The G20 remains a strange forum for global cooperation outside of crisis conditions. In non-crisis conditions, it clearly has yet to prove itself. Let’s take the main sub-headings for its efforts in the macroeconomic area.

Support for global economic growth and employment and mitigating inequality: this is probably the macroeconomic subheading where the most obvious effort has been made—in the form of the Comprehensive Growth Strategies for each country and target for raising global growth by 2 percentage points by 2018. The strategies mostly include some degree of detail on the gist of policy changes, but not really enough to make the full-scale assessments easy or particularly meaningful to do. The effort is not without merit, but one must hope that this is not an exercise that takes up valuable time of technocrats and that is more of a sales job than a substantive consideration of policies. The jury is still out on the strategies.

IMF Quota Reforms and Inclusion of Emerging Economies: the critical path here is US approval of the quota increase and reform. Realistically, the G20 can join the chorus of those chastising the US, but is unlikely to be better positioned than the many other institutions attempting to goad the US into action.

Accountability, inclusiveness, and effectiveness of IMF governance: Again, the G20 can join the chorus of critics, but has no particular leverage or position on this issue.

Sovereign debt crisis resolution: The IMF has a good proposal on the table for improving its mandate to address severe sovereign debt crises quickly and efficiently. It is not clear what the G20 has to add to this. The impediment to progress is all political—once again owing to the reluctance of the United States—and must be resolved within the IMF.

Surveillance under current frameworks (MAP, IMF surveillance) and commitment to appropriate domestic fiscal and monetary policies to foster stability in the international monetary system. Once again, outside of crisis conditions when the G20 can be an exceptionally effective forum, it is not clear what the G20 brings to these issues (in terms of either analysis or international dialogue) that the IMF does not have within its own structure.

In short, in the area of macroeconomic management the G20 has yet to find a distinct role for itself. A critical question is: how can the G20 remain a viable forum for the few (mainly crisis) conditions when it is truly useful while not, in calm periods, indulging in efforts that overlap with those of other institutions. Unless an answer to this question is found (at least as it relates to macroeconomic policy), the risk is that the G20 extinguishes itself or becomes a burden that actually impedes the success of other established institutions.