This paper explores the role of emerging-country members in the Basel process, a key aspect of the global financial standard-setting process. It argues that this process has been significantly more politically resilient than adjacent aspects of global economic governance, in part because major emerging countries obtain continuing “intra-club” benefits from participation within it. The most important of these are learning benefits, but status and sometimes influence over standard-setting outcomes can also be valuable. The paper outlines how these benefits could be enhanced to secure the ongoing resilience of global financial regulatory governance. It recommends some modest reforms to further improve the position of emerging countries in the process and to bolster its perceived legitimacy among members and non-member countries.
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CIGI Papers present in-depth analysis and discussion on governance-related subjects. They include policy papers that present CIGI experts' positions or contributions to policy debates, and background papers that contain research findings, insights and data that contribute to the development of policy positions.