Five reasons to stay out of Syria

The Globe and Mail

June 19, 2013

The decision is a bad one. It marks the beginning of a slide down the slippery slope to deeper military engagement. It could follow with a repeat of the battle to unseat Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, by way of a no-fly-zone.

Syria is no Libya. There are huge risks that come with deeper military engagement, and Syria is a pawn in a much wider regional and global power struggle.

Here are five reasons to stay out.

First, Prime Minister Stephen Harper is correct: Arming Syria’s rebel forces could easily put weapons into the wrong hands, including those of Sunni extremists who have entered the battle against Mr. al-Assad. These weapons could easily be turned against us.

Second, there is a danger that arming Syria’s opposition will escalate the conflict without levelling the playing field as intended. Iran has already announced that it will send 4,000 members of its Revolutionary Guard to fight with Mr. al-Assad. More may follow if Iran believes Western meddling is tipping the scales toward Syria’s Sunnis.

Russia will also be forced to up its ante. It might supply Mr. al-Assad with its latest S-300 surface-to-air missile system to help him cope with a no-fly zone. We would take heavy casualties if they did. With Iran’s entry into the conflict, we might even find ourselves dragged into a wider regional war against Iran, or even Russia, if a Russian ship or aircraft were accidentally hit by a bomb or cruise missile. Israel could also intervene because of the danger it sees from the S-300 missiles.

Third, Western military intervention, including a major effort to arm Syria’s opposition, will only drive a wedge between Russia and the West and doom the proposed peace talks. President Vladimir Putin’s resolve to keep Mr. al-Assad in power was apparent at the just-concluded G8 summit.

Fourth, even getting rid of Mr. al-Assad won’t necessarily solve anything. Getting in is the easy part. The hard lesson from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya is that military intervention without a clear exit strategy simply compounds a civil war. The onus is on those who champion the merits of intervention to explain the game plan after Mr. al-Assad is gone.

Fifth, Western democracies simply don’t have the stomach for protracted, inconclusive military gambits. The West gains nothing but opprobrium from trying to militate the peace. Mr. Obama knows this, which is why he has dragged his feet. Mr. Harper knows it, too.

Canada does not have a dog in this fight. We don’t support Mr. al-Assad and we should not be siding with one religious group against another. We must give all the help we can to the victims of this conflict. But we should not be stoking its fires or trying to pick winners.

The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.

About the Authors

Derek Burney was Canada’s ambassador to the United States from 1989 to 1993. He led the Canadian delegation in concluding negotiations of the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement.