Internet governance

Nuclear non-proliferation

Other (please specify)

21. In the future, how would you like to receive updates about CIGI's work related to the G20?

From the CIGI newsletter

Through CIGI's social media accounts

By publishing it to CIGI's website

By listening to a CIGI podcast

By downloading a CIGI App

I am not interested in such updates

22. Do you have any other suggestions for CIGI's work on G20-related issues?

Thank you very much for your time and contribution to the evaluation.

The survey is complete